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ABSTRACT 
The Symbolics of Death and the Construction of Christian Asceticism: 
Greek Patristic Voices from the Fourth through Seventh Centuries 
 
Jonathan L. Zecher 
 This thesis examines the role which death plays in the development of a uniquely Christian 
identity in John Climacus’ seventh-century work, the Ladder of Divine Ascent and the Greek ascetic 
literature of the previous centuries.  I argue that John Climacus deploys language of death, inherited from 
a range of Greek Christian literature, as the symbolic framework within which he describes the ascetic 
lifestyle as developing a Christian identity.  This framework is expressed by thee ascetic practice of 
‘memory of death’ and by practices of renunciation described as ‘death’ to oneself and others. 
 In order to understand Climacus’ unique achievement in regard to engagement with death it is 
necessary first to situate the Ladder and its author within the literature of the Greek ascetic tradition, 
within which Climacus consciously wrote.  In the Introduction I develp ways Climacus draws on and 
develops traditional material, while arguing that it must be treated and interpreted in its own right and 
not simply as his ‘sources.’  I then examine the vocabulary of death and the lines of thought opened up in 
the New Testament.  Chapter One argues that the memory of death plays an important role in 
Athanasius’ Vita Antonii.  Chapter Two surveys material from the fifth- and sixth-century Egyptian and 
Palestinian deserts in which memory and practice of death are deployed in a wider variety of ways and 
are increasingly connected to ascetics’ fundamental understanding of self and salvation.  Chapter Three 
examines the sixth-century Quaestiones et Responsiones of Barsanuphius and John of Gaza in which further 
elaboration of the same thematic is discernible.  Chapter Four concludes this thesis with a sustained 
reading of John Climacus’ Scala Paradisi in which the various thematics centring on memory and practice 
of death are synthesized into the existential framework and practical response, respectively. 
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There are three conditions which often look alike 
Yet differ completely, flourish in the same hedgerow: 
Attachment to self and to things and to persons, detachment 
From self and from things and from persons; and, growing  
 between them, indifference 
Which resembles the others as death resembles life, 
Being between two lives – unflowering, between 
The live and the dead nettle.  This is the use of memory: 
For liberation – not less of love but expanding 
Of love beyond desire, and so liberation 
From the future as well as the past.  Thus, love of a country 
Begins as attachment to our own field of action 
And comes to find that action of little importance 
Though never indifferent.  History may be servitude, 
History may be freedom.  See, now they vanish, 
The faces and places, with the self which, as it could, loved  
 them, 
To become renewed, transfigured, in another pattern. 
Sin is behovely, but 
All shall be well, and 
All manner of thing shall be well. 
 
---T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets:  IV:  ‘Little Gidding’, III, ll. 1-19
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
On might say that Christianity rendered the souls of the living and those of the dead 
continuous in a new way, as if the living soul were in some sense already dead, while the 
dead soul, in that very same sense, were still alive. 
---Robert Pogue Harrison,  
The Dominion of the Dead, 106-107 
 
 
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his 
appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot 
value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead. 
---T.S. Eliot,  
‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, in his  
The Sacred Wood:  Essays on Poetry and Criticism, 48 
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A monk is:  achievement of the order and state of the bodiless beings in a material and 
defiled body.   
A monk is:  one who holds only God’s edicts and words in every time, place, and act.   
A monk is:  ceaseless struggle against nature and unfailing prison of senses.   
A monk is:  chastened body and purified mouth and enlightened mind.   
A monk is:  affliction—a soul trained by ceaseless memory of death, whether asleep or awake.1 
 
John Climacus, abbot of the Vatos Monastery at the base of Gebel Musa on the Sinaite peninsula, 
penned these words in the mid-Seventh century.  This series of ὅροι, ‘definitions’, of the monk form part 
of the opening chapter of his magnum opus, the Scala Paradisi, or Ladder of Divine Ascent, a work which 
would exercise unparalleled influence on the Byzantine and Eastern Christian spiritual traditions.  I have 
highlighted the final definition because, as this study will demonstrate, engagement with death is 
fundamental to the development of a monk’s character and, in fact, thanatological vocabulary underpins 
and informs the other definitions given.  The monk’s home is his ‘tomb before the tomb...For no one 
leaves the tomb until the general resurrection.  But if some depart, know that they have died.’2  The monk 
lives as though dead on the earth yet, as this passage indicates also, differently from those have ‘died’ 
through premature departure from the monastery.  Climacus makes of death a symbolic framework 
within which to cultivate and communicate the contours of Christian ascetic identity.  In doing so, 
Climacus highlights the profound importance of understanding practices like the ‘memory of death’ and 
metaphorical deployment of ‘death’ for interpreting the ideals and tools of Christian asceticism. 
Climacus was hardly original in emphasizing the ‘memory of death’ or in metaphorizing death in 
order to cultivate a markedly Christian, ascetic, identity.  A peculiar attitude to death as constitutive of 
life is, as it were, stitched through whole fabric of the early Christian theological tradition.  Paul had 
reminded the Christians in Rome that in baptism they had ‘died’ and ‘been buried’ with Christ, and so 
they ought to live accordingly, expecting resurrection and glory with him as well.  Jesus in the various 
Gospel accounts cautioned his disciples that, in order to live they must first die—whether intended 
literally or figuratively, John’s image of a fallen grain of wheat, trampled into the dirt only to spring up 
                                                          
1 Scala Paradisi, §1, PG 88:633B-C:  Μοναχός ἐστιν τάξις καὶ κατάστασις ἀσωμάτων ἐν σώματι ὑλικῷ καὶ ῥυπαρῷ 
ἐπιτελουμένη. Μοναχός ἐστιν ὁ μόνον τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐχόμενος ὅρων καὶ λόγων, ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, καὶ τόπῳ, καὶ 
πράγματι. Μοναχός ἐστιν· βία φύσεως διηνεκὴς, καὶ φυλακὴ αἰσθήσεων ἀνελλιπής. Μοναχός ἐστιν ἡγνισμένον 
σῶμα, καὶ κεκαθαρμένον στόμα, καὶ πεφωτισμένος νοῦς. Μοναχός ἐστιν κατώδυνος ψυχὴ ἐν διηνεκεῖ μνήμῃ 
θανάτου ἀδολεσχοῦσα, καὶ ὑπνώττουσα, καὶ γρηγοροῦσα.  See Abbreviations for editions and ET’s. 
2 §4, PG 88:716B:  Μν῅μά σοι πρὸ μνήματος ὁ τόπος ἔστω. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπὸ μνήματος ἐξέρχεται ἄχρι τ῅ς κοιν῅ς 
ἀναστάσεως· εἰ δὲ καί τινες ἐξ῅λθον, ὅρα ὅτι ἀπέθανον· ὅπερ μὴ παθεῖν ἡμᾶς, τὸν Κύριον δυσωπήσωμεν. 
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once more, is haunting.  To see how later generations of Christians would heed Jesus’ words, one need 
only call to mind the armies of martyrs who chose death in order to gain life.  Death’s role remained 
integral to the ascetic movement’s rapid growth in the Fourth century.  In Athanasius’ biography of him, 
Antony the Great used the thought of death and Christ’s eschatological judgment to repel the Devil’s 
advances.  Evagrius described the practice at some length, Ps-Macarius praised the qualities of the corpse, 
while various Desert Fathers would, in various ways, speak of ‘dying to oneself’, of ‘keeping death before 
one’s eyes’, and of the virtues that went with these practices.  Climacus stands self-consciously within a 
long line of ascetic theologians and practitioners, whom would refer to as the ‘discerning Fathers’ and 
professed to follow wholeheartedly.  To understand Climacus and his contribution to Christian ascetic 
spirituality, we must also appreciate and understand those who would influence, inspire, and provide 
him with much of the raw material out of which he would craft his own ladder to Paradise.   
This study will, therefore, examine a range of Greek Christian ascetic literature of the centuries 
leading up to Climacus’ own lifetime (ca. 579-659 CE).3  I shall focus on the language of ‘death’, and will 
argue that death, considered as both the fundamental condition of mortality and an entrance into 
eschatological judgment by Christ, provides an evocative symbol on which these writers regularly draw 
to cultivate and communicate their ideal identity as Christians.  I look first at Athanasius of Alexandria’s 
mitigated but suggestive deployment of engagement with death in his Vita Antonii (Chapter 1). I then 
explore death’s complicated, often ambivalent, elaboration in the Desert Fathers of the fifth and early 
sixth centuries (Chapter 2).  Next, I examine the correspondence of the Gaza Fathers of the mid-sixth 
century to show how for them the themes and imagery of death have become integral to their 
hermeneutic of the ascetic life (Chapter 3).  In each of these three chapters I will discuss a number of 
interrelated practicess treated throughout the literature:  obedience, renunciation, exile, humility, non-
judgment, dispassion, and, above all, the denial of one’s own will.  These concepts are common to the 
writers at hand and suggest a relatively stable vocabulary for speaking of ascetic spirituality.  I will 
discuss them because over time authors increasingly describe these various practices in terms of the 
practice of ‘death.’  The importance of death for ascetics is demonstrable from this movement by which 
death becomes a dominant feature of the language of ascetic identity.  Nevertheless, I will also 
demonstrate the ambiguities and ambivalence which accompany the language of death as it becomes 
more widely used. 
                                                          
3 I will discuss dating in chapter four below. 
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I will then offer a sustained reading of the Scala Paradisi (Chapter 4) in which I will argue that 
John Climacus elaborates these ascetic practices within an existential engagement with death which 
overcomes the ambivalence and ambiguities of prior literature.  For Climacus the event and concept of 
death provide the organizing logic for the ascetic life—principles according to which the monk can make 
progress through failure and become a Christian— in Climacus’ definition a true imitator of Christ.  
Under the rubric of death, Climacus draws together the themes laid out in the first three chapters and, in 
doing so, elaborates a profound vision of the human person and of ascetic spirituality.  For him, all 
progress in the virtues and practices discussed in the first three chapters is mobilized by a certain 
existential engagement with death.  Further, this progress toward Christian identity takes the form of a 
metaphorical practice of death. 
This study will accomplish three tasks.  First, it will offer a holistic understanding of John 
Climacus’ contribution to ascetic spirituality in terms of identity-formation, opening up fruitful avenues 
for further research on the Ladder as well as re-examination of later Byzantine ascetic literature.  Second, it 
will broaden our understanding of the variety of literature associated with the Egyptian and Gaza deserts 
by examining at length a theme which has not yet received scholarly attention.  Third, by thus situating 
Climacus, this study will demonstrate more clearly than has yet been done the ways in which a Greek 
ascetic tradition took—or, perhaps, was given—shape as a normative and coherent body of wisdom which 
would itself shape later writers in their own traditional and creative work. 
This last point will not only be made over the course of the study, but also informs the choices I 
have made in terms of material, organization, and hermeneutical approach.  I will, therefore dedicate the 
remainder of the Introduction to three inter-related tasks.  First, I will situate the study’s scholarly 
contribution in terms of how others have attempted to locate the Ladder within earlier and later Greek 
ascetic literature.  Second, I will explain, in light of its intended contribution to scholarship, the shape of 
this present study.  Third, I will trace the contours of the vocabulary and conceptualizations of death 
which are found in the New Testament (NT).  I do so because the NT provides a common well-spring of 
Christian ascetic self-understanding, ideals, and practices, as well as a shared vocabulary with which to 
describe those ideals and practices.  The themes which I will examine over the course of this study all 
have their roots—one way or another—in creative interpretations of Scriptural and, especially, NT 
material.  The introduction, then, will offer an understanding of tradition as both material and 
hermeneutic which will allow us to fully appreciate Climacus’ unique contribution to Christian 
spirituality and, more specifically, Byzantine and Eastern ascetic theology. 
16 
 
I. THE PLACE OF THE STUDY 
 
I had not originally intended this study to be about Climacus.  Having envisioned a broad 
thematic survey, I approached the Ladder expecting only another example among many.  What I found—
and what I hope to convey to the reader—was a profound and synoptic presentation of the ascetic life in 
which death figured not as leitmotif or even as one principle among many, but as a central and 
organizing concern.  Moreover, I found that I could not treat Climacus as simply one more ascetic author, 
and then move on.  His influence was immense in the Byzantine ascetic world and is still unsurpassed in 
the Christian East.  Though as yet barely felt in the scholarly world, a body of literature is growing 
around this enigmatic figure and his imaginative treatment of ascetic spirituality.  For these two 
reasons—his influence and his profundity—I have chosen, then, to focus this study on John Climacus.  
Chapter Four will offer a lengthier introduction to the Ladder, its structure, and its author, but I will here 
draw out what I mean by Climacus’ ‘influence’ and discuss what sort of text it may be.   
 
The Ladder in Byzantium and Beyond 
It is the Ladder more than the man which so inspired later monks and theologians.  The man 
remains enigmatic, his ‘biography’ by Daniel of Raithou (the basis for all later menological and 
hagiographical notices) cookie-cutter hagiography.  The Ladder itself, however, has become a unique locus 
of reverent study.  Peter Brown, though dedicating to it only a few brief pages in his massive The Body and 
Society, there called the Ladder the ‘masterpiece of Byzantine spiritual direction’4  His comment concerns 
its content, of which we will speak at length later, but it also touches on its popularity.  Scripture 
excepted, almost no other work has exercised such a profound and lasting influence on Greek Christian 
ascetic spirituality.   
 
Climacus’ Spiritual Sons 
The Ladder’s popularity spread from Sinai across the Byzantine Empire and would gain a decisive 
place in Eastern Christian spirituality.  In Sinai, Climacus’ work was followed, expanded, and interpreted 
                                                          
4 Brown, The Body and Society:  Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (rev. ed.; New York:  
Columbia, 2008), 237 
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by Hesychius (7th-8th c.?) and Philotheus (8th-9th c.?) of Sinai.5  These two authors, about whom almost 
nothing is known, but whose short works are memorialized by their inclusion in the Philokalia6 together 
form what some scholars refer to as the ‘Sinaite School’ of ascetic spirituality.7  The language of ‘school’ 
unduly pigeonholes their works, but it remains true that the Ladder so exercised their imaginations that 
their works simply elaborate on it.  Further afield, the great Constantinopolitan monk and monastic 
organizer Theodore the Studite (759-826) liked and recommended the Ladder.8  Later, it graced the courtly 
library of Symeon the New Theologian’s father, and Symeon’s (949-1022) discovery of this book inspired 
and in no small part formed Symeon’s own life and ideas.9  Symeon’s disciple and biographer, Nicetas 
Stethatus (11th c.), like his mentor drew heavily on the Ladder.10 
Later, the Hesychast movement—an important strand of ascetic spirituality in Byzantium which 
became the dominant one following its vindication and political backing in the mid-Fourteenth century—
turned to the Ladder for instruction.11  Briefly summarized, Hesychasm is the practice of ‘inner stillness’ 
(ἡσυχία) through certain techniques like short, repetitive prayers, the most famous being the ‘Jesus 
prayer’:  ‘Κύριε Ἰησοῦ Φριστὲ υἰὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐλέησον με.’  Monks, particularly in Athonite monasteries 
after the twelfth century, undertook this practice assiduously, seeing in it the culmination of ascetic 
                                                          
5 Hesychius, Λόγος πρὸς Θεόδουλον ψυχωφελὴς καὶ σωτήριος περὶ νήψεως καὶ ἀρετ῅ς ἐν κεφαλαίοις 
διῃρημένος διακοσίοις τρεῖς, Philokalia 1:141-75; Philotheus, Νηπτικὰ κεφάλαια τεσσαράκοντα, Philokalia 2:279-88.  
See especially their respective introductions in Philokalia ET, 1:161 (Hesychius) and 3:15 (Philotheus). 
6 An anthology edited by Macarius of Corinth and Nicodemus of Athos and published in 1782, it is composed of 
works conducive to or consciously written about what had become known as ‘Hesychast spirituality,’ which I discuss 
below.  Publication information is found in Abbreviations. 
7 Philokalia ET, 3:15; Völker, W., Scala Paradisi.  Eine Studie zu Johannes Climacus und zugleich eine Vorstudie zu Symeon 
dem Neuen Theologen (Wiesbaden, 1968), 291-314.  See also John Chryssavgis‘ more cautious assessment in his John 
Climacus: From the Egyptian Desert to the Sinaite Mountain (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2004), 39. 
8 Theodore the Studite, Epistulae, 150, 303; Theodore several times defers to ‘the holy Climacus’ in his own catecheses:  
Μεγάλη κατήχησις, 73 (p. 505) 98 (p. 706), .122 (p. 913). 
9 Nicetas Stethatus, Vita Symeonis Novi Theologici, 6, in Hausherr, Irénée (ed. and trans.), Un grand mystique byzantine:  
Vie de Syméon le Nouveau Théologien par Nicétas Stéthatos, Orientalia Christiana 12 (Rome: Pontificum Institutum 
Orientalium Studiorum, 1928). 
10 It is clear from Symeon’s own writings as well as Nicetas’ biography that he drew from Climacus his emphasis on 
tears and the memory of death, as well as his views on the ‘spiritual father.’   See especially the excellent article by 
Kallistos Ware, ‘The Spiritual Father in Saint John Climacus and Saint Symeon the New Theologian’, SP 18.2 (Leuven:  
Peeters, 1989), 299-316.  Nicetas’ teaching on tears reflects what we find in both Climacus and Symeon:  ‘On the 
Practice of the Virtues’, 69-70 in Philokalia ET 4:97.  See also Hilarion Alfeyev’s Saint Symeon the New Theologian and 
Orthodox Tradition, OECS (Oxford:  OUP, 2000), 273. 
11 Couilleau, G., ‘Saint Jean Climaque’, DS 8, 382-86 379-80, 386-87; Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 222-232; Ware, 
‘Introduction’, 43-58.  See also Bogdanovic, Dimitrije, ‘Jean Climaque dans la literature Byzantine et la literature Serbe 
ancienne’, in his Jovan Lestvičnik u vizantijskog i staroj srpskoj književnosti (Belgrade:  Vizantolozhki Institut, 1968), 222-
224. 
18 
 
Christian life.  They even claimed that such practices allowed them to reach such a state of blessedness 
and union with God that they could physically see what they referred to as the ‘uncreated light of Christ.’  
This movement began in the monasteries of Mt. Athos in the Thirteenth century and as it spread its 
proponents, particularly Gregory of Sinai (1265-1346) and Gregory Palamas (1296-1359), would turn to 
the Ladder to find references to both the ‘Jesus prayer’ and experience of ‘uncreated light.’12  While it 
would be very hard indeed to claim (as some have) that Hesychast readings of the Ladder reflect the 
concerns of the text or its author, it is probable that Hesychasts drew not only inspiration but, more 
especially, legitimacy and the unquestionable stamp of tradition, from imaginative readings of the 
Ladder.13   
Ultimately, I would not argue that the Ladder alone imparted to later Byzantine spirituality its 
unique character.  Rather, it appears in later writings as an unquestioned and authoritative document, 
recommended reading for monks and Hesychasts, as well as lay people common and royal.  Climacus 
was not the only author so memorialized, nor the Ladder the only work, and yet it more than any other is 
cited, used, and recommended by name.  Understanding later Byzantine theological and spiritual 
thought demands that we pay sustained attention to this formative element in its tradition. 
 
The Character of the Text 
Aside from references in later writers, even a brief glance at the Ladder’s textual history reveals a 
vast and widely dispersed manuscript tradition extending well beyond Byzantium’s borders.  To judge 
from its surviving manuscripts, the Ladder is—Scripture excepted—one of, if not the the most popular 
spiritual work of the Christian East.14  Written in the seventh century, by the eighth it was translated into 
                                                          
12 Nicephorus the Monk, ‘On Watchfulness and the Guarding of the Heart’ (in Philokalia ET, 4:200); Gregory of Sinai, 
‘On Stillness:  Fifteen Texts’, 2-13 (Philokalia ET, 4:265-72); idem, ‘On Prayer:  Seven Texts’, 4-5 (Philokalia ET, 4:277-80); 
and Gregory Palamas, ‘In Defense of Those Who Devoutly Practise a Life of Stillness’, 4-7 (Philokalia ET, 4:335-37).   
13 Hesychasm was a relatively recent development and its claims struck many as ‘novel’—the dirtiest word in 
Byzantine theological vocabulary.  Its proponents defended its traditionality by scouring accepted works by Mark the 
Monk, Diadochus of Photice, Nilus of Ancyra, the Gaza Fathers, and Climacus for possible references to Hesychasm. 
14  Robert Sinkewicz lists more than seven hundred Greek manuscripts.  Of these, three hundred date from before 
1300 CE.  To these must be added Slavonic (of which Bogdanovic lists 108), Romanian, Syriac, Arabic, Georgian, 
Armenian, and even the Latin manuscripts which would follow.  See:  Sinkewicz, Manuscript Listings for the Authors of 
the Patristic and Byzantine Period, Greek Index Project Series 4 (Toronto:  Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1992), L21-C22; Johnsén, Henrik Rydell.  Reading John Climacus:  Rhetorical Argumentation, Literary Convention and the 
Tradition of Monastic Formation (Lund:  Lund University, 2007),10-11; Bogdanovic, JovanLestvičnik, 205-08, cited in 
Heppel, Muriel, ‘Some Slavonic Manuscripts of the ‘Scala Paradisi’ (‘Lestvica’), Byzantinoslavica 18.2 (1957), 233; 
Gribomont, Jean, ‘La Scala paradise, Jean de Rhaïthou et Ange Clareno’, Studia Monastica 2.2 (1960), 345-58. 
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Syriac; by the eleventh into Georgian, Armenian, and Slavonic; by the fourteenth into Latin, Romanian 
and then Spanish, Portuguese and more.15  Each monastery would have had a copy, as did kings and 
princes, scholars, courtiers and other laymen.16  The evidence also suggests that these were well read and 
much-loved.  For example, the Ladder was kept in Romanian households and handed down just like a 
family Bible.17  Likewise, at the other end of the social spectrum, we have already seen how Byzantine 
courtiers might keep a copy in their private library and there is the interesting point that after Scripture 
the Ladder is the most often-quoted text in the surviving correspondence of the Russian Tsar Ivan IV ‘the 
Terrible’ (1530-1584)—though perhaps we should not hold this fact against the Ladder.18  The numerous 
surviving manuscripts are also—almost uniquely so—very heavily illuminated and illustrated19 while 
iconic depictions of it adorn numerous monastery church walls.  Clearly, Climacus’ masterpiece fired the 
artistic imagination of Byzantine copyists and iconographers.  While authorial references reveal it as 
influential in certain circles, the manuscript tradition reveals the Ladder as an enormously popular and 
highly respected text across the entire Christian East. 
Yet for all its popularity the Ladder has a relatively stable textual transmission.  Where we might 
expect dozens of different versions all claiming authority, we find, for the most part, a text free from 
significant variation.  Henrik Johnsén has usefully compiled results from the Ladder’s editors and 
scholars, discerning five more or less common types of variation:  the title of the book, the titles of the 
rungs, the division of some rungs, explanatory additions, and short omissions.  There is one other point 
of significant variance, though not in the text itself.  Manuscripts of the Ladder very often have bodies of 
scholia (interpretive comments) either appended to chapters or in the margins.  In some cases, the scholia 
have found their way into the text—thus the ‘explanatory additions.’  Nevertheless, the scholia vary 
                                                          
15 See Couilleau, ‘Jean Climaque’, 382-86; Corneanu, N., ‘Contributions des traducteurs roumains à la diffusion de 
«l’Echelle» de saint Jean Climaque’, SP 8 [TU 93] (Berlin:  Akademie Verlag, 1963), 340-355.  Portions of the Ladder 
survive in Ethiopic as well—sections of §6 (on the Memory of Death) in the Patericon Aethiopice, 2 vols., ed. Victor 
Arras, CSCO 277-78 [Scriptores Aethiopici 53, 55] (Louvain:  Peeters, 1976) as well as a recently published version of 
§5 (on Repentance) in an article by Robert Beylot (‘Un Témoin éthiopien inédit du Gradus 5 de Jean Climaque, 
Collegeville EMML 1939, Folio 102 R˚-113 V˚’, in M.A. Amir-Moezzi, J.D. Dubois, et al. (eds), Pensée grecque et sagesse 
d’Orient.  Hommage à Michel Tardieu, Bibliothèque de l’école des hautes études sciences religieuse 142 *Turnhout:  
Brepols, 2009], 89-107).   
16 Since the Ladder must be read each Lent, the monastery library could not be without it.  We have already seen 
Symeon the New Theologian’s father, a Byzantine courtier, in possession of a copy. 
17 Corneanu, ‘Contributions des traducteurs roumains’, 342 
18 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 236 
19 Martin, J.R., The Illustration of the Heavenly Ladder of John Climacus, Studies in Manuscript Illumination 5 (Princeton, 
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1954) 
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widely within the manuscript tradition.  Scholia aside, Johnsén concludes astutely that ‘there are 
variations in the manuscripts, but they do not seem to be numerous and rarely of much importance.’20  In 
this way the Ladder differs from other very popular works like the Apophthegmata Patrum or the Pratum 
Spirituale, whose textual transmission is as tortuous as it is vast.21  Rather, the Ladder’s greatest point of 
variation emerges in the body of scholia, not always well distinguished from the text, which has attached 
to it.   
These two facts—stability and commentary—allow us to characterize how the Ladder was 
perceived by its readers.  It was understood as an authoritative collection of wisdom and so, while its author 
could remain all but anonymous, its copying was undertaken with great care—changes being rare 
(outside of book and chapter titles), and illustrations (even colour ones) popular.  This same perception 
explains the more widely varied body of scholia which have, in some cases, attached to the text itself:  as 
it was read and interpreted, other bits of wisdom (often attributed to if not directly taken from works of 
famous luminaries like Isaac the Syrian, Barsanuphius of Gaza, and others) which recalled the Ladder or 
with which it resonated, would be inserted in the margins to explain this or that obscure point.  It was—
like works by Maximus Confessor, Dionysius the Areopagite, or Gregory Nazianzen to which similar 
bodies of scholia have attached—difficult to understand, but, like those other theologians, must have 
been also perceived as worth the effort of understanding.  It became a locus of meditative reading onto 
which readers might pour out libations of wisdom accrued from numerous writers. 
 
Conclusion 
In light of textual stability and the continuing lack of a critical edition, I have relied confidently 
on the editio princeps by Matthew Rader, reprinted in Migne’s PG.22  Though it has undeniable flaws—
misreadings, omissions, typos, the usual litany of errata associated with texts in PG—it is likely a 
                                                          
20 Johnsén, Reading John Climacus, 14-17 (quote from 16) 
21 On AP see Guy, J.-C., ‘Remarques sur le texte des Apophthegmata Patrum’, Recherches de science religieuse 63 (1955), 
252-58 ; as well as his Recherches sur la tradition grecque des Apophthegmata Patrum, Subisidia Hagiographica 36 
(Brussels:  Société des bollandistes, 1984).  On PS, see Mioni, Elpidio, 'Il Pratum Spirituale di Giovanni Mosco', OCP 
17 (1951): 61-94; and Chadwick, Henry, ‘John Moschus and his Friend Sophronius the Sophist’, JTS n.s. 25:1 (1974), 
41-47. 
22 Sancti patris nostril Ioannis Scholastici abbatis Montis Sina, qui vulgo Climacus appellatur opera omnia (1633), reprinted in 
PG 88:632-1164.  Edition and ET’s are found in Abbreviations.  I have consulted Colm Luibheid and Norman 
Russell’s ET, but all translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
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representative and reasonably accurate rendering of the Ladder.23  I have, however, not examined the 
scholia (though Rader printed many at the end of each Rung), as lying somewhat outside the 
hermeneutical purview of this study—though a study of these would be very fruitful in its own right. 
It is his popularity, though, which continues to astound me.  Climacus and the Ladder are 
commemorated on the Fourth Sunday of Lent in the Christian East and in those monasteries the Ladder is 
prescribed daily reading alongside Theodore the Studite’s Catecheses and the ‘Greek’ Ephrem’s metrical 
homilies in the Triodion—the book of services for Lent—thus perennially reinforcing its perception as a 
dominant force in Eastern Christian spirituality.24  One can easily see from the foregoing survey of its 
literary influence and textual tradition that Climacus—or, rather, the Ladder—is well worth scholarly 
attention.   
Though the textual critic and historian alike find themselves stymied before this unknown man 
John and his inordinately popular work, it cannot be denied that understanding Climacus greatly 
facilitates our comprehension of the complex development of various traditions and, in particular, the 
Hesychast movement in later Byzantine and Eastern Orthodox spirituality.  Likewise it gives us an 
important insight into the spiritual assumptions and reading habits of generations of Eastern Christians.  
In light of its popularity and influence the continuing scantiness of scholarly attention is, to say the least, 
surprising, even with the lack of scientific critical edition.  The Ladder, therefore, deserves greater 
attention and, I shall argue now, more nuanced interpretation, than it has so far received. 
 
The State of Climacian Studies 
 I must confess to a bit of irony in using the term ‘Climacian studies.’  Unlike so many Church 
Fathers whose venerable names have been eponymously applied to the ever-increasing bodies of 
scholarly literature dedicated to their study, Climacus has garnered no such legacy.  To date there are 
                                                          
23 Another edition, by the monk Sophronius, (Κλίμαξ, [Constantinople, 1883; repr. Athens, 1959]), is preferred by L. 
Petit (‘Saint Jean Climaque’, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholiques, vol. 8 [Paris, 1924], 690-93) and Couilleau, (‘Saint 
Jean Climaque’, col. 382).    In favour of Rader’s edition, Dimitrije Bogdanovic, noted that ‘l’édition de M. Rader<est, 
à notre sens, encore utilizable, cor les variants, pourtant existantes, ne sont ni nombreuses ni importantes’ (‘Jean 
Climaque dans la littérature‘, 217).  Johnsén (Reading John Climacus, 12-19) has made a persuasive case for preferring 
Rader’s edition—Sophronius had no qualms about incorporating scholia and his own readings into the text when he 
felt that explanation might be required.  His text, therefore, is less reliable as a witness to the Ladder than Rader’s 
which, for its faults, leaves the Ladder alone. 
24 Lash, Ephrem, ‘The Greek Writings Attributed to Saint Ephrem the Syrian’, in Behr, John, Conomos, Dimitrie, and 
Louth, Andrew (eds), Abba:  The Tradition of Orthodoxy in the West, Festschrift for Bishop Kallistos Ware (Crestwood, NY:  
SVS Press, 2003), 82-83 
22 
 
only five monographs and a couple dozen articles dedicated to the man or the work.  Apart from these, a 
few book chapters, two introductions and the requisite dictionary entries make up the bulk of what we 
may affectionately term ‘Climacian studies.’  This situation is certainly surprising, given the incredible 
popularity of the Ladder among Byzantine and Eastern Christians, but, in fact, it is probably urged on by 
precisely that fact.  The Ladder’s manuscript tradition, as I have noted, is so vast and complex—however 
stable it may be—as to preclude a critical edition which is, undoubtedly, the cornerstone of a scholarly 
corpus.  Nevertheless, the literature grows and, as it does, two clearly discernible hermeneutical trends 
haver emerged.  I will briefly lay these out and then introduce the relevant literature according to them, 
before moving into the more detailed hermeneutical discussion which will follow. 
 John Climacus wrote probably three centuries after the Christian ascetic movement exploded 
across the Mediterranean world.  He wrote with the accumulated wisdom of those centuries spread out 
before him and his own work is deeply indebted to a wide range of literature.  He was also followed, as I 
have shown above, by numerous authors who either continued his work in their own way or—as was 
more common among the Hesychasts—plundered his pages for whatever might be amenable to their 
own practices and beliefs.  Thus, when reading Climacus, it is tempting either to look back to the world 
which shaped his text or forward to the world which was shaped (or at least wanted to have been shaped) 
by his text. 
 Moderately applied, of course, neither tendency is damnable.  In fact, both may yield up rich 
fruit.  However, it is also tempting to move to polar extremes and to let concern with its past or future 
ideologically drive one’s reading of the Ladder.  Looking backward, scholars too often read Climacus 
simply as a ‘synthesizer’ of earlier tradition and so submerge the Ladder’s concerns and context in an 
ever-further dissected analysis of ‘source-material.’  Or, looking forward, it is easy to read Climacus as 
‘proto-Hesychast’ and the Ladder as a Hesychast treatise written about six centuries before its time.  Both 
of these extremes lead to more or less egregious misreading of the Ladder, either emphasizing things 
Climacus does not or fitting him into constrictive pigeonholes.  Curiously, both extremes, motivated by 
certain conceptions of ‘tradition’, effectively disjoint the Ladder from its proper place within the complex 
and ever-developing Greek ascetic tradition.  It is neither the ‘end’ nor the ‘beginning’, but, rather, an 
important moment in which prior moments are joined, and later ones anticipated or hinted at.  
Nevertheless, reading the Ladder as end or beginning of tradition has been the tendency among scholars 
who can generally be divided into two camps based on which pole they choose for Climacus’ location. 
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The Discerning Fathers 
 In 1968, Walther Völker published Scala Paradisi.  Eine Studie zu Johannes Climacus und zugleich eine 
Vorstudie zu Symeon dem Neuen Theologen,25 one of a series of works by him on Greek patristic 
spirituality.26  In it, he analyzed the Ladder chapter by chapter, attempting to work out the practical 
spirituality he found therein.  What is interesting about this piece is that, aside from careful examination 
of Climacus’ possible sources, Völker approached Climacus as preparation for an examination of later 
Byzantine theology—that he dedicated the final chapters to the ‘Sinaite school’ and to Symeon the New 
Theologian shows that he has in mind the Ladder’s Nachlass and, indeed, this significantly colours his 
approach.  In the same year appeared Dimitrije Bogdanovic’s Jovan Lestvičnik u vizantijskog i staroj srpskoj 
književnosti, whose closing chapter he mercifully wrote in French rather than Serbo-Croat.  Bogdanovic 
was clearly a careful reader of Climacus, though he too was, at least in his closing chapter, deeply 
concerned with later readings of Climacus and, especially, his influence on the Hesychast tradition.  In 
1989, John Chryssavgis published his doctoral dissertation entitled Ascent to Heaven:  The Theology of 
Human Person according to Saint John of the Ladder which over the years he refined into John Climacus: From 
the Egyptian Desert to the Sinaite Mountain.  This book is less a study of Climacus than an interesting essay 
in theological anthropology for which the Ladder and Christos Yannaras’ work,27 as well as Hesychasm, 
provide three entangled root-systems.  Chryssavgis falls directly into the trap of trying desparately to 
find Hesychast leanings in Climacus.28 However, it must be noted that Chryssavgis also wants to fit 
Climacus into categories which he draws from the earlier Gaza Fathers.29  Unfortunately, this Amounts, 
in his work, to making the Gaza Fathers also into curiously Existentialist-Palamite Hesychasts.   
 More recently, the pendulum has, thanks to a salutary push from Germanic historical 
scholarship, swung in the opposite direction.  In 2006, Andreas Müller penned his massive Das Konzept 
des geistlichen Gehorsams bei Johannes Sinaites.  Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte eines Elements orthodoxer 
Konfessionskultur.  In it he attempts to radically re-date Climacus, situating him within the time of the 
                                                          
25 Full bibliographical information for all works mentioned can be found in the bibliography. 
26 This is actually not the first book on the Ladder, but it is the first monograph dedicated to its teaching.  J.R. Martin’s 
1954 study, The Illustration of the Heavenly Ladder, is a useful demonstration of the fusion of Byzantine artistic and 
spiritual consciousness, and includes a Greek ‘Penitential Canon to the Holy Criminals’ which I will discuss in 
Chapter Four. 
27 Yannaras, Christos, Η ΜΕΤΑΦΥΣΙΚΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ.  Σποθδὴ στὸν Ἰωάννη τῆς Κλίμακος (Athens:  Dodone, 
1971) 
28 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 95-97, 228-32 
29 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 38 
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Emperor Justinian, allowing Müller to formulate a new understanding of Climacus’ ideas on monastic 
organization.  This is all very interesting but, as far as his conclusions about Climacus’ ideas on obedience 
go, they tell us little we did not already know and, in their unique points, are derived much more from 
AP and Basil of Caesarea than anything else.  Müller’s reading shows us little of the unique genius of 
Climacus.  The following year, Henrik Rydell Johnsén published his doctoral dissertation entitled Reading 
John Climacus:  Rhetorical Argumentation, Literary Convention and the Tradition of Monastic Formation.  This 
most recent work also looks backward, but now to Byzantine rhetorical practice.  Johnsén works very 
hard at what he calls a ‘literary’ interpretation of the Ladder, discerning forms of argumentation and prose 
style.  His conclusions are interesting, but most intriguing is his attempt to re-evaluate Climacus’ 
relationship with tradition—meaning, for Johnsén, his literary sources.  He too presents Climacus as 
working off of other peoples’ work—this time the Greek Systematica and Evagrius’ more practical 
treatises.  For Johnsén, Climacus is not even a systematizer or synthesizer—he merely adapts the wisdom 
of others to his own situation and so, for Johnsén, rhetorical strategy exhausts the meaning of the 
Ladder—there is no place for its ‘content.’ 
 Over the last century L. Petit, G. Couilleau, and Kallistos Ware wrote fascinating introductory 
pieces on Climacus.  Each of these engages Climacus with a deep consciousness of his debt and 
repayment to tradition.  Ware’s is by far the most complete, concise, accessible, and informative 
introduction to the Ladder available in English—possibly in any language.  However, even he betrays a 
certain predilection for Hesychast reading of Climacus, though he is, at least, more cautious about it than 
Chryssavgis.30  There have also been a number of very interesting articles on the structure of the Ladder, 
which I will evaluate at some length in Chapter Four.31 
 
Conclusion 
The history of Climacian studies, though brief, reveals a common hermeneutical problem faced 
by anyone wanting to understand the Ladder.  They must first appreciate its place within a much wider 
body of ascetic literature.  The answer commonly supplied by Orthodox readers, such as Chryssavgis and 
Ware—reading Climacus through Hesychast eyes—may be dismissed out of hand as destined to distort 
                                                          
30 Ware, ‘Introduction’, 43-58 
31 Price, James R. in ‘Conversion and the Doctrine of Grace in Bernard Lonergan and John Climacus,’ Anglican 
Theological Review 72 (1980), 338-362; Lawrence, Richard T., ‘The Three-Fold Structure of the Ladder of Divine 
Ascent’, SVOTQ 32:2 (1988): 101-118; Duffy, John, ‘Embellishing the Steps:  Elements of Presentation and Style in 
‚The Heavenly Ladder‛ of John Climacus’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 53 (1999):  1-17 
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not only the author’s intentions, but the whole thought-world of the text.  The other answer, favoured by 
more recent writers, is to look more assiduously to Climacus’ own context, be it rhetorical formation or 
Justinianic policies.  These writers appreciate more fully the ways in which Climacus draws on his 
tradition but they too end up drowning Climacus’ own voice in the crowd of sources, just as others have 
submerged him in ‘schools’ of later interpreters.  The question then becomes, how should we approach the 
Ladder?  A clearer hermeneutic is in order, and in the next section I will draw out in greater detail the 
potential and pitfalls of engaging Climacus via tradition. 
 
The Ladder and Greek Ascetic Tradition 
While I have argued against readings motivated too much by Climacus’ literary sources or 
successors, it is nevertheless true that the Ladder cannot be divorced from the tradition in which its author 
explicitly places himself and his work.  Climacus alerts us to his self-conscious traditionality at the very 
outset of the Ladder, when he describes his authorship thus: 
 ...faithfully constrained by the commands of those true slaves of God, stretching for a 
hand unworthy of them in undiscerning obedience, and by their knowledge taking up 
the pen to write, dipping it in downcast yet radiant humility, resting it upon their hearts 
smooth and white, just as on sheets of paper or, rather, spiritual tablets, divine words—
or rather, seeds—we will write here, painting them in many colours.32 
 
This irenic statement belies the complexity of Climacus’ engagement with the ‘fathers’ he claims, yet it 
certainly shows that, in order to understand Climacus, one must also appreciate the tradition within 
which he worked.  Along these lines, Peter Brown’s assessment is as correct as it is vague, that ‘the 
tradition of the Desert Fathers flowed into The Ladder of Divine Ascent of John Climacus.’33  For Climacus, 
the ‘tradition of the Desert Fathers’ refers especially to their writings, the literary tradition to which he 
would have had access and out of which he saw himself writing.34  This was quite elaborate by the time 
John wrote, and so, while his milieu is worth investigating, we are primarily concerned with Climacus’ 
reading habits.  Analysis of Climacus’ utilization of and relationship with earlier literature reveals the 
kinds of ideas he liked and disliked, which lines of thought he followed up, and which he avoided.   
The range of literature discernible from the Ladder is impressive:  Barsanuphius and John’s 
Quaestiones et Responsiones, Isaiah’s Asceticon, Dorotheus’ Doctrinae, AP, HM, HL, PS, Evagrius (especially 
                                                          
32 §1, PG 88:633C 
33 Brown, Body and Society, 237 
34 Johnsén, Reading John Climacus, 197 
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the Practicus, and Eulogium), Ps-Macarius’ homilies (though only in resonances), Diadochus of Photice’s 
Capita, Mark the Monk (especially De Lege and Ad Nicolaum), Basil’s Asceticon, the Vita Prima Graeca 
Pachomii, John Cassian, Gregory Nazianzen, and even Gregory the Great (perhaps).  The question then 
becomes for us:  how does Climacus relate to all this literature?  What did he do with what he read?  By 
examining just how Climacus engages tradition in the Ladder we will be able to delineate the concerns 
which motivate him as well as the parameters within which he exercises his own creativity.  I will, 
therefore, lay out three models of engagement which represent the three major tendencies among 
scholars of Climacus:  an Evagrian-Macarian synthesis, a Desert-Gazan trajectory, and an adaptation of 
formative techniques. 
  
Evagrius and Macarius on Sinai 
First, Eastern Orthodox scholars at times suggest that Climacus combines the Evagrian with the 
Ps-Macarian tradition.35  This assessment relies on a distinction drawn by Irénée Hausherr between two 
‘grands courants’ in Byzantine spirituality.   First, there was a ‘Semitic’ one, focused on the will and 
locating the unity of the human person in the καρδία (and, therefore, body) with an emphasis on 
purifying the θέλημα.  This, he argued, was exemplified by the Syrian monk, Ps-Macarius (4th/5th c.).  
Second, was a Hellenistic one, locating the person’s true ‘self’ in the νοῦς and describing humanity’s 
proper activity as a divine and wholly ‘intellectual’ θεωρία.  This was exemplified by Evagrius Ponticus 
(346-99).36  For Hausherr, the latter ‘courant’ represented a corruption of the common inheritance of early 
Christianity from Judaism.  Thus, Hausherr sees a tension between ‘intellectual’ and ‘voluntary’ 
spiritualities, each with its own exclusive anthropology and soteriology.37  Climacus, it is then argued, 
brings these together either by including both (Ware) or by avoiding either exreme (Chryssavgis).38 
Two problems immediately emerge from the ‘Evagrian-Macarian synthesis.’  First, the whole 
dichotomy relies on artificial and ultimately untenable categories which do not take account of other 
factors like variety of monastic organizations, problems of the Origenist controversies, and other 
                                                          
35 E.g.,  Meyendorff, John, Byzantine Spirituality:  Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York:  Fordham, 1974), 
67-69; and Ware, ‘Introduction’, 60-61; Chryssavgis, ‘Sources of John Climacus’, 6 
36 Hausherr, ‘Les grands courants de la spiritualité orientale’, OCP 1 (1935), 121-24; I will critique Hausherr’s position 
in relation to Evagrius in Chapter Two below. 
37 Couilleau (‘Jean Climaque’, col. 372) and Müller replace Ps-Macarius with Basil of Caesarea, making the synthesis 
concern individual versus community:  Evagrius representing Scetiote eremiticism and Basil a coenobium. 
38 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 37 
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complexities which beset readers of ascetic literature.  Second, even if Climacus utilizes language and 
perhaps even ideas akin to Evagrius and Macarius, it is unclear from the different perspectives of Ware 
and Chryssavgis that what he accomplishes is in any way a rigorous ‘synthesis’ of two different modes of 
thought.39 
 Nevertheless, it is true that Climacus seems to envision no real distinction or priority between 
‘voluntary’ and ‘intellectual’ humanity.  It would be hard to say with Climacus whether νοῦς, ‘mind’, or 
θέλημα, ‘will’ locates the core of a person.  Rather, each must be transformed and offered to God.  
Consequently, Climacus is equally comfortable with language of καρδία (as one might find in Ps-
Macarius) and νοῦς (as in Evagrius).  Indeed, he sees a deep connection between what happens in one 
organ and the other.40  Thus, Climacus effectively holds together different, even hostile, strands of thought 
within a holistic (though perhaps not ‘monistic’) view of the human person.41  One way, then, of 
describing Climacus’ achievement—and, I shall argue below, a very helpful one—is to say that he stitches 
together the human being which ascetic spirituality had so successfully laid bare—his synthesis is an 
existential one, albeit not a consciously anthropological one. 
 
Scetis came to Gaza, Gaza came to Sinai 
Second, scholars consider Climacus as the end of a trajectory of thought which may be visualized 
roughly as a pilgrim trail carved from Scetis and Nitria up to Alexandria, over to Gaza and Palestine, and 
down to Sinai.  Climacus is strikingly fond of AP and related literature from (or at least purporting to 
come from) Egypt, utilizing tales and sayings liberally throughout the Ladder.42  He read this literature, 
though, very often in light of its interpretation and utilization by the Gaza Fathers:  Abba Isaiah (d. 491), 
Barsanauphius (d. ca. 540), John (d. 542), and Dorotheus (d. ca. 578).  Chryssavgis would go so far as to 
say that ‘John could be seen as a deliberate continuator or a direct successor of this school of 
                                                          
39 The same criticisms, mutatis mutandis, hold true if the synthesis operated on Evagrius and Basil. 
40 See, e.g., §1, PG 88:633D (calling the heart the tomb, and the mind Lazarus of Bethany), §4, 700B-C (recommending 
parallel activities for heart, mind, and body), §6, 796B (insensitivity in the heart hardens the mind) and §26, 1064C (an 
unmoved heart and mental prayer represent ἀπάθεια). 
41 Climacus is not constructing an ‘anthropology.’  Rather, the ways he describes the human being are not susceptible 
to division. 
42 According to Ware, citations from Alphabeticon and Anonyma are second in number only to Scriptural references:  
Ware, ‘Introduction’, 59-60. 
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spirituality.’43  The reasons for this are easily discernible.  Not only were AP first written down and 
collected in Palestine, but the earliest collection of apophthegmata in Greek belongs to the Asceticon of Abba 
Isaiah (Logos 7).44  Numerous sayings, with and without names, but substantially belonging to AP as we 
now know it, are to be found in the Quaestiones et Responsiones.  The Gaza School was inspired by and, 
most likely for that very reason, helped collect and edit, the variety of sayings and stories associated with 
the Egyptian desert.45  Under this model, the best way of understanding Climacus is to first read Desert 
and Gazan literature, see the themes and ideas developed there, and examine how Climacus handles 
them.   
Of course, the ‘Desert-Gaza’ model is hopelessly vague as regards the Ladder’s specific subject-
matter.  But it does alerts us to the kind of mindset, the preferences and animadversions which Climacus 
might have encountered.  It can also lay bare the tensions and ambiguities of the literary tradition within 
which Climacus worked.  This model proposes a more helpful genealogy of ideas rather than the static 
categories of the ‘Evagrian-Macarian.’  And, taken together with the ‘Evagrian-Macarian’ model, it 
reveals the kind of literature to examine in order to better understand Climacus’ work.   
 
Formation and Adaptation 
Third, we find Henrik Rydell Johnsén’s model centring on Climacus’ adaptation of ‘formative’ 
techniques.  Johnsén has shown exactly the limitation of any kind of ‘synthetic’ or ‘source-critical’ 
approach to the Ladder, whether conceived as Evagrian-Macarian or Desert-Gazan.  He writes, ‘Either 
scholars seem to presuppose that a source, a text or a concept is something more or less static or 
unchangeable, understood or conceived in the same way in the new text, or at least they do not 
thoroughly investigate how the sources are actually used and function in the new text.’46  Johnsén then 
argues that most ‘source-critical’ examinations of Climacus seek to find what he retains or misses or, at 
least to trace ‘ascetic doctrines that the text is supposed to expose to the reader.’  In so doing, scholars 
assume that Climacus is a dogmatic writer and the Ladder a systematic treatise to be read as such—neither 
                                                          
43 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 38; Völker reads Climacus against Desert and Gazan literature (see, e.g., Scala Paradisi, 
25-41).  See also Müller, Das Konzept des geistlichen Gehorsams, 156-164. 
44 Regnault, ‘Les Apophtegmes des Pères en Palestine aux Ve-VIe siècles’, in Les Pères du Désert, 80-83; so also Chitty, , 
Derwas, The Desert a City:  An Introduction to the Study of Egyptian and Palestinian Monasticism under the Christian 
Empire (Crestwood, NY:  SVS Press, 1966), 67-68.   
45 Chitty, Desert a City, 73-77, 103-04. 
46 Johnsén, Reading John Climacus, 23 
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of which is the case.47  In order to draw out Climacus’ ideas on certain topics or themes, he says, scholars 
rip material from its proper place in the Ladder, set various formulations against one another, and so 
attempt to construct a representative and, perhaps, synthetic view of Climacus’ ideas on this or that 
topic.48  Johnsén proposes a rather different reading of the Ladder which centres on the concept of 
‘formation.’ 
 Johnsén himself argues at length that Climacus operates very much within a literary tradition, 
and was himself shaped by the texts and treatises to which he had access.49  He spends much time on 
what he sees as the order of argumentation and Climacus’ prose style, before turning to examining the 
Ladder as ‘formative’ literature.50  With his emphasis on argumentation and style, Johnsén considers 
especially how Climacus ‘re-arranges’ ordering of vices and virtues found in the Greek Systematica and 
Evagrius’ works.51  Climacus’ achievement is, for Johnsén, not a synthesis at all but, rather, an adaptation 
whose novelty—if there is any—lies in the structural changes which Climacus makes to patterns of 
argumentation rather than ideas gleaned from previous authors.  In this model, Climacus retains the spirit 
of his predecessors and even maintains his allegiance to them as teachers, while modifying their teaching 
in accordance with his own rhetorical strategy, aimed at inculcating certain practices among his own 
audience. 
 While Johnsén is right to speak of ‘formation’ rather than ‘systematization,’ his model suffers 
from at least one great flaw:  he sees only the ‘formal’ aspect of ‘formation’, and ignores its purpose and 
material.  Johnsén’s greatest achievement is his discernment of an order of argument within the various 
chapters of the Ladder—he sees very clearly the ‘rhetorical strategies’ of which Climacus makes use.  The 
accuracy and the precision of the form Johnsén describes is open to criticism, but for present purposes it 
is worth noting that, even if it turns out to be correct, it tells us little if anything about what Climacus 
teaches.  Thus, ‘formation’ excellently keeps the reader focused on Climacus’ practical intent, but must be 
filled out by deeper engagement with the Ladder’s specific content. 
 
Conclusion  
                                                          
47 Ibid., 23-24 
48 Ibid., 18 
49 Ibid.¸ 196-99 
50 Ibid., 196-276 
51 Ibid., 198 
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 Each of the three models here laid out contributes something to understanding Climacus, but 
each represents also an unduly limited way of engaging the Ladder.  The ‘Evagrian-Macarian synthesis’ 
rests on false categories and generalizations, but it also takes account of a profoundly existential concern 
in the Ladder.  The ‘Desert-Gazan trajectory’ tells us little about what Climacus thinks or what topics 
specifically concern him, but it does lay out an excellent way of locating Climacus within recognizable 
trends in literature.  The ‘adaptation’ of ‘formative’ strategies calls the reader back to Climacus’ intent, 
but has been applied only to a purely formal critique of the Ladder’s ‘rhetorical strategies.’  In the next 
section I will elaborate a way of understanding the Ladder as ‘formative’ which moves beyond formal 
critique and describe how this study will read Climacus against and yet within Greek ascetic tradition.  
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II. TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL MONK 
 With these three models—‘Evagrian-Macarian’, ‘Desert-Gazan’, and ‘adaptive-formative’—in 
mind, I will offer a hermeneutic which takes account of the Ladder’s existential concern with identity-
formation, and which more fully delineates Climacus’ literary relationship with the tradition within 
which he stood.  Over the course of the study I will carry this reading through with regard primarily to 
death but, for now, I will trace its outline with special reference to the issues discussed above. 
 
The Identity of the Monk 
To begin with, we must appreciate the wider implications of Climacus’ emphasis on ‘formation.’ 
Kallistos Ware perspicaciously remarked of the Ladder that, ‘It is an existential work, and only those who 
read it existentially will appreciate its true value.’52  Ware means that the Ladder seeks to form the kind of 
person who can live a specifically Christian way of life.  If, then, ‘formation’ describes Climacus’ purpose, 
we must understand this as referring not simply to ‘rhetorical strategy’ but to the cultivation of identity.  
Climacus’ teaching is not limited to one or a collection of beliefs or actions or even habits but refers, 
rather, to the whole constellation of ways of perceiving, objects of belief, habits of acting and speaking, 
and modes of relating to other people, to the world more generally, and, especially, to God.   
Specifically, Climacus seeks to form Christians through monastic lifestyles.  To explain, Climacus 
begins the Ladder with definitions of the ‘monk’—with which ὅροι I opened this introduction.  Together 
with these, Climacus offers a definition of the Christian, suggesting that a monk is ultimately just that—a 
Christian.  His monastic vocation allows him more completely and more effectively than those in the 
world to flee from sin toward the Kingdom of Heaven and the love of God.53  Love demands complete 
adherence54 and its attainment at the final rung of the Ladder confers a ‘likeness to God.’55  And yet, only 
thus does the monk achieve the definition of ‘Christian’ which Climacus offers in the First Rung:  ‘<the 
imitator of Christ, as far as humanly possible, in words, deeds and thought, rightly and blamelessly 
                                                          
52 Ware, ‘Introduction’, 8 
53 §1, 633C:  ‘Πάντες οἱ τὰ τοῦ βίου προθύμως καταλιπόντες, πάντως ἥ διὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν βασιλείαν· ἥ διὰ 
πλ῅θος ἁμαρτημάτων· ἥ διὰ τὴν εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπην τοῦτο πεποιήκασιν. Εἰ δ’ οὐδεὶς τῶν προειρημένων σκοπῶν 
αὐτοῖς προηγήσατο, ἄλογος ἡ τούτων ἀναχώρησις καθέστηκε.’  Cf. 640B-C on married people who, for all their 
virtue, are only ‘οὐ μακρὰν...τ῅ς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν.’ 
54 Witness §1, 644A:  ‘Σίς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πιστὸς, καὶ φρόνιμος μοναχὸς, ὃς τὴν θέρμην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφύλαξεν 
ἄσβεστον· καὶ μέχρι τ῅ς αὐτοῦ ἐξόδου καθ’ ἡμέραν [προστιθεὶς] πῦρ πυρὶ, καὶ θέρμην θέρμῃ, καὶ σπουδὴν 
σπουδῆ, καὶ πόθον πόθῳ οὐκ ἐπαύσατο;’ 
55 §30, 1156B:  ‘Ἀγάπη κατὰ μὲν ποιότητα ὁμοίωσις Θεοῦ, καθ’ ὅσον βροτοῖς ἐφικτόν.’ 
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believing in the Holy Trinity.’56  Here is an identity, modelled on the person of Christ, which incorporates 
actions, speech, and thought.  The virtues which Climacus teaches so well are those which render their 
practitioner more and more like Christ through faith in the Trinity.  The Ladder speaks not only to this or 
that practice but to the human character in both its voluntary and intellectual capacities, and the uniquely 
Christian hope of the ascetic.  It is formative, but formative of a Christian identity which incorporates and 
implicates the whole human being. 
 
Shape and not System 
Since Climacus writes to form identity, then it stands to reason that he read ascetic literature with 
similar hopes.  That is, like any monastic, he read ascetic literature as something normative for life, and 
his own achievement will stand out best when read against earlier authors’ ideas about the cultivation 
and communication of a peculiarly Christian ascetic identity.  This should hardly be surprising, since 
ascetic literature is inevitably prescriptive:  consisting of advice about habits, thoughts, and words; of 
rules; of exemplary and cautionary tales which explicitly or implicitly call for either imitation or aversion.  
That is, ascetic literature is most naturally read as teachings on cultivating a peculiarly Christian 
identity—to become a monk and, as so many Desert pilgrims would say, to ‘be saved.’  The important 
thing is that we also be sensitive to this way of reading.  Certainly, Climacus is likely not a conscious 
synthesizer and still less a systematizer.57  This fact does not preclude Climacus from operating within 
certain doctrinal contexts and concerning himself with the content rather than merely the form of earlier 
teaching. 
 
The Doctrinal Context 
John clearly does not write like dogmatic theologians.  We find only hints of technical Trinitarian 
or Chrisolotical language, and absolutely no polemic against opponents real or imagined—rather, 
Climacus keeps always to his formative purpose, instructing monks in the way in which they can become 
Christians.  However, in doing so, John also presupposes certain doctrinal and ecclesial contexts.  He refers, 
in the ὅρος of the Christian, to ‘rightly and blamelessly believing in the Holy Trinity,’ and elsewhere 
                                                          
56 §1, 633B:  ‘Φριστιανός ἐστιν μίμημα Φριστοῦ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων, λόγοις, καὶ ἔργοις, καὶ ἔννοίᾳ εἰς τὴν 
ἀγίαν Σράδα ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀμέμπτως πιστεύων.’ 
57 Note his unwillingness to adjudicate between various fathers at §14, 897A-B. 
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states that ‘I venerate a Trinity in unity and a unity in Trinity.’58  In this instance, Climacus quotes a 
doctrinal statement issued by the Emperor Justin on his accession, showing that he is certainly aware of 
the importance of right belief as maintained in the Byzantine Empire.59  Elsewhere John remarks that, 
‘Some say that prayer is better than memory of one’s death *ἔξοδος]; but I hymn two natures of one 
person.’60  Here Climacus writes in Chalcedonian language, using its famous (and, in the sixth century, 
highly divisive) definition as the backdrop to his comment on two activities which, though seemingly 
disparate, he would aver together.  John writes from within the fold of the Byzantine Church.  Yet he 
does so merely in passing—Christology provides the context within which the ascetic life may unfold.   
Imitation of Christ presupposes a sense of who and what Christ is.  Climacus’ emphasis is on a way of 
life, but this way can only be found within ‘right and blameless’ belief in the Holy Trinity.  We must, 
therefore, keep in mind that John develops his treatment of monastic identity within the strictures of 
Nicene and Chalcedonian (Byzantine) orthodoxy. 
 
Ways of Shaping 
Within that context, there are basically three ways in which Climacus engages with traditional 
material.  First, there are a very few instances where he openly rejects a seemingly acceptable point of 
teaching.  Climacus rejects Evagrius Ponticus—by the seventh century a straw man for almost all suspect 
eschatological speculation—as ‘most foolish of the foolish.’ However, John rejects Evagrius not on 
account of Evagrius’ suspect eschatology,61  but because he thinks Evagrius’ advice on fasting is too strict.  
John quotes Evagrius as saying:  ‘‚When our soul desires various foods, discipline it with bread and 
water.‛’62  Climacus compares Evagrius’ advice to ‘telling a child to ascend the whole ladder in a single 
bound.’  Climacus offers rather more moderate advice instead—cut out fatty foods and don’t eat too 
                                                          
58 §25, 993A: ‘<προσκυνῶ Σριάδα ἐν μονάδι, καὶ μονάδα ἐν Σριάδι.’  See also §3, 672B; §25, 992A; §27, 1117A. 
 
59 The phrase quotes the Emperor Justin’s ‘τοῖς ἑκασταχοῦ Φριστιανοῖς πρόγραμμα’ found in Evagrius Scholasticus’ 
Historia Ecclesiastica, 5.4:  ‘Μονάδα γὰρ ἐν τριάδι καὶ τριάδα ἐν μονάδι προσκυνοῦμεν.’  Müller (Das Konzept des 
geistlichen Gehorsams, 213) thinks this a reference to a Greek translation of the creed Quincunque vult, citing the 
Formula Tertia (PG 28:1587C):  ‘Ὥστε κατὰ πάντα (καθὼς εἴρηται) καὶ τὴν μονάδα ἐν Σριάδι, καῖ τὴν Σριάδα ἐν 
μονάδι σέβεσθαι δεῖ.’  Justin’s letter uses προσκυνέω as John does, rather than Formula Tertia’s σέβομαι, making it 
the most likely source. 
60 §28, 1137A:  ‘Υασὶ μέν τινες κρεῖττον εἶναι προσευχὴν μνήμης ἐξόδου· ἐγὼ δὲ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως δύο οὐσίας 
ὑμνῶ.’  This phrase is most curious, as we might expect ‘ἐν μιᾷ ὑπόστασει’, which would reflect standard 
Chalcedonian usage. 
61 Cf., e.g., PS 26, 177 
62 Evagrius, Practicus 16 
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much.63  On this point, Evagrius’ ideas were hardly heretical or extreme.  Climacus, nevertheless, rated it 
unfavourably against his own experience which he judged to be of greater worth.64  Climacus’ rejection of 
this teaching, operating as he does within Chalcedonian parameters, demonstrates that he was critically 
and reflectively engaged with literature which fell within those bounds. 
Second, there are times when Climacus submits his own opinion to the wisdom of the ‘discerning 
fathers.’  For example, Climacus believes insensitivity to be the second vice after lust (which he covers in 
§15).65  Nevertheless, he follows ‘the discerning fathers’ in putting avarice (or, as Climacus calls it, the 
‘many-headed snake of idolatry’) between the two.66  He admits to not knowing why the fathers have set 
things down in this order and, although he has followed them, it seems to him incorrect.67  Nevertheless, 
the order he accepts becomes the order of his work.  Perhaps there is ambiguity here and, while Climacus 
cannot understand the reason for it, experience teaches that, in fact, the order of things that has been 
handed down is perfectly usable.   
Most often, Climacus combines and re-shapes traditional material.  A simple but illustrative 
example concerns Climacus’ list of vices, which is inspired by Evagrius’ list of eight thoughts, which 
passed into common usage from the fifth century.68   These λογισμοί take hold as πάθη, Climacus argues, 
according to a psychological schema derived from Mark the Monk.69  However, Climacus crucially 
modifies and expands Mark’s terminology by including an Evagrian term not previously applied to 
human psychology.70  The change, though slight, represents a view of human psychology different from 
either Mark’s or Evagrius’.  Moreover, Climacus freely reduces Evagrius’ eight thoughts to seven, as did 
Cassian and, later, Gregory the Great, and then splays them out once more according to the order 
deemed best by himself and others, dwelling on their confused interrelations and offering his own 
                                                          
63 §14, PG 8:865B 
64 Cf. Ware, ‘Introduction’, 7-10 
65 §14, 869C 
66 §17, 929B; an Evagrian inheritance—see Monachos, Prol (PG 79:1236), Vitiis 3 (PG 79:1141), etc. 
67 §17, 929B:  Σρίτην πῶς οὐκ οἶδα λαχὼν παρὰ τοῖς διακριτικοῖς τῶν πατέρων ἐν τῆ ὀκτὼ ἀλύσει. 
68 Cf. Johnsén, Reading John Climacus, 239-73. 
69 Following Philokalia (ET 1:365-67) the stages are:  προσβολή (provocation), συνδυασμός (coupling), συγκατάθεσις 
(assent), αἰχμαλωσία (shamefulness), πάλη (delusion), πάθος (passion) (found at §15, PG 88:896C).  All save 
αἰχμαλωσία are Marcan in origin (see De Lege 141, 142; Operibus 148).  Climacus expounds it at some length (§15, PG 
88:897A-D), adding to it another term of Mark’s—παραῤῥιπισμὸς νοός, ‘disturbance of mind’ (found in Ad Nicolaum 
9).  
70 Αἰχμαλωσία is simplya property of demonic λογισμοί (Eulogium, PG 79:1113C, 1120C). 
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account of how best to deal with them.71   Climacus demonstrates here that, while he very often does not 
adjudicate between different strands of thought, he will hold them together.  When necessary, though, he 
will either reject prior teaching as inconsistent with experience, or submit his own experience to the 
wisdom of his fathers.  Through the interaction of these three modes of engagement, Climacus crafts an 
ascetic spirituality which, though resembling what one finds in previous literature, is fully unique.   
The implications of Climacus’ threefold engagement with tradition illuminate the Ladder as a 
unique achievement.  Mark’s schema, like Evagrius’, was built on a particular understanding of human 
psychology, which said that thoughts work in this way and not another.  By changing the process of 
temptation and by setting it within his own ordering of vices and virtues, Climacus establishes a 
necessarily different series of assumptions and beliefs about human psychology.  In doing so he creates a 
new, equally formative, model for ascetic practice, operative now according to his own understanding 
and experience of human nature and capacity.  At stake in Climacus’ working of traditional material, by 
which he holds together various strands of thought, is a concept of the human person.  What emerges is a 
new and profound picture of the human being as a sinner struggling by the grace of God to a Christian 
identity always by means of existential engagement with death. 
 
Tradition and not Sources 
 Crucially, the works on which Climacus drew were not afterward discarded as unnecessary.  
Rather, they too continue to be read within the same Christian ascetic context where they remain 
normative pieces whose portraits of asceticism monastics still strive to emulate.  We do well, then, not 
simply to point out how and where Climacus differs from other writers and thus laud his uniqueness.  
Rather, we must also locate him within the elaboration and shaping of a living tradition which neither 
ended nor began with him.  He stands within tradition, and his achievement is most noticeable as it 
interprets and contributes to that tradition. 
Therefore, I will devote whole chapters to the literature which would contour Climacus’ 
theological and spiritual ‘thought-world.’  I will treat it in roughly chronological order, which will allow 
me to show how authors drew on, elaborated, and even disagreed with, one another.  This conversation 
over time, wherein each generation could interrogate its predecessors especially through their texts, 
                                                          
71 §22, 948D-949A; §29, 1149A-B; on which see Ware, ‘Introduction’, 62-66 
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created currents of spirituality and gave a increasingly definite shape to ascetic practice.72  Samuel 
Rubenson, commenting on AP, writes, ‘Scholars trying to draw general conclusions from the complete 
collections of sayings have thus come to conflicting conclusions on a variety of subjects, including the 
degree of literacy, theological training and speculative thinking among the monks.’73  If this is so for 
scholars, it was also true for those monastics who sought in collections like AP ways to craft their own 
lives.  Thus, as Douglas Burton-Christie notes, ‘In assessing the Sayings as literature, one must take into 
account the diversity and richness of its literary expressions and the dynamic, reciprocal relationship that 
existed between it and other early monastic texts.’74  I will certainly show how variant usages of the 
language of ‘death’ demonstrate heterogeneity in Greek ascetic literature.  This heterogeneity implicates 
conceptions of the monastic vocation, even of the human being itself.    And yet we must keep in mind 
Burton-Christie’s later remark, ‘This exuberant polyphony of words is one of the real strengths and 
charms of the Sayings.’75  For all of the different voices were read together, all accepted as useful and at 
least potentially normative for the reader’s life.  As texts were read, some elements were picked up, 
others discarded; they were recombined, reconceived, and redeployed.  Trajectories of thought thus 
emerged and by this frictive yet dialogical process a tradition emerged, marked at times by ambiguity 
and ambivalence, and yet possessing an increasingly pervasive sense of the importance and potential of 
death as impulse and symbol of asceticism.  This sense would be given its fullest expression and 
profoundest application in John Climacus’ Ladder of Divine Ascent. 
I will, therefore, demonstrate in Chapters One through Three how themes and vocabulary 1) are 
maintained over time, 2) diverge, 3) are broadened in their application; and 4) are sometimes worked out 
in deeper ways.  Not everything in Chapters One through Three will feature in Chapter Four, but it 
remains important for the material treated in those chapters.  This ‘singing silence’ will also further our 
appreciation of Climacus’ achievement as both ‘traditional’ and ‘original.’ 
  
                                                          
72 See on this Harmless, William, ‘Remembering Poemen Remembering:  The Desert Fathers and the Spirituality of 
Memory’, Church History 69:3 (2000), 488-89, 518. 
73 Rubenson, Samuel, ‘Origen in the Egyptian Monastic Tradition of the Fourth Century’, in Bienert, W.A. and 
Kühnweg, U. (eds), Origeniana Septima (Leuven:  Leuven University Press, 1999), 332 
74 Burton-Christie, Douglas, The Word in the Desert:  Scripture and the Quest for holiness in Early Christian Monasticism 
(Oxford:  OUP, 1993)esert, 90 
75Ibid., 94 
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III. THE SHAPE OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
 In keeping with the hermeneutical considerations outlined above, I have made certain material 
choices by which I have focused my argument both in terms of the material to be covered and the 
questions to be addressed.  One could trace the genealogy of Climacus’ ideas back through not only 
Greek ascetic material, but hagiographic, martyrological, biblical, and even Greco-Roman literature.  This 
is because Climacus, like any other writer, writes from within not only his immediate milieu, but, as I 
have already discussed, the wider tradition which informed it.  But that tradition also has its own past.  
Thus, we must be selective when attempting to delineate Climacus’ tradition.  I have first chosen to 
confine myself to Greek ascetic materials (and, rather briefly, the Christian Scriptures), foregoing 
extended examination of other obvious loci, such as the Christian Acta Martyrum or Greco-Roman 
philosophical and rhetorical materials. 
 From among Greek ascetic authors I have to be yet further selective, and it is easiest to describe 
the selections in reverse order.  As already noted, the Gaza School is Climacus’ most proximal source and 
teacher.  Its inclusion is integral to the study.  Of the authors associated with Gaze, I have limited 
discussion, for reasons of space, to the central two:  Barsanuphius and John.  However, the close and 
sustained reading which I offer of their Quaestiones et Responsiones, will be representative of the main lines 
of thought which Climacus took from Gaza. 
Likewise, for both Climacus and Gaza, the Apophthegmata Patrum, the various Historiai, and 
related ‘Desert literature’ were important.  His debt to the Desert is coloured by the ways in which its 
traditions were understood and elaborated by the Gaza Fathers who were inspired by and helped shape 
the apophthegmatic literature especially.  This study will examine a variety of pieces to which I will refer 
by the terms ‘Desert Fathers’ or ‘Desert literature’:  the Apophthegmata Patrum (ca. 5th c.)—both the 
Alphabeticon and the Anonyma;76 the anonymous travelogue, the Historia Monachorum in Aegypto (ca. 399); 
Palladius of Helenopolis’ Historia Lausiaca (ca. 420); and, John Moschus’ Pratum Spirituale (ca. 593).  Of 
these, the first three are obvious choices,77 but the last was probably not directly known to Climacus.78  I 
                                                          
76 I will leave aside the Systematica, pace Johnsén (Reading John Climacus, 216-39), whose argument for Climacus’ 
reliance on the Greek Systematica is unconvincing.   
77 HM and HL were so closely associated in readers’ minds that HM in its Greek form was thought until the twentieth 
century to be part of HL.  See Butler, Cuthbert (ed), The Historia Lausiaca of Palladius, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 1904), 
I:10-15.   
78 Though Ware (‘Introduction’, 60 n220) and Johnsén (Reading John Climacus, 201 n19) have discerned one apparent 
allusion. 
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have included PS because it represents a literary continuation of the tradition begun with AP and the 
Historiai.  While HM and HL purport to describe lives and practices of fourth-century Egyptian monks, 
and Moschus those of fifth- and sixth-Century Palestinians,79 the differences are not so great as they 
might seem.  First, as Demetrios Katos notes, Moschus’ collection of pilgrim’s tales was, perhaps, the first 
great ‘literary successor’ to HL and HM80.  Second, AP was first compiled in Palestine,81 and quote from 
and allude to both HL and HM.82  That is, while AP purport to describe Fourth-century Egyptian monastic 
culture, they may reflect at least as much of the mentalité of Fifth-century Palestinian monasticism.  PS 
more obviously continues the story of that world, including quite a bit of apophthegmatic material either 
original or, in a few cases, lifted directly from AP.83  Thus, PS consciously continues the kind of literary 
and spiritual traditions which first flowered in AP, HL, and HM.84 
In the same chapter, I discuss the most famous teachers of the Christian desert:  Evagrius 
Ponticus (346-99), Ps-Macarius (4th/5th c.), Mark the Monk (5th c.), and Diadochus of Photice (5th c.).  
Climacus’ reliance on these is universally acknowledged.  However, I do not focus primarily or even at 
any great length on these authors, and this for two reasons.  First, because of space; and second, because 
their treatment of death does not differ markedly from what we find in other literature.85  I will, however, 
certainly draw attention to and incorporate these authors and their work wherever necessary and, though 
short, the readings will be responsible and representative. 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 Moschus’ account, as John Binns notes, picks up where where Cyril of Scythopolis’ biographies leave off, in 558.  
However, the two authors share nothing of genre or style, and Moschus is certainly far fonder of anecdotes and lore, 
in the style of AP and the Historiai.  See Binns, John, Ascetics and Ambassadors of Christ:  The Monasteries of Palestine 314-
631, OECS (Oxford:  OUP, 1994), 49-52. 
80  Katos, Demetrios S., Palladius of Helenopolis:  An Origenist Monk and Writer of the Fifth Century (Ph.D, CUA, 2001), 43 
(this will soon appear in OECS under the same title, though I have not been able to consult the book-form in 
preparation of this study). 
81 Regnault, ‘Les Apophtegmes des Pères en Palestine aux Ve-VIe siècles’, in Les Pères du Désert, 73-83 (especially 80-
83) ; so also Chitty, Desert a City, 67-68 
82 Gould, The Desert Fathers, 5; see also Gould’s article (‘The Collection of Apophthegmata Patrum in Palladii Lausiaca 20 
(P: 74, 377-82)’, SP 45 [Leuven:  Peeters, 2010], 27-33) on a later Latin version of HL which is really a sort of anthology 
of extracts from HL and AP.  This only goes to show how HL, HM, and AP were interrelated in their readers’ minds. 
83 See, e.g., PS 54, 110, 113, 115, 144, 152, and 212 (which comments on N 337). 
84 So concludes Henry Chadwick (‘John Moschus and his friend Sophronius’, 43-44, 60 
85 Excepting Evagrius’ speculative eschatology which was roundly rejected by the sixth century and did not influence 
Climacus. 
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Vita Antonii 
I have also included Athanasius’ Vita Antonii.  In fact, I begin with it.  This may seem a somewhat 
stranger choice, and raises a few methodological questions which must be addressed: why stop the 
genealogy with a work not directly referred to by Climacus?  Why not Basil’s Asceticon instead or as well?  
Indeed, why not press on to include the Acta Martyrum?   
I include VA because of its paradigmatic significance for later hagiographers and Desert writers.  
Like the Ladder’s, VA’s influence may be traced in two ways:  translational dissemination and literary 
influence.  For the former, we know that it was translated into Latin no later than 374 by Evagrius of 
Antioch, though another, more literal Latin translation was completed before his.  Coptic translations 
were made quite early, as witnessed by Shenoute’s homilies, though these may also include Coptic source 
material (as is suggested by a late-sixth century text of John of Hermopolis).  Arabic and Ethiopic 
translations were also made.  VA was translated into Syriac in the Fifth Century and later into other 
languages of the Christian world.86  Anyone who wished could read the story of Antony and it seems that 
very many wished for exactly that. 
We can see VA’s literary and spiritual influence at work in Jerome’s ascetic biographies, in the 
foundation of Marcella’s monastery in 386,87 in Augustine’s own ascetic tendencies,88 in Chrysostom’s 
                                                          
86 On the early dissemination of VA see especially Garitte, G., ‘Le text grec et les versions anciennes de la Vie de saint 
Antoine’, in Basilius Steidle (ed.), Antonius Magnus Eremita 356-1956, Studia Anselmiana 38 (Rome: Pontificium 
Institutum S. Anselmi, 1956), 1-13; cf. also Barnard, ‘The Date of the ‚Vita Antonii‛’, 169-70 and Bartelink, 
‘Introduction’, 68-70.  On the independent witness of Coptic material, see Garitte, G., ‘Panegyrique de saint Antoine 
par Jean, evêque d’Hermopolis’, OCP 9 (1943), 100-31 and 330-65.  On the early Latin translations, see Gandt, Lois, A 
Philological and Theological Analysis of the Ancient Latin Translations of the Vita Antonii (PhD:  Fordham, 2008), 1-55 and 
Mohrmann, Christine, ‘Note sur la version latine la plus ancienne de la Vie de saint Antoine par saint Athanase’, in 
Steidle (ed), Antonius Magnus Eremita, 35-44, who argues that the translation, though often close to the Greek text, is 
still interpretive. 
 
Renée Draguet (La Vie primitive de S. Antoine conserve en syriaque, CSCO 407-08 [Scriptores Syri 183-84] [Louvain:  
Peeters, 1980]) had argued that the Syriac version depended not on the Greek, but on a lost Coptic original.  From this 
claim flared up an argument concerning Athanasius’ authorship and the provenance of VA.  Against those like T.D. 
Barnes (‘Angel of Light or Mystic Initiate?  The Problem of the Life of Antony’, JTS ns 37:2 [1986]:  352-368) who 
argued that Athanasius had little if anything to do with VA.  Against this, Andrew Louth (‘St. Athanasius and the 
Greek Life of Antony’, JTS ns 39:2 [1988]:  504-509) argued convincingly from the theological content that Athanasius  
was at least an editor.  David Brakke (‘The Greek and Syriac Versions of the Life of Antony’, Le Museon 107:1 [1994], 29-
53) established firmly on linguistic grounds that the Syriac text does not betray a Coptic original but is, in all 
likelihood, a Fifth-century translation and redaction of Athanasius’ Greek original. 
87 Jerome, Epistulae, 127.5 
88 Confessiones 8.14-29 
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homilies,89 and in Sulpicius Severus’ popular and influential Vita Martini.  Of the Desert literature 
surveyed in this study, VA is explicitly or implicitly utilized in:  HM,90 HL,91 and AP.92  It was read in the 
sixth century, since Cyril of Scythopolis utilizes it in five of his biographies,93 including a reference in his 
Vita Euthymii to the memory of death94 and a vision of death in Vita Johannis Hesychastae.95  Barsanuphius 
and John were, at least, familiar with it,96 while Dorotheus’ first letter alludes to it.97  Thus, even if 
Climacus does not directly refer to VA, its influence can be felt in salient ways throughout the tradition in 
which he wrote. 
One might ask, though, why VA and nothing else?  Though it meets many the same criteria, I 
have not discussed Basil’s Asceticon because death does not feature very strongly in that work, and so it 
adds very little to the tradition on this theme.  This does not undercut my argument more generally, since 
it is hardly necessary that every author utilize death in the same way or even to the same extent.98  We 
encounter in VA—albeit only in seminis—many of the practices and concepts centring on death.  Likewise, 
I have ended Climacus’ ascetic genealogy with Antony and not with the martyrs because, while the 
martyr-literature bears on the topic and would enrich this study, it would require a full study of its own 
and, in any event, raise fundamental questions of continuity and self-understanding among late antique 
Christians, which need not concern us here.   
 
Conclusion 
 I have thus far laid out the material and hermeneutical considerations with which this study will 
approach John Climacus’ Ladder of Divine Ascent as well as the broader tradition of Greek ascetic 
                                                          
89 In Mattheum, 8 
90 E.g., HM 22.9 preserves VA 60.1:  its author paraphrases Antony’s vision of Amoun’s death.  HM 9.1’s tale of a 
δράκων recalls Athanasius’ language in VA  6.1 and 24.4.  So Russell in Lives of the Desert Fathers, 132 n. 1. 
91 HL 21.16-17 incorporates VA 66.1-5:  Palladius tells Antony’s vision of death. 
92 E.g., Arsenius 41 refers to VA 91.1:  Arsenius echoes Antony’s burial requests. 
93 Garitte, G., ‘Reminiscences de la Vie d’Antoine dans Cyrille de Scythopolis’, in Silloge Bizantine in honore di S.G. 
Mercati, Studia Bizantini e neoellenici 9 (Rome, 1957):  117-122; See also Roldanus, ‘Die Vita Antonii als Spiegel‘, 194-
98, 211-16.  For VA’s later influence, see Foscati, A., ‘‚Antonius maximus monachorum‛.  Testi e immagini di Antonio 
eremite nel Basso Medioevo’, in L. Canetti, et al. (eds), Studi di storia del cristianesimo.  Per Alba Maria Orselli,  Le 
Tessere 16 (Ravenna, 2008), 283-311. 
94  Vita Euthymii, 9 (Schwartz, p. 17, 14-15) echoes VA 5.6 and 19.3 
95 Vita Johannis Hesychastae, 17 (Schwartz, p. 215-16) redeploys VA 60.1 
96 QR 508 relies directly on VA 7.11-12. 
97 Epistula 1 (§181) alludes to VA 26; so Regnault, Lucien and de Préville, J., Dorothée de Gaza. Oeuvres spirituelles,  SC 
92 (Paris:  Éditions du Cerf, 1963), 492 n.1 
98 I will, however, discuss Basil as an influence on Barsanuphius, in Chapter Three.  
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literature.  I have argued especially that the Ladder is concerned with the cultivation of a particular 
Christian identity.  This purpose relies on and implicates a conception of human nature, which fact 
carries the hermeneutical consequence that, if we are to understand the ways in which Climacus 
conceives Christian identity, we must first expose his more existential assumptions as well as the 
organizing principles of his ascetic instruction.  By accomplishing this, we will be able to understand the 
full depth of Climacus’ ascetic spirituality and the breadth of his contribution to the Greek spiritual 
tradition. 
 I have elaborated three ways in which Climacus actively engages with traditional material.  He 
infrequently rejects, sometimes submits to, and consistently re-shapes traditional material.  His re-
shaping takes place through combination, interpolation, and adaptation (re-deployment in new contexts) 
of conceptual material and language drawn from ascetic literature.  Each of these modes of interaction 
contributes to the formation of a unique interpretation of ascetic spirituality as formative of a Christian 
identity.  I have also shown, however, that the literary tradition on which Climacus drew should not be 
thought of merely as source-material for his work.  Rather, it is a free-standing, vibrant, and living 
tradition, within which Climacus holds a place together with the material he re-shapes.  We do not set out, 
then, simply to interpret the Ladder, but, rather, to situate it and its author within a living tradition to 
which his work contributes, whether through rejection, submission, or reshaping.   
I have so far only gestured toward the specific topic of death, around which this study will be 
centred.  But, with these general hermeneutical principles in place, I will dedicate the first three chapters 
of this study to showing how a tradition was built up which drew attention to death as an event which is 
determinative of human life and as a symbol for the practices and achievements of Christian asceticism.  
In these chapters I shall be sensitive to the rough edges of tradition, and the frictive forces by which it is 
shaped over time.  I shall then argue that, for Climacus, death reveals humanity in its limitation and 
possibility, and will demonstrate that the event and concept of death (as both mortality and judgment) 
provides Climacus with the organizing logic of ascetic spirituality.  In doing so I will show how he draws 
together different strands of thought, resolves tensions, and crafts a coherent framework within which to 
consider ascetic spirituality that does not suffer from the ambiguities and ambivalences present in earlier 
literature.  Only thus will we be able to fully appreciate both the profundity of Climacus’ contribution 
and the ways in which tradition takes shape over time. 
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IV. THE VOCABULARY OF DEATH 
 
 Anthony Meredith once wrote, ‘Even the most philosophically self-conscious attempt to justify 
asceticism with the Church has never been able to forget the appeal to the words and example of Christ in 
the New Testament as a basis for its practice.’99  This final section inaugurates our study by describing 
key vocabulary and conceptual themes which Greek writers obtained from Scripture.  I will argue here 
that in some NT literature death as physical event is relativized to eschatological hopes and fears, and 
attention shifted from mortality to Christ’s universal judgment and the eternal destiny that judgment 
determines.  Second, I will show that in other literature death manifests the power of sin as well as the 
means by which Christ (and Christians) overcome it.  I will, in keeping with the concerns laid out above, 
conclude by noting other salient themes and terminology not connected in the NT with death or 
judgment but which ascetics will increasingly describe using language of death.   
 
The Event of Death 
Scripture does not use any one word to signify the phenomenon of death.  Generally, we 
encounter two kinds of vocabulary:  terms for ‘death,’ and terms for ‘destruction.’100  Both of these are 
opposed to words for ‘life’ or ‘living,’ (particularly ζωή).101  The commonest words for ‘dying’ are 
(συν)(ἀπο)θνῄσκω, and τελευτάω.102  The latter is rarer than the former and, though τελευτάω shares an 
etymological origin with τελειόω (‘to perfect’ or ‘make complete’), τελευτάω simply means to ‘come to 
the end [of one’s life].’103  Thus, τελευτῶν, ‘dying’, refers to the deterioration of the human being leading 
up to and culminating in death (Heb 11.22).  Σελευτάω and its related form τελευτή refer most generally 
to the cessation of physical life and, therefore, to death as an event which terminates or, at least, 
demarcates, physical existence.104   
                                                          
99 Meredith, Anthony, ‘Asceticism, Christian and Greek’, JTS ns 27:2 (1976), 331-32 
100 ‘Destruction’ (ὄλεθρος, φθείρω/φθορά, ἀπόλλυμι/ἀπωλεία) is only tangentially related to the topics under 
survey. 
101 S.v. θάνατος, TDNT 3:7-25 
102 The NT also uses κοιμᾶσθαι:  literally, ‘to fall asleep’ (e.g., John 11.11-13, 1 Cor 7.39).  Sleep and death were closely 
associated in Greek and Jewish thought and, as Bultmann notes (s.v. θάνατος, TDNT, 3:14 n60) both Homer and the 
rabbis could use ‘to fall asleep’ for ‘to die’ without intending any idea of afterlife, let alone physical resurrection.  Cf. 
John 11.11-13. 
103 S.v. τελευτάω, LSJ 
104 E.g., Gen 6.17, 27.2, Lev 24.16, Ezek 18.17, Mat 2.19, Mar 9.48, John 11.39, Act 7.15 
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Another curious word is ἔξοδος.  Though rare, its range of meaning is remarkable:  aside from 
the obvious reference to the departure of the Israelites from Egypt, it can mean, among many other 
things, death.105  Luke, for example, uses the term of Jesus’ death:  ‘Οἳ ὀφθέντες ἐν δόξῃ ἔλεγον τὴν 
ἔξοδον αὐτοῦ, ἣν ἤμελλεν πληροῦν ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ‘(9.31).  The context of the transfigured Jesus 
speaking with Moses and Elijah suggests an intentional reference to the Exodus narrative.  Though 
tempting to infer similar references elsewhere, this is generally unwarranted, and ἔξοδος simply means a 
‘departure’ and so ‘death.’  Ἔξοδος can refer to the departure of πνεῦμα from σάρξ (or σῶμα—the 
material portion of the human being), as in the following:  ...’παρακλήθητι ἐν αὺτῷ ἐν ἐξόδῳ 
πνεύματος αὐτοῦ’ (Sir 38.23).  Or it can refer to death generally as a person’s ‘departure’ from the life:  
‘΢πουδάσω δὲ ἑκάστοτε ἔχειν ὑμᾶς μετὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἔξοδον τὴν τούτων μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι’ (2 Pet 
1.15).106  By ἔξοδος authors intend ‘departure,’ though without any discernible consensus on what exactly 
that entails. 
Finally, there is Jesus Ben Sirach’s curious formulation of τὰ ἔσχατα, ‘end.’  While ἔσχατα is a 
common expression,107 Ben Sirach uniquely uses it thrice to refer to death: 
Ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις σου μιμνῄσκου τὰ ἔσχατά σου καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα οὐς ἁμαρτήσεις 
(7.36). 
 
Μνήσθητι τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ παῦσαι ἐχραίνων καταφθορὰν καὶ θάνατον καὶ ἔμμενε 
ἐντολαῖς (28.6). 
 
Μὴ δῷς εἰς λύπην τὴν καρδίαν σου ἀπόστησον αὐτὴν μνησθεὶς τὰ ἔσχατα (38.20). 
 
In these passages τὰ ἔσχατα refers to ‘death’ as ‘end of existence.’  Ben Sirach does not envision anything 
after death, whether an eschatological judgment or a post-mortem existence.  He says, rather, ‘μὴ 
ἐπιλάθῃ οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἐπάνοδος...μνήσθητι τὸ κρίμα μου ὅτι οὕτως καὶ τὸ σόν ἐμοὶ ἐχθὲς καὶ σοὶ 
σήμερον.  ἐν ἀναπαύσει νεκροῦ κατάπαυσον τὸ μνημόσυνον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακλήθητι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν 
ἐξόδῳ πνεύματος αὐτοῦ (38.21-23).  Thus, τὰ ἔσχατα must refer simply to that common κρίμα 
(‘sentence’) which is death and whose result is the νεκρός, the ‘dead body.’108  Nevertheless, as these 
same verses show, consciousness of death’s inevitability impinges on one’s manner of living:  protecting 
                                                          
105 Judges 5.27, Wis 3.2, 7.6; Sir 38.23, Luke 9.31, and 2 Peter 1.15 
106 Cf. Phil 1.23 and 2 Cor 5.8. 
107 The plural reflects LXX usage for ‘end’ or ‘final end’, as at 2 Sam 2.26, Lam 1.19, and Wis 2.16; or for ‘outcome’, as 
at Isa 41.22 and Dan 12.8; or even for ‘descendants’, as at Dan 11.4; or for ‘latter’ state or days, as at Job 8.7, 42.12, and 
Mat 12.45.     
108 Cf. Eccl 2.15-16. 
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from sin (7.36), helping to make peace (28.6), and lightening one’s heart in face of calamities (38.20).  Ben 
Sirach’s usage is not retained, as Christian authors apply radically different meanings to τὰ ἔσχατα and 
εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, neither of which, for them, refer to the present life but, rather, to eternity.  However, his 
ideas will resonate throughout the ascetic tradition.  Sirach 7.36 is the biblical foundation for the μνήμη 
τοῦ θανάτου, the ‘memory of death’, which will be so vital to ascetic authors.   
 Something similar was prevalent in Greco-Roman philosophical circles and it is even possible 
that Ben Sirach, a Hellenistic Jew of Alexandria, was influenced by philosophers’ ‘μελέτη τοῦ θανάτου.’  
Pierre Hadot discussed at some length the practice and perceived benefit of so-called ‘spiritual exercises’ 
in antiquity, arguing that Christian ascetical practices owed much to these.109  In particular he found in 
προσοχή, ‘attentiveness’ (usually to oneself), a concept which fared well among Christians.  For Stoics 
and Platonists alike, the philosopher sought to see himself as he really was and to discern how he did and 
ought to obey the supreme principle, whether θεός, λόγος, or φύσις.110  Προσοχή, Hadot argues, 
‘suppose une continuelle concentration sur le moment présent, qui doit être vécu comme s’il était à la fois 
le premier et le dernier.’111  Thus, attention to oneself means also attention to one’s death, because humans, 
being mortal, live always under the shadow of their own mortality which is natural, reasonable, and 
distinguishes humans from gods.  Indeed, Hadot characterizes the ‘spiritual exercises’ of philosophers as 
existential.  He says, ‘...ces exercices veulent réalise une transformation de la vision du monde et une 
métamorphose de l’être.  Ils ont donc une valeur, non seulement morale, mais existentielle.  Il ne s’agit 
pas d’un code do bonne conduite, mais d’une manier d’être au sens le plus fort du terme.’112  That is, the 
Socratic ‘μελέτη τοῦ θανάτου,’ the ‘practice of death,’ helped the philosopher to live a life whose goals 
and habits accorded rationally to the fact and consequences of his mortality.113  Thus, a practice vital to 
ascetics has its genealogy from philosophical exercises and Scriptural admonitions, both of which would 
be interpreted through Christian perspectives on death. 
 
 
                                                          
109 Hadot, Hadot, Pierre, ‘Exercices spirituels antique et « philosophie chrétienne »’, in his Exercices spirituels et 
philosophie antique, (Paris:  Études Augustiniennes, 1981), 60-63 
110 Ibid., 63 
111 Ibid., 65 
112 Ibid., 60 
113 See especially Epictetus, Enchiridion, 21; Marcus Aurelius, Σὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν, 2.11.  See also any who took up Socrates’ 
definition of philosophy as μελέτη τοῦ θανάτου (Phaedo 81a):  e.g., Chrysippus, SVF 3.786 and Iamblichus, 
Protrepticus, pp. 13, 100, 115, 119. 
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Definitions Physical and Metaphorical 
For ‘death’, Scripture usually uses (ἀπο)θνῄσκω, ‘to die’, and its related noun, θάνατος, ‘death.’  
Neither NT nor LXX gives an explicit definition of θάνατος or related words.  Rather, we must, as early 
Christians did, look outside the range of Scripture to the definition of death dominant in the Greco-
Roman world:  ‘χωρισμὸς ψυχ῅ς ἀπὸ σώματος,’ the ‘separation of soul from body.’114  This definition 
became normative also for Christian writers115 and is employed in those rare moments in ascetic literature 
which gesture toward defining death.116  What χωρισμός might entail—whether the ψυχή would 
continue to exist eternally or only for some time, or not at all; whether it could still function at all, or even 
function better, without the σῶμα; whether death meant the complete destruction of a particular human 
being or simply of the material portion; whether χωρισμός means release or dismemberment—hardly 
found consensus.  Indeed, the ways in which philosophers filled out the details of χωρισμός implicated 
their cosmological and anthropological ideas more broadly, and these vary widely between schools, eras, 
and cultural milieus. 
Because the common definition left so much in doubt, alternative definitions were deployed by 
Jewish and Christian thinkers with a vested interest in the immortality of the soul.  These definitions 
suggested that the soul, being ἀθάνατος, can suffer something analogous to what the entire human, 
being θνητός (at least with regard to the σῶμα φθαρτόν), suffers in physical death.  For example, Philo, 
attempting to explain why, given God’s stern warning in Genesis 2, Adam and Eve in fact did not die 
upon eating the forbidden fruit, argues that the term is equivocal:  ‘For death is twofold *διττός+:  of a 
person [ἀνθρώπου+ and, properly, of the soul *ψυχ῅ς ἴδιος]:  while death of a person is ‚separation of 
soul from body‛ *χωρισμός ἐστι ψυχ῅ς ἀπὸ σώματος], death of a soul is corruption of virtue [ἀρετ῅ς 
                                                          
114 True of Platonists, Stoics and Epicureans, as well as their common descendants:  e.g., Plato, Phaedo 67D; Zeno, SVF 
1.146 and Chrysippus, SVF 2.604, 2.790; Plutarch, Moralia 1052C; Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragmenta, 37; Philo, Legum 
Allegoriarum 1.105, De Abrahamo 258; Iamblichus, Protrepticus, p. 65; Plotinus, Enneads 3.6.5.20; Sextus Empiricus, 
Adversus mathematicos 7.234; Alexander of Aphrodisius, Problemata 3.11; etc. 
 
Aristotle only discusses θάνατος briefly in his medical works, defining it as a cooling of interior heat or cessation of 
respiration—the loss of vital energy—and the corruption that accompanies that loss.  See De respiratione, 472a, 479b; 
Problemata, 909b. 
115 Matthew 10.28 hints at it, but see  e.g., Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 4.3.12.5, 7.12.71.3; Origen, Contra Celsum, 
7.5; Epiphanius, Panarion, 2.30.8 Gregory of Nyssa, De iis qui baptismum differunt PG 46:424B; Nemesius of Emesa, De 
natura hominis 2; John of Damascus, Expositio Fidei, 72; etc. 
116 E.g., Ps-Macarius, Collectio H, 22; Theophilus 4; Cyril of Scythopolis, Vita Joannis Hesychastae, 17; Evagrius, 
Practicus, 52.  Climacus offers no definition of death. 
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μὲν φθορά] and reception of evil [κακίας ἀνάληψις+.’117  Alexandrian Christian authors, familiar with 
Philo’s move, similarly multiplied definitions of θάνατος to incorporate not only the cessation of 
physical existence which was, for them, of only limited import, but also a more worrisome ‘death of the 
soul.’  Clement of Alexandria would boldly invert thanatological language, ‘One could dare to say that, 
while death *θάνατος+ is the participation of a sin-prone soul in a body [ἡ ἐν σώματι κοινωνία τ῅ς 
ψυχ῅ς ἁμαρτητικ῅ς οὔσης+, life is separation *χωρισμὸς+ from sin.’118  Clement uses θάνατος to describe 
a sinful state of being, and ζωή to describe freedom from it.  Origen would make similar assertions, 
when, describing how the Holy Spirit is called ‘life-creating’, he compares it to Paul’s remark that ‘the 
letters kills, but the spirit makes alive’ (2 Cor 3.6).  Origen then asserts that ‘the ‚letter kills‛ and works 
death, not as the separation of the soul from the body, but as the separation of the soul from God and his 
Lord and his Holy Spirit.’119  Here Origen shows his acceptance of the common definition of death, but 
suggests that, in relation to God, there is a different kind of state which might also be called by the name 
θάνατος.  In these examples, the standard definition of death is accepted (at least implicitly), but its 
primary claim—that death means a separation of normally united elements—applied to the soul’s status 
with regard to God, truth, or virtue.  Writers thus attempted to elucidate the consequences of death in 
spiritual terms as well as physical.  The ascetic writers we will survey will also liberally apply the term 
θἀνατος to vices which damage the soul or to a separation from God, even while envisioning a ‘death’ 
which positively contributes to Christian identity.120 
 
Death and Disclosure 
In the LXX θάνατος is sometimes personified,121 sometimes a natural event,122 sometimes a 
metaphor for great suffering,123 often the consequence of divine judgment,124 even an expression of the 
                                                          
117 Legum allegoriarum 1.105-06, cf. 2.77; on which see Zeller, D., 'The Life and Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria:  
The Use and Origin of a Metaphor', Studia Philonica Annual 7(1995):  19-55. 
118 Stromateis 4.3.12.1 
119 Origen, Commentarium in Ioannem, 13.23.140:  ‘αὶ γὰρ τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει καὶ ἐμποιεῖ θάνατον, οὐ τὸν κατὰ 
τὸν χωρισμὸν τ῅ς ψυχ῅ς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸν κατὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τ῅ς ψυχ῅ς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦ 
κυρίου αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.‘ 
120 ‘Ὁ θάνατος ὁ δεύτερος’, ‘the second death’ (Rev 2.11, 20.6, 20.14, 21.8) is not used by these, and in the literature 
under survey I find only one reference (QR 233) and there without comment. 
121 Hos 13.14, Hab 2.5, Sir 41.1-2, Job 18.13; cf. 2 Kgds 22.5, Prov 7.27, etc. 
122 Gen 3.19, 18.27; Eccl 12.7.  See on OT theology of death generally, Bailey, Lloyd R., Sr.:  Biblical Perspectives on 
Death, Overtures to Biblical Theology (Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1979), 58f, 109-110.  On the Eden episode see 
47 
 
moral character of one’s life.125  Death may not have been a good thing, but neither was it necessarily a 
bad one:  death was a fact of life.  For NT writers, the situation looked rather different.  Paul, for example, 
sees death disclosing the limitations imposed on humanity through sin, while Matthew refers it the 
eternal resolution of human existence in Christ’s eschatological judgment.  For John, while death is 
terrible, even tragic (11.34, 12.27), it in no way disrupts the life which Jesus offers (11.25-27).126  For such 
writers, death can only be a good or bad thing, and, if ever it is neutralized, as Matthew’s or John’s 
Gospels might suggest, it is only with reference to a more fearful prospect in eternity127 or an eternal hope 
realized in the present.128  Ascetics, to put it very generally, also concerned with the spiritual ‘meaning’ of 
death, take ideas of eschatological judgment from Matthew, and their focus on death as symbol of fallen 
and saved humanity from Paul.  While the modern critic would be in no danger of confusing these two 
strands of thought, patristic readers would, through creative readings, combine them without rejecting 
either.  I will, therefore, lay out these strands of thought without attempting to adjudicate or synthesize.  
We will, in the chapters which follow, see the ways that Matthew and Paul’s ideas, if not always their 
words, resonate through ascetic literature. 
 
Death and Judgment 
 Because it was conceived as the cessation of human existence, θάνατος could give Job hope for 
rest after his torment (Job 3.13-16), remind Ben Sirach not to worry so much, or could, conversely, cause 
the Teacher to toy with nihilism (Eccl 2.15-20).  In the Pentateuchal and Historical narratives what 
mattered was that death be natural, in old age, and that one be buried and ‘gathered to one’s people.’129  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
especially Barr, James, The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality:  The Reed-Tuckwell Lectures for 1990 (London:  
SCM, 1992), 1-20. 
123 Pss 17.5-6, 106.18, 114.3, etc.; cf. Rom 7.12-25. 
124 Gen 2.17, 6.7; Exod 12.29, 32.28; 2 Kgds 6.7; etc.; so also in some NT writings—Acts 5.1-11; cf. Luke 13.1-5.  This is 
most especially true for Paul (Rom 5.12-21), on which more below. 
125 Bailey (Biblical Perspectives on Death, 47-52, 77-80) confines this distinction to older strata of literature, seeing it 
subverted in Wisdom literature and fully reversed in Christian martyr literature as well as passages like 1 Cor 4.9-13 
and Luke 21.16.  This does not deny the validity of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ death, but simply changes the criteria rather 
drastically.  See also Johnston, Philip S., Shades of Sheol:  Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (Downer’s Grove, IA:  
Intervarsity, 2002), 39-46 
126 See Bailey, Biblical Perspectives on Death, 51-52; Clark-Soles, Jaime, Death and the Afterlife in the New Testament  (New 
York:  T&T Clark, 2006), 122-138; and Rowland, Christopher, ‘The Eschatology of the New Testament Church’, in 
Jerry L. Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology (Oxford:  OUP, 2008), 66 
127 Mat 5.22:  ‘ἡ γέεννα τοῦ πυρός’ 
128 John 17.3:  ‘ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή’ 
129 Johnston, Shades of Sheol, 26-27, 33-35 
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To wish for more than peaceful oblivion was unknown and to expect any fate other than that which 
befalls all mortals was absurd.  Not so in Matthew’s narrative.  He writes, ‘Καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἀποκτενόντων τὸ σῶμα, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι· φοβήθητε δὲ μᾶλλον τὸν 
δυνάμενον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀπολέσαι ὲν γεέννῃ’ (10.28).  For him, therefore, physical 
death—which affects only the body—is much less important than the possibility of eternal and total 
destruction ‘ἐν γεέννῃ.’130  Death’s meaning is, therefore, ultimately referable to an eschatological fate. 
How does this terrible fate come about?  We learn that ‘Ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν 
τῆ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄγγελοι μετ΄ αὐτοῦ, τότε...συναχθήσονται ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ 
ἔθνη, καὶ ἀφορίσει αὐτοὺς ἀπ΄ ἀλλήλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιμὴν ἀφορίζει τὰ πρόβατα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρίφων’ 
(25.31-32).  The all-important event is the eschatological and universal judgment of Christ at which all 
will be divided into their two possible destinies:  beatitude with Christ or torment in Gehenna.  In this 
moment all secrets are revealed (10.27) and God takes account of actions.131  Elsewhere, Matthew (6.4; cf. 
Heb 4.13) suggests (following 1Kgds 16.7) that God’s gaze even now penetrates appearances.  Yet it is 
only in his eschatological judgment that all will see clearly what God sees now—thus the surprise of both 
the sheep and the goats Matthew 25.  The goats are dismissed and sheep welcomed because of their 
ethical habits:  feeding the hungry, aiding the poor, visiting prisoners, etc.  The surprise is that Jesus’ 
judgment reveals even the most apparently banal actions as divinely significant:  ‘Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐφ΄ 
ὅσον ἐποιήσατε ἑνὶ τούτων τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου τῶν ἐλαχίστων, ἐμοὶ ἐποιήσατε‘ (25.40).132  The myriads 
of different human lives, the numerous shades of goodness, resolve into the only two possibilities which 
remain when nothing is kept secret and the implications of every action fully understood.133  The 
revelation of Christ makes death refers not primarily to mortality, but to Christ’s judgment and the 
destiny it determines, which lies beyond the grave and is based one how one lives presently.  The terror 
                                                          
130 See also Mark 9.43-49 (with Byzantine variants).  On which see Metzger, Bruce, Textual Commentary on the New 
Testament (2nd ed.; Stuttgart:  Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994), 86-87. 
131 So also Luke 12.3 
132 Paul also speaks of (probably) eschatological judgment (in one of the very few instances that he could be said to 
speak of it at all) in terms of actions as well:  ‘Ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον φανερὸν γενήσεται, ἡ γὰρ ἡμέρα δηλώσει, ὅτι ἐν 
πυρὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται· καὶ ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον ὁποῖόν ἐστιν τὸ πῦρ δοκμάσει...Εἴ τινος τὸ ἔργον κατακαήσεται, 
ζημιωθήσεται· αὐτὸς δὲ σωθήσεται, οὕτως δὲ ὡς διὰ πυρός’ (1 Cor 3.13, 15).  On which see Clark-Soles, Death and 
Afterlife, 82-83. 
133 Clark-Soles, Death and Afterlife, 188-90 
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facing humans, therefore, is not the physical event of death but eternal ‘destruction’—which is itself 
understood as a more complete form of ‘death.’134 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen the μνήμη τοῦ θανάτου, which, for Ben Sirach, referred primarily to the fact of 
mortality.  Christian ascetics would interpret Ben Sirach’s verses through descriptions of eschatological 
judgment such as Matthew’s.  In doing so, they would fill out θάνατος with eschatological content, such 
that its ‘memory’ refers most especially to ‘judgment’ and only secondarily to ‘mortality.’  Memory of 
death still motivates certain patterns of behaviour, but now these must accord particularly with the 
criteria of judgment.135  Thus, for example, when Jesus counsels the removal of every stumbling block 
external or internal, since ‘καλόν ἐστίν σε κυλλὸν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν’ than to go intact ‘...εὶς τὴν 
γέενναν, εὶς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον, ὅπου ὁ σκώληξ αὐτῶν οὺ τελευτᾷ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται’ (Mark 
9.43-44), this must be weighed against Jesus’ demand that ‘Εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρός με καὶ οὐ μισεῖ τὸν 
πατέρα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τὰς ὰδελφὰς ἔτι 
τε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, οὺ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής’ (Luke 14.26).136  The relativization of physical 
death to eschatological judgment makes possible a perspective within which total renunciation of the 
present life—insofar as it presents an obstacle—is desirable.  This understanding of the world will inform 
ascetic ‘μνήμη τοῦ θανάτου.’ 
 
Mortality, Sin, and their Solution 
 Another trend in NT writings—confined to Paul and his pseudonymous successors137—is to treat 
physical death as an expression of the condition of sin.  Death enters the world through the sin of Adam 
                                                          
134 NT writers commonly use ἀπόλλυμι/ἀπωλεία, which can refer to any ‘loss’ or ‘destruction’, to refer to the end of 
sinners (Mat 7.13, Phil 3.19, Heb 10.39, 2 Pet 3.7).  Paul (1 Cor 1.18, 2 Cor 2.15; cf. Jame 4.12) opposes ἀπολλυμένοι to 
σῳζομένοι, thus suggesting a binary analogous to Matthew’s description of judgment.  One is either ‘saved’ or ‘lost’ 
and, at least in Matthew, this ‘destruction’ must be understood as an ongoing separation from Christ, ‘εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ 
αἰώνιον ἡτοιμασμένον τῷ διαβόλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ’ (25.41).  So Clark-Soles, Death and Afterlife, 73. 
135 So notes Rowland, ‘Eschatology of the New Testament’, 60 
136 Cf. also Luke 9.62, Mat 16.24, etc. 
137 Generally, scholars aver Pauline authorship only of Romans, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Philippians, 
Philemon, and 1 Thessalonians.  They refer to more dubious letters as ‘Duetero-Pauline’:  Ephesians, Colossians, 2 
Thessalonians.  They refer to the Pastorals as ‘Pseudo-Pauline’:  1 and 2 Timothy, Titus.  I have no intention of 
entering that fray.  I will accept it as writ that Paul’s authorship is contested for many letters but will, for the sake of 
brevity, speak as though Paul himself wrote them. 
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and, since all sin (Rom 3.23), all die (5.12).  In Paul’s cosmology, sin is not merely a kind of action (though 
it is that); it is also a malevolent force which holds humanity in thrall.138  Sin’s power is expressed through 
mortality:  ‘...ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ’ (5.21a).  Thus, Paul can apply ‘death’ as a 
description of the life of those bound by sin (Eph 2.1, Col 2.13).139  However, death’s sinister force is only 
revealed by Christ and, most especially, his death.  But Paul sees this as uniquely vivifying because it 
ended in a resurrection which Paul sees as the type and guarantee of a universal resurrection:  ‘Ἐπειδὴ 
γὰρ δι΄ ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, καὶ δι’ ἀνθρώπου ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν (1 Cor 15.21).140  Jesus is no longer 
held by the power of sin because he has died (Rom 6.10, 7.1-6) and yet, by his resurrection, the 
constricting potency of death was utterly nullified (cf. Rom 8.37-38, 1 Cor 3.22) and the power of his 
resurrection extends to all who will receive it.  Thus we see Paul’s emphasis on the σταυρὸς τοῦ Φριστοῦ 
as the manifestation of the power of God (1 Cor 1.18) as the means of salvation (Eph 2.16, Col 1.20) and as 
the procurement, by death, of life (1 Cor 15.21).  This means that death is revealed as an ‘ἐχθρός’ (1 Cor 
15.28) only because it has been ‘conquered’ by Christ’s own death, the rule of sin broken and Christ exalted 
that he might rule over ‘καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων’  (Rom 14.9). 
 The upshot is that, as C. Clifton Black argues, Paul’s understanding of death comes primarily 
from his understanding of Christ.141  Thus, although death expresses sin, it also becomes the means by 
which believers receive life.  More than that, ‘death’ becomes a mode of ‘life.’  Believers are called to a 
kind of ‘death’ themselves, but one which is in accordance with Christ’s, and not the end of sinners.142  
Thus, Paul describes baptism ‘ἐις Φριστόν’ as baptism ‘εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ’ (Rom 6.3).  However, 
elsewhere, he reminds his readers that ‘ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Φριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Φριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε’ (Gal 
3.27).  To put on Christ—to become like Christ, which, as I have already pointed out, is Climacus’ 
definition of the Christian—means in some way to die not only like but with Christ.  Baptism into his death 
means that believers have the opportunity of living free, beyond the reach of death and sin, because they 
                                                          
138 Rom 3.9, Gal 4.3; cf. Heb 2.14-15; on which see Cousar, Charles, A Theology of the Cross:  The Death of Jesus in the 
Pauline Letters, Overtures to Biblical Theology (Minneapolis:  Fortress, 1990), 57; and Tannehill, Robert, Dying and 
Rising with Christ:  A Study in Pauline Theology, Beiheift zur Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und 
die Kunde der älteren Kirche 32 (Berlin:  Walter de Gruyter, 1966), 124 
139 Cf. Heb 6.1, 9.14; Jam 2.17, 2.26 
140 Cousar, Theology of the Cross, 88-109. 
141 ‘Pauline Perspectives on Death in Romans 5-8’, Journal of Biblical Literature 103:3 (1984), 413-433. 
142 Cousar, Theology of the Cross, 157-64 
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live toward a resurrection like Christ’s which allows them to live with Christ.143  Paul’s words are worth 
repeating on this point:   
συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτί σωματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη 
Φριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τ῅ς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζω῅ς 
περιπατήσωμεν. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τ῅ς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα· τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος 
συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα καταργηθῆ τὸ σῶμα τ῅ς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῆ 
ἁμαρτίᾳ· ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τ῅ς ἁμαρτίας. εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν 
Φριστῷ, πιστεύομεν ὅτι καὶ συζήσομεν αὐτῷ. (Rom 6.4-8) 
 
Believers exist now in a state of ‘death’, having been buried and looking forward to a future 
resurrection.144  Paul compares this state to a καινὴ κτίσις (2 Cor 5.17), a new person (Col 3.10), entirely 
free of the constraints and demands of his παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, his σάρξ (Gal 5.24) which, like his 
relationship to the world, has been ‘ἐσταύρωται’ (Gal 6.14).   
Believers can, therefore, happily face all manner of suffering, knowing that ‘οὐκ ἄξια τὰ 
παθήματα τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθ῅ναι εἰς ἡμᾶς’ (Rom 8.18).  As we 
saw with Matthew, believers gaze beyond death to the eschatological hope which overshadows and 
displaces the present life.  On this account, they can accept as trivial or, perhaps, even beneficial, 
whatever trials come, ‘πάντοτε τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι περιφέροντες, ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ 
Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν φανερωθῆ’ (2 Cor 4.10).  Thus, suffering now actually helps constitute future 
blessings.145  Death now, life later—or, to put it differently, alive now in spirit while dead in body (Rom 
8.10, 2 Cor 4.16), alive at the resurrection in glorified body and spirit (1 Cor 15.51-54).   
New life, severed from the constraints of sin yet still subject to mortality, carries an important 
ethical component.  Paul exhorts his readers, since they have died to sin, not to allow it a place in their 
bodies (Rom 6.11-13) and, therefore, ‘Νεκρώσατε οὖν τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τ῅ς γ῅ς’ (Col 3.5).  The believer 
who, like Paul, would imitate Christ (1 Cor 11.1, Eph 5.1, 1 Thess 1.6) must act the part—he does not sin 
because of his freedom (Gal 2.16-19) or in order to receive God’s gift afresh (Rom 6.1).  Rather, he 
remembers Paul’s injunction that ‘εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζ῅τε, μέλλετε ἀποθνῄσκειν· εἰ δὲ πνεύματι τὰς 
πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε, ζήσεσθε’ (Rom 8.13).146  If sinful acts lead ‘to death,’ render a person 
‘dead in sins,’ and are themselves ‘dead works,’ then only by a process of severance analogous to death, 
                                                          
143 So argues Tannehill (Dying and Rising with Christ, 14-20). 
144 Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 15; and 2 Tim 2.11 quotes the saying as ‘πιστός.’ 
145 See Cousar, Theology of the Cross, 150-51 
146 See also Rowland, ‘Eschatology of the New Testament’, 60-61 
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does a person live.  A metaphorical death, therefore, allows believers to receive God’s gift of life 
predicated on Christ’s life-giving death. 
 
Conclusion 
 Paul opens up a second important mode of engaging with death.  Here, death can express both 
the condition of sin and the life of the Christian.  The former allows Paul to describe nonbelievers and 
their lifestyles as ‘dead.’  The latter allows Paul to describe Christians as ‘dead’, but rests implicitly on the 
reversal which Christ’s death effected, delimiting death and offering resurrection to humans.  Believers 
look forward to resurrection but, for the moment, live in a state of tension, a kind of living burial, dead as 
far as the world or even their own bodies are concerned.  They are free from the constraints of sin—and 
therefore ‘dead’ to it—but not from mortality—and therefore ‘dead’ in their bodies.147  This line of 
thought will be important as well for ascetic writers, providing a theologically symbolic framework of 
thanatological imagery within which to conceive Christian ascetic lifestyles. 
 
Advanced Vocabulary Lessons 
 Having looked at two lines of thought about death in the NT from which spring ascetic emphases 
on ‘memory of death’ and ‘practice of death,’ I will enumerate five other concepts which those authors 
would draw from the NT.  Although the NT does not describe any of these in terms of ‘death’, per se, 
ascetics would increasingly use thanatological language for them.  To begin with, the NT emphasizes 
(ἀπ)ἄρνησις, ‘self-denial.’  In a statement which ascetics never tire of quoting, Jesus tells those who 
would follow him, ‘Εἴ τις θέλει ὀπίσω μου ἐλθεῖν, ἀπαρνησάσθω ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀράτω τὸν σταυρὸν 
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθείτω μοι’ (Mat 16.24).148  Though similar to Paul’s statements above, here the 
emphasis on ἀπάρνησις, ‘denial’ of oneself, is explicit:  to die with Christ is to willingly relinquish one’s 
own desires, choices, anything which might hold back.  The idea of self-denial here enshrined will be of 
universal importance for ascetics as regards the θέλημα, ‘will.’ 
 Then there is ‘non-judgment’:  Μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθ῅τε, ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε 
κριθήσεσθε, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν’ (Mat 7.1-2).  Judgment, as we have seen 
above, belongs to Christ, and so arrogating that function to oneself Amounts to hubris which will, in 
                                                          
147 Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ, 76-77, 85, 130 
148So Mark 8.34, Luke 9.23  
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Christ’s eschatological judgment, be turned against the usurper.  Nevertheless, Jesus’ call to non-
judgment does not preclude all ‘discernment’—‘διακρίνειν’ is praised (Mat 16.3, 1 Cor 6.5, 14.29) and 1 
John commands people to ‘δοκιμάζειν τὰ πνεύματα’ (4.1).  Certainly, both sides—refusal to judge 
others, and a strong emphasis on διάκρισις, ‘discernment’—come together in ascetic thought, particularly 
by turning judgment against oneself, as Paul exhorts: ‘Εἰ δὲ ἑαυτοὺς διεκρίνομεν, οὐκ ἅν ἐκρινόμεθα (1 
Cor 11.31). 
 We note also πένθος, ‘mourning,’ and λυπή, ‘sadness.’  In the NT, the former is rare and 
negative (Luke 6.25).  The latter is important to Paul, who says, ‘νῦν χαίρω, οὐχ ὅτι ἐλυπήθητε ἀλλ’ ὅτι 
ἐλυπήθηετε εἰς μετάνοιαν· ἐλυπήθητε γὰρ κατὰ θεόν, ἵνα ἐν μηδενὶ ζημιωθπητε ἐξ ἡμῶν.  ἡ γὰρ 
κατὰ θεὸν λύπη μετάνοιαν εἰς σωτηρίαν ἀμεταμέλητον ἐργάζεται· ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου λύπη θάνατον 
κατεργάζεται (2 Cor 7.9-10).  Paul makes a crucial distinction here between ‘godly sorrow’ which 
‘operates repentance’ and ‘worldly sorrow’ which ‘operates death.’  There is, then, a kind of sorrow, 
perhaps even of ‘mourning,’ (1 Thess 4.13)149 which is not only acceptable but actually conducive to that 
fundamental and universally acknowledged virtue, μετάνοια.   
Μετάνοια, however, is a kind of first movement toward God and away from the world, or sin, or 
oneself.  As the author of Hebrews says:  ‘Διὸ ἀφέντες τὸν τ῅ς ἀρχ῅ς τοῦ Φριστοῦ λόγον ἐπὶ τελειότητα 
φερώμεθα, μὴ πάλιν θεμέλιον καταβαλλόμενοι μετανοίας ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων καὶ πίστεως ἐπὶ θεόν 
(6.1).150  Nevertheless, as a θεμέλιος, μετάνοια is ever-present, and must characterize one’s actions over 
which one will be judged (Mat 3.8, Acts 26.20).  While Paul does not elaborate on his distinction between 
repentance-bearing and death-working λυπαί, ascetic literature—especially following Evagrius—will use 
λυπή to refer to that ‘worldly sorrow’ which leads to death, associating it with ἀκηδία, ‘restless 
indifference’, and ἀνελπιστία, ‘despair.’151  In place of Paul’s ‘λυπὴ κατὰ θεόν’ ascetic literature will 
deploy πένθος and δάκρυα, ‘tears’ as the result and source of μετάνοια. 
 
                                                          
149 As Clark-Soles, Death and Afterlife, 101; pace Barclay, J.M.G., ‘‚That you may not grieve, like the rest who have no 
hope‛ (1 Thess 4:13):  Death and Early Christian Identity’, in Morna D. Hooker (ed.), Not in the Word Alone:  the First 
Epistle to the Thessalonians (Rome:  Benedicta Publishing, 2003), 131-153. 
150 Cf. Luke 24.47, Rom 2.4, 2 Tim 2.25 
151 In fact, Evagrius claims that λυπή and ἀκηδία are σύμφοιτοι (Vitiis, PG 79:1141D).  In some works, Evagrius does 
preserve the Pauline semantics as, for example, at Eulogius, 6-8 (PG 79:1101D-1104D) and Spiritibus (Recensio B), 5.19-
20.  However, more generally he will make of λύπη a wholly negative vice:  Vitiis 3 (PG 1141D-1141A), Practicus 10, 
19; Monachos 56, Rationes 5 (PG 40:1257A), etc.  Generally, then, the same distinction continues to operate, whether or 
not under the same semantics.  
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Humility, Obedience, and Love 
The five virtues I have discussed, self-denial, mourning, repentance, discernment, and non-
judgment flow into the final and, for ascetic writers, probably greatest virtue available to those who 
would be like Christ:  ταπείνωσις, ‘humility’.  Σαπείνωσις appears in the NT primarily in its verbal 
form, ‘ταπεινόω.’  In the Gospels, Jesus says:  ὅστις δὲ ὑψώσει ἑαυτὸν ταπεινωθήσεται καὶ ὅστις 
ταπεινώσει ἑαυτὸν ὑψωθήσεται’ (Mat 23.12).152  The implication of such statements is that by self-
deprecation of some kind (cf. Luke 18.9-14) one becomes open to aid by which God effects an exaltation 
(cf. Luke 14.7-14).   
It is no surprise, then, that with ταπείνωσις goes ὑπακοή, ‘obedience.’  Ὑπακοή is very often to 
God’s ἐντολαί, ‘commands.’153  Obedience, in the NT, specifies humility’s ‘submission to God’ by means 
of the twin Mosaic commandments to love:  God with a whole heart (Deut 6.5), and one’s neighbour as 
oneself (Lev 19.18).154  While these commands are taken from the LXX, the Gospel writers focus on 
broadening a concept of ‘neighbour’ to include not only one’s friends, kin, or co-religionists, but 
‘enemies’ (Mat 5.44, Luke 6.27), ‘persecutors’ (Rom 12.14), and even a complete reversal of the concept 
(Luke 10.25-37).   
The wider definition of obedience as love has important ramifications for Christian identity, 
which will exercise the imaginations of many ascetic writers.  For example, Paul will find none of the 
distinctions in Christ which kept people from being ‘neighbours’, whether social, cultural, or even genetic 
(Gal 3.28, Col 3.10-11).  Likewise, in the Johannine writings, love motivates and is characterized by 
obedience, as Jesus told his disciples:  Ἐὰν ἀγαπᾶτέ με, ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐμὰς τηρήσετε’ (John 14.15; cf. 2 
John 1.6).  There, Jesus’ ‘commands’, though, are to love (13.34) and give oneself for others (John 15.10-
13).  Obedient self-giving takes place according to Jesus’ own example, and so love, through obedience, 
makes one like him.  Similarly, Paul writes of Christ, ‘ἀλλ’ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν 
ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν 
γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ’ (Phil 2.8).  This verse—another favourite 
among ascetics—draws together in Christ’s example of obedience both self-giving and humility, with 
death as the only limit to each.  Ascetics would treasure Christ-like ταπείνωσις as a preeminent virtue, 
                                                          
152 The opposition of humbling and being exalted is almost proverbial in NT writings:  Luke 18.14, 2 Cor 11.7, Phil 2.6-
11, Jam 4.10, 1 Pet 5.6. 
153 E.g., Mat 5.19, 19.17; John 10.18; 1 John 5.2 
154 Mat 22.36-40, Mark 12.29-31, John 13.34-35, Rom 13.9, 1 John 3.23; cf. Luke 18.20-21 
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and ὑπακοή as the necessary means of achieving it.  While they will recognize various motivations—fear 
of punishment, hope of reward—they will honor ἀγάπη of God and neighbor above all others—ὑπακοή 
is only perfected in ἀγάπη, and only through that does ταπείνωσις raise one up to heaven. 
 
Conclusion:  Memory and Metaphor 
From Matthew we have seen that the end of physical existence is rather less important than the 
consequences of Christ’s eschatological and universal judgment.  Eschatological focus effectively 
relativizes physical death and motivates—whether through fear or hope—patterns of behaviour which 
will be in keeping with the judgment to come.  One strives to become the sort of person whom, having 
served everyone as though they were Christ, is united to him in the Kingdom, and not the sort who, 
having ignored him in this life, will be shut out in the next.  This is the death Greek ascetics ‘remember’, 
and for which they prepare—the judgment into which one enters precisely through death. 
For ascetic readers, this line of thought operates in conjunction with the Pauline metaphors of 
death.  Thus, death—physical death at that—symbolizes the destructive power of sin as well as the 
saving power of God in Christ.  Death reveals the tragic position of humanity only insofar as it is already 
conquered and those limitations destroyed by Christ—only because it is already, in a sense, rendered 
indifferent, is it also revealed as powerful.  Because of this, Paul’s writings use death as the point of 
contact between present and future ages, and suggest its deployment as a metaphor for the unique ways 
in which Christian identity is formed in conscious contradistinction to the normative ethics and 
limitations of the world at large.  Thus, Paul can describe as ‘dead’ those under sin and those who live in 
Christ. 
 Nevertheless, I would stress that the literature which we will examine in coming chapters rarely 
operates along semantic lines.  The vocabulary of death is insufficient to understand the conceptualities of 
death.  Ascetic identity will include virtues of self-denial, discernment, non-judgment, mourning, 
repentance, obedience, humility, and love.  While they do not connect to death in the NT, ascetic writers 
increasingly use the language of ‘dying’ to oneself and others to describe these virtues and practices.  
And it is that kind of perspectival shift, incorporating seemingly unrelated practices and 
conceptualizations into a symbolic framework derived from death, which is of particular interest for this 
study.   
 I turn now to the ascetics themselves, to show how ‘memory of death’ and metaphorical practice 
of death play out in the body of literature leading up to and including the Ladder of Divine Ascent.
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1. VITA ANTONII 
 
 
 
 
Ὅτι θανάτῳ ἀποθανούμεθα καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ καταφερόμενον ἐπὶ τ῅ς γ῅ς ὃ οὺ 
συναχθήσεται 
 
      ---2 Kingdoms 14.14 (LXX) 
 
Δέκατος ὅρος τ῅ς τελείας ἀλλοιώσεως· ἐν τρυφῆ θεοῦ χαρὰν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ στυγνὸν 
τοῦ θανάτου. 
      ---Diadochus of Photice, Capita, Proimion 
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 Having sketched out biblical vocabulary and NT conceptualizations about the place and meaning 
of death, we turn to the ascetic tradition itself, beginning with Athanasius’ Vita Antonii (VA), Athanasius 
of Alexandria’ encomiastic biography designed to function as a normative exemplar.  In this chapter, I 
will show how Athanasius deploys ideas of the ‘memory of death’ and how his conceptualization of 
spirituality as ‘ascent’ operates within a cosmology in which life and death operate analogously.   
 This chapter has four parts.  The first argues that Athanasius’ a consistent concern with ἄνοδος, 
‘ascent,’ contours his portrayal of ascetic spirituality in VA.  The second argues that Antony utilizes and 
advises a sustained ‘memory of death’—both in terms of mortality and eschatological judgment—in 
order to undertake the ‘ascent.’  The third examines three visions in which Athanasius’ focus on ἄνοδος 
is revealed as normative both for living and dead.  The fourth argues that Athanasius’ depiction of 
Antony’s ‘daily dying’ contains seeds of later ascetic emphasis on a ‘practice of death.’ 
 What follows touches only tangentially on many of the important themes, ideas, and issues 
present in VA.  I will not discuss monastic organization, episcopal jurisdiction, Nicene orthodoxy; matters 
of authorship, genre, style, and sources, pervade scholarly literature and need not concern us here.  We 
are not primarily concerned even with the portrait of the great ‘mystic initiate’ himself.  Engagement with 
death and judgment does not radically colour the picture of Antony as perfected holy man in which 
Athanasius emphasises his ‘Adamic,’155 even ‘deified’ life-style,156 or his thaumaturgical sanctity.157  
Rather, as we consider VA from the perspective of the spiritual ‘ascent’ I discuss below, we emphasize 
instead those initial movements of the ascetic which lay the groundwork for his later achievements, as 
well as those practices which he would counsel for beginners in his great sermon.  For the Desert and 
Gazan Fathers and, especially, Climacus, initial movement, daily struggle, and the means of progress are 
more pressing concerns than idealized sanctity.  By elaborating VA’s incorporation of death into Antony’s 
spiritual career, we will see more clearly the first seeds of themes which will dominate in the Ladder. 
 
  
                                                          
155 Brown, Body and Society, 222-26; Bartelink, ‘Introduction’ to VA, 57 
156 Harmless, William, Desert Christians:  An Introduction to the Literature of Early Monasticism (Oxford:  OUP, 2004), 90-
93 
157 Anatolios, Khaled, Athanasius:  the Structure and Coherence of his Thought, Routledge Early Church Monographs 
(London:  Routledge, 1998), 180-94 
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I.  A RULE IN NARRATIVE 
What sort of text is VA?  It has been hailed as masterpiece of encomiastic biography,158 and its 
form compared to those biographies which concerned the θείος ἀνήρ, the ‘divine man.’159  G.J.M. 
Bartelink (among others) discerned in Athanasius’ portrayal of Antony a Christianized development of 
the classical topos of the θείος ἀνήρ:  ‘Chez le chrétiens ‚l’homme de Dieu‛ a succédé à ‚l’homme divin‛, 
et l’homme héroisé, en plein possession de l’ἀρετή éthique ou politique et qui se suffit à soi-même, a cédé 
la place à l’homme de Dieu chrétien, guidé par la grâce et qui n’est qu’un instrument dans la main de 
Dieu.’160   The ‘divine man’ referred to great philosophers, deified heroes, men whose lineage might be 
traced to the gods.161  Christianization, however, so changed their physiognomy that we cannot 
realistically equate Antony with ‘divine men’ at all.  He moves instead within the tradition of the Israelite 
‘man of God’:  the patriarchs and prophets, followed in the usual ascetic litany of exemplars with 
Christian apostles and martyrs.  This sense of ontological subordination to God which marks out ‘men of 
God’ from ‘divine men’ is central to Athanasius’ portrait of Antony.  Johannes Roldanus writes,  ‘c’est 
toute la vie ascétique qui est devenu possible par l’incarnation du Christ,’ but, he continues, ‘la vraie 
stature d’ascèse est réalisée par Christ.’162  The ascetic life reflects Christ’s life, something possible only 
because of what Christ accomplished.  Thus, Bartelink points out that Athanasius subordinates Antony, 
the ‘subject’ of VA, is to Christ:  ‘Il y a, dans l’ascèse d’Antoine, une différence essentielle avec celle des 
                                                          
158 See especially Bartelink, G.J.M., ‘Die literarische Gattung der Vita Antonii.  Struktur und Motiv’, VC 36 (1982), 38-
62.  However, almost immediately after the appearance of that article, Patricia Cox called into question the whole 
idea of stable genres in late antiquity:  as also Cox [Miller], Patricia, Biography in late antiquity:  a quest for the holy man, 
Transformation of the Classical Heritage 5 (Berkeley:  UC Press, 1983).  See also, Hägg, Thomas and Rousseau, P. 
(eds.), Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 31 (Berkeley:  UC 
Press, 2000), 1-28. 
159 Athanasius’ classical models include the Vita Plotini by Porphyry and Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii Tyanae.  On which 
see Reitzenstein, R., Des Athanasius Werk über das Leben des Antonius.  Ein philologischer Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
Mönchtums (Heidelberg:  Sitzunberichte der Heidelberg Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1914), 13-39.  See also Ludwig 
Bieler’s classic discussion:  ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ:  das Bild des ‚göttlichen Menschen‚ in Spätantike und Frühchristentum 
(Darmstadt:  Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976). 
160 Bartelink, ‘Introduction’ to VA, 47-48 
161Bieler, Ludwig, ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ:  das Bild des ‘göttlichen Menschen’ in Spätantike und Frühchristentum (Darmstadt:  
Wissenschafliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976); see also Cox [Miller], Patricia, Biography in late antiquity:  a quest for the holy 
man, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 5 (Berkeley, CA:  UC Press, 1983), 20-30, 52-54 
162 Roldanus, J., Le Christ et l’homme dans la théologie d’Athanase d’Alexandrie.  Étude de la conjonction de sa conception de 
l’homme avec sa christologie, Studies in the History of Christian Thought (Leiden:  Brill, 1968), 316 
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philosophes (surtout néoplatoniciennes):  elle tire sa force du Christ et se dirige vers lui.’163  Antony’s life, 
his achievements and his career, are contoured on the identity of Christ, who represents end and means, 
the one whom Antony serves and the strength by which Antony labours.  This decentring process—
relativizing the ostensible subject, Antony, against another, Christ—makes VA a curious sort of 
biography, if it is one at all.  So concludes Bartelink in his article on VA’s genre: 
Die didaktischen Zwecke stehen in der Vita Antonii mit den eigentlich biographischen in 
starker Konkurrenz. Doch darf man mit gutem Recht sagen, dass Athanasius, der 
zahlreiche historische Einzelheiten verarbeitet hat, ein weit besseres Bild seines Helden 
gezeichnet hat, als es in manchen späteren stereotypen Heiligenleben zu geschehen 
pflegt, welche nicht weiter kommen als einen vagen Schattenriss, wobei jedes 
individuelle Element fehlt.164 
 
That is, in describing Antony in relation to Christ, VA inscribes in Antony’s personality the points of 
Christian spirituality which particularly mattered to Athanasius, thus crafting a remarkable portrait of 
this ‘ideal Athanasian human being.’165  VA owes both the vividness of its biography and the pointedness 
of its spiritual content to the kinds of concerns which Athanasius foregrounded in it:  Christ’s renovation 
of humanity as it plays out in an ascetic lifestyle reflective of Christ’s own life.166 
In this context, Athanasius and his readers understood VA as a normative model of ascetic 
spirituality.  Athanasius wrote that, ‘For monks, the life of Antony is, as it were, a model *χαρακτὴρ] for 
discipline [ἄσκησιν+.’167 Gregory Nazianzen hailed it as ‘a legislation of the monastic life in the form of a 
narrative.’168  When Augustine and his friends read it, they very nearly ran off to join a monastery.169  
While its form may be that of a βιός or ἐγκωμίον, VA was meant, to inspire and model other lives, and 
not, as biographies would, to demonstrate Antony’s uniqueness.  As Gregory’s description and 
Augustine’s reading show, Athanasius’ readers were inspired to imitate Antony.  To read VA, then, is to 
                                                          
163 Bartelink, ‘Introduction’, 48; see also Françoise Frazier, ‘L’Antoine d’Athanase à propos des chapitres 83-88 de la 
Vita’, VC 52 :3 (1998), 235. 
164 Bartelink, ‘Die literarische Gattung’, 62 
165 Brakke, David, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, OECS (Oxford:  OUP, 1995), 242 
166 Roldanus, Le Christ et l’homme, 317-21 
167 VA Prol.3; Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 201-03 
168 Oratio 21.5 (PG 35:1088D):  Ἐκεῖνος [Ἀθανασίος] Ἀντωνίου τοῦ θείου βίον συνέγραφε, τοῦ μοναδικοῦ βίου 
νομοθεσίαν, ἐν πλάσματι διηγήσεως. 
169 Confessiones 8.14-29 
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read not a ‘biography’ exactly, but the story of Antony’s awe-inspiring yet paradigmatic relationship to 
Christ.170  VA presents, therefore, a picture of ascetic spirituality, whose shape we will here explore. 
 
Ἄνοδος 
 The story of Antony is, in fact, the story of his relationship with God and the display of Christ's 
power in him.  I wish, then, to examine not the ‘perfect monk’, but the form of life which cultivated and 
nurtured his vivifying relationship to Christ.  It is difficult in VA to discern a point in Antony’s life where 
he is anything less than perfect, making it difficult to say how, exactly, anyone can imitate Antony.  It is, 
however, possible to trace a peculiarly Athanasian shape of spirituality in VA, which could act as a sort of 
‘rule’ even for beginners.  Athanasius was fond of describing Christianity as an ἄνοδος, ‘ascent’, to 
heaven.  David Brakke has argued that  
Athanasius eschewed an educational program in describing the Christian life and instead 
articulated a myth (humanity’s ascent past weakened demonic powers) that stressed 
moral effort and required practices of withdrawal from society, which he metaphorically 
described as a death.  The Christian life became an ascetic life.171 
 
Brakke here contrasts Athanasius with earlier Alexandrians, such as Clement and Origen, who focused 
more on humanity’s corrupted understanding and assigned to Christ especially a teaching function.  
Athanasius did not deny the importance of Christ’s teaching, arguing at length in DI that Christ frees 
humanity from the deceit of demons.172  However, the ‘myth’ of the ἄνοδος delimits Athanasius’ 
conception of what Christ taught:  the demons are responsible for epistemological error, whose symptoms 
include idolatry, adultery, and murder.  Their epistemic activity is one way in which these demons, by 
inhabiting the atmosphere, block the soul’s path to God.173  By his death on the cross (‘in the air’) Christ 
overcame these malevolent spirits and by his resurrection opened up the ἄνοδος to God once more.174  
Humans are tasked with actually ‘traveling’ this ascent. 
Athanasius raises the issue of aerial ascent quite explicitly in VA.175  Indeed, David Brakke argues 
that VA ‘is governed by Athanasius’ myth of heavenly ascent...the monk merges his own story into the 
                                                          
170 So also Roldanus, Le Christ et l’homme, 308; Louth, Andrew, ‘St. Athanasius and the Greek Life of Antony’, JTS ns 
39:2 (1988):  506; Anatolios, Athanasius, 180-84, 190-96. 
171 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 144 
172 See, e.g., DI 14 ll.19-30 
173 On which see CG 2, ll. 24-26; DI, 25, ll. 17-21, 23-25; cf. also Plato, Epinomis 984E; Origen, De Principiis, 2.11.6. 
174 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 149-155 
175 VA 65.7 
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myth of the Word’s incarnation, death and resurrection.’  The monk, typified by Antony, follows Christ, 
taking on his characteristics and achieving, by Christ’s power, great acts of sanctity:  ‘Christ has rendered 
the devil and his demons powerless, but the monk, through his ascetic regime, must make Christ’s 
victory his own.’176  Constitutive of all this are ‘social practices of withdrawal.’177  That is, Antony leaves 
the world in order to remain on the ἄνοδος.  So long as he continues his renunciatory practices, Antony 
walks yet in the ἄνοδος and does not reach his goal in this life, as Roldanus writes:  ‘So unerschrocken er 
auch, so sehr er ‚Artzt‛ und Vorbild für die Menschen ist, er bleibt Kampf und Gefährdung, solange er 
lebt, nicht endgültig entzogen.’178  Antony lives, therefore, in the same tensed hope as all Christians, and 
though his life appears more perfect than others, it is only because the ἄνοδος to which all are called is 
revealed so perfectly in his life.  
 
Obedience and Withdrawal 
What is the ἄνοδος?  Brakke, as I have mentioned, points to ‘social practices of withdrawal’ as 
well as ‘moral effort.’  These, however, are various means of maintaining a total obedience to God’s 
commands as revealed in the Christian Scriptures.  Withdrawal is, for Antony, simply a requisite facet of 
that obedience.  Looking at Antony’s very first movements in the ἄνοδος, we find that Athanasius 
presents Antony’s entire career as a response to Scripture readings in Church: 
‘If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your goods and give them to the poor, and come, 
follow me, and you will have treasure in heaven.’ (Mat 19.21) 
 
 
This is not a conversion, but it is an epiphany of sorts—the point of departure for a new kind of 
movement in Antony’s life for which his Christian faith had already prepared him.  Antony had been 
meditating on just the right question, wondering how ‘the Apostles, abandoning everything, followed the 
Savior.’179  Antony responds to Jesus’ command to ‘come, follow me’:  ‘But Antony, as if he held the 
memory of the saints [the Apostles] by divine inspiration, and as if the reading had been performed for 
him alone, straightway departed from the Lord’s house and gave away what he had received...’180  He 
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keeps a little back until he later hears ‘Do not be anxious for tomorrow’ (Mat 6.34a).181  Then, giving the 
rest of his goods to the poor, Antony throws himself wholeheartedly into a life of asceticism. 
 Antony began the movement which would make him famous out of obedience born of faith.  Of 
this scene, Johannes Roldanus writes: 
Il est net ici que pour Athanase la foi en Christ n’est pas seulement une vertu parmi 
beaucoup d’autres ; mail qu’il ne peut s’imaginer l’obligation et l’obéissance de la foi sans 
ascèse.  Afin d’être parfait dans l’obéissance au Christ et de gagner la gloire céleste, il est 
nécessaire de se détacher de toute possession terrestre, d’abandonner toute 
préoccupation, de se détourner même des parents et des amis et de ne plus prêter qu’à 
soi-même.182 
 
Antony’s career from this point is a tale of continuous obedience and submission which keeps him ever 
on the ἄνοδος.  Even Antony’s more spectacular acts of renunciation function within his daily 
commitment to obedience.  He moves from village to tomb, fortress, desert, and, finally, the ‘inner 
mountain’—ever further outward as he ‘outgrows’ his current place.183  His burial place epitomizes this 
withdrawal:  unknown save to the two monks who actually buried him and God.184  This path, however, 
is marked by obedience.  Antony puts himself first under a local ascetic and those whom he could find 
nearby,185 later directly under God,186 though he still submitted to the proper ecclesiastical authorities.187  
The outward motion of withdrawal and, with it, renunciation, allows Antony to keep himself ever on the 
upward path of obedience to Christ.  Antony’s work on that path is simply to stay on it.  Athanasius 
writes that Antony ‘...each day, as though possessing a beginning of discipline *ὡς ἀρχὴν ἔχων τ῅ς 
ἀσκήσεως], he had greater labour for progress...he strove each day to present himself to God such as one 
must appear to God, pure in heart and ready to obey his will and no other.’188  Antony works to maintain 
each day the same fervour he had when he first heard Christ’s command to ‘come, follow me.’  Antony’s 
withdrawal simply allows him to shed, so far as possible, the distractions of society, money, property, 
family, and personal glory, which muddy the clarity of Christ’s commandments.   
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Conclusion 
Antony the Great is also and especially Antony the obedient.  By obedience to Christ Antony 
participates in and dispenses Christ’s power.  All those distinctive signs of sanctity on which Athanasius 
lovingly dwells are subordinate to the triumph already wrought by Christ.  Thus we can properly 
appreciate Athanasius’ proclamations of Antony as ‘athlete’189 or as ‘mystic initiate’190 or even as the 
‘Physician given to Egypt’191.  Antony is an athlete trained not only by the old men whom he found near 
his village, and not only by self-discipline, but ultimately by Christ.192  The mysteries into which he is 
initiated are those of Christ, and we ought to recall Athanasius’ argument elsewhere that Christ is the 
‘Physician and Saviour’ for all humanity.193  Antony’s achievements all participate in Christ’s universal 
achievement since ‘God, and God alone, can destroy corruption and give life, and can unravel demonic 
deceits and lead each into all righteousness.’194  Yet Antony is not some automaton, but a subject whose 
willing response to Christ is the basis for his entire career.  Along these lines, Alvyn Pettersen argues that  
The individual...is to be brought to maturity, to be completed and perfected.  Hence, even 
individual human acts are significant.  Indeed, there is a seriousness about the particular 
individual’s experience of conflict, persecution and tragedy...wanting reconciliation and 
integration and healing in and through God incarnate.195 
 
Antony progresses toward toward maturity rather than conversion, and obedience refers him always to 
the model of life set forth in the Incarnate Christ.  Andrew Louth has noted especially ‘an emphasis on 
the decisive nature of the Incarnation of the Word and the triumph of the Cross’ as well as the 
understanding of ‘our relationship to God as fulfilled in contemplation’ and, finally, ‘a twinning of 
Incarnation and deification.’196  The life which Antony displays, because it reflects Christ’s life, reveals the 
ascetic movement, and all the monastic developments which accompanied its rise, as a particular means 
to the end proper to all Christians:  perfect humanity modeled on Christ.197  The way to that end is 
Athanasius’ ἄνοδος, which is best appreciated as a consistent commitment to obedience which demands 
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the more visible and spectacular acts of withdrawal and renunciation—asceticism is the mode of 
obedience, and obedience the path to God made possible by Christ. 
 It is a temptation to which most readers understandably succumb, to focus on the result of 
Antony’s relationship with Christ.  They wish to discover the ‘new man’, the ‘ideal’, the perfect saint.  I 
wish to ask how Antony began, how he continued, and how he held on to ‘his’ achievement.  If we look 
at Antony’s first steps in the ἄνοδος, enshrined in those first crucial chapters after his epiphany, we will 
find the means by whch Antony maintained his obedience to Christ and set ‘ascents in his heart.’  
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I. THE NEW MAN AND THE OLD ENEMY 
 Having delineated VA’s spirituality as an ‘ascent’ to God constituted by consistent and 
perseverant obedience maintained through ascetic withdrawal, I turn now to Athanasius’ portrayal of the 
initial movements of withdrawal.  I will argue that in these movements engagement with mortality and 
judgment emerges as a tool conducive to maintaining the fervor of obedience to Christ. 
 
Antony and the Monks 
We will proceed in a conceptual, rather than narrative order, and begin in the middle of Antony’s 
great sermon to young monks and disciples—his sermon is directed to beginners and concerns their first 
movements while revealing Antony’s own.  Antony there portrays physical death as an important ally of 
the monk, an aid and incentive in his ascetic and, ultimately, Christian, hopes.  Antony says,  
Lest we neglect *our work+, it is good to consider the saying of the apostle that ‚I die each 
day‛ *1 Cor 15.31+.  For if also we live thus, as dying each day, we shall not sin [ὡς 
ἀποθνῄσκοντες καθ’ἡμέραν, οὕτω ζῶμεν, οὐχ ἁμαρτήσομεν].  There is a saying that, 
‚we rise up each day‛ *ἐγειρόμενοι καθ’ἡμέραν], so let us think that we will not remain 
until evening, and again, when we come to sleep, let us think that we will not rise.198 
 
In this passage Antony does not treat death as a remote possibility, or mortality as a theoretical condition.  
Rather, death looms each morning and night and renders foolish any confidence of reaching the next day.  
Antony goes on to argue that this belief is the proper way to respond to the inescapable uncertainty of 
mortal existence:  ‘By nature our life is uncertain *ἀδήλου] and measured each day by Providence [παρὰ 
τ῅ς προνοίας+.’199  Athanasius contextualizes mortality primarily in terms of God’s providence (πρόνοια), 
and this context marks out the uniqueness of Antony’s position:  it is, in a sense, God’s care for humans, 
rather than an ontological condition, that makes death’s hour uncertain.  Because humans are naturally 
mortal, death looms as its ever-present expectation.  However, the curiously uncertain foreknowledge of 
death’s inexorable approach heightens awareness of every moment (for which ‘each day’ stands in 
Antony’s formulation) and reveals it as the only moment available in which to obey, and so ascend to, 
God.  Athanasius describes Antony’s daily fervour beautifully, and it is worth quoting at some length: 
For he did not think it important to measure by time the way of virtue, nor the 
withdrawal undertaken on its account, but, rather, by desire and choice.  He, therefore, 
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did not remember the present time, but each day, as possessing a beginning of discipline, 
had greater labour for progress, continually saying to himself the saying of Paul, 
‘Leaving behind what lies behind, stretching out to what lies before’ (Phil 3.13).  He 
remembered also the voice of the prophet Elijah, saying ‘The Lord lives, before whom I 
stand’ ‘today’ (1 Kgds 18.15).  He carefully observed that, saying ‘today’, he  did not 
measure the present time but, as though always making a beginning [ἀρχὴν 
καταβαλλόμενος], each day he strove to present himself to God just as one must appear 
to God, pure in heart and ready to obey his will and no other.200 
 
Antony lives only in the present day, not measuring out the past and not looking to an uncertain future.  
By consciously eschewing any moment but the present, Antony sees more clearly that the present 
moment images the time when he will stand before God—thus connecting ‘mortality’ to ‘judgment’, 
which I discuss below. 
Obversely, the consciousness of mortality counters one of the Devil’s favourite ploys:  fantasizing 
about the future.  We shall see that, in VA 5.2, the Devil suggests not only past memories, but also ‘the 
rough goal of virtue, and how great its labour; he laid before Antony the weakness of the body and the 
length of a life-time.’201  But, if we take Antony seriously, there is no tomorrow for ascetics.  There is only 
today, and ascetic progress is ultimately ‘a new life, a new future to be constructed daily.’202  However, 
what futurity the new life might have refers to an ‘eternal’ future which the ascetic enters only when 
death cuts short the illusory ‘future’ of his present existence.  Thus Athanasius speaks of Antony ‘always 
making a beginning.’  Each day is, in a sense, the first day and the last of one’s ἄνοδος.   
 
Antony and the Demons 
 Death has also an eschatological content, derived from NT teaching on Christ’s universal 
judgment.  Death, as John Chrysostom would later put it, functions as each person’s entrance into 
eschatological judgment and so its memory must also include that of judgment.203  Antony battles 
demons throughout VA, and for his warfare he utilizes and recommends a recollection of judgment.  Not 
long after Antony had given his sister to the care of virgins and betaken himself to study under a nearby 
ascetic, he was attacked by a series of three temptations designed swiftly to end his hopes.  First, the 
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‘good-hating and envious Devil’ conjured memories as a means of drawing Antony back to his former 
life:  the Devil contrasted the pleasures of village life with the rigours of asceticism and, moreover, 
recalled to Antony his obligations in familial relationships.204  Central in the list is Antony’s ‘charge of his 
sister’—their parents being dead, her maintenance fell to him until she married.  But, of course, Antony 
has given her to the care of others and so, despite the ‘bonds of kinship’ which he shares with her and, 
presumably, other members of his village, Antony presses on.  Athanasius says tellingly that the Devil 
found himself weakened before Antony’s πρόθεσις (‘purpose’) and repulsed and cast down, by his 
στερρότης (‘firmness’ or ‘resolve’).205   
 A second time the Devil attacked, aiming a bit lower in hopes of snaring Antony with sex—even 
taking a feminine appearance and trying to seduce him.  But Antony, ‘considering *ἐνθυμούμενος] 
Christ and his nobility, and thinking on the intellectual part of the soul, ‚quenched the coal‛ (2 Kgdm 
14.7) of that one’s deceit.’206  The scriptural allusion is telling.  In 2 Kingdoms, to ‘quench my coal’ is a 
metaphor for the utter destruction of one’s household and life, leaving ‘leaving neither remnant nor name 
upon the face of the earth.’  Antony, it seems, leaves to the Devil no further deceit—sex, family, property, 
what other blandishments can the present life offer? 
But, though his deceits are revealed as illusory, the μισόκαλος ἐχθρός depicts once more ‘the 
sweetness of pleasure.’  Antony, ‘as befitting one made angry and sad, considered [ἐνεθυμεῖτο] the 
promise of fire and the work of the worm (cf. Mark 9.43-49); and opposing these *to the Devil’s 
suggestions+ he passed over unharmed.’207  With Antony’s scripturally motivated rebuttal, the Devil is 
utterly cast down and departs.  After this episode we find Antony physically attacked by demons—the 
Devil had reached, it seems, the acme of temptation, and with the thought of death as judgment, no 
image of passing pleasure could ever again hold power against Antony. 
 
The Fear of Punishment 
The Devil’s return to pleasure after Antony’s apparently total victory is curious, and we should 
note the function ‘pleasure’ plays in CG-DI.  There, the ‘fall’ of humanity into sin was, in fact, a fall into 
‘pleasure’, or, rather, into the erroneous belief that pleasure and its attainment constitutes a ‘good’ equal 
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to or even greater than union with God.208  The Devil attempts by showing ‘the softness of pleasure’ to 
turn Antony not to a particular action (as he might with sex or kin) but toward a way of viewing the 
world which would surely hinder and very likely scuttle Antony’s ascetic obedience to Christ.  So, in 
response, Antony considers Christ’s judgment.  In his sermon, Antony recalls and advises the same: 
We ought not simply master [κρατήσομεν]209 desire for a woman or for any other impure 
pleasure, but rather let us turn from it as something which passes away, always 
struggling and beholding in advance the Day of Judgment.  For ever the greater fear and 
agony of tortures [βασάνων] dissolves the softness of pleasure, and rouses the drowsy 
soul.210 
 
Athanasius reminds readers here that the struggle is not simply one or another pleasure, but the 
ἐπιθυμία τ῅ς ἡδον῅ς—the condition of sin-bound humanity—which contemplation of judgment 
effectively ‘dissolves.’  Why?  Because the things which tempt are only temporary.  On the contrary, 
judgment, or at least its consequence, is eternal.  Antony weighs the eternity presupposed in judgment 
against the transient world of present life, and in their opposition, eternity is inevitably the weightier 
option. 
 This fearful and eternal judgment belongs to Christ and, in the passage from Mark to which 
Athanasius alludes in VA 5.6, is predicated not on a tally of actions but on a willingness to sacrifice 
anything which might obstruct a person from the ascent to God.  It is better, Christ warned his disciples, 
to enter missing some parts than to be cast complete into fire.  Thus, judgment emerges here as a question 
of identity, a wholeness and unswerving obedience in those who would follow Christ.  As Françoise Frazier 
argues, this sense of an identity founded in Christ pervades VA:  ‘La simplicité de l'esprit comme la 
pureté de cœur, l'attachement exclusif à Dieu dont il est le serviteur et l'instrument, le "relais" auprès des 
hommes: tels sont donc les traits essentiels de la spiritualité du moine que veut fixer Athanase.’211  
Regarding the present passage we may further note that Antony’s meditation on eternal punishment 
parallels his meditation on Christ and the ‘intellectual part of the soul’ in 5.5.212  That is, in response to the 
Devil’s attacks (which focus, in both instances, on pleasure, whether conceived in its particulars or 
generally), Antony reflects on two aspects of Christian belief as on two sides of a coin:  on one side Christ 
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the Λόγος and the naturally λογικός human who is made ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ’ (Gen 1.27);213 on the 
other the pleasure-seeker consumed in eternal torment.  These are merely the sheep and goats of 
Matthew 25, the ends of the narrow and wide ways respectively, and, therefore, the only two eternal 
possibilities for humans. 
 
The Hope of Beatitude 
 Antony exhorted visitors, would-be monks, and beginners by ‘discoursing and recalling the good 
things to come and the love of God for us, ‚who did not spare his own son, but gave him up for us all‛ 
*Rom 8.32+...’214  By such admonitions, Athanasius tells us, Antony persuaded many to become monks.  
One cannot underestimate the paraenetic value of future hope.  Because so much awaits those who give 
themselves wholeheartedly to the Kingdom of Heaven, it is no great matter to sacrifice things which, like 
women and pleasures, ‘pass away.’  The gaze which reveals ‘pleasure’ as worthless simultaneously 
discloses eternal ‘goods’ as infinitely more valuable. 
Hope, then, recalls VA 5.5, wherein Antony overcame sexual temptation by contemplation the 
‘nobility of Christ’ and the intellectual aspect of the soul.  In that case, Antony accomplished the 
renunciation of the bodily aspect of human life—which, though not of itself an ‘evil,’ carries the twin evils 
of ‘pleasure’ and ‘desire’ which pin humans to fractured desires and a demonic lifestyle215—by 
concentrating on another.  He renounced the sexual expression of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, the ‘desiring’ aspect 
of the soul, and aligned himself entirely to the νοερόν, the ‘intellectual’ aspect.  Athanasius presents 
Antony’s choice in VA just as he does Adam’s choice in CG-DI—as a directing of his soul toward God who 
is contemplated first via νοητά.216  But, in that movement Antony also aligns himself with what, in 
humanity, is eternal or, at least, capable of becoming so—he cuts of his foot in order to enter heaven 
without it.  ‘Hope’ and meditation on the beatitude which awaits Christ’s judgment means also 
acceptance of a particular notion of what it means to be human, and a corollary rejection of those aspects 
of human life which run counter to that notion.  Yet this is no anti-somatic Platnoism:  Antony meditated 
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not simply on the νοερόν but, first and foremost, on the ‘nobility of Christ’—the Incarnate Christ who 
properly utilized his body.217 
 
Conclusion 
Living with mortality and judgment provides Antony with a crucial means of persevering in his 
ascetic mode of obedience to God.  First, by admitting that, in face of death’s uncertainty, each day is but 
a gift offered providentially by God, he rightly perceives the urgency which each holds.  Antony’s 
recollection of death is most definitely not a φόβος θανάτου, ‘fear of death.’  For Athanasius (following 
Sir 40.1-11), this is an entirely negative category—a result of humanity’s fall which keeps humans 
enthralled with passing pleasures.218  Rather, as Brakke rightly notes, Antony’s μνήμη τοῦ θανάτου is ‘a 
focused attention on the present and on oneself.’219  In that regard it far more closely resembles the 
‘spiritual exercises’ which Pierre Hadot discerns among philosophers.  Thus, Mark Sheridan applies 
Pierre Hadot’s arguments to VA and says that, for Antony, attention to oneself (προσοχή) is ‘an essential 
element in the development of the spiritual life, a continual concentration on the present moment, which 
must be lived as if it were the first and the last; in this way prosoche is closely linked to mindfulness of 
death.’220  However, unlike them, Antony meditates on the far more important topic of Christ’s judgment, 
before which fear and hope are reasonable and appropriate responses.  By doing so Antony sees not only 
the vanity of the world but the criteria of obedience to Christ and so discerns in every momentary choice 
the eternally dichotomy of beatitude and damnation.   
Nevertheless, mortality also alleviates the burden of an uncertain future:  for the monk there is no 
future in this life; there are only today, death, and eternity.  He lives authentically with a simple fact 
which Charles Spurgeon would later describe eloquently:   
To-morrow—it is not written in the almanack of time.  To-morrow—it is in Satan's 
calendar, and nowhere else.  To-morrow—it is a rock whitened by the bones of mariners 
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who have been wrecked upon it<To-morrow—it is a dream. To-morrow—it is a 
delusion. To-morrow, ay, to-morrow you may lift up your eyes in hell, being in torments. 
Yonder clock saith "to-day;" everything crieth "to-day!‛221 
 
Athanasius draws on both sides of Paul’s engagement with death.  In his theology mortality means for 
non-believers only the cessation of pleasure and so becomes an object of fear and repulsion.222   
Conversely, physical death actually aids ascetics like Antony because it discloses the urgency of their 
business and, by revealing the transience of pleasures and the prospect of Christ’s judgment, it also 
clarifies the absolute and complete identity toward which every choice will tend.  In light of death, there 
are no idle moments—there are only moments pregnant with eternal possibility.  Thus, meditation on 
mortality and judgment enables Antony remain firm in his renunciation, and to maintain his fervency in 
obedience to Christ. 
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III. LIFE, DEATH, AND ASCENT 
  
Having seen just how valuable the recollection of mortality and judgment is for Antony, I turn 
now to further elaborate the cosmological assumptions behind the conception of death at work in VA.  I 
will, in this section, interpret two visions of death and one of the ascetic life which has often been 
mistakenly read as a third death-vision.  I will show that Athanasius understands the ἄνοδος as operative 
in both life and death.  From this I will argue that life and death are linked up in Athanasius’ cosmology 
and that their continuity means that the present age determines the next, while the next reveals, as it 
were, the realities underlying the present.  I will conclude with a discussion of Antony’s paradigmatic 
death-scene. 
 
Amoun’s Ascent 
 While ‘seated in the mountain’—his ‘inner mountain’ in the far desert—a mature Antony sees 
‘someone *τινα] ascending [ἀναγόμενον] in the air, and there was great rejoicing from all those he 
encountered.’  Antony is perplexed but excited:  ‘He prayed to learn what this might be.  And 
straightway a voice came to him, [saying] ‚this was the soul of Amoun, the monk in Nitria.‛’223  
Athanasius then explains that Amoun had ‘remained an ascetic until old age’ and immediately launches 
into a calculation of the distance between Antony’s mountain and Nitria, before digressing about the 
deeds of Amoun—a celebrated wonder-worker and frequent visitor at Antony’s retreat.224  Athanasius 
then returns to Antony whose disciples have recorded the date of his vision and, sure enough, though the 
distance was thirteen days, Antony’s vision had taken place the very night of Amoun’s death.  
Ostensibly, then, the story is another proof of Antony’s gift of clairvoyance, his discernment and favour 
with God. 
 On another level, though, it tells us something of what Athanasius thinks death might be.  It is 
first worth noting that Antony does not know what he sees—the ‘soul’ of a person is, even to his eyes, no 
more than τις or τι—someone, something.  Moreover, Antony’s great power only operates thanks to 
                                                          
223 VA 60.1-3 
224 Amoun likely founded the community at Nitria, and is well known from other sources as well, whose accounts 
(minus the frequent visits to Antony) correlate with Athanasius’.  See, e.g., HL 8, Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica 1.14, 
6.28; and Socrates, Historia Ecclesiastica, 4.26, cf. Vita Pachomii altera 4.  See Chitty, Desert a City, 11-12, 29-32; Evelyn 
White, The Monasteries of Wadi’n Natrûn, vol. 2:  History of the Monasteries of Nitria and Scetis (New York:  Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, 1933). 
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God’s revelation which must explain to him what he saw, and which is only granted in response to his 
prayer.  The vision itself is simple enough in most other ways:  Antony sees what takes place when a 
great Christian goes to join Christ in heaven.  Those who ‘meet’ Amoun are, presumably, the angels who 
guide him to and meet him in heaven (cf. Luke 15.7, Heb 12.23).  We will shortly see how important such 
figures can be.  Amoun, though, is an old man who has endured—‘remained’ in Athanasius’ favoured 
terminology—in the ‘discipline’ until his death.  His joyous entrance into heaven is continuous with his 
chosen of life:  his death befits his earthly accomplishments.  Palladius emphasises the continuity of life 
and death when paraphrasing VA 60 in HL 8.6:  Amoun’s soul is borne aloft by angels, just as they carried 
him across the river Lycus.  Athanasius relates the miracle but says nothing of angels—only that Amoun 
did not actually walk on the water, since that is possible only for Christ.225  Palladius’ account elaborates 
Athanasius’ implicit cosmology:  angels ferried Amoun in life, and so they did in death—in each event 
because Amoun had sought it through asceticism and God had granted it by grace.  Death and life 
operate in the same ways. 
 
The Giant and the Birds 
A second vision of death, this one rather more universal, elaborates on the ways in which 
Athanasius’ myth of ascent plays out in death.226  A discussion arose with visitors concerning the ‘journey 
of the soul and what sort of place there will be for it after these things.’  The next night,  
a voice called *Antony+ from above, saying, ‚Antony, rise up and go out and see.‛  He 
went out, therefore...and he beheld a great figure looking upward, formless and fearful, 
standing and reaching to the clouds, while figures were ascending like birds; and that 
figure was stretching out its hands and some he impeded and some flew over him and 
passed over, and were led upward without worry.  The great figure gnashed his teeth at 
those that escaped, but at those that fell he rejoiced. 
   
Understandably, Antony does not comprehend the vision.  But his gift is to receive understanding and so: 
Immediately a voice came to Antony:  ‚Understand what you see.‛  And his 
understanding being opened, he knew that the vision concerned the passage of souls 
[τῶν ψυχῶν εἶναι τὴν πάροδον], and the standing figure was the enemy who hates the 
faithful.  And those who were liable to him he mastered and impeded from passing on 
                                                          
225 VA 60.5-9 
226 Interestingly, as John Wortley notes, this story does not provide a model for later ‘visions’, as Wortley notes, but is 
echoed in PS 66:  ‘Death, Judgment, Heaven, and Hell in Byzantine ‚Beneficial Tales‛’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 55 
(2001), 61-62 
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[καὶ τοῦς μὲν ὑπευθύνους αὐτῷ κρατοῦντα καὶ κωλύοντα διελθεῖν].  But he was 
unable to master those who did not obey him, as they passed over.227 
  
After death, whether immediately or eschatologically, the soul seeks to ascend to God.  If it owes nothing 
to the enemy it can ascend.  If not, for whatever reason, it is hindered.  The ‘enemy’ is formless.   His 
appearance, like that of Amoun’s soul, is unclear to Antony.  Yet the enemy in death is certainly the 
enemy in life, who has always attempted to hinder souls from their ascent to God.228  The metaphor of 
ascent past diabolical forces is, as we have seen, integral to Athanasius’ vision of salvation.  Yet, just as 
Amoun’s death befitted his life, so here the metaphysics of death reflect the course of life as ἄνοδος.  The 
question is whether a person is liable (ὑπεύθυνος) to the enemy.  If so, the ἄνοδος is blocked and, in 
death, this blockage means also permanent mastery by the enemy.  In life, as we shall see below, people 
have the opportunity to clear their debts by repentance, and to gain the support and aid of Christ and his 
angels.  In death, it seems, what was done in life is accomplished with certainty; and all the shades and 
grades of identities resolve into those who owe the enemy and those who do not.  Thus, while death is 
continuous with life, it also reveals as a permanent state what in life had been only a tendency, thus 
clarifying the urgency of every choice.229 
                                                          
227 VA 66.2-5 
228 Cf. DI 25.17-21 
229 This story finds its way, with only slight changes, into HL.  There Cronius (in whose biography this vision is 
included) tells Palladius that Antony prayed for ‘a whole year...that the place of the righteous and of sinners might be 
revealed.’ Gone is the deliberate ambiguity and formlessness of the Athanasian account, Antony says that ‘*I saw+ a 
great giant...black...and under him a lake as vast as the sea, and I saw souls flying like birds.’229  Some fly over and are 
saved, but those he strikes fall into the lake.  Cronius then relates Antony’s interpretation of the relationship of the 
soul-birds to the black giant:  ‘Then came a voice to me saying, ‚These souls of the righteous which you see flying are 
the souls which are saved for Paradise.  But the others are those which are drawn down to hell, having followed the 
desires of the flesh and revenge.‛’229  Although Palladius’ (or Cronius’) version differs somewhat from Athanasius’, 
its description of the soul beholden to the enemy clearly accords with Antony’s preaching in VA. 
 
In this version Antony asks to see ‘the place of the righteous and of sinners.’  This language has an eschatological 
ring, making the vision a curiously inverted vision of God’s judgment seat.  Rather than God dispatching righteous 
and sinners to their appropriate places, we see the enemy allowed to take all that belong to him, but through his own 
inability and their agility, unable to snatch away the righteous.  The sinners fall because of their own attachments, 
which happen to serve and make them liable or susceptible to the Devil.  It is similar to Athanasius’ language of 
‘mastery’ but the emphasis now rests on the sinners rather than the enemy—their choices have made them slaves to 
the Devil.  The righteous rise first because they are ‘saved’, but also, presumably, because they are pure of these 
faults and, by implication, acceptable to God.Palladius has undoubtedly drawn the story from either from VA 
directly, from an unknown elaboration, or from a common source.  Palladius claims to have heard the story from 
Cronius while at Nitria (cf. HL 7.3).  The only question is whether Cronius is the source or whether Palladius had in 
mind Athanasius’ written account—he certainly could have, writing nearly seventy years after Athanasius did (and, 
if he did hear the story, hearing it forty years after Antony’s death).   
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The Aerial Path 
In the narrative, Antony has an unexpected vision immediately prior to that of the giant, of 
angels and demons warring over his soul as he is being ‘led through the air’ *ὡς εἰς τὴν ἀέρα 
ὁδηγοὐμενον].  This story, does not concern death.230  Rather, it is a brief allegory of Athanasius’ 
conception of spirituality as ἄνοδος, but its proximity to Antony’s vision of death is not accidental, for 
reasons that will become clear below.  This vision serves, in conjunction with the vision of the giant, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
We can discern with some clarity the provenance of the elements of Palladius’ telling which differ from Athanasius’ 
most sharply:  the lake, the specificity of the enemy, and the bird-like appearance of souls.  It could be that Palladius 
intends the ‘lake of fire’ referred to throughout NT writings.  However, since he does not mention fire or in any way 
connect the lake with punishment per se, it seems unlikely that he has in mind an NT reference.  Instead, the lake, the 
giant and the birds, as W.K. Lowther Clarke noted in his translation—according to a private letter sent him by E.A. 
Wallis Budge—are ‘certainly Egyptian’ (The Lausiac History of Palladius, Translations of Christian Literature Series 
One [London:  SPCK, 1918],96 n.1).  Thus, what sets Palladius’ version apart is its stronger resonance with pagan 
(especially Egyptian) myth on exactly the points which Athanasius’s language leaves nonspecific. 
 
It is possible, then, that Athanasius and Palladius share a common source, one amenable to local lore.  Athanasius, 
however, was not so amenable—his only representation of Egyptian deities in VA concerns a fawn-like creature, 
meant, as David Brakke notes, to represent the Egyptian god Min.  Antony, we are told, is calm before this creature, 
telling it simply ‘Φριστοῦ δοῦλός εἰμι· εἰ ἀπεστάλης κατ’ ἐμοῦ, ἰδοὺ πάρειμι’ (53.2).  At this, the creature is so afraid 
that it runs off and dies (53.3).  Athanasius only introduces this Egyptian deity, whose name he does not deign to 
give, in order to show the feebleness of the demonic world before Antony the man of  God:  ‘Ὁ δὲ τοῦ θηρίου 
θάνατος πτῶμα τῶν δαιμόνων ἦν’ (53.3).  Athanasius was at pains first to link the world of Egyptian myth with the 
demonic and, then to show that, divine or not, these entities are powerless before the ‘new man in Christ.’  
Athanasius would, therefore, very likely have effaced any pagan echoes in Antony’s vision. 
 
Palladius, on the other hand, allowed them to remain, ascribing the story to Cronius as a source.  Indeed, Palladius’ 
placement of the story is so stark, so curious, that its very awkwardness militates for its authenticity.  It sits between 
two much lengthier stories told by Cronius:  Eulogius and a maimed man (21.1-15), and Paul the Simple (22.1-13); 
connected only by their inclusion of Antony.  Between these two more elaborate stories falls the vision, introduced 
only by the words ‘And Cronius related this too, that...’  The lack of embellishment in presentation and the simplicity 
of the narrative suggest that Palladius is merely relating a tale he thinks valuable, and that he preserves substantially 
what Cronius had told him.  Under this interpretation, Palladius, rather than Athanasius, records a more authentic 
version, ascertained from Cronius, who had acted as Antony’s interpreter. 
230 Many do think this vision concerns death.  See, e.g., Daniélou, Jean, ‘Les demons de l’air dans la ‚Vie d’Antoine‛’, 
in Steidle (ed.), Antonius Magnus Eremita, 140-145; and Alexandre, Monique, ‘A propos du récit de la mort d’Antoine 
(Athanase, Vie d’Antoine.  PG 26, 968-974, § 89-93).  L’heure de la mort dans la littérature monastique’, in Jean-Marie 
Leroux (ed), Le Temps Chrétien de la fin de l’antiquité au moyen âge 3e-13e siècles (Paris:  Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 1984), 271.  I disagree.  Given that this vision is immediately followed by another one whose content is 
explicitly related to death, it seems unlikely that Athanasius would have simply stacked varying visions on top of one 
another.  Moreoever, the language is different—although Antony is led εὶς τὴν ἀέρα, there is no mention either of his 
ψυχή or an ἀναγωγή—both of which Athanasius uses in the vision of Amoun and that of the giant.  John Wortley 
draws the same conclusion, but rightly notes that ‘Although this experience concerns only Antony’s monastic life, all 
the elements of many subsequent visions of the last judgment are here.’  See his, ‘Death, Judgment, Heaven, and 
Hell’, 62. 
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strengthen the impression gotten from Amoun’s death:  that life and death operate analogously and 
within the same cosmological framework of ascent.   
Certain ‘vindictive and fearful beings *πικροὺς231 καὶ δεινούς τινας+’ stood in Antony’s aerial 
path and ‘desired to hinder him as not to allow him to pass through.’  Given what we have already seen 
of Athanasius’ demon-filled cosmology, these are undoubtedly demons.  Antony’s guides, however, 
argue back that he is not ‘liable to them *μὴ ὑπεύθυνος αὐτοῖς εἴη+.’  This vision expresses, in no 
uncertain terms, Athanasian concern with the Christian’s ἄνοδος past weakened yet ever-present 
demons.232   
Liability, however, extends even to the minutiae.  Athanasius’ language of ‘ὑπεύθυνος’ relies on 
a belief in at least the possibility of being completely free of liability—those who ascend are, like Antony, 
answerable for nothing.  Of course, as Athanasius and the entire Christian tradition would clarify, all are 
liable for something, but by Christ’s mercy ‘each day a beginning’ is available.  This new beginning, 
however, implies greater problems.  Antony’s guides in VA 65 sternly warn his interrogators that deeds 
from birth to his profession as a monk are wiped clean by Christ.  However, Antony must answer for 
whatever he has done since that profession:  the new beginning implies a new birth into a life with its 
own records and judgment.  The radicalism of the ascetic mode of spirituality is quite clear in this 
distinction.  Antony passes by unharmed only because his interrogators cannot prove anything against 
him as a monk.  The monastic lifestyle demands an absolute renunciation of all that has gone before, 
because the monk is fully accountable for everything.  The way is open, but only to those who are not 
liable to the demons.  Indeed, only after demonic accusations fall flat did ‘the way become free to him and 
unhindered.’233  Demons hinder and angels help, but, in the midst of such legal wrangling it is, ultimately, 
Christ’s mercy that makes ascent possible.   
Athanasius then relates another story.  He describes Antony as meditating on Ephesians 2.2, 
‘‚concerning the prince of the power of the air‛ for in the air the enemy has power, by fighting and trying 
to hinder those who pass through.’234  Antony, considering this verse, has a mystical experience235 in 
                                                          
231 The usual meaning of πικρός is ‘sharp’ or ‘bitter.’  But it can also mean ‘relentless’ or ‘vindictive’ (s.v. LSJ).  This 
latter definition fits with the legal scene and language (ἀπαιτέω, ὑπεύθυνος) at hand. 
232 Cf. VA 21.1-5 and, Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk, 36-37. 
233 VA 65.2-5 
234 VA 65.7 
235 Which Athanasius compares to Paul’s trip through the ‘third heaven’ (2 Cor 12.2-5). 
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which he ‘saw himself coming up to the air and struggling until it *or he+ became free.’236  In this 
experience the emphasis lies much more on Antony’s effort.  Yet it is not irreconcilable with the more 
elaborate vision, if we suggest that Antony’s ἄγων consists in maintaining his way of life undefiled, and 
that the only reason the air is even open to human endeavour is the foundational work of Christ. 
 
Conclusion 
Antony’s vision of ascetic life perfectly parallels the vision of the giant, which elaborates on his 
vision of Amoun.  In all three visions a mythological motif of ascent to God through hostile powers 
operates.  Only those who do not owe the Devil something are able to pass by, as Amoun does.  For him 
the hostile powers are non-present and only angelic ferrymen appear to take him heavenward.  This, 
combined with the vision of the giant, makes clear that Christ’s victory opens the way to heaven and yet 
it is equally important that believers maintain their obedience to him and, therefore, their freedom from 
the Devil.  The way to Heaven is open, but not free, whether in life or death:  it is no accident that Amoun 
had ‘persevered’ in ‘discipline’ from youth unto old age.  Demons make the same demand of Antony, 
and his angelic companions are able to answer affirmatively—only when confronted with his perseverant 
obedience to Christ in the ascetic life do the demons allow Antony to pass by. 
In these visions life and death operate within the same cosmological framework, although the 
terms of the myth vary.  At the same time, the visions also demonstrate that both death and life remain 
veiled:  death because humans can only speculate on it; life because it is easy amidst the din of worldly 
occupations and the illusion of longevity to lose sight of the apocalyptically charged meaning of each 
moment.   Antony has death and life revealed to him, and their parallelism suggests that what takes place 
spiritually in the present life on the ‘aerial path’ determines whether or not one evades the giant after 
death.  The dead inhabit the same kind of world as the living, but their status is only determined by their 
actions when alive.  Likewise, the underlying spiritual forces at work in each person’s life are only 
clarified by judgment which takes place after death, though it may be tasted proleptically in the present.  
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Excursus:  Antony’s Death 
VA offers, in the scenes leading up to and including Antony’s death, a narrative paradigm for 
monastic death.  As Athanasius puts it, ‘his death also became worthy of emulation *ζηλωτόν+.’237  
However, Antony’s death remains only as emulable as Antony’s life:  like the ascetic discipline he teaches 
it is normative but not easy.238  Here I will argue that the continuity we have discerned in Antony’s 
visions holds true in Athanasius’ description of his death:  it is continuous with and defined by his way of 
life.  Athanasius dwells on two observable foci of the process of dying:  preparation and burial.  Between 
these poles, Athanasius crafts a vision of death transformed from an object of terror into a calm passage 
to Christ.   
As to preparation, Antony foretells his death to his disciples and prepares them accordingly.  
Athanasius tells us that he ‘learned about his death from Providence.’239  As we have seen, human lives 
are meted out by Providence and so they have no ‘fixed term’ and, therefore, offer no certain time for 
repentance or relaxation.  Antony lived so attuned to Providence that he gained some knowledge of 
death generally:  in one vignette Athanasius says that Anotny knew that one of two monks coming to 
visit him had died because he ‘kept his heart watchful.’240  Antony was, in that case, unable to explain 
why one brother died and not the other, but he was able to confidently ascribe the events to God’s 
inscrutable judgment.241  Antony’s attunement to Providence reveals a world cared for by God as well as 
the course of events as they run, but does not often allow him to offer rational explanations.  Thus, when 
it came time for him to die, Antony simply told his disciples in the outer mountain, ‘This is the last visit I 
will make, and I wonder if we will see each other again in this life; for it is time for me to die [ἀναλῦσαι] 
(cf. 2 Tim 4.6).’242  Antony’s disciples are horrified at this statement and begin to mourn, but he, 
Athanasius tells us, ‘like one setting off from an alien land to his own city, conversed with them 
rejoicing.’243  The formal similarities to Plato’s account of Socrates’ death in the Phaedo are unmistakeable 
                                                          
237 VA 89.1 
238 Alexandre, ‘L’heure de la mort’, 263, 271-72 
239 VA 89.2  
240 VA 59.6 
241 VA 59.1-5 
242 VA 89.2-3 
243 VA 89.3 
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but Antony has greater cause than Socrates to be glad at the prospect of his own death—his ascent, his 
journey ‘home’, as well as his resurrection, is vouchsafed by Christ whom he has served.244   
Antony dies while instructing his disciples one last time.  Many of his instructions concern burial, 
and reveal more about Athanasius’ attitudes toward Egyptian customs than anything else—they 
reinforce what Athanasius elsewhere attempted to teach:  that bodies must be buried, not displayed.  It is 
a false reverence to display a dead body rather than burying it as was done not only for ‘the patriarchs 
and prophets to this day’ but also and especially for the Lord.  For what, Athanasius asks, ‘is greater or 
more holy than the Lord’s body?’245  Antony requested, therefore, a simple burial, not wishing to make of 
himself an idol, even in death.  His disciples complied with his wishes and so, Athanasius reports, no one 
knows to this day where he is buried save the two disciples who dug his grave.246 
I wish to focus briefly on the content of Antony’s farewell address.  Apart from lengthy 
digressions on burial, it is a sort of resume of his great sermon and, therefore, a précis of those points 
Athanasius most wished to impress upon his readers.  Antony says, 
We must be watchful and not abandon our lengthy discipline, but as having a beginning 
now, let us hasten to preserve our perseverance.  You see the demons plotting, you know 
how savage they are, even being weak in strength.  Do not fear them, but rather breathe 
always Christ and believe in him.  And live as though dying each day [ὡς καθ’ ἡμέραν 
ἀποθνῄσκοντες ζήσατε] (cf. 1 Cor 15.31), paying attention to yourselves and 
remembering the exhortations you heard from me...Hasten rather always to join 
yourselves, chiefly to the Lord, but also to the saints, so that after death they may receive 
you, as friends and familiars, into the eternal dwellings (cf. Luke 16.9).247 
 
We see two themes which we have already touched on:  that one must renew one’s discipline each day 
and that one can, in Christ, overcome the demons.  The first command is guaranteed by contemplation of 
mortality, the second by remembrance of judgment.  A third idea on which Antony dwells here is that of 
living ‘as though dying’—which I will discuss below.  Finally, the point of everything is to cling to Christ, 
to be joined to Christ—but not just to Christ, to the saints as well.  The ascetic community strives to enact 
proleptically the eschatological community of heaven.  The monks strive to live now as saints and the 
friends of saints and, especially, as participants in Christ. 
                                                          
244 Antony expresses his hope of resurrection at VA 91.8. 
245 VA 91.4-6 
246 VA 92.2 (drawing a parallel with Moses; cf. Deut 34.6).  On issues with Egyptian burial see Malone, E.E. ‘The Monk 
and the Martyr’, in Steidle, Antonius Magnus Eremita, 216-20; and Alexandre, ‘L’heure de la mort’, 267-70 
247 VA 91.2-5; the ellipsis hides a philippic against Meletians and Arians, which only bolsters my argument that 
Christian community on earth ought to foretaste the heavenly community. 
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Of the moment of death, Athanasius can only say that  
Antony having spoken at length and having greeted each of them, ‚he stretched his feet‛ 
(Gen 49.33) and, as though he saw friends coming towards him, and being very glad at 
the sight (for as he lay his face appeared joyous) he ‚died and was gathered to the 
fathers‛ (cf. Gen 49.33).’ 
 
Athanasius can only say what the disciples saw:  that Antony died tranquilly, beautifully, like Jacob 
surrounded by his sons, the twelve Israelite patriarchs.  Thus Athanasius confidently ascribes to Antony a 
‘good’ death, in the style of the OT’s Patriarchal narratives.248  Yet, for Athanasius, as Monique Alexandre 
argues, it is Antony’s joy which demonstrated that his is a ‘good’ death.249  Antony dies, we hear, as he 
lived, approaching death with the same joyous tranquillity with which he served Christ.  His advice at 
death enshrines the principles by which he lived and through which he hoped to attain to Christ.  His 
death was, as Monique Alexandre puts it, ‘continuité et non rupture.’250  Yet in all this, death’s inner 
quality remains veiled.  We cannot see Antony’s ascent, or what befalls his soul in death.  We cannot hear 
the angels rejoicing over him or the companies of saints which he longed to join.  And so we are thrown 
back upon Antony’s visions of the giant and of Amoun’s ascent, left to ponder how glorious Antony’s 
own ascent must have been.  
                                                          
248 Thus the allusion to Gen 49.33, regarding Jacob’s death.  But it could also be to Abraham’s death (Gen 25.8), to 
Isaac’s (Gen 35.29) or to Moses’ (Deut 32.50).  Athanasius clearly wishes to draw a parallel with these accounts, but he 
presents Antony as gathered not to his fathers, but to ‘the fathers’ (cf. VA 91.2, referencing Jos 23.14).  Athanasius 
suggests, instead, that Antony (like Amoun) is received into the company not of his dead ancestors but of God’s 
righteous ones, the saints who had gone before him.  The ‘fathers’ could then stretch from Abraham to Amoun. 
249 Alexandre, ‘L’heure de la mort’, 266 
250 Alexandre, ‘L’Heure de la mort’, 265 
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IV. DAILY DYING 
 In this final section I will draw together the threads of argument which I have laid out 
throughout this chapter.  I will demonstrate that Athanasius draws heavily on the memory of death as 
mortality and judgment, correlated with his conception of spirituality as ascent to Christ, when 
describing how the monk Antony cultivates his serene and, above all, natural, lifestyle.  This requires a 
radical withdrawal from the world, and with that, a fresh approach to ethics and relationships.  Both of 
these are characterized and motivated by a continuing engagement with death—Antony stays on the 
‘upward path’ by beginning again each day. 
 
Withdrawal as Death? 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, VA portrays asceticism in terms of obedience made 
possible by profound withdrawal.  Athanasius thus traces the lineaments of Christian monasticism as a 
more settled movement with regard especially to ἀποταγή—‘renunciation,’ ‘withdrawal.’  As Roldanus 
notes, the proper characteristic of monks as opposed to ascetically-minded Christians generally,251 is their 
ἀποταγή, their ‘renunciation.’  He says that theirs becomes a new world,  
propre et particulier par l’isolement le plus absolu possible.  Il se libère de tout lien 
familier ou agreeable—famille, domicile, sécurité, propriété, culture, nourriture 
savoureuse, relations sexuelles—et se bâtit, soit tout seul, soit avec d’autres, un milieu 
nouveau dans lequel aucun lien avec le monde temporal ne l’empêchera de vaquer 
entièrement aux choses divines. 
 
Monasticism, then, as it took shape, distinguished itself from more casual asceticism by its creation of a 
new world, cut off and separate from the οἰκουμένη, the ‘civilized’ world.  Monastics symbolized this 
withdrawal by locating their existence in the desert.252  For Athanasius, indeed, Antony’s great 
accomplishment was not the founding of asceticism, nor even of monasticism as such.  It was, rather, his 
withdrawal into solitude which encouraged others to do likewise.  When Antony attempted to persuade 
the old man with whom he first studied asceticism to join him in moving permanently away from the 
village, the old man demurred for two reasons:  ‘his advanced age’ and because ‘this was not yet 
                                                          
251 Such as the old man under whom Antony first studied. 
252 See especially Guillaumont, Antoine, ‘La conception du desert chez les moines d’Egypte’, Revue d’histoire des 
religions 188 (1975), 3-21; and, more recently, James Goehring’s argument for a ‘literary’ rather than historical ubiquity 
of eremitic withdrawal, in his ‘The Encroaching Desert:  Literary Production and Ascetic Space in Early Christian 
Egypt’, JECS 1:3 (1993), 281-96. 
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customary [διὰ τὸ μηδέπω εἶναι τοιαύτην συνήθειαν+.’253  Whether this was quite true or not, Antony’s 
defining characteristic becomes his willingness to renounce as far as possible all that was familiar for the 
sake of an ever more fervent obedience to Christ.   
 David Brakke argues that Athanasius characterizes this withdrawal with ‘the extreme metaphor 
of death.  Natural death, Athanasius believed, was the complete separation of the soul from the body; the 
metaphor of death expressed the goal of ascetic renunciation as the withdrawal of the soul from the 
bodily passions.’254  I agree with Brakke, but we must be careful to not overstate the case with regard to 
VA.255  First, Athanasius does not use the language of death to describe Antony’s withdrawal or ascetic 
practices.256  Second, Athanasius is as much concerned with the re-attainment of humanity’s natural state 
of union with God through Christ.  These, and not a kind of metaphorical death, undergird his famous 
descriptions of Antony’s tranquillity and joy after his emergence from the fortified well.257  It would, I 
think, be unwise to try to make VA conform to a model of asceticism as death. 
 That being said, VA does, however tentatively, suggest a practice of ‘dying’, if not a metaphorical 
state of ‘death.’  This suggestion consists, rather simply, in the implications of Antony’s ‘memory of 
death’ for how the monk approaches ethics, and his relationship to goods and people.258 
 
                                                          
253 VA 11.2 
254 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 158 
255 Brakke (ibid.) cites Athanasius’ Festal Letters (preserved in Syriac), 7.2-3. 
256 Even Antony’s famous move to the tombs is presented as an act of enthusiastic athleticism, rather than a 
metaphorical death (VA 8-10) 
257 VA 67 
258 There is also Athanasius’ famous comment that Antony, returning from his failed attempt at martyrdom in 
Alexandria, ‘...καθ’ ἡμέραν μαρτυρῶν τῆ συνειδήσει καὶ ἀγωνιζόμενος τοῖς τ῅ς πίστεως ἄθλοις’ (VA 47.1).  I 
have, for reasons given in the Introduction, chosen not to discuss martyrological literature in this study.  While an 
appreciation of the connections between Athanasius’ understanding of martyrdom and his conception of asceticism 
would be illuminative, it is possible without it still to appreciate the role played by memory of death and ‘daily 
dying’ in VA. The elements of martyrdom which concern Athanasius have to do with the endurance that the ‘athletes 
of faith’ show in face of tortures and death—and he sees this in Antony’s struggles in the tombs (VA 8-10).  Antony’s 
life is a kind of ongoing near-martyrdom, in which the spectacular ‘single hour’ of martyrdom is traded for the slow 
grind of daily suffering.  On which see Malone, ‘The Monk and the Martyr’, 212-15, 224-27.   
 
Martyrs’ endurance points also to an intrinsic connection with ascetic training, on the implications of which see 
Young, Robin Darling, In Procession Before the World:  Martyrdom as Public Liturgy in Early Christianity, The Père 
Marquette Lectures 2001 (Milwaukee, WI, 2006). 
 
However, none of these elements have particularly to do with an engagement with death, per se, but rather with 
suffering more generally, and so I leave aside Antony’s ‘martyrdom’ as interesting but tangential. 
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Daily ‘Dying’ 
 Antony accompanied his initial withdrawal with ‘spiritual exercises’.  He used the thought of 
death to stave off memories of friends and relatives, property and social responsibility; as well as worries 
about an uncertain future and a precarious bodily health.  More than this, though, Antony preached a 
kind of daily ‘dying’ to his disciples.  The dying Antony commands his disciples to ‘live as though dying 
each day [ὡς καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀποθνῄσκοντες ζήσατε].’259 What does this mean?  Antony’s sermon helps 
fill out what it means to live ‘as though dying each day.’  He says, ‘Serving and living each day thus, we 
will neither sin nor desire anything nor become angry at anyone nor store up treasures on earth (cf. Mt. 
6.19).  But, expecting to die each day [καθ’ ἡμέραν προσδοκῶντες ἀποθνῄσκειν+ we will live without 
property and forgive everything to everyone.’260  This statement echoes what I have already argued, that 
contemplation of moretality means that there is no ‘tomorrow’ for the monk.  Here, however, Antony 
connects a close relationship to one’s own mortality directly to a lifestyle of forgiveness and simplicity.  
This prospect prevents old illusory possessions of both past and future to hold—the monk holds neither 
goods nor grudges.  In fact, propertyless-ness (ἀκτημοσύνη) and tranquil relationships go hand in hand:  
property is so often the cause of strife. 
Antony’s claims about property and relationships function within his renunciation of property 
(his inheritance) and the usual mode of social relationships (family and village).  Because he has given up 
attachment either to property or to people—at least the divisive attachment implied by distinguishing 
family from non-family—Antony can then live happily without property and is able to relate similarly to 
all.  Much of the motivation for Antony’s severing all ties with his family rests on a wish to escape from 
disposing of property.  Yet, as we have seen, Athanasius suggested something further in his description 
of Antony’s death:  he was gathered, not to his ‘people’ but to the ‘fathers’; not to his tribe or family but to 
the community of saints in heaven.261  Thus, living as though dying entails also a radical re-orientation of 
relationships both with property and people which, if carried through consistently, means a new way of 
life for the monk.   
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260 VA 19.4, following Sira 28.6 
261 See Note 248 above ; cf. Guillaumont, ‘La conception du désert’, 17 
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Indeed, while it is quite correct to say that Athanasius does not emphasize a ‘death to self’ in 
Antony’s career, focusing instead on a return to humanity’s natural state and union with the Logos,262 it is 
important to see the ways in which that return is made possible.  David Brakke argues of the monk 
Antony that 
His consideration of the rewards in heaven, the precarious nature of human life...and the 
horrors of hell should produce an unwavering life of virtue free of the ‚negligence‛ that 
led to the fall of the original human beings.  The person whose meditation on death leads 
to such resolve will display courage even in the face of imminent death.263 
 
Living with the constant memory of mortality and judgment induces a new lifestyle which accords to the 
exigencies and demands of both.264  This affects relationships with others, and also cultivates the 
unwavering character which Antony displays.  Yes, his tranquillity is undoubtedly a sign of his living 
κατὰ φύσιν as Adam did—but, importantly, Antony does not lose this tranquillity as Adam did.  Rather, 
first through his renunciation of property and social relationships and then through an engagement with 
death considered in light of Christ’s victory over corruption and the demons, Antony becomes something 
‘something greater than’ Adam, able to not only to find but to remain in a natural state—a crucial 
distinction for Athanasius.265  The monk, though not actually dead, effectively dies each day and is, 
implicitly, born again with equal frequency, and so able constantly to ἀρχὴν καταβάλλειν.266  In a sense, 
then, death constantly clears away all passing pleasures and worries from the ἄνοδος for Antony, 
separating him from his past in sin and mortality, freeing him toward a future whose only reference point 
is Christ’s judgment seat and the hope of beatitude beyond. 
 
Conclusion:  the seeds of tradition 
 For Athanasius, Christian spirituality takes the form of an ascent to heaven made possible by 
Christ’s victory over demons and death.  The ascetic life exemplifies this ascent as perseverant and 
absolute obedience to Christ.  The ascent takes place in the present life, determining what happens in 
death, and the continuity between the two is revealed especially by Antony’s visions of life and death.  In 
                                                          
262 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 238-44; see also the references in Note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
263 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 223 
264 VA 45.1-7 
265 See DI 3 l. 22, 26-33, 5 l. 7; Anatolios, Athanasius, 36-37; Roldanus, Le Christ et l’homme, 63-64; Brakke, Athanasius and 
the Politics of Asceticism, 146. 
266 VA 7.12, 19.4, etc.; so Alexandre. ‘L’heure de la mort’, 267. 
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order to live the life taught and exemplified by Christ in the Gospels, certain radical alterations are 
necessary.  The most important one is withdrawal from society and, with that, renunciation of the 
temporal goods and pleasures which are lauded and sought after in society.  We see in Antony’s first 
movements in the ascetic life the strict severance from the world, from goods and relationships which he 
undertakes by means of remembering death, not only as mortality, but especially as entrance into Christ’s 
eschatological judgment.  In light of judgment eternal implications, Antony discards whatever does not 
help him be united with Christ:  goods, property, even home and familial relationships—anything that 
might tie him to the present life.  Likewise, we see in the sermon he preaches that this same memory, if 
daily practiced, keeps one always on the ascent, because living always as though about to die and as 
though having just been born, one never grows old or gets tired, but stays fresh and enthusiastic, each 
day ‘beginning’ once more.  By living thus, Antony is able to find and, more importantly, to maintain the 
natural state of undisturbed union with and governance by the Logos, which Adam had once lost.   
While Athanasius does not use language of death to describe Antony’s asceticism or his ‘natural’ 
or ‘deified’ life in Christ, it is clear that Antony achieves this result at least partly through his ongoing 
engagement with death.  It is the memory of death—both as mortality and judgment—which, as Brakke 
argues, keeps Antony on the ἄνοδος.  This way of life, free of property and care, works within the context 
of ascetic withdrawal to enable obedience to Christ.  Antony maintains his fervour in obedience through 
the re-orientation of ethics and relationships to both goods and people which withdrawal and daily 
‘dying’ cultivate.  Antony achieves his tranquil, joyous, and natural state only by the power of Christ 
operative in him, and only because of the weakening of demons which Christ’s death and resurrection 
had already accomplished.  Thus, Antony approaches death with calm assurance, aware of the continuity 
between ascetic life and the fate of the dead.  Ultimately, Antony becomes, by the power of Christ, an 
imitator of Christ and a model for what Athanasius would consider a properly human existence.  While 
Athanasius does not call it death, Antony’s way of life differs radically from those living ‘in the world.’ 
Athanasius’ high hopes for ascetic accomplishment—perseverant tranquillity and embodiment of 
Christ’s victory over demons—will, among the Desert Fathers, be played out in terms explicitly taken 
from death.  Likewise, his description of the practice of the ‘memory of death’ will remain basically 
constant through the authors we survey.  Others will nuance, expand, elaborate and, even react against 
the picture of spirituality laid out here—particularly as regards Athanasius’ obvious optimism about 
what can be achieved with Christ’s help—but the practices and, to some extent, the hopes, which 
Athanasius typifies in Antony will remain the standard point of departure for all those who come later.  
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We turn now to the Desert Fathers, among whose writings the ideas presented in VA are elaborated with 
increasingly consistent reference to death and which yet display a tremendous ambivalence to the view of 
ascetic spirituality typified by VA. 
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2. HEIRS OF THE DESERT 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, my ideal soon became my life; whereas, formerly, my life had consisted in a vain 
attempt to behold, if not my ideal in myself, at least myself in my ideal.  Now, however, I 
took, at first, what perhaps was a mistaken pleasure, in despising and degrading myself.  
Another self seemed to arise, like a white spirit from a dead man, from the dumb and 
trampled self of the past.  Doubtless, this self must again die and be buried, and again, 
from its tomb, spring a winged child; but of this my history as yet bears not the record.  
Self will come to life even in the slaying of self; but there is ever something deeper and 
stronger than it, which will emerge at last from the unknown abysses of the soul:  will it 
be as a solemn gloom, burning with eyes?  Or a clear morning after the rain?  Or a 
smiling child, that finds itself nowhere, and everywhere? 
 
--- George MacDonald, Phantastes  
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 Having explored the role played in VA by memory and conceptions of death and judgment, and 
having shown their implications in Antony’s ‘daily dying’, we now turn to the Desert Fathers.  This 
chapter will fall into four sections.  The first will demonstrate that desert literature recommends a 
‘memory of death’ with reference both to mortality and judgment.  In the second, I will explore the 
consequences of ‘memory of death’ for the perceived relationship between the present age and eternity, 
particularly as this informs and motivates ascetic withdrawal.  In the third, I show that ascetics 
characterize their life as a kind of ‘death.’  In connection with this characterization I will discuss 
important practices such ‘cutting off the will,’ apatheia, and obedience which are important to the Desert 
Fathers, but are not often considered in terms of death.  In the fourth, I will highlight points of 
ambivalence and even opposition to the optimism which ‘memory’ and ‘practice’ of death implies in 
Desert literature. 
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I. LIVING TOWARD DEATH 
 When Theophilus, archbishop of Alexandria, was dying, he said ‘You are blessed, Abba 
Arsenius, because you have always kept this hour in mind.’267  Theophilus’ dying words summarize the 
attitude which numerous of the Desert Fathers took toward life and their expectations of it.  Utilizing and 
greatly expanding on ideas present already in VA, ascetics began to make death a constant companion 
and to shape their own selves around it.  Thus an anonymous elder in Palestine rebuked two visiting 
philosophers, saying ‘Let the object of your philosophy be always to contemplate death, possessing 
yourselves in silence and tranquillity.’268 
 
Expecting Judgment 
Unlike what one finds in, for example, CG-DI and VA, the Desert Fathers do not generally treat 
death as something indifferent or contemptible.  Many Desert Fathers actually advocate a kind of φόβος 
θανάτου, though not because mortality is itself terrible or because death ends distasteful pleasures, as in 
Athanasius’ description of sin-bound humanity.  Rather, as Abba Elias said, ‘I fear three things:  when my 
soul will go out of my body, and when I will present myself to God, and when the verdict on me will go 
out.’269  The moment of death becomes an object of fear because it ushers Elias into judgment, but what he 
fears is the verdict.  The movement toward judgment is expected; its outcome as yet unknown.  In this 
instance, fear of ‘death’ means, really, fear of the unknown outcome of a certain judgment whose criteria, 
as we have seen from the NT and VA, are the actions and habits which one has cultivated in life.  As VA’s 
Antony saw, God’s future judgment demands a radical response now if one is to prepare for it.   
What is it that the ascetic contemplates when he speaks of ‘judgment’?  Judgment means Christ’s 
eschatological judgment and, with it, the whole spectacular narrative of Christian eschatology.   
An old man said:  If it were possible, at the time of the coming of Christ after the 
resurrection, that men’s souls should die of fear, the whole world would die of terror and 
confusion.  What a sight, to see the heavens open and God revealed in anger and wrath, 
and innumerable armies of angels and, at the same time, the whole of humanity.  
                                                          
267 Theophilus 1 
268 PS 156 
269 Elias 1:  Εἶπεν ὁ ἀββᾶς Ἠλίας· Ἐγὼ τρία πράγματα φοβοῦμαι· ὅταν μέλλῃ ἡ ψυχή μου ἐξελθεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σώματος, καὶ ὅταν μέλλω τῷ Θεῷ ἀπαντ῅σαι, καὶ ὅταν μέλλῃ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἐξελθεῖν κατ' ἐμοῦ.  See also, e.g., 
Evagrius 4, Sisoes 19, Silouan 2, Syncletica 7; N 110 134, 136, 138-142, 175, 182, 186, 189, 193, 264; HM Prol.7, 11.57; HL 
34.6, 54.5; PS 8, 26, 43, 59, 71, 101, 110, 141, 142, 186 
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Therefore, we ought to live as having to give account to God of our way of life every 
day.270 
 
In this saying, as in Matthew’s Gospel, judgment means especially a revelation—of the heavens, angels, 
earth, and of God as judge.  Yet, as revelation, the judgment merely clarifies what is always true but 
forgotten or only dimly perceived:  that humans must give account to God.  The reason is that full 
awareness of the scope of judgment would actually paralyze people with confusion and even destroy 
them:  ‘human kind / cannot bear very much reality.’271  To ponder judgment means, then, to ponder 
something still veiled, not only in its outcome, but in its scope and depth.  Thus, within the generally 
biblical eschatological narrative there was space for speculation and, certainly, many authors took very 
different views of what Christ’s judgment might look like.  However, all speculation revolved around 
only two verdicts—vindication or condemnation.   
Monastics did not treat Christ’s judgment as distant or in deferral.  Rather, ascetics lived ‘as 
having to give account to God of our way of life every day’272 since ‘our master, Christ, dwelling and 
being present with us, beholds our life.’273  Abba Elias located judgment within the narrative of his own 
death, and the anonymous old man says that eschatological judgment should inspire a sense of being 
judged daily.  Throughout AP and other literature, Christ’s judgment is variously located as daily,274 post-
mortem,275 and eschatological.276  For each of these, it is always one’s daily life which is being judged and 
it is always possibly only once completed.  As Abba Poemen said, one is judged according to the state one 
has attained at death.277  Christ’s judgment is perhaps built up daily, but its effect becomes irrevocable 
only at death—until then one can always ‘make a new beginning.’278  While eternal life is the monk’s goal, 
and this life his means, death connects the two through judgment. 
 
 
                                                          
270 N 136; as also HM Prol.7:   
271 Eliot, T.S., ‘Four Quartets’, I: ‘Burnt Norton’, I, ll. 42-43. 
272 N 146 
273 N 78 
274 Antony 4, Antony 33 Agathon 24, Ephrem 3, Paphnutius 1, Or 11; HM 1.22-25, 8.32-33.  See also PS 38, 76, 78, 99, 
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275 Dioscorus 3, Cronius 3, Sisoes 38; HL 21.16-17; cf. also Poemen 182; PS 19, 44, 128, etc. 
276 Ammoes 1, Zeno 6, John of Cellia 1, Cronius 2, Matoes 12, Orsisius 1, Sisoes 19, Silouan 2, Syncletica 7; HM Prol.7, 
8.53, 11.5-7; PS 8, 26, 95, 101, 130, etc. 
277 Poemen 182, cf. Sisoes 38 
278 Poemen 85, Silouan 11 
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One Judgment, Two Verdicts 
As noted above, whatever the specifics, ascetic conceptions of judgment always has two sides—
positive (vindication/beatitude) and negative (condemnation/punishment).  Regarding punishment, it 
seems to have been common practice to meditate on the horrors which await sinners.  One abba compared 
memory of death and punishments to the squill (a sea urchin needle) which mothers put on their breast 
to wean children—the memory ‘of death and the punishment-chamber of the age to come’ provides an 
analogous antidote for ‘impure thoughts.’279  Likewise, a story of Abba Sisoes is worth recounting: 
Three old men came to Abba Sioes, having heard about him.  And the first one said to 
him, ‘Father, how can I be saved from the fiery river?’...The second said, ‘Father how can 
I be saved from the ‚gnashing of teeth‛ (e.g., Mat 25.30) and from ‚the sleepless worm‛ 
(cf. Mark 9.49)?’  The third said to him, ‘Father what shall I do, for the memory of the 
‚outer darkness‛ (Mat 25.30) kills me?’280 
 
These three questions reveal first, that a ‘memory of punishments’ was common enough practice; second, 
that it was largely based on biblical language; and, third, that it could be almost paralysing in its effect.  
Sisoes gently rebukes their enthusiasm, saying,  
You are blessed, my brothers.  I envy you.  The first of you spoke of the fiery river, the 
second of Tartarus, and the third of darkness.  Now, if your mind masters such memory, 
it is impossible for you to sin...What shall I do, hard-hearted as I am, not being granted to 
know, even if there will be punishment for people [μὴ συγχωρούμενος εἰδέναι ὅτι κἄν 
ἐστι κὀλασις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις]; and from this I sin each hour.281 
 
We will explore Sisoes’ own attitude toward the memory of death in the fourth section of this chapter, 
but for now one thing is clear:  even in his rebuke he admits that a memory of punishment has power to 
turn a person from sin.  His response recalls Ben Sirach 7.36, and conveys the intended result of 
contemplation of torments:  freedom from sin.  Just as that anonymous abba said that the memory of 
punishments could wean a person from impure thoughts, so Sisoes allows that it can keep a person from 
sin.  The fear to which such contemplation gives place has a paralysing effect and, in proper doses, this 
paralysis should extend only to sinful actions and impure thoughts, mobilizing the monk to obey God282 
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and cultivate virtues.283  However, if given too much space, it can actually immobilize a person, like the 
three tormented brothers.  The fear of punishments requires, therefore, a corrective. 
Hope of eternal bliss operates offers such a corrective, and, in fact, operates in dialectic unity with 
fear of punishment.  As Douglas Burton-Christie notes, ‘Mindfulness of judgment also meant awareness 
of the possibility of salvation.’284  This possibility was expressed in robust, yet biblical terms.  A brother, 
suffering in fear and frustration, asked an old man,  
‘How is it that my soul desires tears as I hear of the old men and yet they do not come, 
and so my soul is afflicted?’ The old man said to him, ‘The sons of Israel after forty years 
entered the land of promise, in which, if you return, you will no longer fear warfare.  For 
thus God desires to afflict the soul, so that it may always long to enter into that land.’285 
 
The old man reminds the brother of his great hope, the ‘land of promise’—the eschatological dwelling of 
the saints with Christ, in which he need no longer fear temptation (‘warfare’) or affliction.  Other stories 
speak of the crowns which await those who have endured286, and of the ‘hoped-for rest’287 or the ‘great 
gifts of God’.288  This hope helps carry the monk through the self-doubt and frustration of constant 
warfare and mitigates the paralysing effect of fear.  As Abba Euprepius put it, ‘Knowing that *Ἔχων...ἐν 
ἑαυτῷ], as he says, God is faithful and strong (cf. Heb 10.23), believe in him and you will partake of what 
is his.  But if you take no heed, you must also not acknowledge that we all believe him to be strong and 
believe that ‘all things are possible for him’ (Mark 14.26).’289  God’s faithful promises ground the ascetic’s 
hope and keep him from despair or paralysis. 
Nevertheless, unbridled hope could lead to undue expectations, even arrogance and carelessness.  
Hope must be tempered with fear, just as fear must be tempered with hope.  As fear should make the 
idea of sin so horrific as to be impossible, so hope should make virtue appear possible even when it is 
very difficult to achieve.  Mark the Monk describes this relationship of hope and fear, referring both to 
                                                          
283 See, e.g., Discoros 2, and Burton-Christie, Douglas, The Word in the Desert:  Scripture and the Quest for holiness in 
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the God who alone can judge:  ‘Fear of Gehenna and desire for Paradise yield endurance of afflictions; 
and this not because of themselves, but because of the one who knows our thoughts (cf. Pss 93.11).’290 
We should understand hope and fear, then, as corollaries of the same eschatological 
expectation—the judgment of Christ—and as contributing simultaneously to moulding into a monk the 
person who has already entered a life of asceticism.  A lengthy and influential apophthegm attributed to 
Evagrius291 illustrates this point excellently: 
Being seated in the cell, gather your thoughts.  Remember the day of death.  Behold then 
the death of the body.  Contemplate the event.  Take up the labour.  Observe the vanity in 
the world.  Thus you will be able to remain always in same state of tranquillity and will 
not become weak.  Remember also the present state of things in Hades.  Consider how 
the souls are there, in...great fear and struggle and with a certain expectation...   
 
But also remember the day of resurrection and presentation before God.  Imagine that 
horrible and fearful judgment.  Bring to mind the things reserved for sinners...Then also 
bring to mind the good things stored up for the righteous.... 
 
Evagrius goes on to describe the reactions one should have to these thoughts: 
Bring before yourself the memory of each of these, and weep for the judgment of sinners, 
mourn, fearful lest you yourself come to that end.  But rejoice and be glad at what is 
saved for the righteous.  And exert yourself so as to enjoy these, and to be utterly alien 
from the lot of sinners.  Take care that you do not forget this, whether you be in your cell 
or elsewhere, that you may flee from impure and harmful thoughts.292 
 
According to Evagrius, the monk not only imagines judgment on others, but actually anticipates future 
judgment by God through a conscious anticipation of it in which he judges himself.  Burton-Christie puts 
it thus: 
Remembrance of judgment also engendered an awareness of the need for repentance and 
for a profound exploration of the self.  The fact of an ultimate moral reckoning helped to 
focus attention on the need to cultivate moral purity—both in the hidden recess of the 
heart and in the more visible acts of everyday life.293 
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293 Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 182 
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Thus, the monk learns to accuse himself and so does not simply recall that there will be a judgment but, 
instead, actively envisions what judgment might look like as far as his own thoughts and actions are 
concerned.   
Some ascetics actually performed the results of judgment, but most would resort to the ‘revelation 
of thoughts.’  For example, Abba Zeno was besieged by the idea of plucking and eating a cucumber.  So 
he reminded himself that ‘thieves are punished’ in this life and the next, and betook himself to suffer now 
the kind of punishment he expected would await thieves in eternity, and so stood in the sun for five days.  
At that point he decided it would be better not take the food, since he could not endure the 
punishment.294  More often, though, the monk ‘performs’ judgment through by confessing his thoughts to 
an abba.  Columba Stewart has argued this point brilliantly, saying that by such ‘confession’ monks 
sought to clear away the demonic deception and, as often as not, self-deception, to which humans are 
prone.295  The monk sought through confession and the imagination of Christ’s judgment to cultivate an 
awareness of himself by which he could prepare for that judgment in which all illusion is cast aside and 
things revealed as they really were all along.   
Such self-awareness, however, can only be attained by those already in the ascetic life.  
Diadochus of Photice would later argue that accurate contemplation of God’s judgement requires already 
a degree of detachment from the world and love for God.296  This statement, coupled with Evagrius’ 
portrayal of spiritual exercises as taking place within one’s cell and the fact that revelation of thoughts is 
always to someone else, demonstrates that the practices of contemplating judgment operate within the 
context of ascetic withdrawal.  Memory of judgment and all the activities that go with it became a way of 
cultivating the life-style which one has already, to some degree, chosen; and, therefore, a means of living 
into an identity which one already holds as an ideal. 
 
Mortality 
Consciousness of death means also dwelling on mortality.  Mortality, as Antony preached, is 
uncertain yet inexorable—life is measured out by Providence, but its limit remains hidden.297  This idea 
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297 See also, e.g., Ps-Macarius, Collectio B, 49.4.5:  σπουδάσωμεν τοίνυν, ἀγαπητοί, ὡς τέκνα θεοῦ ἀποδυσάμενοι 
πᾶσαν πρόληψιν καὶ ἀμέλειαν καὶ χαύνωσιν γενναῖοι καὶ ἕτοιμοι γενέσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν ὀπίσω αὐτοῦ μὴ 
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pervades Desert literature as well.298  In one anonymous saying, a new monk keeps back a little money for 
his own maintenance.  An old man advises him to give away even that small Amount—his renunciation 
is not yet complete and he is, therefore, something less than a monk.299  The young brother has trouble 
giving his money away because he imagines that his cell will require repairs—and this thought keeps him 
from prayer.  But, after repeated counsel from the old man, he finally succeeds in completing his 
renunciation.  When the last bit of money is gone, the monk suddenly becomes aware not only of the age 
and decrepitude of his cell but of a lion prowling nearby.  In consternation and terror he confronts the old 
man:  ‘‚Everything here is old, and a lion is coming to eat me up.‛  The old man in turn confessed his 
own thoughts:  ‚I expect everything to come down upon me, and the lion to come and eat me up so that I 
may be set free.  Go, sit in your cell, and pray to God.‛’300  When he held back for himself some measure 
of independent control over the world around him (money), the anonymous young monk was distracted 
by worldly thoughts (fixing his hut).  But when he made his renunciation complete, he no longer had the 
same sort of concerns, and new ones appeared—he could not control his world (the hut’s collapse came 
to seem inevitable) and he had to confront mortality as an ever-present companion (the lion).  When one 
has completely renounced the world, one dwells in sight of death.  But it is only in sight of death, the old 
man explains, that a person can live the ascetic life—‘Sit in your cell’ and pray.301   
This proximity to one’s own mortality, as Antony pointed out in VA, means honesty about one’s 
natural condition.  A ‘great old man’ said, ‘I exhort you, brothers, since we have refrained from the actual 
deeds, let us refrain from the desires as well.  For what are we but dust from dust?’302  Living as one about 
to die is, in fact, no more than admitting that one leads a mortal existence.  Yet that admission helps 
complete the monastic’s renunciation of the world—he can retain nothing of it if he is to make progress.  
This is best illustrated by a story of Abba Elijah, who, burning with lust, left his cell to slake his thirst and 
fell into a pit.  There an angel showed him decomposing bodies of both men and women and said, ‘Go 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ἀναβαλλόμενοι ἡμέραν ἐξ ἡμέρας, ὑπὸ τ῅ς κακίας ὑποκλεπτόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ οἴδαμεν, πότε ἡ ἀπὸ τ῅ς σαρκὸς 
ἡμῶν ἔξοδος γίνεται. 
298 See, e.g., Cyrus 1, Longinus 2, Pambo 8, Rufus 1, Phocas 1, Or 1; HL Prol. 3-4, 5.2; HM 1.29, 1.45-46, 1.56, 8.16-17; PS 
5, 19, 42, 44, 71. 
299 Cf. Cassian the Roman 8 and Antony 20. 
300 N 17 (Stewart’s translation); cf. a similar sentiment in HL Prol.3-4 
301 On ‘sitting in the cell’ as representative of monastic life see, e.g., Moses 6:  Ἀδελφὸς παρέβαλεν εἰς ΢κ῅τιν πρὸς 
τὸν ἀββᾶν Μωϋσ῅ν, αἰτούμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγον.  Λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ γέρων· Ὕπαγε, κάθισον εἰς τὸ κελλίον σου· 
καὶ τὸ κελλίον σου διδάσκει σε πάντα.’  Cf. Also Antony 1, Antony 10, etc. 
302 N 83; see also Evagrius, Cogitationibus (Recensio brevius) 18 (PG 79:1164A):  Σί μετεωρίζῃ, ἄνθρωπε, πηλὸς ὢν, 
καὶ σαπρία τῆ φύσει, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰς νεφέλας ἐπαίρῃ; 
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and enjoy yourself...But in return for that pleasure, take note how much labour you intend to destroy.  
Just look at the sort of sin for which you are prepared to deprive yourself of the kingdom of 
heaven...Would you lose the fruit of all that toil for one hour’s *pleasure+?’303  Mortality reveals the 
natural transience of human life and, therefore, the transience of pleasure, but in light of judgment, that 
transience appears as a hook drawing one toward eternal punishment. 
As in VA so the Desert Fathers speak frequently of ‘making a good beginning.’304  To make each 
day a good beginning implies that the monk carries nothing over from the previous day, and takes 
nothing with him until the next.  One encounters, along these lines, descriptions of the whole ascetic life 
as taking place or, at least, able to take place, within one day:  ‘The whole life of a man is one day for 
those who work with desire.’305  To live entirely within each day, bounded by mortality, dramatically 
illustrates the sort of ‘newness of life’ which monastics sought.  That sort of life must constantly shed the 
past and can take no thought for the future.  Both past and future bind the monk to the world—one 
through passions, family, and memories, and the other through worry and care.  Yet, as other instances 
remind the reader, death cuts repentance short and for those who fall ‘today’ is not always enough.306  
Nevertheless, each day brings the opportunity of beginning once more—which is, I suppose, the sum 
total of progress for which monastics longed.  ‘Abba Moses asked Abba Silouan, saying ‚Is it possible a 
person to make a beginning each day?‛  And the old man said, ‚If he is a worker, it is possible every hour 
to make a beginning.‛’307 Living as though about to die heightens the significance and perceived 
soteriological value of each day and helps the monk to avoid anticipation of an unknown future.308   
 
Conclusion 
Mortality and future judgment cannot be separated.  They are simply different aspects of what 
Christian ascetics expect from death.  As Evagrius put it, ‘He who ever has a care for the remembrance of 
death is led also to the fear of judgment.’309  Contemplation of mortality can refer directly to the 
remembrance of eschatological judgment.  Abba Rufus says, ‘Keep in mind your future death, 
                                                          
303 PS 19, cf. 39 
304 Arsenius 3, Dioscorus 1, Poemen 85, Sisoes 14, Silouan 11, Or 8, N 168, 187, 208 ; cf. VA 7.11-12 
305 Gregory Nazianzen 2; see also Alonius 3, Poemen 126 
306 Antony 14 
307 Silouan 11; see also Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 247-49 
308 So Evagrius, Practicus 12, 27-29; Monachos 54-56; on which Guillaumont, Traité pratique, vol. 2, 566-68 and Brakke 
Demons and the Making of the Monk, 66-67. 
309 Eulogius 20; so also Diadochus, Capita, 81 
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remembering that you do not know at what hour the thief will come.’310  Here, Rufus conflates death with 
the return of Christ, implicitly connecting individual death to the eschaton.  Underlying his admonition is 
not only the rich man whose soul was demanded of him that very night (Luke 12.20), but Paul’s words 
(echoing Christ’s at Matthew 24.43) concerning Christ’s eschatological parousia:  ‘For you know very well 
that the day of the Lord comes as a thief in the night’ (1 Thess 5.2).311  Even where remembering death 
means dwelling on the mortal condition, the activity is inextricably bound up with the eschatological 
ramifications of death considered in light of Christ.  When dwelling on judgment, as we have seen, one 
must always hold together the fear of punishment and the hope of salvation—each balancing the other, 
and both operating together to keep the monk from sin while spurring him to virtue.  Thus, memory of 
death and judgment keeps monks from both despair312 and pride.313  Each day offers the monk a chance to 
anticipate God’s judgment and to accord himself to its criteria through performance of that judgment in 
thought and, especially, revelation of thoughts.  Recollection of mortality helps the monk to constantly 
begin again, to work urgently and tirelessly, since each day becomes, in light of death’s imminence, a 
kind of new lifetime.   
                                                          
310 Rufus 1 
311 Cf. Moschos, Demetrios, Eschatologie im ägyptischen Monchtums, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 
(Tübingen:  Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 155:  ‘In diesen Fällen wird die Erscheinung der Engel mit der Vorbereitung auf den 
Tag des Herrn v.a. als vorbereitun auf den Todestag verbunden.‘   
312 N 121; HM 1.36 
313 HM 1.47 
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II. LIVING BEYOND DEATH 
Hope and fear each rely on the perception of an underlying opposition, even exclusivity, of the 
temporal and eternal worlds.314  The expectation of death diminishes the perceived value of transient 
goods, whether of relationships or objects.  The expectation of existence beyond death keeps the monk 
from falling into nihilism—a possibility of which Palladius, at least, was aware:  ‘For some receive their 
soul in vain, those who, believing it to be dissolved with the body, are careless about virtue.’315  The 
monk, living with mortality at hand, gives up desires, property and even anger—those things which 
define relationships in the world no longer apply to the monk.  Like Antony, he can live in voluntary 
poverty, forgiving all and desiring nothing on earth.  There are several ways in which Christian ascetics 
understood the present life as relating to eternity.  Ascetics saw a fundamental incompatibility between 
the polity of the present life—one defined by property, divisive and fractious relationships, by 
convention, spiritual warfare and, ultimately, sin and demonic powers—and their ‘citizenship in heaven.’  
This incompatibility bred among ascetics a general sense of ‘opposition’ between the two aeons.  This at 
times can mean that one must suffer presently to rest in the future (something we have already seen 
above), or perhaps labour now for rewards later.  Alternatively, the opposition can play out a kind of 
continuity, wherein one chooses to do something either now or later—humans must suffer, but the choice 
is whether to do so now or in eternity.   
 
The Narrow Way 
 Ascetics had in common with those they repudiated a sense that the present life is an opportunity 
to lay hold of goods.  Those goods could be material and transient—money, property, fame, physical 
pleasures—or spiritual and eternal—the longed-for ‘land of rest’ with Christ.  Acquiring the latter meant 
renunciation of the former, and the enjoyment of spiritual blessings was generally consigned to the ‘age 
to come.’  For example, Amma Theodora said, ‘Strive to enter through the narrow gate.  For such is the 
case with trees, if they do not withstand winter and rain, they cannot bear fruit.  So also with us, this age 
is winter and unless it be through many tribulations and temptations, we cannot become inheritors of the 
                                                          
314 In this section I will use ‘age’, ‘world’, and ‘aeon’, interchangeably as ways of describing the life before and the life 
after death.  These words reflect the usage of ascetic literature and, while having an apocalyptic tone, do not, I think, 
carry gnostic or other mythological baggage. 
315 HL 6.4 
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kingdom of heaven.’316  Generally, ascetics considered that the present life was a time for toil and labour 
and, in particular, for struggle with temptation.  ‘Abba Antony said to Abba Poemen, that ‘This is a 
person’s great activity *ἐργασία], to place his former failings before God (cf. 1 Pet 5.7) and expect 
temptation [πειρασμόν+ until his last breath.’317  Abba Theodore of Pherme warned against ‘taking one’s 
rest in this age, before God grants it.’318  Rather, rest must lay the other side of death, in the ‘age to come.’  
The present life gives an opportunity to work for the age to come, knowing that the desires and habits 
which drag a person back into sin and attach him to passing pleasure are a constant temptation. 
Ascetics responded to the allure of transient goods with renunciation and withdrawal.  We are, 
again, not so far from Antony’s outward movement from village to desert, but we see among the Desert 
Fathers a wider variety of interpretations of ἀποταγή.  For some it might mean especially the distribution 
of money or goods319 or care for the sick320 or, alternatively, it could mean flight from people and 
speech.321  In each case, however, the monastic renounces something and acquires a new activity.  Just as 
the activities of ἀποταγή vary, so also do the descriptions of it.  For some, ξενιτεία, ‘exile’ best describes 
the monk’s life on earth, since he is ever reminded that his true citizenship is in heaven.322  Mark the 
Monk, on the other hand, draws freely on the Gospel images of sowing and reaping, to argue that the 
present time provides opportunity to renounce what one hopes to find again, multiplied a 
hundredfold.323   
For all their differences, these activities and descriptions of ἀποταγή all have their rationale in an 
engagement with death.  The reality of death and the expectation of judgment particularly sharpen the 
sense of opposition, the character of renunciation, and the urgency of labour.  For example, a particularly 
visceral apophthegm of Antony says: 
Have always before your eyes the fear of God.  Remember the one who ‘kills and makes 
alive’ (4 Kgds 5.7).  Hate the world everything therein.  Hate all fleshly rest.  Renounce 
                                                          
316 Theodora 2; see also Bessarion 12, Elias 6; Moses 18, 20; Hyperechius 6-7.  This saying echoes John of Lycopolis’ 
admonition at HM 1.29-30.  So also HM 8.53; N 21, 141, 142, 193, 299, 312, 368; PS 69, 152; Nilus of Ancyra, ΛΟΓΟ΢ 
Α΢ΚΗΣΙΚΟ΢ (Philokalia, 1:191-92); Mark the Monk, Operibus 130, 156.  So also Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 
219-22. 
317 Antony 4 
318 Theodore of Pherme 16 
319 E.g., HL 54.4-5, 61.7, 68.1-4, 71.1-4; PS 231 
320 E.g., HL 21.3; cf. PS 75, on which see Chadwick, ‘John Moschus and his friend Sophronius’, 61. 
321 E.g., Asenius 1-2, Doulas 2, Evagrius 2; cf. Mark the Monk, De Lege 108, 114 
322 See, e.g., PS 12, 37, 55;  
323 Mark the Monk, Operibus 47, 121, 133, 137; see also N 157 and Nilus of Ancyra, ΛΟΓΟ΢ Α΢ΚΗΣΙΚΟ΢, Philokalia, 
1:190. 
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this life, that you may live to God.  Remember what you have vowed to God—for it will 
be demanded of you in the Day of Judgment (Mat 10.15, 2 Pet 3.7, etc.).  Hunger, thirst, 
go naked, keep vigil, mourn, weep, wail in your heart.  Test yourself whether you are 
worthy of God, then despise the flesh that you may save your souls.324 
 
As Antony describes matters, the monastic lives ever in the ‘fear of God’ and expectation of death.  The 
latter reminds the monk that worldly goods will be irrevocably lost and are, in any event, of only illusory 
value—fleshly rest is not eternal rest and, as Evagrius puts it, ‘possessions will not benefit you in the day 
of death.’325   The fear of God, as this apophthegm says, rests on the assumption that one has to ‘give 
account’ to God of ‘what has been vowed to him’ or, as an anonymous apophthegm puts it, ‘our way of 
life.’  While engagement with mortality helps monks to ‘despise the flesh’, the fear of God and, especially, 
his judgment, reminds them to ‘save their souls.’326 
 
A Matter of Eschatology 
 I have said that death lies between the monk and his hopes.  However, many monks, like 
Evagrius, for whom gnosis constitutes the ultimate goal, believed eschatological hopes to be realizable in 
the present life.  Even so, arguments for renunciation hold good, since spiritual goods are still opposed to 
material ones.  Evagrius certainly does see death as an important moment, at which the character of a 
monk is tested and revealed, and in that sense it is safe to say that hopes for rest must lie beyond death.  
He says, 
The monk free of possessions...is above every temptation and scorns present realities; he 
rises above them, withdraws from earthly things, and associates with the things 
above...Affliction comes and with no sadness he leaves that place.  Death approaches and 
he departs with a good heart, for he does not bind his soul with any earthly fetter. 
 
But the monk with many possessions has bound himself with the fetters of his 
worries...Even if death should approach, he is miserable in leaving behind present things 
and giving up his soul...he is separated from the body but he is not separated from his 
                                                          
324 Antony 33 
325 PS 203; cf. Evagrius, Paraenesis (PG 79:1237A):  ‘Ποιήσατε φωτεινὸν ἔνδυμα Φηριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν, ὑπὲρ 
πᾶσαν στολὴν βυσσίνην, ὅτι οὐκ ὠφελήσει ὑπάρχοντα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ θανάτου.’ 
326 Evagrius sums up in Paraenesis (PG 79:1240A):  ‘Οὐ ῥυσεται πίστις καὶ βάπτισμα τοῦ αἰωνίου πυρὸς, χωρὶς 
ἔργων δικαιοσύνης.  Εἰ γὰρ συνετάξω τῷ Φριστῷ, τήρει τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ πιστεύεις τὰ μέλλοντα, 
ἀντιποιοῦ τ῅ς δόξης τ῅ αἰωνίου, καὶ φοβήθητι τὴν φλογίνην ῥομφαίαν.’ 
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possessions; the passion has a greater hold on him than those dragging him [towards 
death].327328 
 
Nevertheless, Evagrius can also speak of the opposition of ‘ages’ as one which plays out in the present 
life.  The ascetic rises by means of πρακτική through ἀπάθεια to a state of γνῶσις wherein προσευχή 
and θεωρία are possible.329  Yet the eschatological hope of the Christian is also θεωρία and προσευχή 
defined as ‘converse of the mind with God.’330  Thus, Evagrian eschatology is strongly realized, since the 
Christian is capable of the same activity now as later—there is little left for death to accomplish except the 
shedding of the body.  Writers like the anonymous author of HM oppose πρακτική and θεωρετική in 
similar terms,331 while Palladius uses ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ persons as his contrasting terms.332 These follow 
Evagrius to some extent, though it is not clear that they share his speculative opinions.333  For the majority 
of the Desert Fathers, though, as Graham Gould notes, the ‘reward’ hoped for is ‘implicitly an eternal, 
heavenly one, a divine response to the way in which [the monk] has chosen to live the monastic life as a 
life of concern for their neighbours.’334  Evagrian spirituality, however popular its fourth-century 
                                                          
327 Paraenesis (PG 79:1240A):  Οὐ ῥυσεται πίστις καὶ βάπτισμα τοῦ αἰωνίου πυρὸς, χωρὶς ἔργων δικαιοσύνης.  Εἰ 
γὰρ συνετάξω τῷ Φριστῷ, τήρει τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ πιστεύεις τὰ μέλλοντα, ἀντιποιοῦ τ῅ς δόξης τ῅ς 
αἰωνίου, καὶ φοβήθητι τὴν φλογίνην ῥομφαίαν. 
328 Cogitationibus (recensio fusius) 3.5-7 ; cf. Monachos 21 
329 For a convenient summary of Evagrian spirituality see Louth, , Andrew, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition:  
From Plato to Denys (2nd ed.; Oxford:  OUP, 2007), 97-110. 
330 De Oratione 3 (PG 79:1168C):  Ἡ προσευχὴ, ὁμιλία ἐστὶ νοῦ πρὸς Θεόν.  The earliest use of this definition, so 
important to Greek ascetics, comes from Maximus of Tyre (2nd c. CE):  ‘ὁμιλίαν καὶ διάλεκτον πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς 
περὶ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἐπίδειξιν τ῅ς ἀρετ῅ς’ (Dialexeis 5.8b-c).  Alexandrian Christians took it up:  Clement of 
Alexandria (to define εὐχή, Stromateis, 7.12.73.1) and, probably, Origen (προσευχή, Fragmenta in Psalmos 1-150, 
[dub.], Ps. 140.2, l. 7).  The definition became common, used by Gregory of Nyssa (De Oratione Dominica orationes 5), 
John Chrysostom (Contra Anomoeos, 7 [PG 48:766]; De fato et providentia [PG 50:760]; In Genesim [PG 53:285]; Catecheses 
ad illuminandos 1-8 (series tertia), 7.25) and Ps-Macarius (collectio HA, 56.6).  For Evagrius, though, it is only one of 
several definitions, but in all of them he envisions a kind of communion between νοῦς and God.  If Guillaumont’s 
assessment of Evagrius’ eschatology (drawn from his analysis of the Kephalaia Gnostica) is correct, then prayer 
anticipates—to the extent possible—the life of νόες in the consummation of the age.  See Guillaumont, A., Les 
‘Kephalaia Gnostica d’Evagre le pontique et l’histoire de l’origénisme chez les grecs et chez les syriens, Patristica Sorbonensia 5 
(Paris:  Éditions du Seuil, 1962), 37-39;  and especially Konstantinovsky, Julia, Evagrius:  The Making of a Gnostic, 
Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2009), 162-70. 
331 HM 1.62, 13.11 
332 Palladius, HL 12.2 
333 See Draguet, ‘L’Histoire Lausiaque, une œuvre écrite dans l’esprit d’Évagre’, Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 41 (1946), 
321-64 and 42 (1947), 5-49.  However, Hunt, E.D., ‘Palladius of Helenopolis:  A Party and its Supporters in the Church 
of the Late Fourth Century’, JTS n.s. 24:2 (1973), 479-80; and Katos, Palladius of Helenopolis, 90-100, argue that 
Palladius, though partial to Evagrius, was not a slavish ‘Origenist’ and his work likely reflects the broader tradition 
within which Evagrius operated.   
334 Gould, Desert Fathers, 105 
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tradition, became increasingly unique after the Origenist Controversy and it remains generally true of 
authors here under survey that, whatever hopes they held for the present life, it was eschatological rest in 
Christ for which they longed, and though they might taste it now, they only expected to enjoy it fully 
after death. 
  
The time of repentance  
Shifting one’s attention and desire from transitory and material goods to spiritual ones whose full 
receipt cannot be realized in the present life requires a forcible alteration of one’s priorities and desires.  
Thus, μετάνοια, ‘repentance,’ a forcible change of attitude and action, is in order:  ‘Abba Peter...told us 
about Abba Thalilaios the Cilician that he passed sixty years in the monastic life, never ceasing to 
weeping, and he always said ‚God gave us this time for repentance, and we have to seek him 
wholeheartedly.‛’335  Abba Thalilaios expressed his repentance through weeping, a common practice 
among the Desert Fathers, though unknown to VA’s Antony.  Emphasis on μετάνοια opposes the present 
age to eternity, not so much in the kinds of activities appropriate to each (though that is certainly true), 
but as mutually exclusive loci for similar activities.  That is, one must weep, and the choice is between 
weeping now and weeping later.336  Thus, a curious continuity between the ages leads to a different kind 
of opposition, in which ascetics strive to suffer now what they wish to avoid in eternity and to renounce 
now the very pleasure they hope to gain in eternity. 
 Arsenius, John of Cellia, and Macarius the Great all agree:  humans must weep at some point and 
so each of these exhorted his disciples ‘Let us weep, brothers, and let tears pour from our eyes, before we 
depart for that place where our tears will burn our bodies.’337  The sense is that while tears are useful now 
for repentance, after death they will be no more than a mark of damnation, paradoxically exacerbating a 
fiery punishment.  Amma Syncletica describes the kind of mourning one must accomplish here and now: 
There is profitable sadness [λυπή] and corrosive sadness (cf. 2 Cor 7.9-11).  Useful 
sadness includes weeping both for one’s own sins and for the weakness of neighbours, so 
as not to fall away from one’s purpose and to lay hold of perfect goodness.  But there is 
also a sadness from the enemy, fully irrational, also called acedia by some.  It is necessary 
to cast this spirit out by prayer and psalmody (cf. Mark 9.29).338 
                                                          
335 PS 59 
336 Following Luke 16.19-31; cf. Mark the Monk, Operibus, 73, 119. 
337 Macarius the Great 34; see also Arsenius 41, John of Cellia 1; see also PS 110. 
338 Syncletica 27, in Guy, Recherches sur la tradition Grecque (cf. Poemen 26, 39, 50, 72).  This saying relies on the Pauline 
distinction—discussed in the introduction—between godly and worldly λύπη. 
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Syncletica points out the danger of indiscriminate weeping as well as the causes of proper mourning—
one’s own sins, and the weakness of others.  One does not weep for material or even relational loss in this 
world—such would be irrational and contribute to a discontentment with the life of renunciation.  We 
may note that, in light of Syncletica’s saying, it is no accident that one weeps before the expectation of a 
judgment in which sin and the world will be condemned.339  In light of death and eternal judgment, 
therefore, one seeks not to lament the loss of those things which must pass away, but to mourn for those 
actions and thoughts which may keep one from God.340  It is no surprise, then, that the primary reason for 
weeping is ‘for one’s sins’ and that πένθος is thereby associated with μετάνοια.341  One may also weep, 
as Palladius puts it, for the lost life of Paradise, spurned in favour of ‘irrational food’.342  The connection 
between these various sources of tears is the effect:  the world loses its power before one who sees in it a 
cause not for celebration but for mourning.   
 
Abba Poemen:  The way of tears 
While many ascetics expected to benefit from tears, Abba Poemen turned mourning into a way of 
life.  Barbara Müller argues that, for monks whose spirituality is typified by the sayings attributed to 
Abba Poemen, πένθος (or δάκρυα343) as not simply one virtue among many, but as a framework within 
which virtues may be cultivated and the whole array of sins is combated.344  Two of Poemen’s sayings 
demonstrate the importance of tears: 
A brother asked Abba Poemen, ‘What shall I do with my sins?’  The old man said to him, 
‘Weep within yourself.  For deliverance from sins and procurement of virtues both derive 
from mourning. 
 
Again he said, ‘Weeping is the way which the Scriptures and our fathers have handed 
down to us.’345 
 
                                                          
339 Poemen 122; Or 1; Evagrius, Eulogius 7; cf. N 140-41 
340 Hausherr, Irénée, Penthos:  The Doctrine of Compunction in the Christian East, trans. Anselm Hufstader, CS 53 
(Kalamazoo, MI:  Cistercian Publications, 1982), 3-4, 17-33 
341 Macarius the Great 27, 41; HM 1.37, 1.53-58; PS 30, 41, 110; on which see Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 184 
342 HL 1.3 
343 Müller, Barbara, ‘Die Tränen der Wüstenväter:  Das Penthos in den Apopthegmata Patrum’, Östkirchliche Studien 
46:4 (1997), 293-94 
344 Ibid., 299-309 
345 Poemen 208-09 (in Guy) 
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These two sayings illustrate the dramatic benefits of a commitment to mourning and yet they also 
demonstrate that tears are only the way and never the end.346  Rather, Poemen’s emphasis on tears begins 
with his engagement with death and ends with the hope of salvation.  As to the beginning of tears:  ‘Abba 
Poemen said: ‚There are *always+ three mysteries before me: it is good for me to pray at all times before 
the Lord, without stopping; to place my death before me at all times; and [to think] that, when I die, I will 
be thrown into the fire because of my sins.‛’347  William Harmless argues that Poemen exhibited a 
particularly ‘penitential piety’ and that ‘By picturing himself as deserving damnation, Poemen fiercely 
cultivates in himself the penitent's heart, knowing that he must face Christ the judge.’348  We must be 
clear—Poemen mourns now not because he will be punished, but so as to avoid punishment.  Tears keep 
him constant in his monastic vocation whose end is salvation.  Two sayings illustrates this:   
When Poemen came to Egypt, he saw a woman sitting at a tomb and weeping 
[κλαίουσαν] bitterly.  And he said, ‚If all the pleasures *τερπνά] of this world came, they 
could not move her soul from mourning [πένθος].  So also the monk should always hold 
mourning [πένθος] in himself.‛349 
 
A brother asked Abba Poemen, saying ‘What shall I do?’  Poemen replied, ‘Abraham, 
when he entered the land of the promise (), purchased a tomb [μνημεῖον] for himself, 
and by this grave [τάφος+ inherited the land (cf. ).’  The brother said, ‘What is a grave 
[τάφος?’  The old man replied, ‘A place of weeping and mourning *Σόπος κλαυθμοῦ καὶ 
πένθους+.’350 
 
The tomb, which represents the activity of mourning by which a monk is protected from worldly 
distractions,351 becomes the means of inheriting the ‘land of promise’, the ‘rest’ for which ascetics strive.  
Poemen advocates mourning as a means of keeping constant in repentance and obedience to God, and is 
motivated to do so through remembrance of death and judgment. 
 
 
 
                                                          
346 Driscoll, J., ‘Exegetical Procedures in the Monk Poemen’, in Lohrer, Magnus (ed), Symbolgegenwort und Theologische 
Bedeutung:  Festschrift für Basil Studer, Studia Anselmia 116 (Rome, 1995), 167 
347 Collectio Monastica 13.46 (CSCO 238 [Leuven:  Peeters, 1963], 95-96), translated in Harmless, ‘Remembering Poemen 
Remembering’, 505-06. 
348 Harmless, ‘Remembering Poemen Remembering’, 506 
349 Poemen 119; on which see Harmless, ‘Remembering Poemen Remembering’, 491f. 
350 Poemen 50 
351 Also Poemen 39 
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Loving what one leaves 
Renunciation and the ‘way of tears’ demand a rigorous lifestyle which cultivates in the monk a 
character pleasing to God.  Monks renounced goods not simply to procure others, but out of love for God.  
In HL, Palladius describes an ascetic as ‘smitten with a love of eternity’ who ‘renounced the clamours *of 
the world+, and disposing of all his goods’ went to undertake the ascetic life.352  The desire for eternal 
beatitude is a desire to please God and to find happiness in him.  Yet, in order to please God, one must 
learn not to hate what one leaves behind—though one must be willing to leave it behind entirely—but to 
love without striving to possess and without becoming unduly attached.  Douglas Burton-Christie’s 
conclusion is particularly apt: 
The telos of the monks’ life in the desert was freedom; freedom from anxiety about the 
future; freedom from the tyranny of haunting memories of the past; freedom from an 
attachment to the ego which precluded intimacy with others and with God.  They hoped 
also that this freedom would express itself in a positive sense:  freedom to love others; 
freedom to enjoy the presence of God; freedom to live in the innocence of a new 
paradise.353 
 
This means that the Desert Fathers looked not for freedom absolutely, but freedom from the enslaving 
power of the world.  They sought rather to become slaves of God and to serve their neighbour through 
love of God and eternity.  Freedom is not the end.  Love, Burton-Christie reminds us—love of God and 
neighbour—is the end, but it is only possible when someone is free from the false love of transient desire 
which seeks only to possess.  The monk renounces goods to flee from anger, from grudges and malice.  
He flees marriage to avoid lust, and family to overcome fractional convention.  He seeks freedom in 
which to forgive all because he is so conscious of his own sins over which he weeps, and learns thereby to 
love and give himself in love as Christ did.  Just as monks must meditate both on punishments and 
salvation in order not only to flee sin but to cultivate virtue, so they must renounce the world in order to 
love creation. 
To illustrate this claim:  in a particularly poignant passage, John Moschos tells the story of Abba 
John the Eunuch who, when he died, had so thoroughly renounced the world and given himself to 
charity that he left ‘nothing whatsoever of the world’s goods behind.  Not even for one hour did he ever 
possess books, money or clothing.  He gave everything to those in need, investing his entire concern in 
                                                          
352 HL 21.3; so Patricia Cox Miller , ‘Dreaming the Body:  An Aesthetics of Asceticism’, in Asceticism, 295-96. 
353 Burton-Christie, Douglas, The Word in the Desert:  Scripture and the Quest for holiness in Early Christian Monasticism 
(Oxford:  OUP, 1993), 222 
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those things which were to come.’354  Yet this same man fed the animals of the monastery right down to 
the ants.  Abba John’s all-consuming desire for the next world sharpened his love for this one.  The all-
encompassing power of ascetics’ desire for the kingdom of heaven drove them to renounce the kind of 
life which might find success in this world.  To dwell on the good things to come means to relativize the 
present world and yet it also means learning to properly love the present world, and to save oneself 
wholly for God requires, ultimately, making a gift of oneself for one’s neighbours.355  It is the ascetics’ 
rejection of the present world which grants them the freedom to love it as they, or rather, as God, wishes.  
To feed the poor one must, it seems, first renounce wealth, and to love one’s neighbour, one must turn 
over property and family.  It is only because they have realized the transience of worldly goods that 
ascetics are so able to love creation.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Desert Fathers were keenly aware of a fundamental incompatibility between this life and the 
next.  The two are in one way continuous—one’s life now determines one’s life later, and the choices one 
makes in this life are made binding after death.  Yet monastics also renounced transitory goods and 
urgently strove for a ‘salvation’ which could not be enjoyed before death.  The Desert Fathers accomplish 
their renunciation in light of the devastating effects of death, which, as the end of material existence, 
nullifies every material gain one has made.  Simultaneously, in expectation of divine judgment whose 
criteria concern one’s actions, monastics cultivated a lifestyle which accorded to Christ’s commandments. 
 While renunciation rests on an opposition of ages in terms of their activities, it also points—
particularly in the virtues of μετάνοια and πένθος—to an opposition of context rather than action.  One 
chooses whether to be afflicted now and rest later or vice versa.  This is often expressed in terms of 
‘weeping’ now or ‘weeping later.’  The opposition is asymmetrical:  the work of repentance and weeping 
now is effective, while later it is merely part of one’s punishment.  Here too death, after which one can no 
longer amend one’s life, demarcates the opposition:  it divides between effective labour and mere 
suffering.  The urgency of repentance is fuelled, then, by monastic meditation on mortality and judgment. 
 While the opposition of ages is contextualized by and predicated on the memory of death and 
judgment, it is also conducive to the lifestyle of renunciation and withdrawal within which one can 
                                                          
354 PS 184; cf. 141, 142; HM 6.4 
355 HL 68.1-4, 71.4; PS 24,  
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acquire virtues.  Fathers like Poemen especially advocated the virtue of mourning.  They mourned not for 
loss of transitory goods, but for sin and the difference between the life for which one longs and the life 
which one leads.  Poemen especially advocated tears as a way of life founded on the consciousness of 
death and judgment and conducive to salvific repentance.  Other stories argue that renunciation actually 
teaches the monk to love.  He renounces illusory love which is, really, possessive attachment to transitory 
good.  He cultivates a lifestyle in keeping with Christ’s commands to love:  God with all one’s self and, 
through that, one’s neighbour as oneself.  This twofold motion reflects also the twofold meditation on 
punishments and salvation—the former inculcates abhorrence of possession, the latter a virtuous 
application of godly love. 
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III. THE LIVING DEATH 
 In this section I will trace out various ‘practices of death’ as they emerge in Desert literature.  
Beginning with general metaphorical depictions of monks as dead or entombed, I will then describe ways 
in which ascetics strove to ‘die to themselves’ and ‘to the world.’  I will particularly draw attention to 
practices which are clearly important to the Desert Fathers but which, in this literature, are only 
sometimes connected with death, and then without any real consistency.  Nevertheless, Desert literature 
lays out the conceptual material for practices and virtues of cutting off the will, non-judgment, apatheia, 
and obedience, all of which the Gaza Fathers and, especially, Climacus, will shape in terms of death.   
 
The Untimely Tomb 
 While Abba Poemen compared monks to mourners at tombs, other stories compare them to the 
denizens of tombs.  To some extent this would have been suggested by VA’s account of Antony’s move to 
the tombs, where he battled demons.356  However, Desert literature portrays flight to the tombs in 
contradistinction to Antony’s enthusiastic assault which carried no connotations of ‘death.’  Rather, as for 
Poemen, the tomb represents the place of weeping—of constant awareness of one’s own sins and failings 
and, of course, of one’s own impending death and judgment.  John of Lycopolis echoes this opinion in his 
tale of an unnamed youth: 
There was another young man in the city who had done many evil deeds and had sinned 
gravely.  At God’s bidding this youth was struck by compunction for his many sins.  He 
made straight for the cemetery [τοὺς τάφους], where he bitterly lamented his former life, 
throwing himself down on his face...for he considered himself unworthy even of life 
itself.  While still living he incarcerated himself among the tombs, and renouncing his 
own life [καὶ πρὸ θανάτου ἐν τοῖς νεκροταφίοις ἑαυτὸν κατακλείσας καὶ ἀπειπὼν 
ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν+, did nothing but groan from below, from the depths of his heart.357 
 
This man went to die before his death, to renounce ‘his own life’, and to be relieved of his sins.  He does 
not go to carry the fight to demons but to take up an abode which befits his way of life.  Certainly, as John 
continues the story, the demons do come—but not as though to an adversary.  Rather, they come to afflict 
him with memory of his sin, terror of judgment, and to claim him as their own.  His response is simply to 
continue his groaning.  And so the demons attack him as they did Antony—physically, but not to the 
point of death.  As with Antony, they continue for three nights, and then depart, crying out ‘You have 
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won; you have won; you have won.’  Now, John relates, ‘he dwelt in the tomb as a pure man without any 
defilement for as long as he lived...And so, my children, first of all let us discipline ourselves to attain 
humility, since this is the essential foundation of all virtues.’358  The youth is raised up to virtue and an 
Antonian persona by first humbling himself down to death.  As Antony Rich puts it so well, ‘The 
awareness of his coming death and judgment, combined with renunciation of secular life, led the monk to 
regard himself as dead.’359  We turn now to the various ways in which the Desert Fathers realized virtues 
through ‘practices of death.’  These rely on the memory of death and judgment, and the perceived 
opposition of ages which makes a ‘death’ desirable in this life if by it one can attain life in the next.   
 
Die to yourself 
 It is not unusual to hear certain Desert Fathers, notably Poemen and Moses the Ethiopian, speak 
of the monk as one dead.360  Several sayings of Poemen illustrate this principle.  Once, Poemen was 
annoyed with his brother Paësius (also a monk) who had conversations not to Poemen’s liking.  Poemen 
fled then to Abba Ammonas and told him the situation.  Ammonas responded thus:  ‘Poemen, are you 
still alive?  Go, sit in your cell and set it in your heart that you have already been in the grave a year.’361  
Two other sayings tell us that Poemen did just that.  Abba Anoub (another of Poemen’s brothers) came to 
ask if Poemen would like to invite the priests over.  Poemen kept silent and finally Anoub left saddened.  
When asked the reason for his behaviour, Poemen responded, ‘I have nothing to do here.  For I died and 
a dead man does not speak.’362  Another time, Paësius fought with his brother till both were bloodied, and 
Poemen said nothing.  Abba Anoub came, scandalized that Poemen had allowed the fight, and Poemen 
said,  ‘Set it in your heart that I was not here.’363  Poemen, the dead man, can hardly leap in and instruct 
brothers.  He cannot even be perturbed by their commotion.  He does not make demands on them and 
they do not disturb him.  Moses the Ethiopian points to a second facet of ‘death’.  He says, ‘A person 
ought to mortify himself from every wicked act before he departs the body that he may do ill to no 
                                                          
358 HM 1.44 
359 Rich, Discernment in the Desert Fathers, 219 
360 See, e.g., Macarius the Great 23, Moses 11-12, 15; N 90, 143; HM 14.15; HL 16.4; PS 144, 229.  See also Collectio 
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one.’364  Not only does the ‘dead’ monk cultivate an interior tranquillity which isolates him from 
distractions and temptations, but he also takes care for how he relates to others.  There are, then, two 
sides to ascetic ‘death’:  death to oneself and death to one’s neighbour. 
 
Death to Self:  Ἀπαθεία 
Monks cultivate interior tranquillity which some compare to ‘death.’  Macarius the Egyptian (the 
‘Great’) had someone come asking for ‘a word that I might be saved.’  Macarius responded by giving him 
a task:  ‘Go to the cemetery and insult the dead.’  So the lad did so, hurling both abuse and stones, and 
upon his return Macarius asks him, ‘Did they say anything to you?’  The brother responds ‘No.’  So 
Macarius tells him to go and ‘praise them now.’  Going he calls them ‘apostles, saints, and righteous 
men!’  Again, upon his return, Macarius asks if the dead responded at all, and again the brother responds 
‘No, not at all.’  Macarius then explains the meaning of this ‘action-parable’365:  ‘You know how much you 
dishonoured them, and they did not respond; and how much you praised them, and they said nothing to 
you.  So also must you be, if you wish to be saved:  considering neither the abuse nor the glory of 
humans, just like the dead, and you can be saved.’366  There can be no starker, no more devastating claim 
to make than to tell the disciple to bear insult and praise alike as meaningless.  Implicitly, all that matters 
is God’s judgment.  Macarius does not use the language of ἀπάθεια, but Antony rich sums up the 
tranquillity which Macarius demands thus:  ‘Ἀπάθεια is to be as unmoved...as the dead.’367  The ascetic 
who has severed his ties to and, therefore, his slavery to, the πάθη, can be insulted without becoming 
angry and praised without becoming vain.  The result, according to Macarius, is that ‘if contempt has 
become for you as praise, and poverty as wealth, and lack as abundance, you will not die.  For the one 
who believes well and works piously cannot fall into the impurity of passions and error of demons.’368  
Such a monk is free from attachments to worldly goods and expectations, which freedom allows him to 
live tranquilly whether praised or insulted—he is unphased by illusions of ego or possession, the 
‘impurity of passions and error of demons.’ 
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Feardorcha Ó Dálaigh, Hallel 5 (1977-8), 253-54 
366 Macarius the Great 23; cf. Agathon 5, Zacharias 3, Isaiah 1, John Kolobos 41 
367 Rich, Discernment, 138; cf. Gould’s similar sentiments about ascetic ‘fear of praise’, at Desert Fathers, 133-39. 
368 Macarius the Great 20; cf. Nisterus the Coenobite 2 
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Palladius’ tale of Sarapion the Sindonite is probably the most extreme example of such a ‘death.’  
Sarapion sought out a famous virgin in Rome, one who had not been seen for years, and askd her first 
why she remained seated when he greeted her.  She respondsedthat, far from it, she was journeying to 
God.  He then asked if she were ‘alive or dead.’  She responded, ‘I believe in God that I have died.  For 
one living in the flesh does not journey *to God+.’369  Wishing to test her and, perhaps, humiliate her, 
Sarapion proposes that she go out and show herself in church.  She demurs and he responds ‘if you have 
died to the world and the world to you, it is for you to go out or not.  So go out.’  She does and, wishing 
to press her to the limit, Sarapion says, ‘If you wish therefore to show me completely that you have died 
and no longer live ‚so as to please humans‛ (cf. Gal 1.10), do what I do and know that you have died.  
Strip off all your clothes with me and go into the midst of the city carrying me in this way.’  She responds 
that ‘I will scandalize many by doing this and they will say I am possessed!’  Sarapion responds ‘What do 
you care?  Are you not dead?...I am more dead than you are and by deed I show that I have died to the 
world.  For I do this dispassionately [ἀπαθῶς+ and unashamed.’370  For such a ‘dead’ man even perfectly 
valid concerns of modesty and scandal—which Athanasius praised in Antony and mark out the 
particularly ‘discerning’ Desert Fathers—hold no meaning.  He lives as though protected from 
temptation.  The optimism implicit in the stories of Macarius and Sarapion continues the kind of 
optimism which VA displayed, but it meets with negative reactions among Desert Fathers, which I will 
discuss below. 
 
Death to one’s neighbour 
With the death ‘to oneself’—the cultivation of ἀπαθεία—goes a death ‘to one’s neighbour [ἀπὸ 
τοῦ πλησίον+’.  Graham Gould understands the ascetical metaphor of death as an expression of ‘the 
Desert Fathers’ strong aversion to attitudes and behaviours which seemed to involve harming anyone 
else (especially if such behaviour also involved a monk in failure to recognize his own sins.’371  Abba 
Moses the Ethiopian said, ‘Unless a person sets it in his heart that he is already three days in the tomb, he 
will not attain to this word.’372  He meant that the way one dies ‘to one’s neighbours’ is the same way one 
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dies ‘to oneself.’  Death means not only that a monk not allow himself to be perturbed by others, but that 
he not allow himself to harm others.  In a sense, it is only the dead man, free of the world, who can really 
relate to others as he ought.  A community of mutual love, rooted in a shared desire for salvation, cannot 
allow a ‘root of discord’ or divisive preferences and factions. 
The tranquil dead man is the one who can forge a community with his brethren.  His freedom is, 
as we have noted already, freedom to love and to give himself without expectation.  A story of Poemen 
and Anoub, strikingly similar to the tale of Macarius and the cemetery, illustrates this principle.  After 
they left Scetis, Anoub, Poemen, and a small band of disciples settled briefly in an abandoned pagan 
temple near Terenuthis.  Anoub suggested that they all live quietly for a week and only at the end of it 
should they come together again.  During the week ‘each morning Anoub stoned the statue’s face, and 
each evening he asked its forgiveness.’  Poemen is understandably confused and, when they come 
together, asks Anoub the meaning, saying ‘Does a believer do this?’  Anoub responded: 
‘I did this for you.  For you saw me stoning the statue’s face and it did not say anything, 
did it, or become angry?’  And Abba Poemen  said, ‘No.’  And again, ‘I did penitence 
before it, and it was not troubled, was it?  And did it say ‚I will not forgive‛?’  And Abba 
Poemen:  ‘No.’  And the old man, ‘We are seven brothers.  If you wish that we remain 
together, let us be like this statue, which if insulted or praised, is not troubled.  But if you 
do not wish to become like this, behold there are four gates in the temple, each may go 
where he wishes.’  And they all cast themselves to the ground, saying to Abba Anoub, 
‘As you wish, Father, let us do, and we hearken as you speak to us.’  And we remained 
together all our lives, working according to the old man’s word which he said to us.’373 
 
Anoub’s point was well made and, perhaps more similar to Macarius’ instruction than might initially be 
expected.  Poemen asks if a ‘believer’ would ask a pagan statue for forgiveness.  Why?  These statues 
were not alive, they had no god behind them.  They were merely stone, no more than empty corpses.  
Statues were not all considered thus—the population of Antioch certainly learned otherwise when it was 
punished for defacing statues of the emperor.  Statues of the living are, in a sense, living.  Statues of dead 
gods are, in fact, dead.  Thus, Anoub’s point is not to be ‘stone’ but ‘dead.’  If the community is to 
succeed, then its members must be as tranquil as the dead.   
The ‘death to one’s neighbour’ requires not only a particular sort of interior tranquillity, but also 
a new way of conceiving relationships.  Social and animal ties are predicated on preference, possession, 
and attachment—my family does not include all people and conducting business often means harming 
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others.  The Desert Fathers rejected these sorts of claims in favour of non-divisive relationships.  The 
dead, as Anthony Rich points out, ‘have no legal rights.’374  Thus, when confronted with an inheritance, 
Arsenius replied, ‘I died before him.  He died only recently.’375  The dead person has no relatives—
Poemen has no sons376 and Evagrius’ acquaintance, when informed that his father has died, responds 
‘Cease blaspheming, for my father is immortal.’377  The monk has God for his father.378  These kinds of 
claims are not to be confused with denigration of marriage or families.379  The ascetic may deny his blood-
family, but he certainly has an ecclesial and monastic family in his ‘brothers’ and ‘abbas.’.  In fact, as Philip 
Rousseau points out, many early ascetics (like Poemen, Paësius, and Anoub) were also blood-relations.380  
He argues that for monks who wished to be ‘spiritual’ relations, ‘some well-defined change had been 
called for; and such change, successfully achieved, ensured a more whole-hearted, freely-chosen bond, 
and further progress in the ascetical life.’381  Relationships had to be re-constituted, not ‘by blood or the 
will of men’ but, rather, the various parties had ‘to realize that they could appeal to some different set of 
ideals, which would impel them to co-operate at a new level of spiritual endeavour.’382  Tensions arose 
when only one party (the ascetic) saw the need for a change, and the other party (a secular family 
member, or a spouse) did not.  Yet this tension demonstrates only the inevitable friction of two mutually 
exclusive attitudes toward the demands of service to God.  While some like Gregory of Nyssa would, in 
service of glorifying virginity, attack marriage as not merely representative of but actually contributory to 
the corrupt condition, the literature at hand is generally more cautious.  What we find instead is a 
constant awareness of how close the world is, that it can tempt through the visitation of a mother, a 
sibling, or in some instances, a spouse. 
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Ways of Dying? 
 How a monastic achieves interior tranquillity and a new kind of relationship is less clear.  For the 
Desert Fathers, ἀπαθεία and new relationships are of interest, but not clearly defined and the ways in 
which they might be cultivated—the specific practices and virtues which might come under the heading 
of death—rarely made explicit.  Nevertheless, Desert literature does elaborate ideals of self-renunciation 
which will be described in terms of death by the Gaza Fathers, and given new shape within context of 
death by Climacus.  These are worth discussing at some length as we find here the conceptual material 
with which Gazan and Sinaite writers would work.   
 
Amputating the will 
 We begin with the ‘cutting off of the will.’  Abba Ammonas, asked what is the ‘hard and narrow 
way’ (cf. Mat 7.14) which leads to life, said ‘It is this:  to do violence to one’s thoughts and to cut off one’s 
own will for God [καὶ κόπτειν διὰ τὸν Θεὸν τὰ ἴδια θελήματα+.  And this is also the saying ‚Behold, we 
have left everything and followed you‛ (Mat 19.27).’383  Why should the amputation of the will proper to 
each (ἴδιον), which labour Gould calls ‘a general feature of the Desert Fathers,’ be so important?384 
 The problem is that one’s own will is very rarely one’s own and it is never God’s.  It belongs 
instead, as Poemen tells a young monk named Abraham, to the demons.  Poemen says, ‘Do the demons 
war against you?  They do not war with us as long as we do our will [τὰ θελήματα].  For our wills 
become demons [Σὰ γὰρ θελήματα ἡμῶν δαίμονες γεγόνασι+.’385  Thus, no work is good if done 
according to one’s own will, not even ‘ascending to heaven’386, because the will stands as the last 
boundary between God and oneself.  It is the ‘brazen wall’ which can only be overleapt by its utter 
rejection.387  Why?  Why should one’s will become a demon?  Why is the choice between God’s will and 
one’s own always an absolutely exclusive one?388 
 The reason has to do with AP’s consistent pluralisation of θέλημα.  In the plural it can mean 
‘desire’, yet θέλημα generally refers to the capacity by which one chooses and pursues particular 
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desires,389 and, in any event, AP have the perfectly serviceable ἐπιθυμία for ‘desire’ or ‘object of desire’.390  
In the NT we find the basis for the ‘plural will.’391  Paul writes: 
And you being dead in trespasses and your sins, in which you once walked according to 
the age of this world, according to the ruler of the authority of the air, the spirit now 
working in the sons of disbelief, among whom you all once lived in the desires of our 
flesh [ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τ῅ς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν], doing the will of the flesh and minds 
[thoughts?] [ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τ῅ς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν], and we were by 
nature children of wrath like the rest. (Eph 2.1-3) 
 
Here, one does the ‘will of the flesh and thoughts’, a concept placed in parallel with ‘the desires of our 
flesh’.  The desires of the flesh and the wills of the flesh, these are ‘trespasses and sins’ in which a person 
is ‘dead’ a ‘son of unbelief’ and a ‘child of wrath.’  Doing these θελήματα places one in servitude to the 
Devil, the ‘ruler of the authority of the air’ and renders one ‘dead in trespasses and sins.’ 
The multiplicity of θελήματα expresses, therefore, the fractional and irrational chase after desires 
which characterizes fallen humans.  A saying of Arsenius makes this claim clear.  When asked why he 
avoided people so assiduously, he said, ‘God knows that I love you, but I cannot be with God and men.  
The thousands and myriads of angels above have one will, but humans have many wills.  I am not able 
therefore to leave God and to come among people.’392  Here the contrast is explicit, and the problem (and 
reason for Arsenius’ flight) is that humans have many wills—note especially the resonance with 
Athanasius’ ideas of the Fall.  To do one’s own will is to do, actually, a variety of ‘wills’ by following 
fleshly desires.  In this way, following one’s ἴδια θελήματα makes one a diabolical person, one in whom 
the Devil can operate, who unknowingly expresses that ruler’s desire rather than one’s own.  Clement of 
Alexandria remarked that ‘choosing according to sin to conduct oneself like the demons, unstable, weak, 
changing in desires like a demon, one becomes a demonic human.’393  The plurality of wills expresses in 
its very multiplicity an underlying duality:  either God or the demons.  Selfishness is no more than 
slavery behind a mask of pleasure. 
                                                          
389 S.v. θέλημα:  LSJ gives only ‘will’ or ‘desire;’ Lampe adds ‘object of an act of willing.’ 
390 See, e.g., Isidore 3, John the Eunuch 3, Poemen 110 (in positive sense), Paphnutius 4; N 152, 165, etc.  See also Ps-
Macarius, Collectio B, 2.9.2, 3.5.1, 15.2.5, 33.1.6, 35.1.3;  Evagrius, Oratione 31; so also Basil, RF 41.  Even if AP suffer in 
this instance from copticizing or semiticizing grammar, Basil and Evagrius do not.  Other explanations must be 
sought. 
391 The LXX does use the plural to describe ‘desires’.  ET’s render θελἠματα at Pss 15.3, 102.7, 110.2; Isa 44.28, 58.3, 
58.13; Jer 23.26 as ‘will’ when it means something more like ‘those things which one would will’, i.e., ‘desires.’  In the 
LXX, the plural expresses totality:  ‘τὰ πάντα θελήματα μου/σου’ means ‘all my/your desires.’ 
392 Arsenius 13 
393 Stromateis 6.12.98.1 
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The plural will which is cut off is a divided one, borne about by demons and devils as their 
plaything.  It is not susceptible to self-enforced unification.  In any event, even if one achieves a measure 
of philosophic self-control, doing one’s own will means elevating oneself to be the one giving 
commandments and thus to falsely usurp God’s place.  To follow the will is to become diabolical; to reject 
it, though, is lose the core of one’s identity.  Burton-Christie says that the Desert Fathers ‘knew from 
experience that the freedom and intimacy with God which they sought could come about only through 
renunciation of one’s very self—that is the will.’394  For many, one’s own will, bound to neither place nor 
company, but rather always accompanying the ascetic, marks the final frontier of withdrawal and 
renunciation.  It is his ‘very self’, and its loss suggests, however implicitly, a form of death. 
 
Desert Anthropology and Evagrian self-denial 
The matter of what constitutes the ‘very self’ is rather complicated, though, and θέλημα is not 
the answer for all.  Irénée Hausherr once argued that this conception of the person is common to early 
Christian thought, as well as other ancient cultures:  ‘pour tous ces anciens, l’homme est avant tout une 
volonté libre, capable d’aimer et de se sacrifier pour son amour.  Dans la charité donc et dans l’abnégation 
qui la prouve, consistera pour eux toute la perfection humaine.’395  It is not certain that the Desert Fathers 
understood the human will as ‘libre’, but it is surely correct to say, in light of the argument above, that 
they very often located the center of the person in the faculty of willing and choosing:  this faculty, 
however dimly understood, is the locus of choice and action and, therefore the nexus between self and 
world. 
Hausherr went on to contrast this ‘spiritualité primitive’ with the intellectualism which, suffering 
under the influence of Plato and his Hellenistic heirs, considered θεωρία to be the τέλος of human life.  
In this strain, θέλημα is much less important than νοῦς, and it is safe to say that many of the activities 
associated with θέλημα are transferred to νοῦς.  Hausherr (unsurprisingly) sets up Evagrius as the 
signifer of this spirituality and argues that, for him, ‘l’homme est une intelligence.’396  This argument, as 
stereotyped as it now sounds, began the ‘Macarian-Evagrian’ distinction which would so influence later 
writers like John Meyendorff and Kallistos Ware, and which those authors and others would apply to 
                                                          
394 Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 219 
395 Hausherr, I., ‘Les grands courants de la spiritualité orientale’, OCP 1 (1935),  121 
396 Ibid., 124 
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John Climacus.397  Such sweeping dichotomies suggest a desire for neat categories and anachronistic 
systematizations.  I do not think Hausherr’s dichotomy worth holding.  Rather, I would point out a level 
of continuity between Evagrius and Ps-Macarius (and, in this case, the broader Tendenzen of Desert 
literature) which speaks to the topic at hand. 
Evagrius’s spirituality operates along lines analogous to those which appear in emphases on 
‘cutting off the will.’  That is, both can be related to a kind of ‘death’ to human restrictions.  He never says 
so specifically, but if we recall that θεολογία (which is, after all, contemplation of the Trinity) is ‘the 
realm of prayer’ in Evagrian thought,398 then we may say with justification that the goal of ascetic life is 
prayer.  In many ways this is quite consonant with VA and much of the Christian ascetic tradition.  
However, Evagrius’ definitions of prayer are somewhat more idiosyncratic399 and one of these is 
extremely telling:  ‘προσευχή ἐστιν ἀπόθεσις νοημάτων.’400  The import of this phrase rests on the 
meaning of ‘νοήματα.’  This word may be translated as ‘mental images,’401 but it must be remembered 
that for Evagrius, νοήματα are the building-blocks of λογισμοί, ‘thoughts.’402  In this he follows the 
psychology laid out by Aristotle.403   
Now, while the demons tempt by means of λογισμοί, human and angelic λογισμοί are perfectly 
acceptable and all operate on νοήματα.404  Humans can proceed to the heights of ‘natural contemplation’ 
without having to reject νοήματα—they are not inherently bad.  David Brakke argues that ‘thoughts 
make use of the more basic intellectual currency of representations [νοήματα]...The mind cannot think 
without representations.’405  However, God is beyond all representation406 and, therefore, any νόημα 
would necessarily be false and would serve only as an idol.407  Brakke’s argument that pure prayer 
transcends only ‘impassioned representations’408 is insufficient in light of Evagrius’ absolute rejection of 
any image which can convey God—prayer must reject all representations and, therefore, λογισμοί.  The 
                                                          
397 Discussed in the Introduction above. 
398 Louth, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, 103 
399 See Note 330 above. 
400 Oratione, 70 
401 S.v. νόημα, LSJ 
402 See, e.g., Cogitationibus (Recensio brevius), PG 79:1201B, 1220B 
403 De Anima, 407A7-10; De Memoria, 450b27-451a2 
404 Cogitationibus (Recensio fusius) 8, 17 
405 Brakke, Demons and the Monk, 72-73 
406 Evagrius, Cogitationibus (Recensio fusius), 40-41 
407 Pace Konstantinovsky, Evagrius, 27-47 
408 Brakke, Demons and the Monk, 73 
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result is that, in order to contemplate God, humans must reject their natural epistemic capabilities and 
thus reject at least one of the most basic and primary means of νόησις, the activity proper to the νοῦς.  
The rejection of intellectual faculties operates in Evagrian anthropology analogously to the ‘cutting off of 
the will’ for those who place θέλημα at the centre of the human being:  in both instances one gives up 
one’s innermost self and becomes open thereby to receiving God instead. 
 
Total obedience 
 The Desert Fathers are rather clearer on the means by which one cuts off the ἴδια θελήματα:  
obedience to one’s abba or abbot.  For example, Abba Rufus told visitors that, of all the activities by which 
monks might live out their withdrawal—caring for the sick, offering hospitality, taking up absolute 
solitude--the monk who practices obedience to his abba becomes the greatest of all, receiving ‘greater 
glory’ than the others in heaven.  Questioned about this claim, Rufus responds that, while the first three 
do good things, they perform them ‘by their own will *ἰδίῳ θελήματι+.’  However the one who ‘has 
obedience, having abandoned all his own desires [πάντα τὰ θελήματα], is suspended [κρεμάται] upon 
God and his own father.’409  Rufus argues here that only obedience actually accomplishes the denial of 
one’s own will which makes renunciation complete.  More generally, AP laud obedience in no uncertain 
terms—it is total and absolute, but freely given by the disciple, never taken or demanded by the abba.410  It 
is obedience which turns men into angels,411 which elevates them to heaven,412 which earns lofty 
crowns.413  Rufus offers, in the same saying as quoted above, a summative encomium of obedience: 
See, my child, how good obedience is when it is undertaken for the Lord...O obedience, 
salvation of the faithful!  O obedience, mother of all the virtues!  O obedience, discloser of 
the kingdom!  O obedience opening the heavens, and making men to ascend there from 
earth!  O obedience, food of all the saints, whose milk they have sucked, through you 
they have become perfect!  O obedience, companion of the angels!414 
 
In the Desert, it does not matter so much what the elder has his disciple do.  What is important is 
that the disciple does it immediately.  One thinks of Mark, Silouan’s disciple, running when called 
                                                          
409 Rufus 2 
410 See Kronius 2, Poemen 174, Pistus 1, etc.  See especially Hausherr, Irénée, Spiritual Direction in the Early Christian 
East, trans.  Anthony P. Gythiel, CS 116 (Kalamazoo, MI:  Cistercian Publications, 1990), 197-98 and Gould, Desert 
Fathers, 58-63. 
411 John the Theban 1; N 46 
412 Hyperechius 8; N 53; Cf. Mius 1 
413 Joseph of Thebes 1; N 211 
414 Rufus 2; so also Cassian 5, Pambo 3, cf. Mark, disciple of Silouan 2; N 72 
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though his pen had not finished the ω he had begun.415  There is also John Kolobos, commanded by his 
abba to water a stick in the desert for three years, at the end of which, according to Cassian, the abba 
simply went and threw it away.416  Or of the man who would be a monk, ordered to throw his own son 
into a river---on his way a monk stops him, saying that the abba had ordered him not to.417  The disciple’s 
role is not to question or to deviate, but simply to obey, and yet his obedience must be voluntary.418  In this 
way he rejects even a naturally good capacity for discernment in order to fully renounce his own will.419   
 Obedience occupies a curious position in AP and related literature.  Certainly, its importance for 
beginners should not be taken to mean that abbas are exempt.420  While Gould, for example, would argue 
that the demands of obedience ‘apply principally to beginners’, he admits that a number of sayings reveal 
an attitude wherein ‘Submission of one’s own will to another is seen as something of value in itself and 
not only a means to an end which can be set aside.’421  A story of Zacharias directly affirms obedience for 
the more advanced.  Zacharias has a vision and asks his abba if it comes from God.  His abba, being yet a 
πρακτικός and not able to adjudge ἀκριβὴς περὶ ταύτα, beats him and says it is from the demons.  But 
the vision persists and Zacharias discovers an abba with great gifts, who not only tells him what 
happened but assures him that ‘the θεωρία is from God.’  But, the old man continues, ‘Go, be obedient to 
your father.’422  Obedience (ὑπακοή) in this story supplants even θεωρία as the work of a monk, and 
Zacharias’ return echoes Rufus’ claim that obedience alone completes a monk’s renunciation. 
 While obedience delineates the relationship of disciple and abba, it also operates in coenobitic 
contexts.  Amma Syncletica argues that obedience is most necessary in coenobitic contexts—there it does 
not simply supplant (as in the story of the would-be Abraham above) but actually expresses the great 
desert virtue of διάκρισις.423  Poemen tells one novice to be prepared, because he will not be ‘free’ even to 
                                                          
415 Mark, Disciple of Silouan 1 
416 John Cassian, Institutes, 4.24.  Cf. John Kolobos 1, which relates that the stick blossoms and bears fruit and the abba 
takes it to the brethren, telling them to ‘taste the fruit of obedience.’  The miracle expresses the interior value of 
obedience—the effect it worked in John’s soul.  But Cassian’s version is more likely the primitive one—as Owen 
Chadwick (John Cassian, 20-22) notes, he would not likely have excised the miracle if he knew of it. 
417 Sisoes 10; also N 295; the stories are clearly modeled on Gen 22.1-18.  Cf. Saius 1. 
418 So Isaac, Priest of Kellia 2 
419 Hausherr points, though, that the ‘astonishing things’ which abbas might command does not imply an actual moral 
responsibility which removes any ethical obligation from the disciple (Spiritual Direction, 199-203). 
420 See, e.g., Isaiah 2-3 
421 Gould, Desert Fathers, 52-53; his discussion of the abba-disciple relationship is also valuable (53-58). 
422 Zacharias 4 
423 Syncletica 17; see on this Hausherr, Spiritual Direction, 204-05. 
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drink a cup of wine in the monastery.424  Nilus of Ancyra (d. 430), writing in all probability for monks 
over which he was abbot, put it thus: 
When such teachers [as Moses] are found, they require disciples who deny themselves 
(cf. Mat. 16.24) and their wills, who conduct themselves like a body whose soul has 
departed or like material submitted to an craftsman.  This is so that, just as a soul 
operates as it wishes in a body and the body resists in no way; or as a craftsman shows 
his art in material, and the material offers no resistance to the purpose of his craft; so also 
the teacher operates the faith of virtue in his disciples, having them obedient and 
contradicting him in nothing.425 
 
Nilus’ formulation of obedience as a kind of death is important, though relatively unique in Desert 
literature.  In all places, though, obedience was, as Hausherr notes, the means of cutting off one’s own 
will and, thereby, of attaining perfection:  ‘The essential interest in salvation and perfection demands the 
death of this perceptible attachment to self which is called one's own will.'426 
 
Judge not, lest you be judged 
 A refusal to judge others emerges also as a principle of monastic community directly related to 
self-denial, obedience, and the various ‘deaths to self’ and others.  Moses the Ethiopian and Pior both 
protested against judgment, even when sanctioned by the community.  To various councils of judgment 
each came with a bag of sand on his back, and a hole punched in the bottom:  ‘My sins pour out behind 
me and I do not see them; and I have come today to judge the sins of another!’427  Moses’ point, as Gould 
notes, is that ‘God alone is the true judge.  For a human being to judge is to appropriate a divine function, 
and this...is always an act of presumption and pride.’428  Instead, focused wholeheartedly on their own 
impending judgment by God, monastics turned that capacity inward, and ‘judged’ themselves—without, 
however, passing verdict.  Joseph of Panephysis, asked how to become a monk, responded, ‘If you wish 
to find rest both here and there, in every action say ‚Who am I?‛  And judge no one.’429  The refusal to 
judge another required the self-interrogation demanded by the prospect of death and judgment.430  
Indeed, as Euprepius noted, only when one refuses to judge others does the ‘fear of God’ dwell in the 
                                                          
424 Poemen 152; cf. 103, Syncletica 16; N 245 
425 Nilus of Ancyra, ΛΟΓΟ΢ Α΢ΚΗΣΙΚΟ΢ (Philokalia 1:214) 
426 Hausherr, Spiritual Direction, 205 
427 Moses the Ethiopian 2; Pior 3 
428 Gould, Desert Fathers, 125 
429 Joseph of Panephysis 2; also Moses the Ethiopian 16, Poemen 99; cf. Gould, Desert Fathers, 130 
430 See especially PS 241 [Mioni 10], Poemen 64, and Diadochus, Capita, 23 
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soul.431  For Abba Moses, this refusal to judge constitutes the essence of ‘dying to one’s neighbour.’432  In 
this regard, the ‘death’ can be quite visceral:  one should not even trust one’s senses, if it means 
condemning another.433  However, beyond death, the refusal to judge could have an almost deifying 
effect.  It was said of Macarius the Great that ‘he became as it is written an ‚earthly god,‛434 for just as 
God covers the world, so Abba Macarius covered defects, which he saw as though not seeing and heard 
as though not hearing.’435 
 
Conclusion 
 In this section I have shown that among the Desert Fathers a vocabulary of death emerges by 
which they were able to describe important practices and ideals of asceticism.  The ideas at which 
Antony’s ‘daily dying’ hinted are here more fully formed.  Monks are called to ‘die’ both to themselves 
and to their neighbours.  Death to oneself means especially achieving the tranquillity of ἀπαθεία which 
means that the monk has severed attachments not only to transitory goods and pleasures, but to his own 
ego.  Death to one’s neighbour operates in conjunction with death to oneself, because it refers to the 
severance of conventional or sanguinary relationships and the cultivation of a spiritual community.  The 
unity in which brothers dwell arises directly from the tranquillity with which they approach 
relationships. 
 While the Desert Fathers begin to deploy a vocabulary of ‘death’, they only seldom suggest how 
one might attain to such tranquil unity as ‘death’ suggests.  However, at various points in the literature, 
certain practices are connected in one way or another to death, and I have argued that by means of these 
one achieves the kind of state to which ‘death’ refers in this literature.  Foremost among them is the 
‘cutting-off,’ ‘denial’, or ‘abandonment’ of one’s own will.  For most the will lies at the very centre of a 
person and its denial means a complete renunciation of oneself—ego, rights, desires, everything goes 
with the will.  Evagrius suggests a similar sort of self-denial as regards the intellectual capacity.  In both 
cases, though, one denies what is one’s own to find what God gives instead—a unified θέλημα attuned 
                                                          
431 Euprepius 5; so Gould, Desert Fathers, 88-92 
432 Moses the Ethiopian 14, 20 
433 Alonius 4, Elias 4, Mark disciple of Silouan 2, Poemen 113-114 
434 Referring, interestingly, to Constitutiones Apostolorum 2.26, where ‘ἐπίγειος θεὸς μετὰ Θεὸν’ refers to the 
ἐπίσκοπος, ‘ὃς 
ὀφείλει τ῅ς παρ’ ὑμῶν τιμ῅ς ἀπολαύειν.’ 
435 Macarius the Great 32 
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to God’s will, or the uniquely image-less θεωρία of God.  Obedience is often presented as the means to a 
life of self-denial.  Obedience concretizes the idea of abandoning one’s own will by submitting to 
whatever one’s abba (or abbot) demands.  While obedience is particularly important for beginners, it is a 
life-long activity by means of which one continually renounces one’s own will.  Lastly, the virtue of non-
judgment, predicated as it is on contemplation of God’s judgment, allows for the cultivation of monastic 
community.  This is the ideal of ‘dying to one’s neighbour’ and it plays out especially in the refusal to 
judge one’s neighbour.  While the denial of one’s own will is not generally presented in the language of 
death, its effect is just as complete, and obedience is at times presented as a kind of ‘death.’  Likewise, 
sayings of Poemen and Anoub claim that only by reckoning oneself as dead can one avoid judging others.  
These various crucial virtues begin to mingle with language of death and are very often predicated on the 
memory of death and judgment as well as a conception of asceticism as conscious self-denial. 
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IV. AMBIVALENCE 
 I have so far laid out evidence that the Desert Fathers utilized the memory of death and 
judgment.  I have argued that this utilization was predicated on a perceived opposition between the 
present life and the age to come.  And I have shown that there emerged in Desert literature a conscious 
deployment of the language of ‘death’ to describe ascetic lifestyles and ideals.  I must now show the 
rougher edges of these claims.  The sayings associated with certain abba’s—especially Poemen, Moses the 
Ethiopian, Arsenius, and Theophilus—assign a significant role to the language and symbols of death, 
others, such as those of Abraham and Sisoes, suggest the opposite.  Between these extremes, sayings 
accrued to men like Macarius the Great which militate in both directions.  If we were attempting to 
reconstruct a ‘theology of Abba Moses’ or a ‘theology of Evagrius’, we might say that, so far as one or the 
other is concerned, the assumptions and ideals which underlie the utilization of death meet with certain 
and specific responses.  However, we are not concerned with analyzing Desert literature into its 
constituent logia to discover what the abba’s ‘really thought.’436  We read these sayings, homilies, and 
gnomic material as they have been collected and as they would have been read together by monks like 
Climacus.  In such collections systematic homogeneity did not feature as a criterion for inclusion.  Rather, 
as Jean-Claude Guy writes, ‘Chaque monastère possédait son Patéricon, et le problème de la conformité de 
cet exemplaire ave un texte original ne se postai évidemment pas.  La qualité du Patéricon devait plutôt 
être jugée `a la mesure de as « richesse », c’est-à-dire du nombre de « paroles édifiantes » ou de récits qu’il 
avait pu recueillir.’437   With these polyphonous—sometimes cacophonous—voices singing together, we 
find that the various polyvalent tendencies in Desert literature do not allow us to re-construct some 
systematic ‘theology of death.’  Rather, we must speak of currents of optimism and ambivalence with 
which various authors deployed or reacted against the language of death. 
 
 
 
                                                          
436 Likely a fruitless endeavour anyway, given the amount of literary working that went into the collections of 
sayings, lives, and travelogues.  On which see Guy, J.-C., ‘Remarques sur le texte des Apophthegmata Patrum’, 
Recherches de science religieuse 63 (1955), 252-58; Regnault, Lucien, ‘La Transmission des Apophtegmes’, in his Les Pères 
du Désert a travers leur Apophtegmes (Solesmes:  Abbaye Saint-Pierre de Solesmes, 1987), 67-69, 70-72; Rousseau, 
Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian (Oxford:  OUP, 1978), 9-18, 32-55; Brakke, Demons 
and the Making of the Monk, 128, 145; Rubenson, ‘Origen in the Egyptian Monastic Tradition’, 319-338.  Pace Gould, The 
Desert Fathers, 25 and Harmless, ‘Remembering Poemen Remembering’, 483-518. 
437 Guy, Recherches sur la tradition grecque, 232-33 
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The Dangers of Remembering Judgment 
As we have seen, many sayings advocate the meditation on death and judgment, and very often 
do so in terms of the punishments which sinners expect.  Generally, then, memory of judgment implies 
and cultivates a close awareness of one’s own sins as well as a fear of the destiny toward which sins draw 
one.  However, for some these two implications are problematic.  For example, the saying of Abba Sisoes 
discussed above betrays his misgivings about meditation on punishment.  When the brothers told him of 
their fear of punishment, Sisoes responded, ‘You are blessed, my brothers.  I envy you.  The first of you 
spoke of the fiery river, the second of Tartarus, and the third of darkness.  Now, if your mind masters 
such memory, it is impossible for you to sin.’438  Yet, he continues, ‘What shall I do, hard-hearted as I am, 
not being granted to know, even if there will be punishment for people [μὴ συγχωρούμενος εἰδέναι ὅτι 
κἄν ἐστι κὀλασις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις+; and from this I sin each hour.’  Sisoes says this, Graham Gould 
argues, to help his visitors ‘to see their fears in a different, more positive light, perhaps even as a source of 
faith and hope.’439  His ironic tone suggests, further, that the practices to which these brothers had given 
themselves were not as helpful as they thought.  The paralyzing effect of meditation on punishment 
stands in stark contrast to Sisoes’ own calm.  Rather than blessing their activity, Sisoes, by questioning 
whether there will even be such a thing as punishment, throws his visitors back on his own hope in God’s 
mercy, saying ‘I do not remember any of these things; for I hope that God, being merciful, will ‚show 
mercy to me‛ (cf. Luk 1.58, etc.).’  Perhaps Sisoes would have been placated by the corrective, discussed 
above, of remembering salvation, but it is not certain. 
On a deeper level, neither Evagrius nor Mark the Monk emphasized the ‘memory of death’, 
(though both allow for it440) because they mistrusted the faculty of memory.  The problem arises from the 
the close awareness of one’s own sins required by contemplation of judgment.  Memory often conjures up 
images and ideas which simply re-kindle the very passions which one hoped to uproot.  For Evagrius, 
while memory is a natural faculty441 and not inherently passionate442 it retains the ‘impressions’ of 
passions left there.  The demons call up these impressions to tempt and to distract from prayer.443  So, 
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while Evagrius may not despise the memory, he certainly does not trust it.444  The same could be said for 
Mark the Monk, who sees the same terrible power at work in πρόληψις or ‘prepossession.’445   Kallistos 
Ware defines πρόληψις as ‘the involuntary presence of former sins in the memory’ which ‘predisposes a 
man to yield to particular temptations.’446  For these influential thinkers, then, the power of memory is as 
dangerous as it might be effective. 
 
Opposition of Ages 
For certain abbas, such as Macarius the Great, the opposition of ages could be amplified to a 
conception of the ascetic life as a kind of complete freedom from the world.  Thus it was not enough 
simply to flee from cities,447 but from desires and regrets—especially those related to marriage and sex.448  
For some of the Desert Fathers, then, their conception of renunciation was so totalizing as to be a kind of 
alternative universe.  A tale told by Macarius the Great powerfully illustrates the deep calling of freedom 
from the world.  Asked for a word, he responds, ‘I have not yet become a monk.  But I have seen monks.’  
He then tells how, having wandered into the far desert, he found an oasis and saw there two naked men 
whom he believed at first to be ‘spirits.’  They placate his fear, though, and the conversation runs thus: 
‘We are from a coenobium, and found concord together, so we came hither.  Behold, *we 
have been here] for forty years!’  One was Egyptian and the other Libyan.  And they 
asked me *Macarius+ saying, ‘How is the world?  Does the water rise seasonably?  And 
does the world have its prosperity?’  And I said to them, ‘Yes.’  And I asked, ‘How can I 
become a monk?’  And they replied, ‘If you do not renounce all that is in the world, you 
cannot become a monk.’  I said, ‘I am weak, and I cannot be like you.’  They responded, 
‘If you cannot be like us, sit in your cell and weep for your sins.’  And I asked them, 
‘When winter comes, are you not cold?  And when summer comes, do not your bodies 
burn?’  And they said, ‘God has ordained this for us, and neither do we freeze in winter 
nor does the summer heat harm us.’449 
 
Macarius saw in those monks the profundity of total renunciation—not only goods and family, but 
clothes and concern for health, accepting only God’s provision,450 to be unaware of whether or not the 
                                                          
444 So Brakke, Demons and the Monk, 64 
445 Operibus 151-52 and Ad Nicolaum 10 
446 Philokalia, ET vol. 1, 367 
447 Arsenius 1-2, John the Eunuch 3; Longinus 1; Poemen 59,  
448 E.g., John Kolobos 16, Zacharias 2, Cyrus 1, Olympias 2, Sisoes 3, Paphnutius 4; N 186 
449 Macarius 2 
450 Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 223-24 (commenting on Poemen 146).  Cf. HM 1.46; PS 85; see also Mark the 
Monk, De Lege, 110, 158, 159. 
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Nile floods—a thing unimaginable for an Egyptian.451  The sight, Burton-Christie says, ‘spoke to his 
deepest aspirations and to those of all the monks—to live an unfettered, graced existence, as their 
ancestors in paradise had done before them.’452 
  Crucially though, that Macarius could not actually attain the state for which he longed.  He 
admitted his weakness, choosing to return to the monastic life and accomplish a far less impressive task:  
to repent like any other monk, weeping for his sins.453  The discontinuity between ideal and reality to 
which Macarius’ tale speaks is echoed also in HL.  There, Macarius visits a coenobium, performing such 
acts of austerity that he is dubbed a ‘fleshless man’ and sent away.  Yet his next story details his failed 
attempt to keep his thoughts in heaven with the angels, in which he succeeded only for two days before 
having to return to earth.454  For Macarius, the opposition of now and later, earth and heaven, is absolute, 
and he strives to live entirely in the next age—but he cannot.  The opposition of ages cannot be so 
amplified as to become absolute; rather, the monk lives in a kind of frontier between the two. 
 
The problematic ideal of ἀπαθεία 
I have argued that ‘death to self’ meant especially the cultivation of tranquillity and ἀπαθεία.  If, 
however, we are to speak of ἀπάθεια among the Desert Fathers, we must bear in mind Abba Abraham’s 
admonition to a monk who thought that he had eradicated the πάθη.  He reminds this monk that, in fact, 
if he saw a woman or money or anything else he would not fail to notice but that he would ‘fight with his 
thought.’  And so, Abraham concludes, ‘The passions live, but they are fettered by the saints.’455  The 
monk’s claim to a complete ἀπαθεία Amounted to foolish self-deception.  Even Abba Joseph’s joyful 
statement that ‘I am a king today, for I rule over the passions,’ implies that he does not rule them every 
day.  David Brakke thus concludes that, while no single view emerges on the possibility and meaning of 
ἀπάθεια, ‘The monks are fundamentally ‚resisters.‛’456  Their combat continues because passions always 
return and temptation always waits.  As a saying of Antony says, ‘This is the great work of a person, to 
put his errors before himself in God’s sight, and to expect temptation until his last breath.’457  A saying of 
                                                          
451 See also HM Prol.6 
452 Burton-Christie, Word in the Desert, 232-33 
453 See also PS 110 
454 HL 18.15-18 
455 Abraham 1 
456 Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk, 151-52 
457 Antony 4 
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Poemen illustrates the fundamental opposition to the optimism of ἀπαθεία.  Although Poemen is a name 
we have seen heavily associated with the ideal of being ‘dead’, he is nevertheless sensitive to the needs of 
his fellow ‘resisters,’ and this saying suggests a very different view of life.  A young monk struggled with 
the λογισμός of πορνεία, and asked Abba Ibistion for advice.  Ibistion told him cast the thought away.  
The monk, certainly discouraged by such austerity, went to Poemen who told him, ‘Abba Ibistion’s works 
are above with the angels, and it escapes him that you and I are in fornication.’458  It is well to be in 
heaven, but there one is not much of an abba, and, even if some can attain such ἀπαθεία as to brush aside 
λογισμοί, most cannot.  We must wonder, then, since even Poemen the ‘dead man’ did not expect perfect 
freedom from temptation, just as even Macarius the Great could not stay in Paradise, to what extent the 
optimism implied being like the dead was well-received among the Desert Fathers. 
 In a different vein, even if monks claimed to be able to achieve tranquillity, and so to bear insults 
and praise alike, they maintained a very definite limit to the abuse they would suffer and to their 
avoidance of judgment:  the accusation of heresy.459  This limit is instructive—the community must have a 
common conception of the theological and spiritual beliefs around which its constitutive relationships are 
constituted.  Community requires non-judgment, self-humiliation, and, when necessary, the judgment to 
part from those who travel a different way.  For example, Agathon was once tested by the brethren.  He 
happily accepted every reproach offered, saying cheerfully that ‘Yes, yes, I have done that as well.’  Until 
the brethren called him a heretic.  At that point he turned on them and said ‘I am not a heretic.’  They ask 
him why he accepted all but this last accusation and he says, ‘The first accusations I ascribe to myself; for 
it is beneficial to my soul.  But heresy is separation from God, and I do not wish to be separated from 
God.’460  Heresy is not something which conduces to salvation.  Rather, it constitutes the damnation 
which asceticism seeks to avoid.  Thus, the criterion for forging relationship always comes back to the 
overriding desire for salvation.  While the fissures which heresy necessitated might be cause for 
lamentation,461 neither place462 nor the demands of hospitality463, nor even the great appearance of 
                                                          
458 Poemen 62; cf. Poemen 8 
459 Gould also notes the limit which one might find when staying with an abba means harm for one’s soul (for 
unspecified reasons):  Desert Fathers, 107-112.  This however, is much less clearly defined than the consistent 
boundary of heresy. 
460 Agathon 5; the problem of heresy forms a great theme in PS:  e.g., 10, 12, 26, 40, 46, 74, 144, 241 
461 PS 86 
462 Agathon 6, 23, Ammonas 5, Ammoes 5, Joseph of Panephysis 8, Poemen 18, 155, 159, 189 
463 Poemen 78 
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sanctity,464 could overcome the ascetics’ simple desire find life in Christ.  The matter of heresy 
problematizes not only the possibility of complete tranquillity—which different assessments of ἀπαθεία 
would already question—but the universal value and validity of such tranquillity. 
 
Conclusion 
These few vignettes serve to illustrate the presence in Desert literature of countervalent lines of 
thought.  The opposition to death rests not on a dislike of the language itself, but on a suspicion of the 
optimism which underlies its use in Desert literature.  Can one or, indeed, should one, attain ἀπαθεία?  
Does one proceed by meditating on death and judgment, or by some other exercise?  Must one live 
wholly ‘on earth as though in heaven’?  Is such a goal beneficial for others, let alone possible for oneself?  
Different Fathers answered these questions in different ways.  Certainly the ways in which Desert Fathers 
praised practices of ‘death’ recall the optimistic picture of the all-forgiving and all-loving monk painted 
by VA’s Antony and his ‘daily dying.’  Those Fathers who react against language of ‘death’ are likely 
reacting more especially against what they perceived as undue optimism, or even self-deception.  The 
memory and practice of death emerge in Desert literature as important but contested means of cultivating 
and communicating the whole ascetic life. 
                                                          
464 PS 106; of which Henry Chadwick (‘John Moschus and his Friend Sophronius’, 57) remarks, ‘Moschus felt no less 
passionately than Sophronius about the truth of the Christological definition of Chalcedon. To be in error on so 
cardinal a matter was to fail in all.’ 
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3. THE GREAT OLD MEN OF GAZA 
 
 
 
Ἐὰν ἴδῃς βίον ἀνδρὸς ἐν μέσῳ θανάτου καὶ ζω῅ς ἐνδεικνύμενον, μήτε παντελῶς πρὸς τὸν θάνατον 
τετραμμένον, μήτε ὅλῳ τῷ ποδὶ ἐπὶ τ῅ς ζω῅ς βεβηκότα, ἀλλ’ ἐν οἷς μὲν σαρκὸς ζωὴ δοκιμάζεται τοῖς 
νεκροῖς ἐναρίθμιον, πρὸς δὲ τὰ τ῅ς ἀρετ῅ς ἔργα, δι’ ὧν οἱ «τῷ πνεύματι ζῶντες» ἐπιγινώσκονται, 
ἀληθῶς ἔμψυχον καὶ ἐνεργὸν καὶ ἰσχύοντα, πρὸς τοῦτον βλέπε τὸν κανόνα τοῦ βίου· τοῦτον τέθεικε 
σκοπὸν ὁ θεὸς τῆ ἡμετέρᾳ ζωῆ. 
 
      ---Gregory of Nyssa, De Virginitate 23.6 
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 By the sixth century, Gaza had become a thriving monastic centre.  Asceticism bourgeoned in 
Palestine from the fourth century onward, beginning with Hilarion at Gaza and Chariton in the Judean 
desert, and its development organizationally and theologically took in influences from Egypt, 
Cappadocia, and Syria.  Egypt, or, rather, an interpretation—a literary memory—of Egypt, was built up 
in Palestine in the fifth century in AP, HL, and other literature.  However, this mythic Egyptian past was 
blended with adherence to Basil of Caesarea’s ascetic teachings and the spirituality of Palestine’s own 
great founding fathers as it played out through controversies surrounding the Council of Chalcedon (451) 
and a resurgence of ‘Origenism’ and its condemnation at the Council of Constantinople (553).465  Monastic 
spirituality flourished in Judaea at the Lavras founded by Euthymius (d. 473) and Saba (d. 532).  And in 
Gaza developments in ascetic theology come particularly from the monophysites Abba Isaiah (d. 491), his 
disciple Peter the Iberian (d. 489).  Isaiah’s thought would be formative for his Chalcedonian successors, 
the abbot Seridos and the two Great Old Men who lived in seclusion at his monastery near Thawatha:  
Barsanuphius, the Great Old Man; and John the Prophet.  These men—Isaiah, Barsanuphius, John, and 
their disciple Dorotheus—form what is sometimes called the ‘Gaza School.’   
This ‘school’ crafted its own vision of ascetic life through creative interpretation and elaboration 
of the literature surveyed in Chapter Two.  All the Gaza Fathers owe much to AP, as well as to Mark the 
Monk, and Basil of Caesarea.466  They take up the apophthegmatic tradition but adapt it to their own 
rather diversified milieu—a lavra which housed and was quite often run by hermits467--and write in 
different genres:  Isaiah and Dorotheus both wrote homilies, and Barsanuphius and John wrote only 
letters.  Of these last two François Neyt remarks that their their correspondence ‘reflète admirablement la 
maturité religieuse qui régnait dans ca monastère; elle assume aussi le meilleur des traditions monastique 
                                                          
465 On the formative influence of Christological and ecclesial controversies in these years, see especially Binns, Ascetics 
and Ambassadors of Christ, 56-78; and Hömbargen, Daniel, The Second Origenist Controversy:  A New Perspective on Cyril 
of Scythopolis’ Monastic Biographies as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism, Studia Anselmiana 132 (Rome:  
Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 2001). 
466 Neyt, François and de Angelis-Noah, Paula, ‘Introduction’, Correspondance, II.1:68-126; John Chryssavgis notes 
particularly the influence of the Apophthegmata, cataloguing over eighty references in QR and fifty-five in Dorotheus’ 
works..  See ‘Introduction’, to his ET of QR, Barsanuphius, 1:10-12. 
467 See on the monastic structure at Maiuma (Isaiah’s monastery) and Thawatha (Seridos’ monastery) Hirschfeld, 
Yizhar, The Judean Desert Monasteries in the Byzantine Period (New Haven, CT:  Yale, 1992); and also his ‘The 
Monasteries of Gaza:  An Archaeological Review’, in Christian Gaza in Late Antiquity, 61-88; cf. Havelone-Harper, 
Disciples, 32-36 
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égyptiennes, sans oublier les écrits des grand Cappadociens et la littérature monastique de l’époque.’468  
Barsanuphius and John represent the efflorescence of the Chalcedonian, anti-Origenist strands of 
Palestinian ascetic thought.  Their work would be influential for centuries of Byzantine ascetics, and 
Climacus’ own reliance on texts like AP often runs through Gaza’s readings and, especially, the ideas 
deployed by Barsanuphius and John. 
In this chapter I will first demonstrate that the Great Old Men elaborate and nuance the now-
standard memory of death and judgment.  I then argue that they take up ‘opposition of ages’ opened up 
in Desert literature and couple it with an important sense of continuity—hearkening back to VA’s visions 
of life and death.  I will then explore Barsanuphius’ particular emphasis on death as limit.  Next I will 
demonstrate that the language of ‘death’ which first emerged in Desert literature becomes, for the Old 
Men, a normative means of describing the ascetic life which touches all aspects of renunciation.  Finally, I 
will argue that ‘death’ and, especially the ‘corpse’ retain important ambiguities in Gazan thought, and 
conclude that asceticism as ‘death’ must be understood within parameters of imitation and response to 
Christ’s death. 
  
  
                                                          
468 Neyt and de Angelis-Noah, ‘Introduction’, Correspondance, I.1: 20 
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I. THE MEMORY OF DEATH AND THE VIRTUE OF TEARS 
Like those before them, the writers of the Gaza school laud the memory of death.  In keeping 
with tradition, they describe this memory in terms of the contemplation of the nearness of death;469 and 
the contemplation of post-mortem judgment.470  Very commonly the Great Old Men connect mortality 
and judgment within the same conceptual space.  Barsanuphius writes succinctly:   
The approach [παρουσία] of death strengthens your thinking, for it is hidden 
[κεκρυμμένη] from every person.  Let us hasten, therefore, to do good before we are 
seized by death—for we do not know in which day the call comes—lest we be found 
unprepared and dismissed with the five foolish virgins (cf. Mat 25.1-13)...Let us do what 
we can in our infirmity, and the Master of all is good and will lead us with the five wise 
virgins into his bridal chamber to unspeakable joy with Christ.  Amen.471 
 
Contemplation of mortality requires the monk to acknowledge that his life is uncertain—meted out day 
by day, as Antony the Great saw.  Uncertain yet inexorable death gives way to an eschatological 
judgment based on one’s actions and choices in life spurs the monk toward good works now.  In this 
regard the Gaza fathers utilize the memory of death in ways perfectly consonant with the tradition 
emerging from VA and Desert literature.   
 
Expanding on an Inheritance 
Nevertheless, the Old Men—John in particular—crucially nuance the content of the memory of 
death.  While Barsanuphius often connects the memory of mortality with that of judgment, John 
separates them in an interesting way.  To a layman concerned with attacks of the passions sparked even 
by a glance at another person he says, 
You ought to remember also the corruption and the stench of our nature, how we are 
entering the graves.  But why give you a word about corruptible things?  Don’t you think 
rather to put the coming fearful judgment of God before your eyes?  And where will the 
inheritance of those who do these [sinful] things be found?  And how will you escape 
that great shame of the revelation of our actions before the angels and archangels and all 
people—before the just judge?  And how will the mouth of those doing these deeds be 
stopped?472 
 
                                                          
469 QR, 37, 92, 94, 98, 99, 123, 517-518, 785, 789 (quoting Sira 7.36), etc. 
470 QR, 57, 77, 138, 208, 242, 271, 379, 428, 446 (where it is advised together with the ‘Jesus prayer’), 454, 464 (citing 
John Chrysostom, In Matthaeum 82.4-5), 553, 569, 574, 685, 690, etc. 
471 QR, 617; so also 20, 96, 232, 256-59, 346, 790.  Barsanuphius and John often use the virgins as an eschatological 
example:  e.g., 37, 201, 638, 659. 
472 QR, 659 
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The memory of mortality, though helpful, is far less valuable than the memory of the judgment which 
follows death.  Certainly, as a guard against passionate relationships with other people, a recollection of 
putrefaction may be helpful.  But that misses the point—rather one flees passions because they expel a 
person from heavenly inheritance.  Though he denigrates it here somewhat, John is actually 
contextualizing the memory of mortality.  Contemplation of limited and uncertain existence must function 
within an expectation that mortal life gives way to an ethically divided eschatological existence.  
Barsanuphius offers much the same advice.  He even catches himself mid-sentence and switches abruptly 
from reminding John of Beersheeba about passing troubles to talking about ‘more fearful things, whether 
in heaven or in earth.’  He then says simply, ‘Place God and judgment before your eyes, and keep in mind 
that we have only a little time in the world.’473  He does not denigrate contemplation of mortality but, 
rather, the troubles of life which are bounded by mortality—the fact of death allows Barsanuphius to 
adjust his correspondent’s focus toward eternal matters.  Here also contemplation of mortality as an end 
of transient matters naturally leads to contemplation of the eternal realities to which physical death 
provides an entrance, and those realities are immediately conditioned by the fact of divine judgment. 
 Barsanuphius offers another sort of corrective with regard to the mode of remembering.  
Barsanuphius shows himself cognizant of the misgivings expressed by Evagrius and Mark the Monk, that 
too specific contemplation of sins simply rekindles old passions:  ‘Compunction *κατάνυξις] comes to a 
person from unceasing remembrance.  Thus, when he prays, the one praying ought to bring into his own 
memory [εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν μνήμην] all his deeds, and how those doing such things will be judged, and the 
fearful voice saying ‚Depart from me you cursed ones unto the eternal fire‛ *Mat 25.41+, and all the 
rest.’474  Well and good, one should remember one’s deeds—presumably one’s sins—in context of God’s 
judgment of sinners and with a suitable fear of condemnation.  However, he goes on, one must be careful 
just how one brings all these sins to mind:  ‘I say memory of sins, not each and individual—lest by 
intruding the adversary lead in other shamefulness—but, rather, simply remembering that we are 
debtors to sin.’  One must be careful to keep memory of sins general while, it seems, imagining God’s 
judgment rather specifically—so far as considering his fearful voice and the (admittedly scriptural) words 
with which God condemns sinners.  Of course, John later tells Aelianus—then a layman, later Seridos’ 
successor as abbot—who had fallen into despair from terror of eternal punishment, that having faith 
                                                          
473 QR, 20 
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means giving oneself to God.  And, since God is merciful, one should never fear too strongly eternal 
punishments.475  Memory of judgment and death must be measured, careful to avoid passionate 
intrusions as well as despair.  One contemplates judgment so as to desire all the more God’s mercy, and 
one does so in hope also of God’s mercy. 
In a fascinating exchange of letters with a ‘Christ-loving layperson’, John also nuances the 
efficacy of contemplation of death in terms of freedom and constraint.  If someone is told that he will die 
the next day and on that account changes his ways, he is saved ‘as though constrained.’  Why?  Because 
when someone sees death at hand, he will ‘give up his deeds in accordance with necessity.’  Rather, if 
someone is to be saved ‘freely’, he must consider that he will live for a long time and if he can still do 
good then he has done so by choice and not constraint.476  The layperson is confused and so John first 
explains that salvation ‘by constraint’ is better than none, but not as good as one freely chosen.  He then 
reminds the layman of the five foolish virgins, deploying the image in much the same way as quoted 
above.477  The laymen, now thoroughly confused, asks ‘If then someone reminds his soul about death 
[Ἐὰν οὖν τις ὑπομιμνήσκῃ τὴν ψυχην αὐτοῦ περὶ θανάτου] and through this he hastens to do good, is 
this not rewarded as something voluntary [ἐκούσιος+’?  John responds by making an important 
distinction:  the memory of death ‘is good, so that someone learn he is mortal and a mortal is not eternal 
and not being eternal he will involuntarily leave this age.  From the unremitting memory of death he 
learns to do good freely [κατὰ προαίρεσιν+.’  But, John explains, if someone attempts a death-bed 
repentance, this is hardly ‘freely chosen’ since death really is waiting then.478  The freedom lies, in fact, in 
the choice to memorialize death and to imagine it being near when, in fact, it may be a long way off—to 
freely put oneself in a constraining situation teaches one to do good freely.  Memory of death is, as for the 
Desert Fathers, a very good tool, especially for beginners. 
Barsanuphius and John also begin to elaborate a wider index of virtues toward which the 
memory of death aids progress, and explicitly draw into the circle of its practice virtues which thus far 
have remained at the edge.  The memory of death certainly retains in Gaza the efficacy it was always 
                                                          
475 QR, 574; see also, e.g., 91 
476 QR, 637:    Ἐὰν εἴπω σοι ὅτι ἀποθνῄσκεις, ὡς βεβιασμένη γίνεται ἡ σωτηρία σου. Βλέπων γὰρ ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ 
στόμα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κατὰ ἀνάγκην ῥίπτεις σου τὰ πράγματα. Ἐὰν δὲ προσδοκᾷς ζ῅σαι ἔτι πολὺν χρόνον καὶ 
ἔλθῃ σοι λογισμὸς τοῦ σωθ῅ναι καὶ τάξῃς οὕτως τὸν λογισμόν σου εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, κἅν ἀποθάνῃς εὐθέως, κατὰ 
προαίρεσιν εὑρίσκεταί σου ἡ σωτηρία καὶ οὐ βεβιασμένη. 
477 QR, 638 
478 QR, 639; cf. 790 
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thought to have for beginners.  The contemplation of mortality and the fear of judgment certainly assist in 
turning away from sinful habits.479  Moreover, in keeping with ideas found already in VA and in some 
Desert literature, Barsanuphius and John, recommend the practice for inculcating various other virues.    
First, the memory of judgment (tempered, of course, with God’s mercy) breeds endurance while the 
memory of death as mortality comforts those who find themselves in affliction.480  Elsewhere, 
Barsanuphius implies that memory of judgment aids in procuring ‘humility, obedience, subjection.’481  
The fact of future judgment appears to help frighten those who have been lazy or are wounded into 
action and the attainment of better virtues than they have hitherto found.482  In this regard it is unclear 
whether the memory of death and judgment is purely a preliminary or remedial tool or whether it holds 
a place even among the higher virtues like humility and love.483  It seems that the memory of judgment 
provides the perspective necessary to develop all the virtues.  It may not itself be a virtue and it may not 
directly inculcate any save fear of sin and willingness to endure suffering, but those two virtues are 
necessary for procuring all others.  I will return below to the value of endurance for Barsanuphius and 
John. 
 
Tears, Detachment, and our Proper State 
We have seen how, for Poemen especially, tears represent a penitential way of life for ascetics.  
Barsanuphius and John take up and expand that way of thinking.  For example, Barsanuphius comforts a 
confused monk who has, somehow or another, been insatiably reading Origen and Evagrius, that it is not 
concerning such speculative matters as they describe that he will give account.  Instead, he ought to 
‘weep and mourn.’484  Speculative theology as Origen or Evagrius may have conceived it holds no 
                                                          
479 See, e.g., QR, 689.  Here John even paraphrases the classic topos of Sira 7.36 and says:  ‘Always fear death, for it 
must come to us.  ‚Remember the hour of departure [Μνῄσκου τ῅ς ὥρας τ῅ς ἐξόδου], and you will not sin unto God 
[εἰς Θεόν+.‛’  Sira 7.36 reads:  ‘In all your words remember your end *τὰ ἔσχατα] and you will not sin unto the age 
[εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα+.’  Sirach’s language refers to death but, for Christians, would have an eschatological ring, and so the 
change of language is entirely comprehensible. 
480 See QR, 77 (on endurance in light of judgment and mercy) and 123 (in light of mortality) 
481 QR, 379 
482 Such is implied by the letter’s subscript—it responds to a monk who has long delayed asking Barsanuphius for 
advice.  Barsanuphius tells him that his wounds have become infected but that there is still time if he does not 
delay—death’s ‘seeds’ are already in him but they can be cut off. 
483 The latter may be implied by its inclusion in a list of salvific virtues as parenthetical to the constant memory of 
God in QR 271. 
484 QR 604; on virtues of mourning see especially Müller, ‘Die Tränen der Wüstenväter’, 294-98; Hausherr, Penthos, 
121-56.  
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particular virtue in Barsanuphius’ opinion, though he is willing at times to engage in it.485  Tears, on the 
other hand, do.486  Along these lines, Jennifer L. Havelone-Harper describes Barsanuphius’ style of 
spiritual direction as ‘not allowing theological speculations to distrct his disciples from their task of 
personal spiritual discipline’, a description borne out by Barsanuphius’ tendency to forcibly bring his 
correspondents back to their daily practice of virtues from the more ethereal spheres of controversial 
debates.487  Barsanuphius says that those who have found ‘true weeping with compunction [ἀληθινὸς 
κλαυθμὸς ὁ μετὰ κατανύξεως+’ that ‘war no longer comes upon them’ and later they ‘are not at all 
bothered by war, whether among people or even prostitutes—it [weeping+ is with us and fights *for us+.’ 
Barsanuphius further eulogizes weeping thus: 
It also wipes out former faults and washes away stains.  And unceasingly it guards the 
man who has procured it with the name of God.  And it banishes laughter and 
distraction and obtains unceasing mourning.  For it is a shield repelling all the ‘fiery darts 
of the Devil (cf. Eph 6.16).488 
 
If you wish to wash all your pollutions, wash with tears, for these wash every stain 
completely away.’ 
 
Barsanuphius’ language in these passages clearly connects the purificatory power of tears to baptism.489  
In the first passage he has substituted κλαυθμός for Deutero-Paul’s πίστις—mourning, Barsanuphius 
implies, has the potency of faith.  The practice of mourning—so long as it resembles Paul’s ‘godly 
sorrow’490 was so fundamental that John refers to monks at one point simply as ‘mourners *Ὁι 
πενθοῦντες+.’491  Godly mourning accompanies him at all times in the fight with demons, with vices, 
with temptations of speech or lust.   
                                                          
485 See Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic School, 99-106; and, as a corrective to their assessment of the Old 
Men as ‘anti-intellectual’, note QR, 137b, ‘On the ‚η‛’ which, according to the redactor is only a sampling of 
Barsanuphius’ more speculative mediations.  On 137b, seeAngelis-Noah, P., ‘La meditation de Barsanuphe sur la 
lettre Ἦτα’, Byzantion 53:2 (1983), 494-506; cf. Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic School, 107-126. 
486 E.g., QR 18, 48, 125, 340, 462 etc. 
487 Havelone-Harper, 25-28 (quote from 26); cf. also QR 58, 693, 694, 695, 699-701.  Barsanuphius and John alike attach 
less importance to doctrinal accuracy than, for example, Cyril of Scythopolis or John Moschos (both staunch 
Chalcedonian anti-Origenists); and more to obedience to God’s commandments as mediated through one’s spiritual 
father. 
488 QR 461, cf. 257 
489 QR, 148 
490 QR, 574:  ‘Λοιπὸν ἀπόρριψον τὴν λύπην, ἥτις κατεργάζεται θάνατον, ‚ἡ γὰρ κατὰ Θεὸν λύπη σωτηρίαν 
ἐργάζεται.‛’  
491 QR, 618 
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Barsanuphius, like Poemen and others before him, founds mourning on the memory of 
judgment.  He writes:  ‘Mourning washes a person from his sins, but it comes with labour, through much 
effort and endurance, and pondering the fearful judgment and eternal shame, and denying oneself.’492  
Moreover, John claims that those who mourn take no thought for temporal possessions—they see things 
in a different light and so recognize the unimportance of objects whose value and utility is bounded by 
death—including their own bodies.493  The monastic does not pamper his body, since it is destined for the 
dust.494  However, Barsanuphius writes elsewhere, neither should he hate his body as though it were 
alien.  Rather, as a part of himself, albeit a mortal one destined for destruction, the body offers the 
monastic a instrument for cultivating virtue.495   
Connecting weeping to detachment, John writes to someone concerning the Beatitudes, ‘Mourn 
[Πένθησον] for your sins in this world so that you may be comforted with those things written in the 
Gospel.’496  John specifies that the weeping which leads to comfort concerns one’s sins.497  In light of his 
dismissal of temporal goods (noted above), it seems likely that John has in mind eschatological comfort.  
John says in another letter, ‘‚To rejoice with those who rejoice‛’ means to rejoice together with those 
establishing godly virtue and to be glad with them in the hope of good things to come.  ‘‚To weep with 
those who weep‛’ (Rom 12.15) is to suffer together the repentance from sin with those who sin.’498  One 
weeps, though, to be comforted through repentance regain one’s hope of ‘good things to come.’  One 
does not hope for anything in this present life—rather, weeping, like the memory of death and judgment, 
nourishes a detachment predicated on the recognition not only of one’s own mortality but of the 
transience of all present things and their conclusion in judgment.  It precludes concern for passing things 
and even temptations because it demands a constant awareness of one’s failures.  Weeping for one’s sins 
                                                          
492 QR, 257 
493 See also QR 241-242 (which draw on Bessarion 11); on which Chryssavgis, Baransuphius, 248 n109. 
494 See, e.g., QR, 517 by John:  ‘Despise the body eaten by worms.’ 
495 QR, 517-18 
496 QR, 627; I here follow Regnault’s translation rather than Chryssavgis’.  Chryssavgis takes the phrase τοῖς 
ἐγγεγραμμένοις τῷ Εὐαγγελίῳ to mean ‘those whose names are written in the Gospel.’  But this seems unlikely—
rather, as with the other Beatitudes he discusses in QR 627, John has in mind the comforts promised by the Gospel. 
497 As also in QR, 699 
498 QR, 675:  ‘‚Σὸ χαίρειν μετὰ χαιρόντων‛ ἐστί, τὸ συγχαίρειν τοῖς κατορθοῦσι τὴν κατὰ Θεὸν ἀρετὴν καὶ τῆ 
ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν εὐφραινομένοις.  ‚Σὸ δὲ κλαίειν μετὰ κλαιόντων,‛ τὸ συμπάσχειν τοῖς 
ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπὶ τῆ μετανοίᾳ τ῅ς ἁμαρτίας.’ 
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cannot help but inculcate sobriety, humility, and with them patience and compassion for others:  the 
monk who sees his own sins and weeps for them has put himself below the trajectory of demonic assault.  
 
Conclusion 
Barsanuphius and John both nuance the means and content of the memory of judgment and 
death, while ascribing to the practice a wider-ranging role than it found in either VA or the Desert 
Fathers.  They begin from the traditional understanding that one recalls mortality so as to dwell on 
immortal things and to detach oneself from transient goods.  Among things immortal they include God’s 
judgment, and meditate on that directly in relation to their own sin.  Certain dangers, as Evagrius and 
Mark had recognized, accompany specific recollection of sin.  Thus the Old Men refer memory of 
judgment to a regular but general self-examination in light of God’s commands, understood as the orders 
of one’s spiritual father.  The memory of death and judgment must also be undertaken when one feels 
oneself distant from death.  Deathbed repentance is, as John points out, of little value to a God who 
desires his creatures to act freely—one freely chooses to hold death near even when it seems not to be, so 
as to willingly acquire virtue with all the urgency of constraint.   
Memory of death and judgment thus inculcate multiple virtues.  It not only helps monks turn 
from sin, but makes them more obedient, humble, submissive, and perseverant.  Many of these virtues 
rest on a proper interpretation of the present world in relation to eternity.  Memory of death and 
judgment therefore foster detachment above all, an attitude which, in keeping with the rigours of 
renunciation, keeps the world at arm’s-length.  With detachment goes a realization of how far one actually 
is from the life one wishes to live.  In an extension of the spirituality associated with Abba Poemen, the 
monk learns through contemplation of death and especially judgment to mourn for his own sins—
thereby becoming humble and non-judgmental.  Tears guard him from further temptations, and his mind 
grows more accustomed to contemplating things eternal and spiritual.  Moreover, tears signify 
repentance and humility.  Tears, like the contemplation of death and judgment, emerge as a kind of 
practice, a way of life which seeks other goods:  humility, endurance, repentance, self-accusation and 
non-judgment all manifest themselves in and through tears.  This is why the Old Men lay such emphasis 
on procuring tears—not because weeping is virtue, but because it is conducive to and significant of, 
numerous fundamental virtues. 
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II. AGES IN OPPOSITION AND CONTINUITY 
 In this section, we return to the ‘opposition of ages’—a perception of the present life in light of 
eternity which, aided by remembrance of death and judgment, motivates renunciation and repentance.  
For the Gaza Fathers, the present life is a limited opportunity to seek beatitude, and while this age and 
the next present fundamentally opposed requirements for success, they are mediated by a proper use of 
worldly goods.  Whether one becomes attached or remains detached from transitory goods, that 
relationship determines in the present one’s future destiny.  We are, of course, not so very far from VA’s 
visions or the Desert’s call to repentance.  However, I will also show that the spiritual relationship 
constitutes another type of continuity exists between between the ages.  In all events, both opposition and 
continuity are mediated by death, and it is on that fact that we will especially focus.   
Barsanuphius says: 
In all these things remember that the world passes away, and its glory is fleeting and its 
enjoyment corruptible.  Choose ‘to suffer ill with the people of God than to have fleeting 
pleasure from sin’ (Heb 11.25).  And again, remember that we depart the world 
unwillingly and our life is not long.  For what is the life of a person?  Particularly since 
we do not have confidence in this life from morning to evening.  Willingly let us give up 
worldly affairs, so that we may have our reward.  Let us choose freedom from care 
[ἀμεριμνίαν] about earthly things, we who yearn to see the face of God, that we might 
be bold to say, ‚Bring my soul out of prison that I may confess your name‛ (Ps. 141.8 
LXX).499 
 
He argues that the transience of the present life and the hope of eternity not only make endurance of 
suffering possible, but actually demand that the monk willingly court suffering through renunciation.  
Detachment from the world and that all-encompassing ἀμεριμνία for which the monastic seeks, are 
themselves for the sake of something better—attachment to eternity.  Throughout his correspondence 
with John of Beersheba,500 Barsanuphius sets out this opposition in cogent, programmatic terms.  I will, 
therefore, outline his conception of the ‘opposition of ages’ primarily from QR 1-55.  Although John has 
little to say about the ‘opposition of ages’, the few times where he raises it seem to correspond to what 
Barsanuphius dwells on at greater length. 
                                                          
499 QR 790 
500 On John of Beersheba’s identity, see  Perrone, Lorenzo, ‘La lettere a Giovanni di Beersheva nella corrispondenza di 
Barsanufio e Giovanni di Gaza’, in J. Mallet and A. Thibaut (eds), Memorial Dom Jean Gribomont, Studia Ephemeridis 
‘Augustinianum’ 27 (Rome:  Institutum Patristicum ‘Augustinianum’, 1988), 467 n. 7; and Neyt and de Angelis-Noah, 
‘Introduction’, Correspondance, I.1:62.  More recently, Havelone-Harper (Disciples, 38-44) argues persuasively for 
identifying John of Beersheba with John the Prophet and co-author of QR.  I follow Havelone-Harper. 
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Opposition 
Barsanuphius sets up two oppositions which are relevant for us.  First he juxtaposes ‘affliction’ 
(θλίψις, πάθη) or ‘labour’ (κόπος) with ‘rest’ (κατάπαυσις, ἀνάπαυσις) or ‘stillness’ (ἡσυχία).501  
Barsanuphius at times speaks of ‘rest’ as eschatological (comparing it to the ‘Kingdom of Heaven’, as in 2) 
and at time assimilates it to John’s impending departure from his cenobium into a solitary cell (as in 6).  
While this may betray nothing more than sloppiness in Barsanuphius’ ascetic vocabulary, it seems more 
likely that he wishes to convey something of the eschatological value of a hermit’s life.  Barsanuphius 
confirms this supposition later when he explicitly compares John’s enclosure to the resurrection and 
divine life promised by Christ in John’s Gospel.502  The monk anticipates presently in his chosen mode of 
existence the eschatological hopes for which he struggles.   
Second, Barsanuphius arbitrates between what is ‘passing’ (παρερχόμενα) and what is ‘more 
fearful’ (φοβέρα).503  In light of things more fearful, such as God and his judgment, ‘Why speak of the 
things of the world which are passing?’  Indeed, Barsanuphius reminds John, ‘we have only a little time 
in the world.’504  God and his judgment are more fearful precisely because they are not passing away.  
God is eternal and his judgment has everlasting consequences.505  If eternal, then more worthy of 
consideration, and so Barsanuphius effectively subordinates any ‘passing’ concerns to eternal, ‘fearful’, 
ones.  In other correspondence, Barsanuphius sometimes expresses this same sentiment with a quotation 
of Romans 8.18 (‘For I do not consider the sufferings *τὰ παθήματα] of the present time worthy of the 
glory about to be revealed to us’) when encouraging his correspondent.506 
Barsanuphius then combines these two oppositions into a single paraenetic framework for John 
(and his other correspondents).  John had gone to Egypt to find work (ἐργόχειρον) and he and those with 
him had to spend a long time before they found any—and so, enduring ‘affliction and reversal *θλίψιν 
καὶ διαστροφήν+’, they grew weary.  Barsanuphius, we are told, prepared a letter in advance for John, 
filled with admonition and encouragement.  Barsanuphius begins thus:  ‘Why are you wearied with 
                                                          
501 In QR, 2 (quoting 2 Cor 6.4-5, 12.10; Heb 4.1, Acts 14.22), 6, 9, 27.  In 2, for example, Barsanuphius uses both terms 
for ‘rest’ interchangeably and in 6 and 9 he treats ‘σου ἀνάπαυσιν καὶ ἡσυχίαν’ as a hendiadys. 
502 QR, 36 (quoting Jn 5.25-26) 
503 QR, 20; I have quoted this letter at greater length above. 
504 QR, 20 
505 Barsanuphius in his tirade against Origenism makes clear that he believes this to be the case—God does not plan a 
series of ‘judgments’ which he may later commute or alter.  See 600:  ‘Ὃ ἅν σπείρῃς ἐνταῦθα, ἐκεῖ θερίζεις. Οὐκ ἔνι 
μετὰ τὴν ἄφιξιν τῶν ὧδε προκόψαι τινά.’ 
506 E.g., QR, 59, 90, and 122.  John echoes Barsanuphius in 597 when he says ‘Σὰ γὰρ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου σκηνή ἐστι.’  
He alludes, I think, to 2 Corinthians 5.1 or 5.4. 
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afflictions as a fleshly person [cf. 1 Cor 3.3], not hearing that afflictions are set before you, as also the spirit 
said to Paul and then encouraged those being with him in the ship to rejoice [cf. Acts 27.21-26, 33-36+?’507  
He goes on to remind John of the Psalmist’s words that ‘the afflictions of the righteous are many’ (Ps 
33.20) and of ‘all the saints from the beginning’ who, though good and loving to all, were received with 
hatred and mistrust—in perspective of Joseph’s troubles or Paul’s obstacles or Job’s patience, difficulty 
finding work should not even wrinkle John’s brow.   
Barsanuphius’ purpose is rather profounder than simply shaming John with examples greater 
than his own.  He first explains how John ought to endure troubles:  ‘If we are righteous, let us be tested 
[δοκιμασθῶμεν+ by afflictions; but if we are sinners, let us endure them as deserved.  ‚For endurance 
fashions character‛ *Rom 5.4+.’  It is in this light that John should consider the saints of the ages—they 
were tried and shown to be saints precisely by their patient endurance of troubles.  It was not, as Job’s 
example must surely demonstrate, that the saints knew their situations to be tests.  Rather it was that they 
knew themselves to be strangers in the world and, therefore, detached from its concerns.  They 
remembered what Barsanuphius would tell John:  ‘Denigrate the works which perish and are passing—
but godly endurance saves the one who cultivates it.’508  Because this world and all that belongs to it is 
‘passing’ and ‘corruptible’, it is not worth becoming attached to it.  Rather, one must cling to God through 
all things—this, I think is what ‘godly endurance’ (κατὰ Θεὸν ὑπομονή) means.  It is endurance which 
does not grow slack through any worldly concern but is, rather, wholly concerned with eternal salvation 
in God—thus also Barsanuphius’ fondness of Romans 8.18.509 
Barsanuphius bluntly rebuked a young monk who had asked his prayers for healing for the 
elderly monk Andrew:  
Importunate brother, ‚if you knew the gift of God *Jn 4.10+‛, on account of which from 
time to time he disciplines [παιδεύει] his slave Andrew as a merciful father [cf. Heb. 12.6-
8], you would have glorified God that he silences the stained mouth of the dragon so that 
one will not find a pretext against Andrew in the day of judgment on account of the great 
promises, offered to Andrew by God through me his lowly and useless slave.510 
 
Barsanuphius is quite clear:  salvation requires suffering.  In order that Andrew come through ‘the day of 
judgment’ unscathed into the ‘great promise’ of God, he must suffer what Barsanuphius treats as a form 
                                                          
507 QR, 31 
508 QR, 31 
509 cf. Ps-Macarius, Collectio H, 32 
510 QR, 122 
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of loving παιδεία.  Barsanuphius thus tells the zealous but misguided brother to leave Andrew to his 
suffering since it is precisely through this that humans learn sonship and that God shows his love for 
them.  All die, willingly or not, and so detachment from the world is necessary for monks to cultivate 
attachment to the next.  Monks prove their detachment—they even develop it—by enduring the 
sufferings which come to them from external events and other people.511   
John’s thumping response to a layperson concerned with hesitation and a lack of faith 
demonstrates that he internalized Barsanuphius’ admonitions to himself and others.  He says that God 
glorifies his saints but that we do not always see it in this life—they had to endure because they were and 
are being tested and proved.  His list resembles Barsanuphius’:  Job and Paul (down to the incident in the 
basket and the Damascus wall).  But he adds Lazarus (in Luke’s parable) and even Christ himself who 
was deeply troubled in the garden:  none of these hesitated, and all were faithful, but all suffered strong 
testing and, crucially, all passed.512  For Barsanuphius and John, endurance means accepting the tests 
which God either sends or allows, which produce and demonstrate character.  Ultimately, then, the 
‘opposition of ages’ Amounts to a what is often a very difficult recognition of the value of transitory 
things in light of mortality and judgment—it is not that they pass away, but that the monk does, and 
enjoyment of material goods is not only fleeting but in no way conducive to the ethical demands of 
eschatological judgment. 
 
Continuity 
 While the ‘opposition of ages’ performs an important function, a subtle ‘continuity’ also emerges 
in their thought, and this continuity, though recalling VA’s descriptions of ἄνοδος in life and death, 
nevertheless distinguishes Gazan spirituality from what we have seen among the Desert Fathers.  The 
lifestyle forged by those who reject ‘passing things’ prefigures the character of eternal existence for which 
monks suffer now.  I will discuss below at greater length the severance of relationships fundamental to 
Gazan monasticism, but for now I want to highlight briefly the type of relationship which survives 
monastic ‘detachment.’  Barsanuphius unfailingly emphasizes the obedience of monks to their spiritual 
directors and to their abbots.513  This relationship lasts until death—obedience, as we shall see below, 
                                                          
511 QR, 790 
512 QR, 382 
513 Though often those would be the same person, in Seridos’ monastery there was the ever-present spectre of the 
Great Old Men.  Seridos himself did not seem to mind this (acting as amanuensis for Barsanuphius and encouraging 
John’s epistolary career), perhaps partly because most of their letters are to monks and laypeople outside Seridos’ 
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becomes the permanent condition of the monk’s life.  But in another way this ‘father-son’ relationship 
outlasts death.514  Barsanuphius assiduously petitions God that he may be always found with his 
children.  Barsanuphius offers the following advice and encouragement to a monk worried at the thought 
of losing Barsanuphius to death: 
Pray that God may grant me to say, ‘Father, give to me that where I will be, there also 
will be my children [cf. Jn 17.24], in the unspeakable life.’  Trust me, brother, that on the 
one hand ‘the spirit is willing’ *cf. Mark 14.26+ to say to my Master who rejoices in the 
requests of his slaves, ‘Master, either bring my children with me into your kingdom or 
blot me from your book.’  On the other, my infirmity and carelessness prevent me from 
having such boldness.  But even so, his mercy is great!  Having, therefore, such a Master, 
let us be comforted, believing that he always show mercy to us.515 
 
Barsanuphius loves his ‘children’ absolutely, by which term of endearment he means, I believe, all who 
correspond with him.516  If Barsanuphius has his way, he would never be separated from those he loves as 
children.  His hope of God’s kingdom involves especially his children with him—it is a kingdom 
composed of relationships rather than stones, bordered only by shared holiness and, ultimately, an 
unfading reliance on Christ who ‘takes care of us unto the ages.’517   
 
Conclusion 
 The fact of suffering expresses a present age whose character is opposed to eternity as labour 
opposes rest.  John’s letter on glorified saints shows this:  their glory is hidden by the suffering which 
comes to them from the world, but revealed by their endurance of it.  Moreover, the saints set their 
examples of endurance precisely through their own recognition that temporary sufferings, minor 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
community.  To those inside the coenobium, the Great Old Men unflinchingly supported Seridos’ authority to his 
monks, thus legitimating his position and assuaging any feelings of rancor he might develop at their occasional 
rebukes to him personally.  Within their own monastery, then, the Great Old Men exerted their authority indirectly, 
through advice and admonition to the abbot who then, because of his easy relationship with them and their 
agreement not to interfere with his public role, acts on their advice and thus exerts their authority over the monks as 
a sort of partially autonomous agent.  I will discuss the relationship of elders, abbots, and disciples further in the 
section on ‘Obedience’, below. 
514 See also Claudia Rapp’s social-historical assessment,‘‚For next to God, you are my salvation‛:  reflections on the 
rise of the holy man in late antiquity’, in James Howard-Johnston and Paul Antony Hayward (eds.), The Cult of Saints 
in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages:  Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown (Oxford:  OUP, 1999), 74-75. 
515 QR, 187.  Cf. also, e.g., 77, 243 (superscript), 274, 573, and 790.   Of course, the relationship is open to nuance.  In 
some letters Barsanuphius claims to have secured salvation (which God promises through him).  In others (e.g., 274) 
Barsanuphius admonishes his correspondent that while he himself desires their unity it is ultimately up to his 
correspondent and not himself. 
516 As also Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic School, 98 
517 QR, 90 
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reversals, and the loss of all things corruptible, appears vanishingly trivial when set against the fearful 
and eternal reality of beatitude in God, refracted through his eschatological judgment.  In contrast with 
transitory relationships, spiritual relationships appear all the more solid, all the more precious and worth 
struggling over.  They are modelled on God’s own παιδεία, and, since God’s care for humans transcends 
the opposition of this world and the next, Barsanuphius finds an eternal bond in his own relationship 
with his spiritual children.  The life which a monk builds up in renunciation and detachment, cultivated by 
contemplation of death and judgment, becomes itself eternal, a mode of being which will not be cut off by 
death. 
In light of this situation, suffering is not incidental to salvation, but constituent of it.  As John notes 
at one point, concern for transitory life prevents one from ‘giving oneself over completely to death for the 
Kingdom of Heaven.’518  The resultant condition he calls διψυχία, an existential ‘duplicity.’  The monk, in 
order to be ἅπλως, ‘simple’ or ‘whole’, must act out of his recognition of the absolute priority of 
eschatological beatitude over the present or ‘fleshly’ life.  Acceptance of suffering is, therefore, not simply 
an action, but an anthropological constitution.  The monk’s action is governed by the δοκίμη, the 
‘character’ which accepts and emerges from the endurance of suffering. 
                                                          
518 QR, 846 
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III. THE LIMIT OF DEATH 
In his Asceticon Magnum—a series of longer and shorter responses to questions about monastic 
life and organization—Basil of Caesarea adduced the example of Christ’s obedience to the Father as 
normative for monastic obedience.  Basil was especially fond of quoting Philippians 2.8:  ἐταπείνωσεν 
ἑαυτὸν γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ.’519  At one point, Basil was asked 
‘How should one be eager ‚to risk‛ even ‚danger for the sake of‛ the commandments ‚of the Lord‛ (Acts 
15.26, 2 Cor 11.26)?’  His response is telling:   
In the first place by reminding oneself that the Lord himself ‚was obedient‛ to the Father 
‚even unto death‛ *Phil 2.8+ and by being fully persuaded of the power of the 
‚commandment‛ of the Lord which ‚is eternal life‛ as it is written *Jn 12.50+.  Then also 
by believing in the Lord who said:  ‚Whoever wants to save his life, shall lose it, whoever 
loses his life for my sake and the sake of the Gospel, is the one who shall save it‛ *Mk 
8.35].520 
 
In light of Christ’s example and the hope which obedience to him offers, death holds little terror for Basil.  
Instead, his response encourages monks to look beyond physical death to the far grander vistas of eternal 
life.  Thus, for Basil, ‘death’ becomes the ‘measure of obedience’ because it is the measure of Christ’s,521 
but as a physical event it is indifferent, the possible outcome of obedience moving beyond it to eternal life 
in Christ.   
 In the literature we have looked at in the first chapters, Basil’s ideas have not featured.  In VA 
Antony displayed a remarkable indifference to death, and Athanasius denigrated ‘fear of death’, yet 
Antony’s disciples were deeply saddened at his departure, which suggests that not all were capable or at 
least prepared to accept such indifference.  Likewise, this pattern of thought is not so visible in Desert 
literature which, considering death most frequently in terms of terrifying images of judgment, 
emphasized fear of the unknown eschatological verdict.  Barsanuphius, however, takes up this more 
‘Basilian’ line of thought and makes endurance unto death a crucial virtue which informs and 
characterizes all others.  I will explore now how death functions as a limitation for spiritual progress—
both as the end toward which one strives and as the cessation of all possible action—through one of 
Barsanuphius’ favorite verses of Scripture.   
Matthew 10.22 
                                                          
519 Basil, RF 28.2, 44, 55; RB 69, 103, 116, 119, 152, 172, 176, 199, 206, 317.  He also quoted John 6.29-34 with some 
frequency:  RF 5.3; RB 1, 60, 137, 138; cf. 120.  All translations are from Silvas’ ET. 
520 Basil, RB, 199 
521 Basil, RB, 317 
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Barsanuphius constantly quotes, alludes to, paraphrases, or generally reminds his readers of, 
Scripture.  In many cases it is difficult to tell where Scripture ends and Barsanuphius begins, so imbued is 
his language with that of Scripture.  As François Neyt and Paula de Angelis-Noah have argued, the Word 
of God—mediated by the Scriptures and the Great Old Man’s commentary on them—is fundamental to 
Barsanuphius’ attempts to form his correspondents in the monastic life.  Neyt and de Angelis-Noah go on 
to highlight the importance of a hermeneutical study of the Old Men since ‘La correspondence des 
moines de Gaza, comme les Régles de saint Basile, se présente comme un commentaire, une explication 
de la Sainte Écriture adaptée à chaque personne pour l’aider’ or, more generally ‘*à+ transformer la vie 
des les correspondants.’522  Elsewhere, Neyt expands on this assessment:  ‘Rarement, dans les écrits 
ascétiques, trouvera-t-on un spiritual posant aussi constamment et aussi radicalement la ‚parole de vie‛, 
qui interpelle, suscite une libération de la personne et une conversion à une Dieu miséricordieux et 
‚philanthrope‛.’523  That is, in order to understand the more general theological claims being adapted to 
individual situations in the correspondence, we do well to examine the Old Men’s use of scripture—in 
particular their deployment of certain preferred passages.  While a study of Barsanuphius’ scriptural 
hermeneutic would lie far beyond the scope of this chapter,524 it is possible to pick out and discuss his use 
of a few relevant verses which stand out from the crowd of quotations littering his letters.  In this regard, 
Matthew 10.22b is stitched into Barsanuphius’ thinking:  ‘He who endures to the end will be saved.’  
Barsanuphius quotes or alludes to this verse eighteen times, making it one of the single most-cited verses 
in his correspondence.525  By contrast, John only alludes to it once.526  This contrast suggests that Matthew 
10.22 expresses Barsanuphius’ unique perspective, disengaged from the more general tradition.527   
For Barsanuphius life-long endurance is, perhaps more than any other virtue, salvific.  He notes 
early on that if one does not endure to the end, one cannot be saved.528  Contrariwise, he comforts the sick 
old monk Andrew thus:  ‘Be, therefore, trustful of the Lord that no one enduring until his end in this 
                                                          
522 Neyt and de Angelis-Noah, ‘Introduction’ Correspondance, I.1:83-84 
523 Neyt, François, ‘Un Type d’Autorité Charismatique’, Byzantion 44 (1974), 352 and ‘La Formation au monastère de 
l’abbé Seridos à Gaza’, in Christian Gaza in Late Antiquity, 154-155 
524 Elia, L., Uso e interpretazione della Sacra Scrittura negli scritti di Barsanufio di Gaza, Dissertazione per la Licenz in 
Teologia e Scienze Patristiche, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum (Rome, 1996-97) 
525 QR 14, 23, 27, 30, 55, 57, 59, 66, 74, 76, 90, 115, 118, 187, 214, 613, and 823 
526 QR, 382 
527 N.b. Barsanuphius understands the ‘end’ as death.  See QR, 823; cf. 23, 27, 57, 74, 187.  For conjunction of Acts 14.22 
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place is cast out of the pen of sheep belonging to Christ our God (cf. John 10.26-29).’529  Why should 
endurance in the monastery (to which ‘this place’ presumably refers) be so salvific?   
If brothers can endure the little difficulties of daily life together then they develop patience and, 
with it, peace and, with that, love—divine attributes given to them by Christ for their labours.530  
Barsanuphius envisions this community—not simply the sum of those living in a certain proximity, but 
the peaceful bond of love which unifies them—as eternal and eschatological.531  It is the community of 
spiritual fathers and children, of spiritual brethren—it is bounded by the limits of virtue rather than by 
time or space.  Endurance keeps monks in the ‘place’—the constellation of activities and relationships—
where they can make progress, where they can practice virtues, where they can find salvation.532  Thus, 
while ‘endurance’ on its own is devoid of content—enduring in what, we might ask—Barsanuphius has in 
mind the endurance of trials533 and illnesses534, and the long-suffering opposition of temptation—
particularly the temptation to despair535 or departure—which keep the monk toiling and grant him the 
necessary ‘faith<humility and long-suffering of endurance through which ‚he who endures is saved.‛’536  
The point of endurance is that all virtue must be cultivated until death.  Endurance, essentially 
meaningless in isolation, stamps all virtues with its own character. 
 
The Boundary of Progress 
Barsanuphius and John not only conceive of physical death as the ‘limit’ of labour, but also as the 
‘boundary’ beyond which labour is no longer possible.  We have already seen this classic topos in their 
teaching on the memory of mortality.    This second way of conceiving death as ‘limit’ reinforces the 
radical opposition of ages as well as sharpening the urgency of the ascetic lifestyle.  John of Beersheba’s 
enclosure prefigures and anticipates his eternal rest.  Yet we must keep in mind Barsanuphius’ aphoristic 
maxim:  ‘Here the toil, there the reward.’537   The proleptic experience of eschatological beatitude is, as 
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Daniel Hömbargen argues, at best partial, and its enjoyment should never be cause for relaxation.  He 
writes,  
In earthly life a monk should not strive for spiritual knowledge, which is only a reward 
in heaven, instead, he should dedicate himself exclusively to the ascetic practice<this 
reveals a conception of the ascetic life which strongly opposes that of Evagrius.  When 
Evagrius divides the spiritual life into praktiké and knowledge, the first stage is a 
preparation for the second, which is a goal to be reached during this lifetime<a result of 
the ascetic practice and belongs to the spiritual progress a monk should make on earth.  
For Barsanuphius, however, it is only a reward bestowed after death...’538 
 
Hombargen’s point is to contrast attitudes which see the summit of perfection as something to be attained 
in this life with attitudes like Barsanuphius’ which see perfection as something only received after 
Christ’s judgment.  Rest—and with it spiritual contemplation—are rewards reserved for heaven.  For 
Barsanuphius and John, the grave bounds the possibility of progress, of repentance, and, with them, of 
salvation.  And the distinction between this life and eternity remains always absolute.  The present life is 
a threshing floor and, though Christ winnows the wheat from the chaff in this present life, the results 
must wait the eschatological resurrection.539 
 
Conclusion 
 There is an ambiguity in the phrase ἕως (or μέχρι) θανάτου, as the prepositions can mean either 
‘until’ (in a temporal sense) or ‘as far as’.540  One may endure ‘until one’s death,’ meaning ‘as long as one 
is alive;’ or ‘so far as death,’ meaning ‘even if this action leads to death or one dies while doing it.’  
Barsanuphius tells Andrew that being a monastic means giving oneself entirely to God, and that means 
holding nothing back—not even care for one’s bodily health.  Barsanuphius says, 
If you truly believe that God has carefully led you here, believe in him as your seal, 
‚casting all your care on him‛ (1 Pet. 5.7), and he himself will ordain all things pertaining 
to you as he wishes<He who gives himself to God with his whole heart (cf. Jer 24.7, Wis 
8.21) ought to give himself over to God even unto death [ἕως θανάτου], for he [God] 
knows much more than us what benefits our soul and body.541 
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Monks offer up to God even their judgment of what is and is not good—a point to which I will return 
below.  Just as they relinquish personal property to the monastery, monks offer their natural self-
preservation to God.  If this self-offering ends in death, then that is to be accepted as the result of God’s 
providential arrangement.  Barsanuphius, however, is not extremist:  the sick should not maintain the 
same regime as the healthy, but they should not consider sickness an excuse to give up their monastic 
vocation entirely.542  Partly, Barsanuphius’ command to endure in monastic work, even if it entails 
physical deterioration or death, comes from his firm eschatological hope—predicated on his 
understanding of the continuity of ages—that God’s concern extends not only through the present life as 
well as the next.543  Barsanuphius considers physical death far less important than eternal beatitude and 
in light of the latter, the former should be viewed as a matter of indifference—simply the end of one’s 
work on earth. 
 While Barsanuphius’ use of Matthew 10.22 is unique, we have seen echoes of his ideas in John’s 
emphasis on wholly giving oneself to God.  To hold back out of fear of suffering or even death leads to 
διψυχία, whereas the monk should be ἅπλως.  The unified identity for which monks labour in light of 
eschatological judgment requires the indifference to physical death which only an equally eschatological 
hope can provide. 
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III. PRACTICING DEATH IN GAZA 
We come now to examine the ways in which Barsanuphius and John explicitly conceive of ascetic 
life as a metaphorical ‘death.’  The conceptual framework of death—only hinted at in VA and traced 
vaguely in Desert literature—approaches normativity in Gaza.  For these it fair to say that to be a ‘monk’ 
is to ‘die’ to oneself and others.  Here the practices of renunciation and withdrawal play out as a kind of 
‘death.’  Barsanuphius uses the image with some regularity to describe the general state of the monk544 
and even describes his cell as a ‘cemetery’ in which he rests, by God’s grace and his own struggle, from 
passions and temptations.545  I have shown that Barsanuphius conceives of rest as both eschatological and 
present—the hermit’s life is, when compared with the coenobite’s, one of ‘rest’, though, as we have also 
seen, perfect rest is to be found only after death.  Barsanuphius’ experience of rest now prefigures his 
experience beyond death and so his ‘rest’ and his freedom are, therefore, to be equated with his status as 
‘dead.’  The monk’s cell, paradoxically the place of his struggle and his rest, becomes the nexus of heaven 
and earth, of ‘time present and time future’ in which the living anticipate their own mortality in hope of 
eternal beatitude beyond.   
 The Gaza Fathers conceive of monasticism as a ‘practice of death’ in three interrelated ways:  the 
severance of relationships, a change of perception, and especially, the denial of one’s will through 
obedience.  For Barsanuphius and John, the practice of death draws together the practice of remembering 
death and judgment, the opposition of ages, endurance in the monastic life, and the monk’s mortal 
identity.  Thus, in Gaza for the first time ‘death’ plays a dominant and organizing role for conceptualizing 
ascetic life. 
 
Relationships Then and Now 
A pious laymen named Aelianus once asked the Old Men how to renounce the world.  Their 
correspondence is particularly intriguing, since Seridos’ διάθηκη named Aelianus as a possible successor 
after his death—under the assumption that Aelianus would become a monk.  Aelianus, however, was 
unaware of Seridos’ will until, all the other possible successors having demurred through humility, his 
name alone remained.  John then had Aelianus tonsured and he became not only brother but abbot of the 
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monastery.546  The correspondence gives us a rather nice ‘before-and-after’ picture of how a man’s 
relationships and attachments change when he enters the ascetic life. 
Before becoming abbot, Aelianus was married with children and property.547  His initially asked 
about becoming a monk and ‘to find in withdrawal a freedom from care.’548  But, he wondered, what 
should he do with his wife, children, and property?  John advises him simply:  leave your wife to the care 
of her nephews, leave her and your children properties appropriate for their expenses, and as for the rest, 
ask Barsanuphius what to do.549   To preface this advice, though, John first alludes to Luke 9.62,550 then 
recalls the fate of Lot’s wife (Gen 19.26), and finally cautions, ‘And again, the lion is caught by a single 
hair, and the eagle by the tip of his talon.’  John’s apocalyptic rationale makes his practical advice 
instructive:  as long as Aelianus is concerned for his family and goods he will find neither the 
ἀναχωρήσις nor the ἀμεριμνία which he seeks—he remains trapped and in danger of the annihilation 
and exclusion implied by Lot’s wife. 
Aelianus then writes to Barsanuphius, who responds in even stronger terms.  He too recalls Lot, 
saying that ‘whoever is able to flee will be saved as Lot from Sodom.’551  Barsanuphius then elaborates on 
what John had already said, describing  (also in terms of Luke 9.62) the difference between those who 
stay in the world and those who flee.  He writes: 
Those bound up with earthly things become earthly, but those renouncing them ascend 
from the earth—therefore it is clear that they become heavenly.  And we wretches do not 
understand, that even if we do not wish to withdraw from these for God’s sake, we have 
to depart unwillingly in the hour of death [Καὶ οὐ συνιῶμεν οἱ ἄθλιοι, ὅτι καὶ μὴ 
θέλοντες διὰ τὸν Θεὸν ἀναχωρ῅σαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἀναχωρ῅σαι ἔχομεν ἐν τῆ ὥρᾳ τοῦ 
θανάτου ἄκοντες+.  Child, God’s command is that a person immediately cut off from 
all....‛No one putting hand to plough and turning back is fit for the kingdom of Heaven‛ 
(Luke 9.62).  And again...‛Let the dead bury their own dead‛ (Luke 9.60) and again ‚Who 
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loves father or mother more than me is unworthy of me‛ (Mat 10.37) and what 
follows.’552 
 
Barsanuphius sharpens the dichotomy to which John had already pointed:  either flee the world and 
ascend to heaven, or stay and be destroyed.  Barsanuphius appends an interesting, albeit very traditional, 
point in his distinction between renunciation ‘for God’s sake’ and ‘involuntary’ renunciation.  The latter 
recalls Evagrius’ description of the monk torn unwillingly away at death.553  The former helps sever the 
attachments to the material world which make death ‘involuntary.’  One cannot ‘partially’ withdraw 
from the world—one cannot renounce a few things and retain others.  Barsanuphius sees no middle 
ground, and so he describes the situation in the absolute terms of life and death.  This tension informs the 
Old Men’s more specific advice elsewhere about relationships. 
Both recognize that the destruction of relationships is a painful process which really does 
resemble death.  John affirms the profundity of renunciation precisely because he recognizes the depth of 
the marital bond and, therefore, the intensity of renunciation.  To Theodore, who was distraught at 
leaving his family for monasticism, he says   
It is written concerning man and woman that ‚The two will become one flesh‛ (Gen 
2.24).  Therefore, just as if some bit of your own flesh were cut off, the rest of your body 
would suffer for a while until the wound was healed and the pain stopped, so also in this 
it is necessary for you to suffer for a time as if your flesh were cut away from you.’554 
 
Barsanuphius responds to Theodore at the same time in a different manner.  He writes, ‘If you have 
chosen for yourself the model of one dead [τύπον νεκροῦ], ask a corpse if it desires to see its own wife or 
if it judges her should she leave and commit adultery.  If you have ‘let the dead bury their own dead’ 
(Luke 9.60), why aren’t you preaching the kingdom of God?  How long will you sleep?’555  Here 
Barsanuphius returns to Luke 9.60 but argues that not only those left behind are dead but, in a rather 
different way, so is the one who leaves them.  While Barsanuphius deploys the image of death 
equivocally, he nevertheless affirms, as he died to Aelianus, that renunciation is absolute and permanent, 
a process no less painful than amputation, no less profound than death. 
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The extent to which Barsanuphius took his own advice is evident from his treatment of his own 
family.  In another letter, Barsanuphius, who we know to have had a biological brother,556 refuses even to 
acknowledge his existence.  He writes:  ‘Concerning your brothers—I do not know that I have a brother 
except for Jesus.  Do you have brothers?  Do with them as you wish, I have nothing to do with it.  If he 
himself *Jesus+ says, ‚Who is my mother and who are my brothers?‛ is it for me to tell you to disobey 
God’s commandment and hold friendship with fleshly brothers?’557  The command to leave behind one’s 
family becomes the command of salvation, while the renunciation of earthly siblings opens up the 
possibility of having Jesus as brother instead. Barsanuphius thus freights monastic profession with all the 
apocalyptic urgency which Jesus’ words in the Gospels can carry. 
 
The Character of New Relationships 
 Well and good—Barsanuphius and John have high hopes for those who would enter monastic 
life.  It is transformative and its first step is renunciation not only of goods but of relationships as well.  Of 
course, the monk is not alone, is he?  He enters a coenobium full of others struggling, undoubtedly, with 
the same doubts, fears, desires, and memories as himself.  Not only that, but the community constitutes, 
by definition, a new constellation of relationships in which—since obedience and brotherhood last until 
death—the monk is bound for life.  Supreme among these relationships the monk maintains obedient in 
all matters to his abbot.  Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky have argued that the goal of monastic life was to 
minimize social interaction for fear of distraction, factionalism, and other related problems.558  Against 
this claim we may recall the monk, discussed above, who wanted hesychia and was rebuffed by both Old 
Men and told to stay in the coenobium.  Neither Old Man is concerned with minimizing relationships as 
such, but with carefully constructing the character of monastic relationships.  If blood ties and social 
friendships are replaced with an abbot and monastic brothers, how ought the monk to conceive of his 
new family? 
Both Barsanuphius and John are clear on the subject:  a monk approaches relationships in 
humility and without recourse to combative argument or recrimination.  A monk’s renunciation of 
biological and other conventional relationships creates a sort of freedom to approach all relationships 
equally.  Barsanuphius writes to his biological brother: 
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This tribulation [an illness] has partly come to you since you attributed importance to 
me, who am nothing, and to yourself:  to me as some great man and to yourself as the 
brother of such a man.  Do you not know that we are children of Adam’s transgression?  
And we are earth and ashes (Gen 18.27)?  Give thanks therefore to God who has driven 
you to this state.  If we have the humility of Jesus, we can say, ‚Who is my mother, and 
who are my brothers?‛ and what follows.559 
 
Here, the monk’s ‘mortal identity’ underpins Barsanuphius claims.  No one is ‘great’, or at least, no one is 
‘greater’, since all are sinful, all mortal, all ultimately children of the same biological forefather.  On that 
account Barsanuphius countenances no favoritism based on pre-given ‘natural’ (biological) or 
conventional (business, friendly, marital) relationships.  He accepts no convention in order that he may 
approach the very possibility of relationship from an entirely different direction:  the imitation of Christ 
in humility and love. 
Barsanuphius’ final letter to John of Beersheba expresses this exquisitely with an allusion to 
Macarius the Great’s advice:  ‘Do not close the door, for mortification is not in closing the door but in 
closing the mouth.’560  The monk, even an anchorite like John of Beersheba whose enclosure is watched 
over by Barsanuphius (who saw no one at all save Seridos), must be open to others.  Even Barsanuphius 
(at least prior to his final enclosure) remains open.  As he says to Andrew, ‘‚Brother, your key opens my 
door‛, for I am witless and I do not dare to hide the marvels of God!’561  Barsanuphius, we have seen 
above, understands the importance of maintaining relationship in the monastery even with those who 
make them difficult.  For that reason, the dead must neither harbor resentment562, nor allow themselves 
the volatility of emotion nor arrogate to themselves positions of authority.563  Instead the monk must 
humble himself before others:  ‘Whoever wishes to please God cuts off his will before his neighbor, doing 
violence to himself.’564  Indeed, humility may be the defining characteristic of monastic relationships.565   
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However, humility relies in its turn on the practice of death, which means that the monk turns against 
himself the weapons with which he might otherwise exert his will over others:  the monk does not claim 
to teach or to arbitrate disputes, regarding himself or others; he enters into no contracts—which, 
Barsanuphius reminds one monk, ‘is not proper to monks, for<this work is not proper to love.’566  Love 
for others requires, paradoxically, violence toward oneself.  It seems that the self is constantly trying to 
exert its will (the ἴδιον θέλημα) and so either one lets it (as in biological and business relationships) or 
one fights against it (as in Christian, and especially monastic relationships).  Curiously, this battle against 
the self allows the monk to imitate Christ who suffered patiently but, John reminds another, no one can 
equal Christ’s loving acceptance of suffering.567 
Life-long endurance defines the character of monastic relationship, thus connecting relational 
‘death’ back to death as limit.  Barsanuphius tells John of Beersheba: 
Brother, we are strangers, let us be strangers and not measure ourselves in anything, and 
no one will attach importance to us and we will find rest.  Having joined us, wrestle in 
order to endure.  For it says, ‚He who endures to the end will be saved‛ (Mat 10.22).  In 
all things struggle to die to every person and you will be saved.  And say to your 
thought:  ‚I died and lie in the grave.‛’568 
 
To be able to endure in a community one must die to everyone.  Not simply, it seems, to those whom one 
leaves behind in the world, but even to one’s own monastic brethren.  Barsanuphius surely echoes the 
advice given Abba Poemen when he was tempted to anger by his brothers and the advice offered by 
Moses the Ethiopian to those who would be monks:  Remember that you are already dead.569  It is only by 
counting oneself as dead or as a stranger that the monk can live in a monastery in peace because it is only 
when he counts himself as dead that he can forge relationships in humility.   
Humility in relationships means especially that the monk never judge others or even ask why 
their lot is different from his—he simply obeys and gives thanks.570  As in Desert literature, relational 
‘death’ connects, then, to self-judgment as the young monk must learn to accuse himself constantly.  In 
doing so he comes to recognize his own sin and, if constantly pre-occupied with that, finds no time to see 
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sin in others; thus he learns to see them as better than himself.571  The humility which comes from 
recognition of one’s earthy, sinful, and mortal condition, enforces the practice of death and submission of 
oneself to others.  In another letter, Barsanuphius elaborates this living death in terms we have seen often 
enough: 
Whoever is among people and yet wishes to die to them, does not judge and does not 
despise anyone and does not enforce his own will—this is what it means to die to all 
while among them<respond with meekness to your neighbor who has provoked 
you<Do not be troubled about being deprived of food<Give thanks to God, judging 
yourself unworthy.572 
 
Equanimity, meekness, non-judgment, self-accusation, an excised will, humility and love—these 
characterize the person who lives among others as one dead. 
 Let us return to the eschatological dimension of Barsanuphius’ and John’s concept of 
relationships.  Theodore, we recall, was commanded to ‘cut off’ his wife though it would hurt like an 
amputation, and to leave himself only the desire for her that a corpse might have.  In the same letter, 
Barsanuphius, who, we have seen, has Christ and his fellow monks for his brothers, offers Theodore a 
proleptic eschatological hope which far outstrips his loss: 
Take from this fire [of suffering] and offer incense, that the Master may smell your 
offerings and bring his Father with the life-creating Spirit, and make his dwelling with 
you in your sanctuary, in which you offer ‚yourself to him as a living sacrifice, holy, 
pleasing to him‛ (Rom 12.2).  And then, kindled from this fire, ever yearning to become a 
fellow traveler, citizen, and inheritor of the saints who have lived righteously, of those 
things ‘which eye has not seen, ears have not heard, and there has not entered into the 
heart of man what God has prepared for those who love him’ (1 Cor 2.9), in Christ Jesus 
our Lord.573 
 
Theodore finds the saints to be his new friends, as Barsanuphius has Christ for his brother.  Severing 
relationships and building new ones—dying and staying dead—he leaves the world in order to dwell in 
heaven, and so it is to heaven that we next turn. 
 
Looking Beyond the World 
 As regards intellectual faculties of perception and judgment, the practice of death constitutes a 
forcible alteration of perception—a kind of alternative epistemology.  This is analogous to the Evagrian 
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‘epistemological death to self’ which I detailed in chapter two above.  What I will call ‘dead’ perception 
rests on the ontological ‘opposition of ages’ (discussed at length above) which have death as their nexus.  
Indeed, ‘dead perception’ may best be described as the epistemological outworking of the ‘opposition of 
ages’ in those who are willing to pay attention.  Barsanuphius says, for example, to John of Beersheba: 
Pass over in thought from this vain world into another age.  Leave the earthly and seek 
the heavenly.  Abandon the corruptible and you will find the incorruptible.  Flee with 
your mind from temporary things you will encounter eternal ones.  Die completely, that 
you may live eternally in Christ Jesus our Lord to whom be glory unto the ages.574 
 
The opposition of ages is here vitally apparent and the command to die connects them—just as physical 
death ushers a person in toto from this age into the next, so a metaphorical practice of death can 
accomplish the same transition as far as the mind is concerned.  Thus, the present may foreshadow 
eternity, if only ‘in mind’ or ‘in thought.’  And yet Barsanuphius’ language is intriguing—‘you will 
encounter eternal’ ones.  The implication is that one perceives spiritual realities only by a forcible shift of 
gaze which requires a kind of total death. 
 This forcible mental transition has also physical consequences.  Barsanuphius tantalizes Andrew 
with the following description of ‘God’s holy ones’:  ‘<even as they are still here, *God+ reveals to them 
his marvelous mysteries, glorious things, enduring rest and glory for them, and [he] alienates their mind 
from this world, and they always see themselves in heaven with Christ and the angels.’575  This new 
perception causes ‘inexpressible and unceasing joy’ such that ‘neither hunger nor thirst nor any other 
earthly thing afflicts them.  They are freed from all the complaints and passions and sins found in life.’  A 
mental flight from the world causes the monk to perceive the glorious things to come, and, in his joy at 
their prospect, he actually forgets the usual bodily and material requirements and desires which define life 
for ‘the living.’ 
 If the monk ‘dies’ solely in order to ‘live’ eternally, then clearly the practice of death is simply the 
pre-requisite for the acquisition of life.  Death is not an end, but a means.  The relativization of death is 
already implied in the dual content of the memory of death as both mortality and judgment.  Post-mortem 
or eschatological judgment fixes the monk’s conception of death within an eternal, but ethically divided 
framework.  ‘Dead’ perception is, therefore, not simply flight ‘from’ but flight ‘toward’—from earth to 
heaven. 
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The Only Way to Salvation 
 Though it relies on and cultivates virtues such as humility, endurance, and heavenly 
relationships, the monastic’s ‘death’ itself revolves around one activity: ἡ ἐκκοπὴ τοῦ (ιδίου) θελήματος, 
the ‘cutting-off of the (personal) will.’  Irénée Hausherr remarked that for the Gaza Fathers the ‘ἐκκοπὴ 
τοῦ οἰκείου θελήματος’ is ‘la pensée central de cette spiritualité<Ce principe commande toute la 
doctrine.’576 John remarks at one point:  ‘This progress is according to God *Σοῦτο προκοπή ἐστι κατὰ 
Θεόν]:  to cut off the will, so that while someone cuts off his own will, even in good things, he does that 
of the saints; in evil things, of his own he flees what is improper.’577  Concerning προκοπή, ‘progress’ (a 
great concern for the Gaza Fathers578), Lorenzo Perrone argues that it refers not to ‘an established pattern 
of progressive stages’ but rather to ‘one essential message continuously drive home:  the ‚way‛ the pupil 
has to follow.’ This ‘way’ consists, Perrone concludes, in ‘the progressive renunciation of one’s personal 
will.  It is no exaggeration to say that precisely this ‚way‛ marks for them the essence of Christianity.’  
Indeed, while we find the motif in earlier Desert Literature, ‘no other source of ancient monasticism so 
radically insists on the ‚cutting away‛ of the will...as embodying the quintessence of the way to 
perfection.’579  ‘Progress’ refers not cut off one’s own will once for all.  Rather, it is more like a continual 
‘shaving away’ of the will, one desire and attachment at a time.   
Perrone’s point is excellent, but requires nuance.  While shaving off one’s will centres Gazan 
asceticism generally, it operates within and as the organizing force of the myriad ways in which 
Barsanuphus and John deploy the imagery of death.  Aryeh Kofsky remarks in passing that ‘overall, it 
seems that Barsanuphius and John are less interested in the will of the flesh—namely, desires and 
passions—and more interested in cutting out the personal will per se.’580  This point could not be more 
important.  As with the Desert Fathers, cutting off of the personal will has less to do with renouncing 
objects of desire or choice than with the destruction and, I shall argue, re-creation—the death and 
resurrection—of the faculty of choice itself.  Thus, to understand how and why ‘cutting off the will’ 
                                                          
576 Hausherr, ‘Barsanuphe’, col. 1257 
577 QR, 380 
578 See QR 2, 21, 89,122, 160, 197, 202, 203, 250, 278, 383, 496, 600, etc. 
579 Perrone, Lorenzo, ‘The Necessity of Advice:  Spiritual Direction as a School of Christianity in the Correspondence 
of Barsanuphius and John of Gaza’, in Christian Gaza in Late Antiquity, 135-137; Kofsky agrees, in ‘Renunciation of 
Will in the Monastic School of Gaza’, Liber Annuus 56 (2006) 332-333. 
580 ‘Renunciation of Will’, 336, expanding on Perrone, ‘The Necessity of Advice’, 142-43. 
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centres Gazan asceticism, it is necessary to appreciate its meaning within the context of the practice of 
death. 
 Barsanuphius contextualizes the process of cutting off one’s will within the more general 
framework of dying for God’s sake to oneself and to the world.  Barsanuphius expresses this idea 
beautifully to Andrew.  Andrew has asked Barsanuphius to forgive all his sins and Barsanuphius has 
already responded that God is forgiving so long as Andrew perseveres.  Andrew, concerned that 
Barsanuphius avoided his question, put it to him a second time.581  Barsanuphius responds rather more 
clearly:  ‘Brother Andrew, may Jesus, who said ‚ask and receive‛ (cf. Mat 21.22) give you all that you 
request—simply prepare your house in great purity in order to receive his gifts, for they are kept in a 
purified house.’  His point is that God alone bestows forgiveness but that in order to appreciate and hold 
on to that gift, Andrew must order his life appropriately.  Unsurprisingly, Barsanuphius then describes 
the radical internal change that comes to one who ‘has tasted’ God’s gifts, saying that he ‘he becomes 
stranger to the ‚old self‛ (Col 3.9), being crucified to the world and the world to him (cf. Gal 6.18), living 
always in the Lord.’  Desire for God’s gift of forgiveness requires a radical death to oneself and the world 
which, far from an inactive or emptied state, is life in the Lord.  In light of this, Barsanuphius counsels 
Andrew to enter wholeheartedly into the self-crucifixion which makes him live in Christ: 
Therefore, brother, hate completely that you may love completely, depart entirely and 
draw near entirely, despise adoption that you may receive adoption (Rom 8.23, Gal 4.5).  
Stop doing *your+ will and do *your? God’s?+ will, cut yourself off and bind yourself 
[together], put yourself to death and make yourself alive (cf. 1 Sam 2.6), forget yourself 
and know yourself.  And behold you have the works of a monk.582 
 
While he seems generally to have in mind something like the gospel paradox of hating mother, father and 
brother and yet loving one’s neighbour and enemy, Barsanuphius’ language is ambiguous.  It is, for 
example, possible that he means to leave off one’s own will in order to do God’s will.  It is also possible 
that the transformative power of crucifixion to the world falls between the first term of each pair and the 
second.  Between perfect hate and perfect love the monk must develop the tranquillity which John 
ascribed to Barsanuphius.  So also between casting aside and taking up a will, whether one’s own or 
God’s, this same radical transformation must take place which makes one’s own will like that of the 
                                                          
581 Barsanuphius devotes five letters (QR, 111-115) to Andrew’s apparently persistent worry about being forgiven.  In 
them he consistently attempts to re-direct Andrew’s attention away from his own ability (or lack thereof) to procure 
forgiveness toward a profounder appreciation of God’s gifts and the sort of life which responds properly to them. 
582 QR, 112 
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saints.583  This transformation is as painful and complete as amputation and death, yet gives way by the 
mystery of God’s grace to life and wholeness.  Barsanuphius’ language recalls Aelianus’ severance of 
familial relationships, but here the cut goes far deeper.  The monk must cut himself down to nothing—
must die—in order to become whole—carefree, alive, able to love.  Before this transformation, even 
attempting God’s will would come from selfishness, a point which Barsanuphius makes explicitly 
elsewhere.584  After this transformation, even doing one’s ‘own’ will would be merely to do God’s will 
with which, as we shall see below, the monk has replaced his own will.  The excision of will constitutes 
the deepest, most fundamental layer, of the transformative death which leads the monk into true life. 
 
Perception and Relationship 
For the Gazan Fathers, cutting off one’s will means rejecting not only specific desires and hopes 
but even the capacity for judgment by which one chooses to accept or reject those desires.  In this regard 
they both accept and expand on Desert ideas of rejecting the θελήματα—ambiguous objects of will and, 
as I have argued concerning Desert literature, a multiplicity of wills.  For example, John tacitly agrees 
with Basil of Caesarea’s brief commentary on Matthew 23.25-26 and 2 Corinthians 7.1, both of which 
exhort a purification of both interior and exterior aspects of the human person.  Basil comments simply 
‘That it is impossible for one who is attached to any visible thing, or for one held by something which 
draws him even the littlest bit from a command of God, to become a disciple of the Lord.’585  John’s 
correspondent mentions this passage and asks whether to pursue a debt owed him by his relatives and 
which he wishes to give to the poor.  He clearly understands enough to realize that pursuing accounts 
receivable is probably the sort of thing Basil had in mind as attachment to the world.586  John responds 
with his characteristic laconism:  ‘If you do not cut off the fleshly mind and receive a little godly 
impudence [ἀναίδειαν κατὰ Θεόν], you will also fall into people-pleasing.  May God grant you strength 
to do his will in all matters.  Amen.’587  It is hard to know what to make of John’s answer.  I think that, 
since he hopes that this monk will do God’s will in everything, and not his own, that he will not pursue 
matters with his relatives—however noble his own motivations may be, they remain expressions of the 
ἴδιον θέλημα, which, like the ‘fleshly mind’ must be cut off entirely.  John’s response seems to pick up 
                                                          
583 QR, 380 
584 QR, 66 
585 Basil of Caesarea, Regulae morales, 2.2 (PG 31:705AB). 
586 Cf. Basil, RF, 9, and Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic School, 211-212. 
587 QR, 319 
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where Basil’s commentary leaves off.  If a person must be detached from every worldly constraint, he 
must ultimately detach himself even from his own will and that means that he must reject his own 
seemingly noble inclinations.  If done out of one’s own will, even alms for the poor remain an act of ‘the 
fleshly mind.’  Cutting off one’s own will becomes, then, the ultimate response to the ‘opposition of ages’. 
Barsanuphius also connects excision of one’s will to the memory of death and places both in 
service of the new perception.  A monk asks him ‘Be merciful with me, master, and tell me how I can be 
saved in this time, for a thought of terror ascends to my heart.  What therefore do you command that I 
do?’  This monk’s terror recalls those three brothers who visit Sisoes only to be revoked for their undue 
fear of punishment.588  Barsanuphius takes a somewhat different tack: 
At all times if a person can cut off his will in everything, and have a humble heart and 
hold death always before his eyes, he can be saved by the grace of God.  And wherever 
he may be, terror will not master him.  For such a person ‚forgets those things which lay 
behind and stretches toward those which lie before him‛ (Phil 3.13).  Do these things and 
you will be saved without care [ἀμερίμνως] through God.589 
 
Here, Barsanuphius treats excision of will as one of three activities necessary for salvation.590  Humility, 
the cutting-off of one’s will, and memory of death, combine to keep a person from terror at the prospect 
of perhaps not being saved, and compel him to look forward rather than back.  Those things which lie 
behind are, we are tempted to think, past sins and, perhaps more importantly, the power which their 
memory exerts over a person.  The memory of sin could easily lead to fear concerning salvation and, if 
unchecked, to terror and despair.  By remembering death, the monk keeps in mind not only that 
judgment is coming, but that it has not yet happened, and so becomes able to attain virtue, since he 
knows time to be left for progress.  The direct means to virtue is through cutting off his will, as I shall 
discuss below.  And the mode of virtue is always humility.  Barsanuphius combines, I think, the 
paradoxical comfort that ‘dead perception’ can offer in light of mortality and judgment with the means 
and mode of virtue.  If a person can combine these, God’s grace is certainly sufficient to save him. 
In similar ways, Barsanuphius adduces violence toward one’s will as constitutive of Christian 
relationships.  He writes to Andrew about how to treat a ‘neighbouring brother’:   
Concerning how to deal with the brother, whoever desires to please God cuts off his will 
for his neighbour, doing violence to himself.  For it is said, ‚the kingdom of heaven 
                                                          
588 Sisoes 19, discussed in chapter two above. 
589 QR, 232; cf. 554 by John 
590 See similar triads:  QR, 69 (blaming oneself, casting one’s will behind, and holding oneself below all creation) and 
554 by John (obedience, humility, and submission, which John defines as excision of the will). 
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suffers violence, and the violent inherit it‛ (cf. Mat 11.12).  Learn, therefore, how your 
brother finds rest and do it—and you also will find rest before God in Christ Jesus our 
Lord.591 
 
As I noted above, the monk must cut off his will for the sake of God.  Here, though, Barsanuphius uses 
the same formulation regarding one’s neighbour.592  The monk must die not only ‘for God’ but, for all 
others in order ‘to please God.’  His relationship with God is still central, but the monk must extend the 
implications of his ‘death’ to include not only ‘God’s will’ but a neighbour’s pleasure—which, as we have 
seen, can mean enduring a cantankerous abba or washing the feet of those who doubt his existence.  The 
alternative, though, to this behaviour, is to make oneself hateful to the monastery and to cause harm to 
one’s brothers.  As to the community’s response to such a person, John advises Aelianus to ‘bear with 
him, if someone abides in his own will, until he is persuaded or, from his own will, casts himself out.’593  
The community endures the unruly brother for the same reason that monks endure cantankerous 
elders—it is especially with regard to the insolent or obnoxious neighbour that Christ’s command to love, 
played out in the monastic command to obey, becomes a test and an opportunity for virtue.    
  
Excision of the will and all monastic virtues 
For Barsanuphius and John, excision of the will stabilizes not only the monastic practice of death, 
but also the whole constellation of virtues which radiate out from its transformative power.  No one, 
Barsanuphius says, is healed of ‘‚jealousy‛ and strife and ‚disorder and every wicked deed‛ (James 
3.16)’, except by ‘cutting off his own will and struggling not to bother his neighbour.’594  Indeed, to do 
one’s own will is futile, arrogant, and proud.595  Doing one’s own will, though, isn’t really doing one’s 
own will.  It is doing the Devil’s will because in asserting oneself over others and, ultimately, over God, 
one mimics and pleases the Devil who not only did the same but counsels others to follow his futile 
example.  On the other hand, cutting off one’s own will procures the tranquillity which John ascribed to 
                                                          
591 QR, 121; John (173) distinguishes between excision undertaken alone in the cell (where it means struggling against 
fleshly desires) and among others in the coenobium, when it means ‘dying to them and being with them as though not 
being.’  Thus, while ἐκκοπὴ τοῦ θελήματος informs monastic life, whether solitary or communal, it operates always 
within the particular context of renunciation. 
592 ‘Κόπτει τὸ θέλημα αὺτοῦ τῷ πλησίῳ [for πλησίον in crit. ed.+’ here versus ‘κόψαι τὸ ἴδιον τῷ Κυρίῳ’ in QR, 572.  
The syntax is the same, if we accept, as I see no reason we should not, the slight assumption that ‘his will’ is to be 
equated with ‘the personal will.’ 
593 QR, 582 
594 QR, 483 
595 QR, 551 
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Barsanuphius in his ‘cemetery’596 and yet also cultivates κατάνυξις and πένθος.597  While the average 
person may not see life in such stark terms, Barsanuphius and John demonstrate that a monk who has 
‘died’ epistemologically, who contemplating death and judgment sees the world in relation to eternity, 
understands the apocalyptic dualism which underlies the apparent multiplicity of goods and the illusory 
scale of moral and spiritual propriety which describe secular existence.   
In an particularly illustrative exchange, Barsanuphius and John write in succession to a monk 
who does carpentry in Seridos’ monastery and who was troubled by thoughts of discouragement, feeling 
that he made no headway in the coenobium and would be better off ‘practicing silence’.598  First, 
Barsanuphius responds by saying that ‘for such as we who wish to be delivered from evil days and 
frightful afflictions, God gave people two gifts through which they can be saved and delivered from all 
the passions of the ‚old self‛:  humility and obedience.’599  If, Barsanuphius goes on, a monk has humility 
and obedience, ‘not only will the Lord prosper the work you do now with your hands *carpentry+, but he 
will also prosper all your works, for he guards the way of those who fear him and watches over their 
goings-on (cf Ps 120.8).’  If the monk can obtain humility and obedience, then the other virtues will flow.  
But to consider leaving the monastery—the ultimate act of disobedience, since by departing the carpenter 
would, of his own will, remove himself from the relationship of obedience to his abbot—this is an act 
entirely out of keeping with monastic identity.  It is an act of will and, therefore, of pride.  Barsanuphius, 
therefore, rounds on him and says, ‘Die, wretch, to every person!  Say to the thought [of departure], 
‚Who am I?  ‘Earth and ashes’ and a dog.‛’  If the monk can learn to hold himself of no account600 he can, 
with endurance and patience and by means of humble obedience, cast off the ‘old self’.  He can die 
completely only if he cuts off his own will in humility.  Yet it is only cutting off his will that he can obtain 
                                                          
596 QR, 278 
597 QR, 237, 257, 285, 462 
598 This picture emerges from the subscripts to QR, 553 and 554. 
599 QR, 553; Lucien Regnault argues that for Barsanuphius, John, and their disciple Dorotheus, humility and 
obedience are inseparable.  See Regnault, Lucien, ‘Théologie de la vie monastique selon Barsanuphe et Dorothée (VIe 
siècle)’,  in Fr. Gabriel le Maitre (ed.), Théologie de la vie monastique: Études sur la tradition patristique, Théologie 49 
(Paris: Aubier, 1961), 320 
600 The technical word is ἀψἠφιστον and, though not used here, is implied.  Elsewhere, Barsanuphius explicitly 
connects γ῅, σποδός, and ἀψήφιστον (QR, 48 and 101) while John and Barsanuphius both connect cutting off the will 
and counting oneself as nothing (QR, 101 and 278). Barsanuphius and John emphasies ‘τὸ ἀψήφιστον κράτειν’.  
While the idea recalls concepts found in Desert literature, the term only occurs there once, at Pistus 1:  ‘Ὁ κατέχων τὸ 
ἀψήφιστον ἐν γνώσει, ἐπιτελεῖ πᾶσαν τὴν Γραφήν.’  See also, e.g., QR, 48, 94, 138, 259, 600 and 604.   
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humility.  Or, rather, humility properly describes the cutting off of his will.  This, though, is to be 
undertaken through obedience. 
 
Obedience:  A How-To Guide to Excising the Will 
 We have already seen that, for the Desert Fathers, obedience was a primary means of cutting off 
one’s own will and of attaining the various virtues of humility, patience, and discernment.  The Gaza 
Fathers continue in precisely that vein, except that they explicitly bring obedience under the heading of 
death, and this move is consistent with what I have shown of how they treat virtues like the excision of 
the will.  Though obedience is without doubt dear to Barsanuphius,601 John speaks of it more consistently 
and in broader terms, so this section will focus on John’s letters.  
For John and Barsanuphius both, cutting off the will means obeying one’s spiritual father, 
whether abbot or, in the case of abbots and hermits, another monk.602  John’s all-embracing vision of 
obedience holds together ‘excision of will’ for God and for one’s neighbor, since the abbot embodies both.  
As superior over a monk, he represents God whose will the monk expects to find in the abbot’s 
commands.  As a man and fellow-monk, the abbot represents the ‘neighbour’, that vague everyman 
figure whom the monk is called to love and before whom he must humiliate himself.  In this regard, the 
monk must also submit to his brethren as though they too were ‘above’ him, but none of them can 
supersede the abbot whose authority is absolute.  The monk’s new relationships define his life in the 
monastic community, and his endurance there, as we have seen above, is predicated on making and 
keeping peace with one’s brethren until death603 and, perhaps most importantly, on living obediently until 
death.  That is, if a monk endures in community, he endures under an abbot.  Even if he seeks advice 
from another, as many did with Barsanuphius and John, they were still ultimately responsible to their 
own abbots604—and, indeed, Barsanuphius and John support Seridos and his successor Aelianus in every 
matter, even if they privately correct him.605  Endurance until death really means obedience until death, as 
                                                          
601 See, e.g., QR, 21, 34, 61, 549, 551 
602 QR, 249, 253, 288, 318 (cf. N 290 and Syncletica 2), 549; see also Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, The Monastic School, 
152-53. 
603 See, e.g., QR, 690, which is addressed to laypersons. 
604 QR, 551, 555-558 clarify that obedience to one’s abbot is absolute—any deviation Amounts to an attempt to assert 
one’s will, which is antithetical to ascetical progress.  QR, 552, though, provides an important corrective:  spiritual 
elders should be understanding with their disciples. 
605 Concerning different different styles of direction in Gaza, and distinctive self-consciousness of authority, Neyt, ‘Un 
Type d’Autorité’, 343-356; and Perrone, ‘The Necessity of Advice’, 144-147.  Their distinctions are valid but as far as 
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Barsanuphius says:  ‘The one who wishes to become his disciple (cf. Mat 16.24) must cultivate obedience 
unto death.’606  This demand was levelled even at the abbot, Seridos, whose obedience to John ‘until 
death’ provides QR’s editor with a perfect example of denying one’s own will.607  Demands of obedience 
never cease, even for those in authority—there is no ‘freedom from’, only ‘freedom within’ obedience. 
Obedience is a life-long condition whose character is such as to relativize physical death to a 
matter of indifference:  ‘Death is not death outside of sins, but translation from suffering to rest, from 
darkness to ‚unspeakable light‛608 and eternal life.609  John connects this idea back to the Desert ideal of a 
‘good death’, saying, ‘If someone dies in the monastery with humility and obedience, he will be saved 
through Christ.  For Christ gives account for him.’610  One who dies in obedience escapes judgment, 
precisely because, I think, he does not do his own will—he does God’s, and so who would give account to 
the Father but Christ?  This is an idea which will be of tremendous importance for Climacus. 
 
Conclusion:  The Will of God, Prayer and the New Self 
I have argued that the memory of death as judgment and mortality feeds into the Gazan 
conception of ascetic renunciation as a ‘practice’ of death.  This practice, in accordance with Barsanuphius 
and John’s emphases on death as the limit of opportunity and extent of obedience, must be life-long and 
complete.  The practice of death leaves no trace of the man who first entered the monastery.  That man is 
gone.  First to go is the web of relationships which bound him to the world.  He severs his ties with 
family, friends, business and property.  This act of severance can take time (as it did for Aelianus and 
Dorotheus), but it must be complete—no worldly thing may be allowed to grasp at the disciple of Christ. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
obedience goes, the demands remain constant (so Hausherr, ‘Barsanuphe’, col. 1258).  Nevertheless, Barsanuphius 
and John, whatever they said in private to the abbot, publicly supported his authority.  The ‘chain of command’ as 
Havelone-Harper calls it, was maintained with great care and only served to reinforce the absolute value of 
obedience (Disciples 44-55).  See also Chryssavgis, John, ‘Aspects of Spiritual Direction:  The Palestinian Tradition’, in 
Allen, Pauline and Jeffreys, Elizabeth, The Sixth Century:  End or Beginning?, Byzantina Australiansia (Brisbane:  
Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1996), 126-130. 
606 QR, 359:  ‘Ὁ θέλων οὖν μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἕως θανάτου ὀφείλει ποι῅σαι τὴν ὑπακοήν.’  See also QR, 
288, 549 and 551 on obeying one’s abbot (or spiritual father) unto death. 
607QR 188, 570c 
608 Cf. Ps-Macarius, Collectio B, 51.1.7 
609 QR, 218:  ‘ὁ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἁμαρτιῶν θάνατος οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος, ἀλλὰ μετάβασις ἀπὸ θλίψεως εἰς ἀνάπαυσιν, 
ἀπὸ τοῦ σκότους εἰς τὸ ἀνεκλάλητον φῶς καὶ εἰς τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον.’ So also QR, 781:  ‘Ὁ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ 
θάνατος οὐδὲν κακὸν ἔχει.’  Cf. QR, 219 and 223. 
610 QR, 582 
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What begins with relationships culminates—this side of death—in a proleptic, interior, taste of 
heavenly blessings.  For Barsanuphius and John the division of ages is absolute and so the monk must 
wait for death to receive his reward.  Nevertheless, he prepares for death, remembering his own end and 
the judgment which follows, fixing his attention firmly on things which will last rather than on those 
which will be lost at death.  His perception of the world, predicated on the ‘opposition’ and ‘continuity’ 
of ages, differs radically from perception and valuation whose scope is limited to the present life.  
Barsanuphius and John describe this radical transformation as ‘death.’ 
Most especially, though, the monk must completely cast away not only his old relationships but 
the character of those relationships; not only a false valuation of present goods, but the means of making 
it—a monk neither demands nor bargains nor expects anything.  In order to complete his renunciation 
and cultivate a new perception and new kinds of relationships, the monk engages in a daily and life-long 
process of ‘cutting off the will.’ He violently rejects this core part of himself so as to receive God’s will 
instead of his own.  He does so primarily through an obedient relationship with his abbot whom he 
serves in every matter absolutely.  In obedience, he must give up his own judgment and even his own 
desire.  No means are left to the monk to exert himself over others and so he is emptied of the selfish 
desire and deliberation which previously defined his relations with others and his perception of the 
world.   
The practice of death has as its τέλος the emptying of the monk.  Death strips him of his old 
identity, and readies him to receive a new one.  What identity does he receive?  Paradoxically, he gains 
his own, which is also God’s, and the result the Old Men sometimes call a ‘deified’ human because the 
emergent monk accepts and accomplishes God’s will rather than a human one.  To quote Irenée 
Hausherr, ‘<la perfection<consiste dans la charité, qui est le faîte de la maison spirituelle.  Or, aimer c’est 
observer les commandements<renier sa propre volonté pour faire la volonté de Dieu, et, ce qui est plus, 
pour l’accomplir.’611  For the Old Men even the abbot represents God, and it is always God’s will which the 
monk prays may be done on earth as in heaven.  John writes also to the wayward carpenter:   
Brother, already it has been made clear to you that it is not beneficial for you to depart 
from the coenobium.  And now I’ll tell you that if you depart, you will come to a fall.  
Therefore you know what you are doing.  But if you desire in truth to be saved, obtain 
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humility, obedience, and indeed submission—that is, cutting off the individual will—and 
you will live in heaven even when on earth.612 
 
John’s advice draws together a number of threads which I have laid out in the foregoing sections.  His 
closing phrase ‘ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τ῅ς γ῅ς’ is strikingly similar to the Byzantine text of Matthew 6.10 
(the Lord’s Prayer):  ‘<ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τ῅ς γ῅ς.’  The similarity is that of recitation, and is likely 
intentional and certainly natural, given that John is speaking about giving up one’s own will.  The 
corollary request in the Lord’s Prayer is that God’s ‘will be done on earth as it is in heaven.’  John here 
implies that the monk lives ‘in heaven and on earth’ precisely because his life consists in doing not his own 
will but God’s.613  His life becomes the active fulfilment of his own request to God.   
The juxtaposition of earth and heaven corresponds to a juxtaposition of personal and divine wills.  
Barsanuphius claims that cutting off one’s will constitutes the meaning of Christ’s admonition to ‘hate 
one’s own life’ in order to follow him.  How else, he asks rhetorically, ‘does one hate his own life except 
by cutting off his own will for the Lord in all things, saying ‚Not as I will but as you do‛ (Mat 26.39)?’614  
Barsanuphius at another point reminds his correspondent that ‘If someone desires to impose his own will 
he is a son of the Devil, and if someone does the will of such a person, he does the Devil’s will (cf. John 
8.44).’615  The request to be delivered from the Evil One is, therefore, a request for help in excising one’s 
own will.  Cutting off one’s will leads, in turn, to acceptance, rather, of God’s will—provided, that like all 
renunciations, it is done ‘for God.’616  Thus, excision of one’s will enables and enforces the shift in 
perception—the death to all that the world has to offer—expressed in prayer.  The monk who sees with 
‘dead’ perception realizes that only two choices lie before him:  his own will which is earthy and, in 
reality, diabolical; and God’s will, which is heavenly.  The monk who accomplishes his own will becomes 
like Satan; the one who accomplishes God’s becomes a child of God. Between the two possibilities is the 
practice of death by which the monk transitions from the old self, a child of the Devil, to the new self 
created according to God.  The monk who learns to cut off his own will obtains humility, with which goes 
                                                          
612 QR, 554; while here John defines only ὑποταγή, ‘submission’, as excision of will, he elsewhere defines humility in 
the same way (462), and argues that cutting off one’s will leads to ἀμεριμνία (505; so also Barsanuphius, 252). 
613 Cf. QR, 173:  ‘Σὸ δὲ θέλημα τὸ κατὰ Θεόν ἐστι τὸ κόψαι τὸ θέλημα τ῅ς σαρκὸς κατὰ τὸν Ἀπόστολον (cf. Eph 
2.3).’ 
614 QR, 572; cf. Diadochus, Capita, 66 
615 QR, 551; see also 574: ‘Ἐὰν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος παραιτήσηται τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐρχόμενα, παρακούει τοῦ Θεοῦ, 
ζητῶν τὸ ἴδιον θέλημα στ῅σαι, οὕτως γὰρ καὶ οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ζητοῦντες τὸ ἴδιον θέλημα στ῅σαι οὐκ ἠδυνήθησαν 
ὑποταγ῅ναι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ.’ 
616 So Perrone, ‘The Necessity of Advice’, 141-43. 
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compassion for neighbours, refusal to judge others, a recollection of one’s own sin, a constant 
remembrance of one’s own sin and the ability to hold oneself as a mortal and sinful human being who, 
whatever his apparent accomplishments, expects death and judgment and stands in need of God’s grace 
and love. 
 
Old and New Selves 
The foregoing discussion points us to the conclusion that at stake in renunciation is the 
development of a new sort of person—a ‘heavenly’ rather than ‘earthly’ human.  John’s recourse to the 
Lord’s Prayer suggests as much, while Barsanuphius’ language of ‘earthly’ and ‘heavenly’ intentionally 
recalls Paul’s eschatological juxtaposition of Adam and Christ (1 Cor 15.47-56).  Barsanuphius’ use of 
Paul’s typology implies that the ‘heavenly’ self is to be equated with the ‘new’ self, and that, at least to 
some extent, with Christ.  However, rather than speaking of ‘now’ and ‘then’, Barsanuphius transmutes 
Paul’s temporal language into a spatial metaphor.  No futurity delays the acquisition of a ‘heavenly’ self.  
It is not only possible here and now, it is the essential goal of monastic renunciation.  Nevertheless, it 
requires a life-long process of transformation through obedience, self-examination, and repentance.  
Aryeh Kofsky argues that ‘the new social and psychological conditions did not diminish the ascetic’s self-
awareness of sin but actually intensified it and even turned it into a life-long preoccupation.’617  His 
renunciatory ‘death to the world’ merely clarifies the monk’s vision, allowing him to see how deep his 
ties to the ‘earthly’ world run.  He will spend his life cutting them and taking on, little by little, a 
‘heavenly’ lifestyle. 
Given that the monk becomes ‘heavenly’ and does God’s will rather than his own, it is no great 
leap for Barsanuphius to boldly conclude:   
The Son of God became human for you; through him, become God.618  For he wishes it, 
when you do.  And I pray that you be freed from ‚the old self‛ (Rom 6.6, Eph 4.22, Col 
                                                          
617 Kofsky, A., ‘Aspects of Sin in the Monastic School of Gaza’, in Jan Assmann and Guy G. Stroumsa (eds), 
Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions, Studies in the History of Religions 83 (Leiden:  Brill, 1999), 421 
618 Chryssavgis (Letters, 1:208 n. 180) thinks Barsanuphius has in mind Athanasius’ De Incarnatione Verbi 54.3, which 
seems unlikely.  Athanasius’ version reads:  Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.  Barsanuphius 
writes rather more abruptly, free of any technical language:  Ἄνθρωπος γέγονε διὰ σὲ ὁ Τἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, γενοῦ καὶ 
σύ, δι’αὐτοῦ Θεός.  Barsanuphius very rarely makes such an explicit claim of ‘deification’ (cf. 200, 207, and 484) and 
so this statement likely represents traditional material.  The most proximal formulation comes from John 
Chrysostom, who says, discussing Paul’s exhortation to ‘feast’ in 1 Cor 5.8, ‘Σί γὰρ οὐ γέγονεν ἀγαθόν; ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ 
Θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος γέγονε διὰ σέ· θανάτου σε ἀπήλλαξεν, εἰς βασιλείαν ἐκάλεσεν. Ὁ τοιούτων τοίνυν ἐπιτυχὼν 
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3.9).  But you are found in this region.  If, therefore, you fight, the Son of God has given 
you a mind—give him this for the sake of heaven, ‚seeking things above, despising 
things below‛ (Col 3.2).  There he is ‚at the right hand of God‛ (Col 3.1) to where I pray 
that you attain, with all ‚those who love his name‛ (Ps 68.37).’619 
 
Barsanuphius would like to tell the hermit to take on his eschatological and even deified identity right 
now.  But he cannot, because, as we have seen above, the opposition of ages is too strictly delineated in 
Barsanuphius’ thought.  Instead he can suggest a partial solution:  to offer God the ‘mind’, to think, if not 
actually dwell, in heaven.  In doing so, the monk interiorily anticipates his eschatological dwelling which 
will be heavenly—in both mind and body.  Barsanuphius has referred to the ‘old human’—that Pauline 
specter of sinful identity which haunts every Christian.  The practice of death becomes the struggle to be 
freed of ‘the old human’ and so become like Christ.  Or, as Barsanuphius puts it elsewhere,  
<from the ‚alpha‛ to the ‚omega‛, from the beginning state to the perfect, from the 
beginning of the road unto its completion, from the ‚putting off the old man with its‛ 
desires (cf. Col 3.9) to the ‚putting on the new human fashioned according to God‛ (Eph 
4.24), from becoming a ‚stranger upon the‛ sensible ‚earth‛ (cf. Jer 14.8) *to+ becoming a 
citizen of heaven (cf. Phil 3.20) and an inheritor of the noetic earth of the promises (cf. 
Mat 5.5).620 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
σὺ καὶ ἐπιτυγχάνων, πῶς οὐκ ὀφείλεις ἑορτάζειν πάντα τὸν βίον;’ (In epistulam i ad Corinthios, PG 61:125B).  
Barsanuphius could, therefore, be using Chrysostom’s language while channeling Athanasius. 
 
Another likely source is N 81, wherein an old man says, ‘Διὰ σὲ ἐγεννήθη ὁ Χριστὸς, ἄνθρωπε. Διὰ τοῦτο ἦλθεν 
ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα σὺ σωθῇς. Γέγονε παῖς, γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος θεὸς ὤν.’  The language is a little more distant 
(γεννάω instead of γίγνομαι) but the soteriological emphasis is certainly visible—however, it lacks language of 
deification.  It is possible, then, that Barsanuphius has in mind either 1) a different version of this apophthegma or 2) a 
conflation of N 81 with Chrysostom and the already common teaching on θέωσις.   
 
Bitton-Ashkelony (‘Demons and Prayers:  Spiritual Exercises in the Monastic Community of Gaza in the Fifth and 
Sixth Centuries’, VC 57:2 [2003]:  200-221) claims that Barsanuphius honours the typically Byzantine emphasis on 
θεώσις ‘more in the breach than in practice’ (221).  Barsanuphius seldom raises the topic of deification under any 
terms (e.g., QR 199, 200, 207, and 484).  However, Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky (The Monastic School, 93-96) argue 
from the same references that ‘Deification (θέωσις) through mystical experience becomes the ultimate monastic goal.  
It is also understood according to traditional monastic spirituality as an imitation of the Son of God’ (The Monastic 
School, 94).  They are not entirely consistent in this judgment, since later they refer ‘the rare occasions when 
Barsanuphius described the culmination of perfection as the total self-transformation of a monk to a state of theosis’ 
(182).  It is difficult to affirm that deification, for Barsanuphius and John, occurs precisely or only through mystical 
experience, or even what that mystical experience would look like, though in the same pages Bitton-Ashkelony and 
Kofsky are eager to equate it with dream visions and trance states.  I would argue instead that ‘deification’ includes 
an intellectual, a relational, and volitional element—all of which converge in the practice of death. 
 
See on deification in ascetic literature generally Russell, The Doctrine of Deification, 235-262. 
619 QR, 199 
620 QR, 49 
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‘Putting off the old human’ corresponds to the beginning of ascetic struggle—the total renunciation of the 
world, past relationship, goods and desires.621  For this to work, the monk’s gaze passes to heaven only 
through the refractory prism of divine judgment.  Because eternity divides according to actions and 
dispositions developed in the present life, the monk who shifts his gaze and, with it, his hopes, to 
heavenly goods, must live a life worthy of or, at least, in accordance with, those goods.  Thus the mental 
renunciation of the world carries with it a totalizing ethical demand, that the monk actually act in 
accordance with the mind given him by God.622  Because of this, the destruction of the old self—a process 
of dying—is not the end.  It only enables the monk to put on a ‘new human’ self, one which is Godly.  
Barsanuphius considers the ‘new self’ to be more properly human, and certainly more godlike, than the 
old one.  Death, then, leads to the formation of a properly human being—which is a god.  Ceasing to do 
his own will, the monk accomplishes God’s; giving up his blood relations, he is adopted as a son of God.   
 
Perfect Prayer 
The active expression of ‘living death’ and its deifying end consists in prayer.  Bitton-Ashkelony 
and Kofsky argue that prayer, for Barsanuphius, helps form the new person in Christ and, moreover, that 
the Gazan Fathers distinguished between ‘pure’ or ‘perfect’ prayer and more generally usable prayers, 
such as the Trisagion and the ‘Jesus Prayer.’623  Thus, prayer forms a person to undertake ‘perfect’ and 
‘unceasing’ prayer with God.  The spiritual exercise is, as Pierre Hadot argued, both formative and 
expressive of an existential condition.  Along these lines, Barsanuphius gleans ideas of ‘perfect prayer’ 
from Evagrius and, before him, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, absorbing what had become, by his 
day, a classic definition of prayer as ὁμιλία (τοῦ νοῦ) πρὸς (τὸν) Θεόν.624  Barsanuphius, as is his wont 
when dealing with traditional material, modifies this definition somewhat toward a rather more 
practical-sounding concept:  ‘Perfect prayer is speaking undistractedly with God by gathering together all 
the thoughts with the faculties of sense [Προσευχὴ δὲ τελεία, ἐστὶ τὸ λαλ῅σαι τῷ Θεῷ ἀρεμβάστως, ἐν 
τῷ συνάγειν ὅλους τοὺς λογισμοὺς μετὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων].’625  Prayer, Barsanuphius, continues, when 
it has become perfect, ‘says nothing further to God, except ‚Deliver me from the Evil One‛ and ‚Let your 
                                                          
621 On the ‘old self’ see also QR, 14, 71, and 77 
622 Cf. QR, 66, etc. 
623 The Monastic School, 157-182 
624 See the discussion in Note 330 above. 
625 QR, 150; Barsanuphius uses εὐχή and προσευχἠ interchangeably. 
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will be done‛ in me (cf. Mat 6.10).’  The one who prays in this manner ‘stands having his mind before 
God and speaks with him.  He perceives that he prays when he is delivered from distraction and sees that 
his mind rejoices, being enlightened by the Lord.’  Perfect prayer is, then, a completed escape from the 
multiform distractions which the world offers.  Prayer, in the two simple requests to be delivered from 
the Evil One and for God’s will to be done, resolves the apparent multitude of worldly and spiritual 
goods into their proper apocalyptic duality, and, as already discussed, continually opens the monk to 
receiving and accomplishing God’s will.   
To connect this perfect clarity back to death:  prayer effects the changes necessary for a monk to 
arrive at this state of clarity and eschatological focus.  Continuing the passage quoted above, 
Barsanuphius explains that ‘What leads a person to *perfect prayer+ is dying to every person and dying to 
the world and all that is in it [Ὁδηγεῖ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἀπὸ παντὸς 
ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἀποθανεῖν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ].’  Thus, Barsanuphius draws an intimate 
connection between the spiritual exercise of prayer and the practice of death, whose result is ‘perfect 
prayer’ in which the monk, dead to the world and all and everyone it contains, can speak undistractedly 
with God.  Prayer thus expresses the radicality of practices of death regarding both relationships and the 
excision of the will, and it enables the monk to become godly and even divine. 
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IV. AMBIGUITY AND CRUCIFIXION 
To conclude this chapter, I want to show briefly how Barsanuphius and John’s deployment of 
language of death refers especially to Christ’s unique death.  VA’s pointedly participatory representation 
of the holy man constructs spirituality in mimetic terms—Antony becomes the ‘physician of Egypt’ in 
imitation of and by participation in Christ’s work as the ‘physician of the world.’  The imitation of Christ, 
however, is a much less prominent theme in Desert literature, and then really not connected to death.626  
However, a sense that asceticism—and Christianity more generally—means imitating Christ and 
especially his death comes to the fore in Gazan literature.  As Paula de Angelis-Noah says, for the Old 
Men ‘l’idéal ascétique est l’imitation du Christ.’627  Havelone-Harper extends the point to say that ‘the 
monk and lay person pursued the same goal:  the imitation of Christ.’628  For the Old Men, then, monastic 
practice is the means by which one attains a properly Christian identity, and their deployment of the 
language of death reflects their concern with imitation of Christ.   
 
The Ambiguity of Death 
To begin with, we cannot get too comfortable with a facile proclamation of the monk as ‘dead’.  
Death, at least for Barsanuphius, holds as many negative connotations as it does positive ones.  While he 
is certainly fond of describing the monk as one who is dead, or has died to all, he also quotes Luke 9.60 
with some regularity.629  This verse reads:  ‘But Jesus said to him, ‚Let the dead bury their own dead; you 
go and proclaim the kingdom of God.‛’  When Barsanuphius admonishes Theodore it is in these terms—
he conceives monastic withdrawal as departure from the dead.  It functions as a call to press forward in 
repentance and obedience,630 as a command to ignore bodily needs631, and as a reminder of the urgency of 
ascetic progress.  Barsanuphius several times couples Luke 9.60 with a command to ‘wake up’ or a 
warning not to sleep too long.  To Theodore, he argues that a sign of having left the dead is to be awake; 
                                                          
626 Though see N 203.  Cf. Diadochus, Capita, 82; and Gould, Desert Fathers, 183:  these mostly point out that death 
leads to resurrection.  Resurrection, though made possible by Christ, need not be construed as an ‘imitation’ of 
Christ. 
627 De Angelis-Noah, ‘La Méditation de Barsanuphe sur la letter Ἦτα’, 505.  See also Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky, 
The Monastic School, 93-94; Regnault, ‘Théologie de la vie monastique selon Barsanuphe et Dorothée’, 320-21; and 
Neyt, ‘La Formation au monastère’, 156-57 
628 Havelone-Harper, Disciples, 105 
629 John never alludes to Luke 9.60.  It is a favorite only with Barsanuphius and its deployment, therefore, a helpful 
witness to his theology.  On which, see Neyt and de Angelis-Noah, ‘Introduction’, Correspondance, I.1:78-81 
630 QR 4, 37, 68, 495 
631 QR 517 
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so those who have claimed to do so ought to act like it.632  This wake-up call sometimes carries an 
eschatological overtone.  Barsanuphius writes to Euthymius, ‘Remember how the Lord says, ‚Leave the 
dead to bury their own dead.‛  Pay attention to yourself, for those will not deliver you in the fearful hour 
[ἐν τῆ ὥρᾳ τῆ φοβερᾷ+.  Often I say to you, ‚wake from your heavy slumber—for you do not know at 
what hour the Lord comes—so that he will find you prepared‛ (cf. Luke 12.39-40).’633  Here, Barsanuphius 
motivates his exhortation to ‘wake up’ by recourse to death (the ‘fearful hour’) and Christ’s parousia with 
its implied judgment.  Barsanuphius’ usage of Luke 9.60 reinforces the urgency of ascetic withdrawal as 
well as the absolute dichotomy which we have already seen in his language of ‘earth’ and ‘heaven.’   
 What is interesting about this is that Barsanuphius is as happy to use language of ‘the dead’ to 
describe those whose lifestyle ascetics renounce as he is ascetics themselves.  This points us to a crucial 
ambiguity in the language of death.  In terms of ends, it can describe either a heavenly or a worldly, a 
saintly or a sinful existence—death ‘to the world’ and death ‘for the soul’ are both, in different senses, 
death.  Of course, this particularly equivocity can be seen already in Paul’s epistles and allows also for the 
development of alternative definitions of death by Philo, Clement, and Origen.  Like those authors, 
Barsanuphius talks about spiritual ‘death’—a death which comes not to the body but the soul.634 A brief 
comparison of passages by Barsanuphius and Ps-Macarius exemplifies this ambiguity.  Ps-Macarius 
describes the soul no longer bothered by passions in the following vivid terms: 
It is as if someone dies in a city:  neither does he hear the voice of those there or the 
chatter of the sounds, but he has died once and for all and is transported to another place, 
where there are no sounds or cries of the city.  So also the soul, when it is sacrificed and 
dies, in which city it resides and lives—the city of the evil of the passions, neither does it 
hear the voice of the thoughts of darkness.  No longer does it hear in itself the chatter and 
cry of vain thought and perturbation of spirits of darkness<Let us strive now also to be 
sacrificed by his power and to die to the age of the wickedness of darkness<635 
 
In this passage Ps-Macarius establishes the insensibility of the corpse as analogous to ascetics shutting 
their senses to the thoughts and impulsions of the passions and the demons.  Barsanuphius uses a 
                                                          
632 QR, 130, 138; Poemen 124 
633 QR, 138 
634 QR, 229, 230, 233 (using the language of ‘second death’ from Revelation), 354, 379, 501 (where he adduces anger 
and lust as the twin causes of death), and 553.  Cf. Poemen 
635 Ps-Macarius, Collectio H, 1, ll. 182-192; so also Evagrius, Spiritibus, 3 (PG 79:1148B):  ‘Ἐξολόθρευσον ἐκ σοῦ πᾶν 
ἔμπνεον κακίας, καὶ μέλη σαρκός σου νέκρωσον ἰσχυρῶς. Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ ἀνῃρημένος πολέμιος, οὐ παρέξει σοι 
φόβον, οὕτω νεκρωθὲν σῶμα οὐ ταράξει σου τὴν ψυχήν. Οὐκ οἶδε πυρὸς ὀδύνην σῶμα νεκρὸν, οὐδὲ ἐγκρατὴς 
ἡδονὴν ἐπιθυμίας νεκρᾶς.’ 
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strikingly similar image to a precisely opposite end.  He tells a hermit who has asked ‘how someone 
comes to self-control and how he distinguishes physical infirmity from demonic and how much he ought 
to drink’: 
<I consider that no one can discern what you request of me, save the one who comes up 
to this measure.  For a living human has a sense of hotness and of coldness in those 
things which are offered to it—but a dead body has no sense of these things, for its sense 
is destroyed.  Likewise, someone who learns them comes to the measure of 
understanding of letters and knows to discern them—but someone who neither studies 
them neither comes to them, even if he asks and hears ten thousand times what the 
letters are is still unable to grasp their meaning.  So also with what you have asked:  
however much you say to someone, it is more necessary to gain the experience.636 
 
To understand the proper limits of even basic ascetic practices—like self-control in one’s diet, or real 
versus false physical exhaustion—requires discernment only gained from lived experience.  Thus, the 
image of the senseless corpse serves very nicely as a negative example, since its insensibility, like the 
ignorance of an illiterate, precludes the possibility of discernment.  Barsanuphius is, therefore, as 
comfortable using death to caution ascetics as he is modeling their monastic life on it.   
 Barsanuphius, at least, reminds us that death remains a highly ambiguous image and certainly a 
precariously perched conception of the ascetic life.  There is a fine line between the ‘τύπον νεκροῦ’ and 
‘the dead’ who ‘bury their own dead.’  Barsanuphius never explains the distinction, but the ambiguity 
appears to be inherent to the language of θάνατος and, especially, the νεκρός. 
 
Bearing the Death of Christ 
 What, then, is the distinction between good and bad metaphorical deaths?  It is worth recalling 
John’s description of Barsanuphius cell as his ‘cemetery.’  He claims that there Barsanuphius ‘rests from 
all passions.  For he has died completely to sin, and his cell in which he has been captured [ζεζώγρηται] 
as in a grave, for the name of Jesus.’637  Barsanuphius has not simply died, but died ‘for the name of 
Jesus.’  Barsanuphius dies for Jesus’ sake—he dies a kind of martyr’s death.  But, more generally, his 
death is contextualized in relation to Jesus.  He does not undertake a self-serving asceticism, but, rather, 
seeks to offer himself to Christ.  We must view the Gazan deployment of ‘practices of death’ in view of 
service to Christ.  For example, John offers some illuminative advice ‘περὶ ὑπομον῅ς καὶ ὑπακο῅ς.’  He 
                                                          
636 QR 154; cf. Evagrius (Rationes, PG 40:1257A), who draws a negative connotation from the image of a νεκρός. 
 
637 QR, 142; so Brown, Body and Society, 219 
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says that ‘Whoever seeks life eternal, should seek to keep Christ’s word ‚unto shedding of blood‛ (cf. 
Heb 12.4) in cutting off the personal will.  For no one seeking the personal will, which is displeasing to 
God, has a portion with Christ.’638  While John’s language certainly recalls the phenomenon of Christian 
martyrdom, more generally he is arguing that the fundamental practice of ‘cutting off one’s will’ is an act 
of obedience unto death.  The metaphorical death to which the ascetic submits becomes, therefore, the 
limit of his obedience to and, more than that, his participation in Christ.  Christ is the reference for ascetic 
practices and, therefore, the criterion by which to determine whether one’s ‘death’ is beneficial or merely 
an expression of damnation. 
 We may go further, though and say that the ascetic’s ‘death’ is an act of imitation of Christ 
performed out of obedient devotion.  To explain, Barsanuphius writes to John of Beersheba at a point 
when John has reprimanded Seridos for the latter’s administration of the monastery.  Barsanuphius 
responds with a scathing rebuke, telling John to recall that he is ‘earth and ashes’, that he should weep 
and mourn rather than slander, that he should never forget the abbot’s position of responsibility for and 
authority over him, that he should count himself as nothing, and much more.  Finally, Barsanuphius 
concludes:   
‘Pass over from the world; mount the cross.  Be lifted from the earth (cf. John 3.14, 12.34), 
‚shake off the dust from your feet‛ (Mat 10.14).’639 
 
We have already seen the language of ‘passing over from the world’—it is the language of dying to 
oneself.  Here, though, Barsanuphius describes that passage in terms of an ascent to the cross and escape 
from hostile territory (the reference to Mat 10.14).  Christ’s crucifixion provides, here, the motive, the 
model, and the means of ascetic practice:  to become new one must die Christ’s death.  Another time, a 
layman asks Barsanuphius how to ‘worthily give thanks to God’.640  Barsanuphius responds eloquently:  
‘If people give thanks and gifts for sensible *αἰσθητῶν] and corruptible deeds, what can we possibly offer 
to the one crucified for us, if we wish to repay him?  We ought to endure unto death for him.’641  Imitation 
of Christ is, Barsanuphius argues, the only possible means of worthy thanksgiving.  He also implies that 
all the enormities of monastic practice and in particular its focus on ‘dying’ to oneself and the world, is 
                                                          
638 QR, 583 
639 QR, 48; see also 88, 112, wherein Barsanuphius describes the monk’s severance from ‘the old self’ in Pauline terms 
of crucifixion, whether of oneself (Gal 6.14) or the flesh (Gal 5.24).  Cf. 351. 
640 Perhaps taken from Tobit 13.11, more likely the phrase is liturgical, being part of the ‘Litany of Thanksgiving’ and 
the priest’s prayer of thanksgiving after the Eucharist. 
641 QR, 404.  For the theme of thanksgiving more generally see 6, 20, 29, 70, 114-116, 137b, 182, and 199. 
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founded on a principle not of legalism or fear, but instead on gratitude for the indescribably great gift 
which God gave humanity on the cross.  Jesus’ crucifixion which salvifically draws all humankind to 
himself demands and describes the ‘death’ which the monk must die.   
 At the heart of the practice of death, we have seen, is the excision of will.  This too the Old Men 
conceive as an imitation of Christ.  Indeed, Barsanuphius explains to Dorotheus that Matthew 16.24 
(‘Whoever desires to follow after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross’) means ‘to cut off the 
will in all things and not to think of oneself as someone.’642  John explains the same verse in terms of 
‘obedience unto death.’643  Crucifixion, then, comes to refer specifically to the core practices of monastic 
‘death.’  Moreover, both Barsanuphius and John cite John 6.38 (‘I have come down from heaven not to do 
my own will but the will of the one sending me’) as an explanation of obedience and the excision of 
will.644  It is an interesting facet of Gazan theology that Jesus the teacher and giver of commandments is 
also the model of obedience.  The Old Men derive this conception from their scriptural formation and, as 
François Neyt and Paula de Angelis-Noah write, ‘typologie s’oriente vers la croix du Christ qui est le 
symbole central du solitaire de Gaza, pèlerin sur les chemins de cette terme.’645  For the Great Old Men, 
obedience to one’s abbot—obedience even and, perhaps especially, unto death—is ultimately both 
justifiable and comprehensible as an imitation of Christ’s obedience to the Father in the incarnation, 
though with particular reference to his obedience unto death.   
This latter aspect of Christ’s life both Barsanuphius and John, like Basil of Caesarea before them, 
draw from Philippians 2.8.  The Great Old Men draw on Paul’s eulogy of Christ to portray endurance 
unto death as singularly Christ-like and use the characterization to underpin various virtues, of which 
thanksgiving to God is foremost.646  Thus, Jesus’ death exemplifies obedience and endurance,647 certainly, 
but it also models humility.648  According to John, bearing one’s cross actually brings a monk to ἡσυχία.649  
Finally, humility, obedience, and endurance find their personal confluence in Christ’s kenotic love.  
Barsanuphius sums up for Euthymius 
                                                          
642 QR, 257 
643 QR, 359 
644 QR, 150 (by Barsanuphius) and 288 (by John); cf. Kofsky, ‘Renunciation of Will’, 335-36 
645 Neyt and de Angelis-Noah, ‘Introduction’, Correspondance, I.1:88 
646 QR, 70 
647 See., e.g., QR 359 and 551 where the language of obedience μέχρι θανάτου echoes Paul’s language in Phil 2.8; cf. 
also 251, where Barsanuphius argues that obedience makes humans like Christ. 
648 QR, 455; cf. 307 which makes the same claim without reference to Phil 2.8. 
649 QR, 314 
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...our great and heavenly doctor gave us cures and balms...Above all he gave us humility 
which banishes every vainglory and ‚every exalted thing which sets itself against the 
knowledge of the glory of the Son of God‛ (2 Cor 10.5); obedience which extinguishes all 
the ‚flaming darts of the enemy‛ (Eph 6.16650); and cutting off our will in all things for 
our neighbour...But the great balm, strengthening ‚all the members‛ (cf. Rom 12.24, 1 
Cor 12.12) and ‚healing every disease and malady‛ (Mat 4.23), he gave us love like his 
own.  For he himself became our example.  For it says, ‚He humbled himself, becoming 
not simply obedient, but even unto death‛ (Phil 2.8).  And ‚laying down his own life for 
us‛ (1 John 3.16), he taught us, saying ‚Love one another, just as I have loved you‛ (John 
13.34).651 
 
Each virtue offers a cure for something, but all the virtues come together in love.  Likewise, in Phil 2.8, 
Deutero-Paul draws together humility and obedience in his description of Christ’s actions.  But 
Barsanuphius must explicate their unity as love, which he accomplishes by referring the interpretation of 
Phil 2.8 to John’s gospel where love is expressed through self-giving in death for others. 
 
Conclusion 
Barsanuphius takes up the metaphorical references which death holds for ascetic practice and 
moulds them to crucifixion.  Revolving the constellation of ascetic practices around Christ’s life, 
Barsanuphius distinguishes a spiritually beneficial ‘death’ from a state which simply expresses perdition.  
The ascetic dies out of obedience to Christ and in thanksgiving for his death.  However, the ascetic’s 
‘death’ becomes a means of imitating Christ—to ‘die’ for Christ means being ‘crucified.’  By such 
language, Barsanuphius contextualizes ascetic practices and ideals within an incarnational framework.  
Thus ‘death’—and particularly that obedient form of death which excises the will—underpins the 
Christlike virtues of obedience, humility, and love.   
Barsanuphius, however, goes somewhat further, turning to the existential radicality which 
attainment of those virtues implies:  a slow, painful death on the cross—but one whose very instrument 
becomes the means of a paradoxical victory.  The cross works wonders, but the greatest wonder is that it 
not only kills but that, since crucifixion is a death ‘to sin,’ the cross brings the monk to resurrection. 
If you wish, therefore, not to limp [μὴ χωλεύειν], take the staff of the cross and affix your 
hands to it and die, and you will no longer limp [οὐκέτι χωλαίνεις], for a corpse does 
not limp.  And if you have this staff, you have no need of a door-keeper.  For with this 
                                                          
650 Again, Barsanuphius has substituted another virtue for Deutero-Paul’s ‘shield of faith.’  In 461, Barsanuphius 
substitutes ‘weeping’ and here ‘obedience.’  It is illuminating of his hermeneutic that he sometimes pastes virtues 
near to his own heart into a Pauline framework of apocalyptic ‘spiritual warfare’. 
651 QR, 61 
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staff you may pursue not only the dogs, but also the leader of the beasts, the ‚roaring 
lion‛ (1 Pet 5.8)...And whoever is nailed to this rod is delivered completely from the 
hemorrhagic flow.  For dying he dies to sin.  And what hope is expected after these 
things except the third-day resurrection?  It is enough for the one crucified to be raised 
with Jesus.652 
 
The ascetic dies, yes, but not just any death.  This death makes a person whole—no longer ‘limping.’  
Barsanuphius here magnificently inverts Jesus’ admonition at Mark 9.45, that ‘καλόν ἐστίν σοι εἰσελθεῖν 
εἰς τὴν ζωὴν χωλόν, ἥ τοὺς δύο πόδας ἔχοντα βληθ῅ναι εἰς τὴν γέενναν.’  We have seen how, not 
only for Antony and the Desert Fathers, but for Barsanuphius and John as well, the prospect of judgment 
devalues temporal goods, health, even one’s own life.  Barsanuphius does not contradict that line of 
thought in this passage.  Rather, he spiritualizes the ‘limp’ and argues that through death, whatever 
physical suffering it may entail, one can become a whole being.  Death is not the end for the monk who 
imitates Christ’s death through renunciation and obedience.  Not even resurrection is the end.  The end—
if I may even call it that—is eternal life:  
Depart from oldness that you may find newness.  And believe in Christ that you may be 
crucified with him and killed with him and buried with him and raised luminously with 
him and caught up gloriously from the earth with him and live eternally with him.’653 
 
                                                          
652 QR, 61 
653 QR, 209 
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4. THE LADDER OF DIVINE ASCENT 
 
 
 
 
 
He thought to keep himself from Hell 
By knowing and by loving well. 
His work and vision, his desire 
Would keep him climbing up the stair. 
 
At limit now of flesh and bone, 
He cannot climb for holding on. 
‚I fear the drop, I feel the blaze— 
Lord, grant thy mercy and thy grace.‛ 
       
---Wendell Berry, ‘1989, IV’ 
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 Thus far this study has traced the development and elaboration of a ‘memory of death’ and a 
‘practice’ of death among Greek Christian ascetics.  The memory of death incorporates contemplation of 
mortality and judgment.  Contemplation of judgment means fear of punishment and hope of beatitude, 
and the two operate best together.  At the same time, not all authors surveyed think so highly of these 
practices, some out of mistrust of memory itself, some on account of possibly extreme results.  
Nevertheless, the literature’s trajectory is to view memory of death as integral to asceticism. 
 Language of death has also been used as a conceptual framework to describe the ascetic life as a 
whole.  This did not arise in VA, though Antony’s admitions about ‘daily dying’ hint at it.  Some Desert 
Fathers speak of ‘dying’ to oneself or others, but others display ambivalence about the language of death.  
This is because, when the Desert Fathers describe asceticism as ‘death’ they rely implicitly on an 
optimistic assessment of what renunciation can accomplish.  The Gaza Fathers take up ideas common 
among in the Desert—severance of relationships, contemplation of spiritual things and the denial of one’s 
own will by means in obedience—and speak of these as ways of ‘dying.’  Barsanuphius, following Basil’s 
Asceticon, sees death as the limit of withdrawal and, especially, obedience.  For them also the opposition 
of the present life and the next, found among the Desert Fathers, is balanced against an important 
continuity of spiritual relationships.  The conceptual material for this ‘continuity’ can be found as far back 
as VA’s visions of death.  The Gaza Fathers, I note, do not resolve the tensions which emerged in Desert 
literature, and do not speak at all to the ambivalences found there.  Rather, in their tacit 
acknowledgement of the ambiguity of death, they hint at the same kind of mistrust found earlier. 
 As we turn to John Climacus, we have elaborated a trajectory in traditional which increasingly 
utilizes language of death to motivate, develop, and describe the aims and ideals, as well as the practices, 
of Christian asceticism.  Rough edges remain—there is as much ambiguity to death and ambivalence 
towards its achievements as there is utilization of its language and practice. 
 In this final chapter, I will argue that, for Climacus, death is not one among many means of 
cultivating the ascetic life.  Nor is it beholden to an undue optimism.  Rather, he draws on, moulds, and 
even harmonizes the themes and material laid out above to craft a comprehensive vision of asceticism as 
imitation of Christ.  I shall argue first, that his vision takes shape through an engagement with time made 
possible by the memory of mortality and judgment.  I will then show that the monk works out this 
engagement as a practice of death in obedience.  Finally, I will show that Climacus conceives of monastic 
identity as an imitation of Christ through the practice of death, and that this lifestyle incorporates 
repentance which allows for failures and earthy realism about what is and is not achievable for ascetics.    
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I. THE LADDER AND ITS AUTHOR 
John of Sinai 
 Though we have discussed him already at some length in the Introduction, it would be good to 
introduce our author.  This is difficult, though, since little is known with any kind of certainty of the man 
who wrote the Ladder.  He is a shadowy figure, remembered more for his writing than anything else.  
Even his commonest epithet, Κλίμακος, merely means ‘of the Ladder’, suggesting that the most important 
thing to know about John is not where or when he lived or what profession he held but that he wrote the 
Ladder.   
Our primary source is a biography written by one Daniel of Raithou, about whom we know 
nothing—save that he was a monk at the monastery of Raithou.654  As Chryssgavis puts it, ‘Daniel writes 
as an eyewitness, or at the very least as a contemporary...Yet we cannot be entirely sure of this; after all, 
in his Life, which resembles an edifying eulogy, Daniel too is imprecise.’655  With Chryssavgis’ caveat in 
mind, we can nevertheless use Daniel’s piece to trace a career for John Climacus from its pages.  He came 
to Sinai at sixteen—likely from Egypt, with at least some education.656  When John arrived, Sinai had 
already a long history and had become a thriving spiritual centre.  Christians had lived in the wilderness 
there since at least the Decian persecution (ca. 254).657  When Egeria visited Sinai at the end of the Fourth 
century, she found a monastic centre well-equipped for pilgrims.658  Various ascetics travelled to the 
wilderness for solitude, and after the ‘devastation of Scetis’ many Scetiote monks settled in Sinai.659  By 
                                                          
654 Vita Joanni cognomento Scholastici, vulgo Climaci, in Rader’s edition, reprinted in PG 88:596-608, with other 
material—miracle accounts (608-09) and the Menological entries (609-612); and in Societé des Bollandistes, Acta 
Sanctorum, vol. 3:  March, part 2, (Antwerp:  Jacob Meursium, 1668), 834F-838F.  I will use PG 88, and refer both to 
biographical material and the Ladder itself only by section and column number. 
655 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 15 
656 Though Daniel admits ignorance of John’s birthplace (596A), he does tell us that John was sixteen (597A) when he 
came to Sinai. 
657 Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica 6.42.4 
658 Itinerarium Egeriae, 1.1-1.5 
659 The narratives associated with Nilus of Ancyra (PG 79:589-694) describe semi-eremitic monks living in seclusion 
on Sinai in probably the early Fifth century.  Ammonius’ described Christians killed by Saracens in raids on Sinai:  
Lewis, Agnes Smith (ed. and trans.), The forty martyrs of the Sinai  desert:  and the story of Eulogios from a Palestinian 
Syriac and Arabic palimpsest (Cambridge:  CUP, 1912), 1-24.  However, Chitty gives good reason for mistrusting the 
historicity of either account, locating them instead as examples of Sixth-century hagiography, what he calls ‘the mood 
of its time’ (Desert a City, 170-71). 
 
On Scetiote colonization, see Cronius 5 (Joseph of Peleusia lived in Sinai), Nicon 1 (who lived at Sinai), Netras 1 
(Netras lived in a cell at Sinai), and Silouan 5 (Silouan also lived at Sinai).  Cf. Sisoes 17, 26; Megethius 2.  On which 
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the time Justinian ordered the building of a castrum (in this case a fortified coenobium) at the base of 
Gebel Musa, the mountain had long been associated with Mosaic Sinai and Elijah’s Horeb.660  The 
monastery there was called ‘Βάτος,’ since it was dedicated to the Mother of God of the Burning Bush.661   
At Sinai, John became disciple to a monk named Martyrius662 who, four years later, tonsured him 
in the chapel atop Gebel Musa.663  John lived for either three or nineteen years under Martyrius' direction 
in a cell near the central castrum.664  This type of life, ‘practicing stillness with one or two others,’ John 
would term hesychastic and would laud above either eremitic or coenobitic lifestyles, even while affirming 
the validity of each.665  Indeed, John experienced firsthand all three forms of monastic life.  After 
Martyrius’ death, John moved further up the mountainside and became a hermit in a cave near Tholas.666  
There he dwelt for forty years, Daniel tells us, in what solitude he could, as his reputation increased 
among the brethren and visitors to the monastery.  John received visitors, gave counsel, worked signs, 
and, above all, became ‘a font of tears.’667  Daniel draws particular attention to this detail, probably 
because John placed so much importance on πένθος and δάκρυα in the Ladder. The length of John’s 
sojourn is less historically precise than religiously allusive, recalling Moses’ forty days atop Sinai (Exod 
24.18f), Elijah’s sojourn there (3 Kgds 19.8) and the Israelites’ forty years in the wilderness of Sinai (Num 
32.13).  During this time John accepted a disciple—aptly named Moses—to live with him.  Eventually, 
John was persuaded to become abbot of the monastery, and he dwelt there in old age—though it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
see Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 2-7.  Cf. also Van Parys, Michel, ‘Abba Silvain et ses disciples.  Une famille 
monastique entre Scetis et la Palestine a la fin du IVe et la premier moitie du Ve siècle’, Irenikon 61 (1968), 313-30 and 
451-80. 
660 Sinai and Horeb refer to the same mountain. 
661 Procopius, De Aedificiis, 5.8.2-10, in G. Wirth (post J. Haury), Procopii Caesariensis opera omnia, vol. 4 (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1964); cf. Eutychius of Alexandria (Saeid Ibn-Batriq), Annales, PG 111:1071-1072.  Eutychius is perhaps more 
reliable than Procopius:  Dahari, Uzi, Monastic Settlements in South Sinai in the Byzantine Period:  The Archaeological 
Remains, IAA Reports 9 (Jerusalem:  Israeli Antiquities Authority, 2000), 56. 
662 608B 
663 608B-C 
664 597B; Daniel’s language is ambiguous.  Ware (‘Introduction’, 4) reads it as ‘when John was nineteen years old’, 
while Chryssavgis assumes that ‘nineteen’ refers to the number of years that John spent with Martyrius (John 
Climacus, 17).  Both are possible, though the latter seems to have been preferred by the compilers of the Menaion who 
assume John to have died at the age of eighty.  The forty years at Tholas followed by an estimated five as abbot 
would give precisely that age.  If we follow Ware, then either the Menaion is wrong (entirely possible, since it is also 
likely wrong about John’s era) or sixteen years need to be accounted for. 
665 §1, 641D-644A 
666 597C 
667 597C-600C; an alternative account is given at 608C-612A, which speaks of numerous miracles.  Daniel notes that 
John was renowned as a healer (604C) but is more interested in his pastoral prowess. 
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possible that, at the end of his life, he returned to solitude.668  Somewhere in all this, John found time for 
reading both spiritual and secular, and at least some rhetorical training.669 
The writing of the Ladder dates in all likelihood to John’s abbasial period.  If the correspondence 
between John Climacus and John, abbot of Raithou, is genuine,670 then Climacus was asked in his capacity 
as abbot and with his experience as a shepherd of souls, to give advice to another abbot for use in his 
monastery.  Indeed, the supplement called Pastor is clearly written from one abbot to another, and so we 
may think of the Ladder as the work of one in authority, but who also had spent most of his life, sixty-one 
years, in the monastic trenches, and so he draws not only on his own wide learning and rhetorical 
education but also on a lifetime of experience as both disciple and guide.671 
Throughout John’s deceptively simple life, the terrain both physical and spiritual of Sinai—the 
history of desert withdrawal and wandering written into the fierce landscape of Gebel Musa—shaped his 
character and his thought.  Traditionally, scholars have understood Climacus as having come from Egypt 
and having at least travelled to Alexandria.  This is evidenced by his remarkable memory for details of a 
‘Great Monastery’ which, based on two allusions to Alexandria, scholars have believed to have been 
located near that city.672  There are, at most, two places in John’s world:  Egypt and Sinai.  Marie-Joseph 
Pierre has recently argued eloquently, though not always persuasively, that there is really only one place:  
Sinai.673  Pierre attempts to recast each scene which might suggest Alexandria or Egypt—especially those 
of the ‘Great Monastery’ (§4) and the ‘Prison’ (§5)—as being veiled references to the Vatos Monastery 
itself.674  Pierre’s argument is speculative, but he is right that Climacus was not simply a resident of Sinai: 
he was formed there and his life of discipleship, solitude, and pastorship, has as its reference a world 
bounded by the spiritual and historical evocations of the Sinaite wilderness wherein he sought the 
                                                          
668 605B-608A; cf. the other account at 609A-B. 
669 Once, scholars like Krumbacher assumed that Climacus was unlettered.  However, not only his biography but also 
the Ladder, of which more below, testify to his learning and skill as a writer and divine.  Most recently, Johnsén 
argues at length that the Ladder is a highly structured example of late antique rhetorical argumentation, and that 
Climacus wrote in the ‘Jewelled style’ advocated by Longinus (Reading John Climacus, 30-195).  Cf. Ware, 
‘Introduction’, 10; and Bogdanovic, ‘Jean Climaque dans la literature byzantine’, 221-22.   
670 In PG 88: 623A-628C; Bogdanovic picks this correspondence out as authentic (‘Jean Climaque dans la literature 
byzantine’, 217). 
671 So Ware, ‘Introduction’, 6-10; Johnsén, Reading John Climacus, 23-25; cf. Völker, Scala Paradisi, 153 
672 See, e.g., Chryssavgis’ extravagant claim that the Ladder provides ‘significant historical information about the 
cenobite monasteries in Alexandria<’ (John Climacus, 19). 
673 Pierre, Marie-Joseph, ‘Unité de lieu dans la vie et l’œuvre de Jean Climaque’, in Pensée grecque et sagesse d’Orient, 
455-475 
674 Pierre, ‘Unité de lieu’, 458-60, 463-67 
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‘spiritual Jerusalem.’675  This world pervades the Ladder, as John deploys there images of Israel’s flight 
from Egypt and its sojourn in the wilderness, as well as Moses’ theophany atop Sinai.676   
  
Dates 
 Assigning John to a specific place in history brings us into a realm of silence and speculation.  
That is, we can assign a likely range of dates based on where he is not mentioned, but we have very little 
in the way of positive evidence.  Once upon a time, John was assigned by tradition and scholarship alike 
to the Sixth century.677  The last century saw a dramatic shift in thinking, beginning with Nau’s 
groundbreaking work on the Narrationes which he ascribed to Anastasius of Sinai and dated to 650 or 
thereafter.678  Combining this dating with contents of Narratio 32 concerning ‘John the Sabaite’, Nau 
suggested that the Sabaite was, in fact, Climacus and gave the date of his death as 649, based on internal 
evidence from the Narrationes.679  Nau’s suggestion has not met with universal acceptance.  Chitty, for 
example, argues in his always persuasive way that John the Sabaite could not be John Climacus.  Rather, 
he reads Narratio 34—which tells the story of a monk Martyrius bringing a disciple to John the Sabaite 
and the Sabaite washing his feet and prophesying that this young disciple would be abbot of Sinai—as 
concerning John Climacus.680  In that case also Narratio 6 likely concerns Climacus and would suggest that 
Anastasius, and not Martyrius, actually tonsured John.681  In either case, Anastasius’ narratives are crucial 
to understanding John’s life.  However, even then Chitty allows tacitly that Nau may be correct in dating 
Climacus’ death to 649.682   
                                                          
675 §3, 662B and §29, 1152A 
676 See, e.g., Climacus’ demand for a spiritual director ‘in every way like Moses’ who will lead those ‘fleeing Egypt 
and Pharaoh’ and who wish to ‘turn to flight the Amalek of passions’ (§1, 633D-636A). 
677 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 42 wrongly claims that the Menaion entry for Climacus dates his death to 603 CE.  
Marginal notes in Acta Sanctorum (3.2:834F-838F) give the year 580 (835B, based on correlations with Saba’s death in 
531).  Nevertheless, Karl Krumbacher, in his Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des 
oströmischen Reiches (527-1453) (München:  Beck, 1897), probably on the basis of menological passages, gave Climacus‘ 
dates as ca. 525-600 (143). 
678 Nau, F., ‘Le texte grec des récits du moine Anastase’, Oriens Christianus 2 (1902), 58-89 
679 Nau, ‘Le texte grec’, 79 n. 6 
680 Chitty, Desert a City, 172-73 
681 So Pierre, ‘Unité de lieu’, 460-61. 
682 Chitty, Desert a City, 178 n. 36 
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There is no other direct testimony to the life of John Climacus.  It is telling that he is not 
mentioned by Moschus in PS—which means he likely postdates Moschus’ death in 634.683  Yet, that being 
said, Climacus makes no mention of the Arab invasions which swept through Sinai and into Egypt in 
640.684  The only hard evidence we have on either side is that Climacus mentions Justinian’s castrum, 
which places the Ladder after 566-67;685 and that he predates the Sixth Ecumenical Council in 680.  
Between those years all is silence and contradiction in external sources.  Climacus himself seems to be 
concerned to defend a dyothelite view of Christ, suggesting that he was at least aware of the Monothelite 
Controversy and, therefore, a contemporary of Maximus the Confessor.686  In the absence of further 
evidence, we can only speculate within these years.687  While a late sixth-century dating is possible, it is 
not, on balance, very likely.  While scholars not accepted Nau’s theory whole, they have not departed far 
from his suggestion of a range of 579 CE – 649 CE.  Bogdanovic, for example, argued for a death 
sometime after 654 CE.688  Chryssavgis argues in favour of a later death—659 or even 679 CE.689  I will 
content myself here with a admitting the likelihood of a Sixth-century milieu and reiterate as plausible a 
range from c. 579 CE to c. 659 CE. 
  
                                                          
683 Petit, noting John’s alternative epithet of ‘Scholasticus’, and linking that to Sophronius’ description of one ‘John the 
Scholasticus’ (PS 102), argued that Climacus was born no later than 579 CE (‘Saint Jean Climaque’, col. 692). 
684 However, this is not decisive.  Heinz Skrobucha (Sinai, photographs by George Allan, trans. Geoffrey Hunt 
[London:  OUP, 1966], 57-60) notes that we possess little information about Sinai between the Arab invasion and the 
Crusades save that the monks were able to secure good relations with the Mameluk rulers in Cairo. 
685 §6, 797A; 7, 812B 
686 Chitty, Desert a City, 174; Ware, ‘Introduction’, 18-19; Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 44-45.  The passage is §6, 793B-C:  
‘Δειλιᾷ Φριστὸς θάνατον, οὐ τρέμει, ἵνα τῶν δύο φύσεων τὰ ἰδιώματα σαφῶς ἐμφανίσῃ.’  This passage resembles 
Maximus the Confessor’s treatment of Gethsemane at, for example, Opusculum 3 (PG 91:48C).  It is, therefore, 
plausible that Climacus draws the distinction of ‘fear’ and ‘terror’ from the dyothelite supposition that Christ had to 
align his human will with his divine will—thus, though he was afraid of death (and, therefore, did not will it 
himself), he was not unduly terrified (and, therefore, subjected his human fear to the divine will by which he would 
die).   
 
In Seventh-century context, such a claim suggests that Climacus is responding to ‘monothelite’ claims.  The 
Monothelite Controversy was confined roughly to the years between 633, when objections were first vocally raised; 
and 680-81, when ‘monothelitism’ (the doctrine that Christ had only one, divine, will) and ‘monenergism’ (the 
doctrine that he had only one ‘theandric’ activity or ‘energy’) were formally condemned and the dyothelite 
Chalcedonians triumphed.  It was for the sake of this that Maximus the Confessor suffered so much before dying in 
exile in 662.  If Climacus is, in fact, making a subtle point about the two wills of Christ, then this would militate for a 
date of composition after 631 (at the very earliest), when Cyrus, a monothelite, was appointed Patriarch of 
Alexandria, and ‘monothelite’ ideas began to be propagated vigorously in Egypt.  See Chitty, Desert a City, 174. 
687 Pace Müller, Das Konzept des geistlichen Gehorsams, 21-56. 
688 Bogdanovic, ‘Jean Climaque dans la literature Byzantine’, 216-17 
689 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 44 
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II. THE QUEST FOR UNITY 
The Way down and the Way up 
John Climacus, whatever his other virtues—and I have no doubt that they were many—was 
neither a clear nor a systematic writer.690  I do not mean that he is incoherent, but rather that wherever 
one traces one line of argument within a chapter, one could also trace three others.  If one can discern a 
particular organization to the Ladder’s Rungs, one can also find at least three others.  This is likely 
intentional.  Chryssavgis writes of John:  ‘<he is a master of the ambivalent, of saying and unsaying the 
same thing.  It is a way of having it both ways.  This, after all, may well be the divine way<’691  Like 
Johannes de Silentio so many centuries later, Climacus ‘neither writes the System nor promises of the 
System, neither subscribes to the System nor ascribes anything to it.’692  Climacus’ apparent obscurity 
serves a didactic purpose—not to frighten readers off, but to draw them in, forcing them to find their own 
way up the Ladder and so be formed by it. Cultivating in monks a properly Christian identity is, as I have 
discussed at length in the Introduction, Climacus’ purpose in the Ladder.  Climacus’ purpose and his way 
of thinking—concerned with the organic and existential reality of asceticism—renders the Ladder obscure 
in part because it is difficult to draw out any kind of linear progression in it.  While the image of a 
‘ladder’ naturally suggests some sort of sequential progression through discrete stages, Climacus, 
concerned with forming identity, constantly anticipates, expounds, and revisits virtues, vices, and ideas.  
Understanding something of the construction of the Ladder will be a crucial aid in drawing out how death 
defines ascetic spirituality for Climacus. 
Scholars have, of course, discerned structure in the Ladder.  Or, rather, they have discerned a 
variety of possible structures.  So, it may be noted, did the illuminators of the Ladder manuscripts.  
Generally, though, we find two sorts of structre:  a bipartite one and a tripartite one.  The first is put 
forward by Couilleau and taken up by Bogdanovic, Ware, and, warily, by Johnsen.  This is a structure of 
opposition and balancing between earlier and later rungs.693  It is a ‘bipartite’ structure, though it is often 
folded into a ‘tripartite’ one.  In fact, two competing tripartite models have been put forward, each with 
its own heuristic validity.  I will set these out and analyse their strengths, and will then suggest my own 
                                                          
690 Pace Johnsén 
691 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 12 
692 Kierkegaard, Søren [as Johannes de Silentio], Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowrie, intro. George Steiner, 
Everyman’s Library 178 (Reprinted 1994 as Everyman’s Library 178: Fear and Trembling.  The Book on Adler.  Princeton, 
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1941) 
693 Couilleau, ‘Jean Climaque’, cols. 373-74; followed by Ware, ‘Introduction’, 14 
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‘model’ which is, in keeping with Climacus’ style, not really a ‘model’ at all, but rather a way of holding 
together two different organizing logics, both of which rely on engagement with death.   
To explain, there are thirty ‘rungs’ or ‘steps’ in the Ladder: 
1. Ἀποταγή 
2. Ἀπροσπάθεια 
3. Ξενιτεία 
4. Ὑπακοή 
5. Μετάνοια 
6. Μνήμη Θανάτου 
7. Πένθος 
8. Ἀοργησία and Πρᾳότης 
9. Μνησικακία 
10. Καταλαλιά 
11. Πολυλογία and ΢ιωπή 
12. Χεῦδος 
13. Ακήδια 
14. Γαστριμαργία 
15. Αγνεία and ΢οφροσύνη 
16. Υιλαργυρία 
17. Ἀκτημοσύνη 
18. Ἀναισθησία 
19. Ὕπνος 
20. Ἀγρυπνία 
21. Δειλία 
22. Κενοδόξια 
23. Ὑπερηφανία and βλασφήμια 
24. Πραότης, Ἁπλότης, Ἀκακἰα 
25. Σαπεινοφροσύνη 
26. Διάκρισις 
27. Ἡσυχία 
28. Προσευχή 
29. Ἀπαθεία 
30. Ἀγάπη 
 
Among these thirty steps, however, we can discern important relationships and can lay down some very 
telling divisions. 
 
The Diptych 
In this analysis, the Ladder has two halves, which mirror each other, and it stresses balance among 
the various Rungs—laid out in Figure One, below.  Though there are actually five divisions in this 
diagram, the Fifteenth Run, ‘Περὶ ἀφθάρτου ἐν φθαρτοῖς ἐκ καμάτων καὶ ἱδρώτων ἁγνείας καὶ 
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σωφροσύνης’, as it is titled in Rader’s edition, is the fulcrum.694  The Ladder balances this central struggle 
against the body’s demands and on either side, each rung has a mirror self.  There is a consistent pattern 
of ‘types’ and ‘anti-types’.  For example, the ‘break from union with the world’ typifies ‘union with God’ 
while ‘fundamental virtues’ mirror ‘crowning virtues’.  Moreoever, the middle section (§§8-23) details the 
ongoing struggle against passions and temptations, in which physical (§§8-13) balance spiritual (§§18-23) 
and all centre on the three physical passions which reveal the troublesome relationship of soul to body, 
and within which all others may be subsumed:  Glutton, Lust, and Avarice.  These are, for Climacus, the 
most insidious because the most natural, and so the struggle against them lies at the very centre of the 
ascetic life.   
Perhaps this rhetorical balancing act is inspired by the other image which dominates the Ladder—
that of Moses and the tablets of the Law given atop Sinai.  Climacus refers to his work not only as ‘ladder’ 
but as Πλάκες πνευματικοί, ‘spiritual tablets’, of which he says: 
...faithfully constrained by their commands, those true slaves of God, stretching for a 
hand unworthy of them in und-discerning obedience, and by their knowledge taking up 
the pen to write, dipping it in downcast yet radiant humility, resting it upon their hearts 
smooth and white, just as on sheets of paper or, rather, spiritual tablets, divine 
words...we will write here, painting them in many colours.695 
 
In this polychrome portrait of the ‘spiritual law’ (cf. Rom 8.2), written, fittingly, on ‘spiritual tablets’, the 
beginner’s work mirrors the contemplative’s prayer, while virtues and vices mirror and balance one 
another.  This ‘diptych’ structure, as Richard Lawrence describes it, is elegant and powerful, drawing the 
reader inward and always reminding him that each virtue has a shadow, and each step a partner.696   The 
diptych also reminds the reader that one progresses within virtues and not simply from one virtue to 
another.  In Climacus’ thought, ‘lower’ virtues compose higher ones just as bread is made from 
previously separate ingredients, or as a rainbow is composed of various bands of color.697  The ascetic’s 
life can be understood, then, not as progressing from one virtue to another, but as progressing toward 
                                                          
694 §15, 880A 
695 §1, 633C; many manuscripts bear the title Πλάκες πνευματικοί and Chryssavgis goes so far as to claim this was 
John’s ‘original title’ (John Climacus, 21), but there is no clear internal evidence for preferring Tablets to Ladder, and in 
the manuscript tradition Ladder is clearly dominant—not only in titling, but in illumination, as Martin’s book 
demonstrates. 
696 Lawrence, Richard T., ‘The Three-Fold Structure of the Ladder of Divine Ascent’, SVOTQ 32:2 (1988), 104-107 
697 §25, 989C-D 
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union with God by a gradual agglomeration of the various fundamental and crowning virtues, possible 
only within an ongoing ‘break with the world’ and struggle against the passions.698 
 
1.  Breaking with the World 
a. Ἀποταγή βίου 
b. Ἀπροσπάθεια 
c. Ξενιτεία 
 
2. Fundamental virtues 
a. Ὑπακοή 
b. Μετάνοια 
c. Μνήμη Θανάτου 
d. Φαροποιὸς Πένθος 
 
3. Struggle against Passions 
a. Ἀοργησία and Πρᾳότης 
b. Μνησικακία 
c. Καταλαλιά 
d. Πολυλογία and ΢ιωπή 
e. Χεῦδος 
f. Ακήδια 
i. Γαστριμαργία 
ii. Αγνεία and ΢οφροσύνη 
iii. Υιλαργυρία and Ἀκτημοσύνη 
g. Ἀναισθησία 
h. Ὕπνος 
i. Ἀγρυπνία 
j. Δειλία 
k. Κενοδόξια 
l. Ὑπερηφανία and βλασφήμια 
 
4. Crowning virtues 
a. Πραότης, Ἁπλότης, Ἀκακἰα 
b. Σαπεινοφροσύνη 
c. Διάκρισις 
 
5. Union with God 
a. Ἡσυχία 
b. Προσευχή 
c. Ἀπαθεία 
d. Ἀγάπη 
                                                          
698 Cf. Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 29-30 
FIGURE ONE 
Non-Physical Passions 
Physical Passions 
Spiritual Passions 
190 
 
The Triptych 
Yet one can just as well discern a tripartite structure at work, drawing us back to the image of a 
‘ladder.’  Figure Two presents a tripartite structure.  While scholars have long noticed some such 
structure,699 James Robertson Price, followed by Richard Lawrence, has put forward an interesting model, 
differing from traditional tripartite schemata in its organizing logic as well as its divisions.700  This can be 
seen—as Richard Lawrence describes it—in Figure Three below.   
Lawrence, following Price’s model, attempts a reconciliation, though he is by no means always 
successful.  Price had argued that Climacus himself suggests a tripartite structure when he says that 
‘Repentance lifts us up, mourning knocks on heaven, holy humility opens it.  I say this and I worship 
Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity.’701  Thus, Lawrence finds parallels between rungs in a repentance-
mourning-humility structure.  Thus, for him ‘renunciation’ and the ‘memory of death’ or ‘discernment’ 
and ‘apatheia’ must parallel one another.  At this point, his model, though imaginative, ends up feeling 
rather forced.  The mirroring between sections is lost as well as the ‘type-antitype’ relationship between 
rungs.  There are too few clear connections between the divisions he proposes and too much reliance on 
numerical symbolism which is, of course, notoriously malleable. 
Lawrence does, however, have a few important virtues.  First, like others before him he points 
out the centrality of πένθος in Climacus’ thinking.702  His biographer, Daniel, drew particular attention to 
it, as we have already seen.  Symeon the New Theologian and, through him, the later Hesychasts, derived 
much of their emphasis on mourning from Climacus.  Second, Lawrence draws attention to the 
universality of μετάνοια.  A superficial reading of the Fifth Rung would suggest that μετάνοια means 
‘penance’ when, in fact, it refers to ‘repentance’ more broadly, of which specific acts of penance are 
emblematic.  The ‘holy criminals’, as we shall see below, form by no means a limited or isolated group.  
Moreover, Lawrence rightly discerns in the Sixth Rung on Memory of Death a ‘linking’ chapter—one 
whose meaning is only comprehensible in light of its connection to what came before (Repentance) and 
what will follow (Mourning).   
 
                                                          
699 So Ware, ‘Introduction’ 12-13, Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 28-29. 
700 Price, James R. in ‘Conversion and the Doctrine of Grace in Bernard Lonergan and John Climacus,’ Anglican 
Theological Review 72 (1980), 338-362 
701 §25, 992D; cited by Price, ‘Conversion and the Doctrine of Grace,’ 358-59. 
702 See, e.g., Völker’s treatment of πένθος at Scala Paradisi, 164-180 
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1.  Fundamentals of the Ascetic Life 
a. Ἀναχώρησις 
b. Ἀπροσπάθεια 
c. Ξενιτεία 
d. Ὑπακοή 
e. Μετάνοια 
f. Μνήμη τοῦ Θανάτου 
g. Πένθος 
 
2. The Practical Life 
a. Ἀοργησία and Πρᾳότης 
b. Μνησικακία 
c. Καταλαλιά 
d. Πολυλογία and ΢ιωπή 
e. Χεῦδος 
f. Ακήδια 
g. Γαστριμαργία 
h. Αγνεία and ΢οφροσύνη 
i. Υιλαργυρία 
j. Ἀκτημοσύνη 
k. Ἀναισθησία 
l. Ὕπνος 
m. Ἀγρυπνία 
n. Δειλία 
o. Κενοδόξια 
p. Ὑπερηφανία and βλασφήμια 
q. Πραότης, Ἁπλότης, Ἀκακἰα 
r. Σαπεινοφροσύνη  
s. Διάκρισις  
 
3. The Contemplative Life 
a. Ἡσυχία 
b. Προσευχή 
c. Ἀπαθεία 
d. Ἀγάπη 
  
FIGURE TWO 
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1. Repentance 
a. Ἀναχώρησις 
i. Ἀπροσπάθεια 
1. Ξενιτεία 
2. Ὑπακοή 
ii. Μετάνοια 
b. Μνήμη τοῦ Θανάτου 
 
2. Mourning 
a. Πένθος 
i. Ἀοργησία and Πρᾳότης 
ii. Μνησικακία 
iii. Καταλαλιά 
iv. Πολυλογία and ΢ιωπή 
v. Χεῦδος 
vi. Ακήδια 
1. Γαστριμαργία 
2. Αγνεία and ΢οφροσύνη 
3. Υιλαργυρία and Ἀκτημοσύνη 
vii. Ἀναισθησία 
viii. Ὕπνος 
ix. Ἀγρυπνία 
x. Δειλία 
xi. Κενοδόξια 
i. Ὑπερηφανία and βλασφήμια  
b. Πραότης, Ἁπλότης, Ἀκακἰα 
 
3. Humility 
a. Σαπείνωσις 
i. Διάκρισις  
1. Ἡσυχία 
2. Προσευχή 
ii. Ἀπαθεία 
b. Ἀγάπη 
One can, of course, adduce further divisions within either tripartite scheme. Ware and 
Chryssavgis, certainly, see a tripartite structure operative alongside the mirroring which Couilleau 
described.  Thus we can easily see the classic division of the ascetic life into πρακτική and θεωρία with 
an introductory framework defined by virtues which one retains throughout both phases of life.  In this 
way we can more easily see Climacus’ ideas of progress and ascent and find once more a ‘ladder’ to 
follow. 
FIGURE THREE 
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What sort of Ladder? 
Though ‘tablets’ are important to him, it is with a ‘ladder’ that Climacus closes, and a motif of 
ascent dyes the fabric of his great work.  Speaking of love, the ‘empress’ who ‘appears from heaven’, 
Climacus says  
How Jacob saw you atop the ladder (Gen 28.12), I long to learn.  Show to one who desires 
what is the form of this ascent; what the way of life and what the joining [ἔρανος] of that 
fashioning of steps to you, which your lover ‚has set as ascents in his heart‛ (cf. Ps 83.6 
LXX).  What is their number I have thirsted to learn, and how great, therefore, the time of 
the course.  For one who learns your struggle and sight has announced them to those 
whom he leads by the hand.703 
 
Moreover, the epilogue (probably spurious, but written, if not by Climacus himself, then by a loving 
disciple) begins thus:   
Ascend, ascend eagerly ‚the ascents placed in the heart‛, my brothers, hearing one 
saying ‚Come, let us ascend to the mountain of the Lord and unto the house of our God 
(Isa 2.3) who makes our feet as those of a stag and sets us upon the high places‛ (Hab 
3.19) in order to be victorious in the way.704 
 
Climacus calls readers to an ἄνοδος.  This ascent may be up the ladder seen by Jacob, or perhaps up the 
craggy side of Gebel Musa.  The ‘diptych’ or ‘mirroring’ extends even to the images adduced by 
Climacus—one at the beginning, one at the end—to describe his own work:  tablets brought down the 
mountain side and a ladder leading back up; wisdom whose origin and end is in God, come down from 
heaven to draw sinners to himself. 
For all that, Climacus has no interest in linearity or consecuity for their own sakes.  Climacus is 
fonder of the metaphors of ‘family.’  Thus he lays out the tortuous, anarchic familial relations between 
vices, and the curious, often paradoxical relationships between virtues.  His, then, is a ladder shaped like 
the paths which wind down the side of Gebel Musa, contorted and retorted until every rung and every 
grain in the wood of every rung seems to intersect every other.  It is, therefore, very difficult to find an 
organizing principle, and would be impossible to communicate it—at least, without speaking of 
numerous others.  We cannot, therefore, ignore the divisions to which Couilleau pointed, for they seem 
equally as valid.  There is a sense in which the monk never progresses beyond, but only within, the 
diptych of Climacus’ spiritual tablets.  I think that choosing one model on which to structure the Ladder 
                                                          
703 §30, 1160A 
704 §30, 1160D-1161A:  ‘Προτροπὴ ἐπίτομος καὶ ἰσοδύναμος τῶν διὰ πλάτους εἰρημένων.’ 
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will always end up feeling forced.  One model is a little like one definition—valuable to scholars but 
anathema to Climacus, who happily runs out lengthy lists of ὅροι when he might have given only one.  If 
we are to speak of ‘structure,’ or of coherence, it is not to found in the reconciliation of various schematic 
or systematic models. 
 
Conclusion:  Dyad, Triad, Unity 
Therefore, rather than a strict bipartite or triparte structure, I propose a more fluid model of 
interrelated dyad and triad.  The dyad refers to an ascetic life possessing ever two sides which must be 
held together.  The monk who has found θεωρία does not thereby forget the benefits of the πρακτική.  
Evagrius once wrote: ‘The Gnostic monk and the Practicing monk met, and the Lord stood between 
them.’705  So too, Climacus happily holds beginning together with end—memory of death (§6) and prayer 
(§28)—averring that ‘Some say that prayer is better than memory of one’s departure; but I hymn two 
natures in one person.’706  Climacus sees value in holding together apparent opposites, in balancing and 
mirroring because that is what he sees at work in the Incarnation.  Christ’s personal union of divine and 
human, heavenly and earthly, not only allows but even demands that the most fundamental virtues 
remain in and alongside the most ethereal.   
At the same time, Climacus is concerned with ‘progress.’  For this, the triad defines a trajectory—
three points a path—of progress toward divine and heavenly existence.  Certainly, one begins with 
fundamental virtues, and then can cultivate practical ones, and only then contemplative ones.  Each 
section of the triptych contextualizes the next.  Thus, to return to Climacus’ description of progress above, 
‘Repentance lifts us up, mourning knocks on heaven, holy humility opens it.  I say this and I worship 
Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity.’707  Climacus can cap his description of progress with a reference to 
the ‘Trinity in unity’ because progress is always within rather than from, as the dyad requires.  One may 
more into the life of the Trinity, but one never leaves behind one’s natural composition of soul and an 
often-contentious and demanding body.  This body, ‘fellow worker and enemy, aid and opponent, 
defender who plots against me’, ‘to which I am bound eternally’, Climacus says, ‘will rise with me’.708  As 
                                                          
705 Evagrius, Monachos, 121:  ‘Γνωστικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς ὑπήντησαν ἀλλήλοις, μέσος δὲ ἀμφοτέρων εἱστήκει 
κύριος.’ 
706 §28, 1137A 
707 §25, 992D; cited by Price, ‘Conversion and the Doctrine of Grace,’ 358-59. 
708 §15, 901C-D; Climacus’ dialogue with his body (901C-904B) is instructive.  He dwells on the soul’s contradictory 
relation to the body at some length.  This duality cannot be referred unequivocally to a fallen state to be transcended 
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Chryssavgis very rightly notes, Climacus has a strongly unitary view of the human being:  ‘This 
seemingly dualistic language denotes ultimately a unitary conception.  If there is any ‚separation‛—as in 
the case of death—it is only temporary.  This adds an eschatological dimension to John’s ascetic 
thought.’709  I would add that the human being is a ‘unity’, certainly, but always a ‘composed’ one—body 
and soul.  I speak of triad to convey motion—progress; I speak of dyad to recall that motion is always 
within; I speak of unity to describe the composite personal existence whose progress is toward 
wholeness. 
With dyad and triad in mind, and the quest for unity as context, we may fruitfully ask how 
Climacus organizes the ascetic life.  Though Climacus devotes the Sixth Rung to the Memory of Death, he 
describes a practiced encounter with death in at least twelve forms710 in eighteen of the thirty steps711 and 
connects this directly with twelve distinct virtues.712  Additional complications arise because the 
connotations of various terms overlap, and of the virtues to which Climacus connects the memory of 
death, some precede and some follow it in the Ladder.  He says in his Sixth Rung, ‘Memory of death gives 
birth...for those away from the din of worldly concerns, to resignation and constant prayer, and a guard 
of the mind.  But these stand as mothers and daughters of the memory of death.’713  The memory of death 
is interconnected in curious, even paradoxical ways, with other virtues.  It runs like a grain of wood 
through the whole Ladder and so, I shall now argue that Climacus develops the ‘triad’ using the ‘memory 
of death.’  He creates a framework for progress built on a triadic engagement with time in which past, 
present, and future all illuminate the ascetic’s eternal existence by their reference to death as both 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(pace Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 57-59)—it is this body which will rise, this body to which one is eternally bound.  
Climacus dwells very little on the glorification of the human body.  Rather, he calls on the monk to make progress ‘in 
a material and defiled body’ (§1, 633B). 
709 Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 56; cf. also his article, 'The resurrection of the body according to Saint John of the 
Ladder', Greek Orthodox Theological Review 30:4 (1985), 447-453. 
710 These are:  μνήμη θανάτου (§1, §4, §6, §11, §15, §18, §27),  ἔννοια θανάτου (§6, §20, Summary after §26), 
ὑπόμνησις θανάτου (§12), μελέτη θανάτου (§4, §6, §18), μέριμνα θανάτου (§26), μνήμη ἐξόδου (§6, Summary after 
§26, §30), αἴσθησις θανάτου (§6), δάκρυα ἐξόδου (§7, §18), πόθος θανάτου (§26), ἔπειξις θανάτου (§27), δειλία 
θανάτου (§6), and φόβον ἐξόδου (§1).  Climacus also uses other phrases and terms with similar or analogous 
meaning. 
711 These are:  §1 (On Renunciation), §4 (Obedience), §5 (Repentance), §6 (Memory of Death), §7 (Mourning), §11 
(Talkativeness and Silence), §12 (Falsehood), §13 (Despondency), §14 (Gluttony), §15 (Chastity), §17 (Poverty), §18 
(Insensitivity), §20 (Alertness), §22 (Vainglory), §26 (Discernment), the Summary after §26, §27 (Stillness), §28 
(Prayer), and §30 (Faith, Hope, and Love) 
712 These are:  combating lust (§4), mourning (§5, §6, §7), detachment (§1, §6), obedience (§6), fighting gluttony (§6), 
silence (§11), fighting lying (§12), pricking insensitivity (§18), wakefulness (§20), discernment (§26), self-control 
(Summary after §26), and prayer (§30). 
713 §6, 793C 
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mortality and judgment.  I shall then demonstrate that Climacus develops the ‘dyad’ in terms of a 
practice of mortality in which human and divine interact.  In the Conclusion I will show how ‘dyad’ and 
‘triad’ operate together to cultivate an imitation of Christ which can account for failings and so transcend 
the ambivalence and ambiguities which so far have accompanied language of death. 
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III. THE TEMPORAL AND ICONIC FRAMEWORK OF THE ASCETIC LIFE 
This next section concerns the memory of death and judgment, and will show how it creates a 
framework within which ascetic progress is possible.  I will elaborate three scenes to which Climacus 
devotes an inordinate amount of space.  The first depicts the death of a penitent monk taking place in a 
special penal monastic foundation which Climacus calls ‘the Prison.’  I turn then to three visions or 
ecstasies experienced by unnamed monks of Egypt and Tholas and one Hesychius the Horebite, a 
companion of John’s at Sinai.  The final scene depicts the death of a holy elder, Stephen, whom John 
clearly held in high esteem.  The first will show how the sensible world images the spiritual, and the 
temporal the eternal.  The interlude will show how death as an event of mortality delays what the first 
scene shows as already present.  The final scene will show the importance of the past for the monk 
moving forward—it will demonstrate the ‘retrospective’ nature of the ascetic life. 
 
Overture:  Death in the Desert 
To situate Climacus’ treatment of death in the monastery we will first look at what themes and 
motifs emerge from Desert literature with which Climacus was likely familiar.  I have already treated the 
two visions of death found in VA, as well as Antony’s own paradigmatic death-scene depicted there. But 
Desert literature has many death-scenes.  These scenes, many of which were modelled on or in 
juxtaposition with Antony’s, invite us see the judgment at work which would, at the consummation, 
eternally separate the righteous from the wicked.   
 
Good and Bad Death 
These death scenes divide, then, into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ death, in which many of the usual visible 
signs by which witnesses could discern God’s judgment or comment upon the status of the dead, are 
spiritualized.  Relatives cannot be present, though fellow ascetics might be; burial is of no importance; 
sickness, violence, and mourning are often signs of nothing.  Instead, Desert literature focuses on the 
ascetic’s attitude toward his own death, which expresses his way of life—either as prepared or 
unprepared for death and the judgment which follows.   
For the prepared, death may almost be another episode in his life. Some texts describe the monk  
dying in the midst of his work, as Pambo in HL:  ‘After a little while the man of God fell asleep, not from 
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an attack of fever, nor from any illness, but while he was stitching up a basket, at the age of seventy.’714  
Elsewhere, Paphnutius seems almost to die simply because he cannot continue his work:  ‘When he had 
also sent this man [a disciple] on ahead to heaven, Paphnutius himself lost the will to live, for he was no 
longer able to practise ascesis.’715  The monk dies as he lived, allowing the event of death to become a 
further expression of the sort of character he had become.  A tale of Arsenius illustrates this perfectly.  He 
died weeping, but this was not a sign of his impiety or unpreparedness.  Rather, it was the final 
expression of a man who ‘had a hollow in his chest channelled out by the tears which fell from his eyes 
all his life.’  His disciples saw him weeping at death and asked him ‘Truly, Father, are you also afraid?’  
They could not fathom that such a man should be afraid, but Arsenius’ response was telling:  ‘My fear at 
this hour has been mine since I first became a monk.’716 
 The story of Pambo, quoted above, illustrates another facet of the ‘good’ death.  The monk is not 
described as ‘dying’, but simply ‘falls asleep’ or ‘surrenders his soul.’717  In one monastery, apparently, 
‘the monks within the walls were such saints that all could work miracles and none of them ever fell ill 
before he died.  On the contrary, when the time came for each to depart, he announced it beforehand to 
all the others and then lay down and fell asleep.’718  When Antony died, he was joyful, ‘like one greeting 
his dearest friends.’719  At the point of death, Sisoes’ face ‘shone like the sun.’720  The ascetic approaches 
death knowing two things:  that death leads to judgment and the possibility of beatitude, and that he has 
spent his life seeking and preparing for exactly that.  Thus, the ascetic approaches death calmly, almost 
voluntarily, with the same imperturbable will with which he has approached everything in life.  If he is 
afraid of death it is only because the fear of death was always his tool for living freely, as one already 
dead.721 
For the wicked, death comes unexpectedly and usually involves cruel sickness.  John Moschus 
records the death of ‘Thalilaios, the impious archbishop of Thessalonica’ who ‘feared neither God nor the 
reward which was in store for him’ and, in the midst of his wickedness is found dead with his head in a 
                                                          
714 HL 10.5; cf. 47.4 
715 HM 14.23 
716 Arsenius 40 
717 HL 5.1-3, 7.6, 60.2, 10.5; PS 86, 105,  123, 178, 182, 202 
718 HM 17.3 
719 Agathon 29 
720 Sisoes 14 
721 One old man, at the moment of his death, laughs three times.  Asked why, he says, ‘‚I laughed because you all fear 
death; I laughed again because you are not prepared; but the third time I laughed  because I go from labour to rest.‛  
And straightway the old man fell asleep’ (N 279). 
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privy drain.  Moschus then compares this death to that of Arius who suffered similarly.722  Moschus 
describes both deaths as divine retribution for the men’s wickedness.  At other times, the fact of death 
itself is a sign of God’s judgment.  Athanasius makes this point in a tale of Antony, who had a vision of 
two brothers in trouble, but only one was found alive.  Athanasius says of the unexpected death of a 
brother that,  
If someone asks on what account he did not speak before the death of the other brother, 
he does not ask correctly, putting it this way.  For the judgment of death was not 
Antony’s, but God’s, who passed judgment concerning him who died and revealed and 
uncovered the situation of the one who lived.723 
 
For the wicked, then, death and, especially, an unpleasant death comes through the judgment of God, 
and expresses that judgment.   
The literature does not claim that only the healthy were good monks, or that an unpleasant death 
is a sign of God’s judgment, although it is possible to read some stories in that way.  Because of the 
danger of over-simplification, several tales help clarify the situation.  Palladius records the story of 
Benjamin who had reached ‘the perfection of asceticism’ and had ‘the gift of healing’.  He says 
In this mountain of Nitria was a person called Benjamin, living to about eighty and 
practicing asceticism to the end, being judged worthy of a gift of healing...This man, 
judged worthy of such a gift, for eight months prior to his death had dropsy.  And his 
body was so swollen as to look like another Job.  Dioscorus the bishop...said to us, ‘Come, 
see a new Job in this swollen body and incurable suffering acquiring boundless 
thanksgiving’...Then that blessed man, Benjamin, said to us, ‘Pray, children, that my 
‚inner man‛ not contract dropsy, for this one *i.e., the ‘outer man’+ neither benefitted me 
when healthy nor harmed me when ill (cf. 2 Cor 4.16).724 
 
Palladius writes that ‘I have felt bound to describe this affliction, lest we should be surprised when some 
untoward fate befalls righteous men.’725  Clearly, some were worried that a painful death meant that 
monk was less than perfect, since the best ascetics simply fell asleep while working or teaching.  The 
repeated references to Job, and to the ‘inner man’ (cf. 2 Col 4.16) point us toward a subtle, spiritualized 
definition of what makes a death ‘good’ or ‘bad.’  The healthy monk dies with clarity and tranquillity.  He 
is, ultimately, able to approach death, rather than be overtaken by it.  The good death, then, is not simply a 
voluntary one or an apparently painless one.  It is the death wherein the monk can continue to express 
                                                          
722 PS 43 
723 VA 59.5; see also Antony 21 and QR, 599, which relies on it; cf. PS 129, 145 
724 HL 12.1-2 
725 HL 12.2; so also for the monk Stephen at 24.1-3; see also QR 144, 223, and 599 
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himself as a ‘dead’ man and, most importantly, as an imitator of Christ.  The will with which the monk 
approaches death is not his own.  That has been destroyed by obedience.  It is, instead, a reflection of the 
will of Christ who offered himself for others.  Thus, the monk makes death also a matter of imitation, 
particularly since the physical event may be understood as a final manifestation of his way of life.   
The event of death, when described as ‘surrendering the soul’ makes it a moment of self-offering.  
This self-offering, again, accords with the way in which the ascetic has always offered himself to God.  
Arsenius, though he may have wept at death, approached it confidently.  Abba Daniel reported that, ‘At 
the point of death, Abba Arsenius sent us this message, ‚Do not trouble to make offerings for me, for 
truly I have made an offering for myself and I shall find it again.‛’726  Arsenius does not seem to expect 
his death to require anything other than what he has already offered God, and this offering may be said 
to carry through to his death, when he can finally offer himself fully. 
Death’s ‘goodness’ concerns the ascetic’s approach toward it:  prepared, clear, and expressing 
even in death his way of life in imitation of Christ.  At the moment, the prepared ascetic can imitate one 
obedient old man:  ‘When the old man’s death came, he saw one angel on the right and one on the left 
saying to him, ‚Do you wish to come, abba, or should we go away?’  And the old man said to them, ‚I 
wish you to stay and take my spirit.‛  And thus he died.’727  The ascetic can ask for and accept the ‘hour of 
necessity’ and tell those sent that they are allowed to ‘snatch his soul.’  Death’s ‘badness’ concerns the 
same:  the approach of something fearful and surprising, an expression perhaps of the surprise with 
which sinners greet the revelatory judgment of God.  The wicked do not approach death.  They are 
overtaken by death because they have not dedicated their lives to preparation for it.  The ascetic, on the 
other hand, who has lived with death every day, lived as though dead and about to die every hour, 
approaches death naturally, joyfully, peacefully—he moves, through death, from his foretaste of eternity 
to the good things themselves, offering himself to God fully, as he has done partially throughout his 
ascetic life.  A tale of Patermuthius encapsulates the contrast of those who are and those who are not 
prepared: a monk was terrified of death, because he was not ready; so Patermuthius prays and grants 
him three years to prepare and at the end that time, Patermuthius ‘presented him to Christ no longer a 
man but an angel...[Patermuthius] set him in the midst of them [the brethren] in good health and [this 
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man] spent the whole night teaching them.  Then the brother began to feel drowsy, and falling asleep, 
died.’728 
 
Instruction and Silence 
 At the moment of death, some ascetics offer instruction to those who survive them.  The 
instructions which ascetics give at death generally take their own lives as an example and, perhaps, 
warning, for the young.  The tale of Pambo nicely illustrates this point: 
They said about Abba Pambo that when he was dying—and at the hour of death, he said 
to the holy men standing about, ‚Since I came to this wilderness place and built my cell 
and lived in it, I do not remember eating bread which did not come from my own hand, 
and I have not regretted a word I have spoken, until this hour; and so I go to God as not 
having begun to serve him.729 
 
Similar tales are told of Romanus, John Cassian, and Chomas.730  Antony’s death scene contains ethical as 
well as burial instructions, and Arsenius follows suit at his own death.731  The abba is not always willing to 
give advice, but in some cases he can, at least, be coerced into it.  Such scenes are generally rather 
pedestrian manifestations of testamentary literature.  It is worth nothing how testamentary scenes refract 
the elder’s life into an exemplary tale, which is why AP’s redactors spliced Arsenius’ death-scene together 
with advice he gave at other points in his life.732 
 More interesting are those death scenes which seem to deliberately defy the usual expectations of 
testamentary literature.  In these scenes, the elder is begged for a revelation, but will not give it or offers 
only a partial version.  The tale of Zacharias’ death is instructive:  ‘Abba Poemen said that Abba Moses 
asked Abba Zacharias, who was about to die, ‚What do you see?‛  Zacharias said, ‚Is it not better to 
silent, Father?‛  And he said, ‚Yes, child.  Be silent.‛’733  As Agathon died he told his disciples that he 
stood ‘before the judgement seat of God.’  As they persisted in questioning him about it, he finally 
responded in exasperation:  ‘Please do not speak to me any longer, for I do not have time.’734  These two 
stories make somewhat different points. The second concerns distraction—Agathon, though willing to 
                                                          
728 HM (10.17-19) 
729 Pambo 8; so also HL 10.6 and HM  11.5-8 
730 Cassian 5, Romanus 1, Chomas 1; cf. also N 22, 63, 341 
731 VA 89-92; Arsenius 40 
732 So also Agathon 29, Silouan 2 
733 Zacharias 5; similar is the story of John of Lycopolis, HM 1.65; cf. HL 1.3. 
734 Agathon 29 
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reveal something of what happens at death, is concerned with his judgment, and not with the questions 
of his disciples, who do not seem to grasp the importance of the moment.  Zacharias, on the other hand, 
flatly refuses any revelation of death.  The speculative or mystical stories of the soul’s flight to God 
through judgment after death, scattered through the desert literature, have no place at Zacharias’ death-
bed.  Instruction is good, revelation better, but neither is given at the risk of usurping or anticipating a 
judgment which belongs to God alone.  Thus, Desert death scenes remind us that the monk lives even 
until death in uncertainty born of hope and fear.  His death expresses and clarifies the character which he 
had developed in life, even as it may express God’s judgment on him.  Both are revealed by the ways in 
which one approaches or is overtaken by death, and by the revelation that death means a judgment 
whose outcome cannot, for all the preparation one may make, be anticipated.  So, with this in mind we 
turn to Climacus’ subversive deployment of similar scenes. 
 
First Scene:  Exeunt the Penitents 
The Fallen Monks 
Our first scene takes place in that most distasteful portion of Climacus’ book, the most shocking 
and disturbing:  The Prison.735  This place makes its first appearance in Rung Four, on Obedience, as the 
place of the penitents to which the abbot of the Alexandrian monastery would send those monks who 
had fallen and yet wished to remain monks.736  It was not, it seems, for just anyone.  And yet, to read 
Climacus’ extended description of it in Rung Five one gets the impression that people did not choose to 
leave the prison monastery—they die there instead, treating its overseer, Isaac, as their unquestioned 
abbot.  Later copyists seem to have been aware of the universality and tremendous importance of the 
Prison scenes, since they illustrated it at great length, often including a picture for each group or action 
described by Climacus.737  Moreover, there exists a fascinating ‘penitential canon’, a series of hymn verses 
                                                          
735 Ware, ‘Introduction’, 5, 22; John Duffy calls it ‘certainly the strangest part of the work, and easily the most 
moving< a veritable visit to the underworld, with a catalog, in gruesome detail, of self-inflicted misery, deprivation, 
and punishment. With the visitor we see the harrowing sights and hear the groans and anguished questions of the 
tormented’ (‘Embellishing the Steps: Elements of Presentation and Style in "The Heavenly Ladder" of John Climacus, 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 53 [1999], 14).  Cf. Chryssavgis, (John Climacus, 22-23) who argues that we should ‘not suppose 
that John intended people to be put off by, for instance, the fifth step relating to repentance, and especially by the 
horrendous account of the monastic penitentiary of Alexandrian Prison [sic+  in the same step.’  The account is 
certainly disturbing, though, and Climacus’ own rhetoric suggests that he, at least, was aware of just how disturbing 
it might be.  So argues Derwas Chitty at Desert a City, 174. 
736 §4, 704A-B 
737 On these illustrations, see Martin, The Illustration of the Heavenly Ladder, 47-120 
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dedicated to the ‘holy convicts’, asking forgiveness and promising repentance, which takes its material 
directly from Climacus’ Fifth Rung.738  This scene, as prurient as it may seem, fired the imagination of 
Byzantine ascetics, and allowed them to at least mentally place themselves within the Prison, asking with 
the ἅγιοι κατάδικοι for God’s mercy. 
The Prison is a place full of surprise and paradox.  First, Climacus does not seem to envision its 
inhabitants as any more unique or marginal than, for example, their brethren in at the great coenobium 
(§4).  He begins by describing repentance in glowing terms and comparing its relationship to obedience to 
Peter’s relationship to John—both ran to the empty tomb to find Christ.  John got there first, as obedience 
does; but Peter arrived as well, as repentance does.739  Climacus certainly envisions it as a virtue 
necessary for his readers (and himself).  He exhorts his readers, saying, ‘Let us hear and keep and do, as 
many of us as have suffered an unexpected fall.’740 The ‘Prison’, then, descriptions of which fill out what 
one should ‘hear, keep and do’ offers an example of repentance for all monks, whether or not they ever 
visit or find themselves guests there.741  As I have noted before, repentance shows us the contours of 
progress, and so, as the penitential canon says, ‘All of you, come and eagerly imitate them; for behold a 
type of salvation is set before us.’742   
The penitents may, therefore, function for readers as types of the ascetic life, whether novice or 
abbot, fallen, virtuous, and advanced.  Unlike the monastery at Alexandria, filled with well-painted 
characters and named individuals, Climacus eschews all individuating description from the Prison, 
omitting even Isaac’s name.743  The penitents are referred to as a group, or else as ‘some’ or ‘others’ or 
                                                          
738 Καν(ὼν) κατανυκτικὸ(ς) τ(ὴν) ἱστο(ρίαν) διαλαμβάν(ων) τ(ῶν) ἐν τῆ κλίμακι ἀγίων καταδίκ(ων).  The ‘canon’ 
is the standard Byzantine hymn form, composed of nine ‘odes’ (of which the second is omitted, yielding eight in 
practice) based on nine ‘songs’ found in Scripture.  Each ‘ode’ is composed of an initial stanza (or troparion) called 
irmos, which gives the melody, followed by a variable number of troparia with some kind of refrain between, and 
closed with a repetition of the irmos, called katavasion.  This canon has four troparia per ode, and uses model melodies 
in the fourth plagal tone.  The first letter of each troparion (irmoi and katavasiai excepted) forms an acrostic (a common 
device in Byzantine canons):  ΠΕΝΘΟΤ΢ ΕΝΑΡΓΟΤ΢ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΣΑΝΟΙΑ΢ ΣΤΠΟ΢.  The canon may be found in 
Martin, The Illustration of the Heavenly Ladder, 128-49. 
739 Note also a similar remark at §28, 1133B 
740 §5, 764C:  ‘Ἀκούσωμεν καὶ φυλάξωμεν, καὶ ποιήσωμεν, ὅσοι τι ἀδόκιμον πτῶμα πεπόνθαμεν.’  Cf. §15, 885D-
888A 
741 So Bitton-Ashkelony:  ‘John Climacus stands a part *sic+ in this regard.  He was fascinated by acts of extreme 
asceticism performed in the process of penitence...For Climacus these monastic prisoners...were a model of penitence’ 
(‘Penitence in Late Antique Monastic Literature’, 191). 
742 First Troparion of the First Ode:  Πάντες οἱ...δεῦτε καὶ μιμήσασθε προθύμως· ἰδοῦ γὰρ πρόκειται τύπος 
σωτήριας. 
743 He only gives it in §4, 704B 
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‘one of them.’  They are described using quotations from the Psalms, and speak in stock phrases and 
Scriptural quotations.  They are not, I think, flesh-and-blood characters, but rather general types of ascetic 
looks, responses, and demeanours.  There is a sense in which Climacus leaves the penitents empty so that 
readers may find space for themselves in the Prison.  The death of one of these, then, can be the death of 
any monk. 
 
The Hour of Death 
‘The last hour of one these was a fearful and pitiful spectacle.’744  In the description of that hour 
with which he follows this ominous sentence, John does not disappoint.  He vividly and harshly 
dramatizes the final moments of a penitent, who would die surrounded by his brethren, questioned to the 
last about his own progress and their expectations for judgment: 
For when his fellow convicts perceived one departing before them about to die, they 
circled around him while his mind yet in good health.  Thirsty, mourning, with a most 
pitiful look and sullen word they questioned he who was about to depart:  ‚What is it, 
brother and fellow convict—how is it?  What do you say?  What do you hope?  What do 
you expect?...Are you freed or are you still liable [ἥ ὑπεύθυνος ἔτι ὑπάρχεις]?...Have 
you received confidence or do you still have an uncertain hope [ἥ ἄδηλον ἔχεις τὴν 
ἐλπίδα]?  Have you received freedom, or is your thought still confused and uncertain?745 
 
Two things are worth noting.  First, the penitents refer to themselves and their fellow as ‘fellow convicts.’  
They exist on the same social stratum—brothers bound by their failures.  Second, there is their reference 
to ‘uncertain hope.’  Ἄδηλον, which I have translated as uncertain might also be rendered ‘unclear’ or 
even ‘unrevealed.’746  The emphasis, though, is on uncertainty since the penitents live with an uncertainty 
formed from their failures.   
The questions continue on and on, culminating in Scriptural quotations, which effectively ask 
whether he has heard a voice within (Ἐγένετό τις ἐν σοὶ φωνὴ λέγουσα ἔνδον) saying something like 
‘your faith has saved you’ (Mark 5.34) or perhaps something like ‘Let sinners depart into Hades’ (Ps 
9.18).747  The dying man then responds in kind by quoting one of several verses of Scripture:748 
                                                          
744 §5, 772C 
745§5, 772C-D 
746 S.v. LSJ 
747 §5, 772D:  this ‘inner voice’ speaks Scripture, and when speaking of hope it quotes:  Jn 5.14, Mt 9.2, or Mk 5.34.  
When describing fear, it quotes Pss 9.18, Mt 22.13, or Isa 26.10.  While descriptions of hope vary, those of fear 
consistently refer to being dismissed from God’s presence and sent elsewhere.   
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To these questions some of those dying would respond, ‚Blessed be the Lord who has 
not rejected my prayer, and *turned away+ his mercy from me‛ (Ps. 65.20); again, some 
would say, ‚Blessed be the Lord, who has not given us to beasts as prey for their teeth‛ 
(Ps. 123.6).  But others said sadly, Will our ‚soul pass through the raging water‛ (Ps 
123.5) of the spirits of the air?  These did not take courage as yet, but looked steadily at 
what would transpire in that accounting.  Others, sadder still, responded differently and 
said, ‚Woe to the soul that did not keep its vow blameless749—in this hour and this only, 
will it know what is prepared for it.‛750 
 
After this response, we can only presume that the penitent dies.  In the paragraph preceding the death 
scene, Climacus notes that when one knew he was about to die, he would go to the overseer, Isaac, and 
‘beg with oaths to be deemed worthy not of human burial, but of the burial of an irrational animal—to be 
tossed out into the midst of the river or in the field with the beasts.  And often that lamp of discernment 
[ὁ τ῅ς διακρίσεως λύχνος+ obeyed [ὑπήκουσεν],751 bidding that he be carried out deprived of psalmody 
and all honour.’752   
Despite its apparently unique formulation, the penitent’s death scene is remarkably similar to 
those of abbas in the AP, the HL, and PS.  Likewise, the brethren and the dying all inhabit the same 
stratum—the dying is not called ‘father’ or in any way distinguished from his fellow convicts.  We will 
use these two points to explore just what the Prison can reveal about the importance of the memory of 
death. 
 
 
Penitents and Elders 
 In the scenes we have examined above, elders die surrounded by disciples eager to learn what 
the abba experiences at death.  Such questions, however, often met with rebukes or silence.  In the Prison, 
such questions receive answers—at least, such answers as may be given.  It was also a particular trait of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
748 Climacus uses this technique earlier in §5 as well as at §27, 1116A-B, to illustrate a diverse but indefinite series of 
possible slogans or responses to a particular issue to which all must respond. He thus preserves an important respect 
for individuality in the ascetic life.  Climacus is particularly sensitive to the fact that, although all ascetics have 
generally the same goal, and ought to have similar motives, they do not all arrive by the same way (something he 
elaborates in §26, on Discernment).  He gives the reason for this quite bluntly at §28, 1140C:  ‘Neither in body nor in 
spirit are all alike.’ 
749 Cf. §27, 1108D:  ‘νεᾶνις μὲν μὴ φυλάξασα κοίτην, ἐμίανε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴ μὴ φυλάξασα συνθήκην, ἐμίανε 
πνεῦμα.’  After this ‘defilement’, both bride and soul descend to further crimes and sins (1108D-1109A).  Cf. §1, 632B 
750 §5, 773A-B 
751 Rader lists the even more emphatic ‘ἐποίησεν ὑπακούσας’ as textual variant for ‘ὑπήκουσεν.’ 
752 §5, 772C 
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holy monks to have foreknowledge of impending death, a trait which here passes to the penitent as well.  
It was also, from Antony onward, characteristic of the more popular ascetics to ask for secret or at least 
simple burial.  Arsenius’ gruff reply put it perhaps better than any other:  ‘Don’t you know how to tie a 
rope around my feet and drag me to the mountain?’753  Climacus clearly has in mind the scene 
characteristic for desert elders, but he subverts it to his own unique purpose. 
 The death of the penitent in the Ladder is comparable to the death of a Desert abba.  The lowest die 
like the most exalted (and, as will be seen below, the holy die like the condemned).  Indeed, the demands 
which elders put on their disciples for discreet burial are now requests made by the subservient to their 
overseer.  Climacus, by thus subverting a classic topos, emphasizes the fear and uncertainty of the 
moment—whereas the reader of AP knew to be confident for the dying elder (whose soul would not 
doubt be seen ascending to heaven), no one has any confidence for the dying penitent.  And, if one in 
whom no confidence is possible dies like the best, then we are left to wonder what to make of elders.   
 Climacus’ subversion of the elder’s death scene has also a second and very nearly opposite effect.  
We have examined Antony’s profound vision of the soul’s ascent after death (in VA and echoed in HL, 
discussed in Chapter One above), and both Athanasius and Palladius describe the damned as ὑπεύθυνοι.  
This word refers to one who owes someone something, and especially an account.754  It seems never in 
Desert literature to have a positive connotation.  If a monk is ὑπεύθυνος, it is to sin755 or punishment756 
or, as in Antony’s visions, the ‘enemy.’  Indeed, in those visions of death, the ὑπεύθυνοι are damned, 
taken by the enemy to whom they have given themselves up through sin and indolence.757 
 In the Ladder, however, Climacus uses the term ὑπεύθυνος liberally, applying it in the quotations 
above to penitent monks.758  In paradoxical language, he calls them μακάριοι ὑπεύθυνοι759 and τῶν 
ὑπευθύνων ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνευθύνων.760  Yes, these men are κατάδικοι, but of their lives Climacus says, 
‘Repentance is the daughter of hope and the denial of despair.  The one repenting is condemned but 
                                                          
753 Arsenius 40, taken from VA 89-90; so also PS 178 
754 S.v. LSJ 
755 HM 20.1; Cyril of Scythopolis, Vita Cyriaci; Ps-Macarius, Collectio H, 32 
756 HL 24.3 
757 Obvious in Palladius’ vision of the giant:  HL 21.16-7; as also in Ps-Macarius, Collectio H, 22. 
758 See, e.g., §14, 869C:  Gluttony asks monks why they should demand any knowledge of her, they who are ‘οἱ ἐμοὶ 
ὑπεύθυνοι τυγχάνοντες.’ 
759 §5, 769D 
760 §5, 765A 
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unashamed.761  In this paradox of liability and freedom from debt is the essence of the death scene:  it is 
fundamentally uncertain, and yet it remains at least mildly optimistic.  Climacus implies that those 
condemned, those who would be accounted damned in other visions of death, still have hope—in fact, to 
be and expect to be treated as a convict is ‘the denial of hopelessness.’  The other side of his subversion—
that even elders have cause for concern—will find its place below in Scene Two. 
  
The Memory of Judgment 
The reason for this apparent paradox lies with our penitent’s activities in life, and is intimately 
connected with the second point the story raised.  In this scene the living and the dying occupy the same 
status.  In part, this simply continues Climacus’ subversion of the elder’s death scene.  However, it also 
has a profounder theological importance.  Because the dying have the same status as the living, enquiry 
into their death is, in a sense, inquiry into one’s own.  The brethren’s questions are, therefore, far more 
than idle curiosity or a needless torment.  Climacus says approvingly that ‘Silence in knowledge is...a 
prison of mourning, friend of tears, worker of the memory of death, portrait-painter of punishment, 
enquirer into judgment...’762  The word φιλοπράγμων connotes something like a ‘busybody.’763  The 
scandal or, at least, surprise, that this word generates is certainly not lost on Climacus, for which reason 
he includes it in a list of virtues explicitly opposed to contemptible πολυλογία.  A φιλοπράγμων is, 
instead, a blessed σιωπὴ ἐν γνώσει.  Climacus marvelously incorporates the scandalous semantic 
element into his description of the penitents at their brother’s deathbed.  The brethren conclude their 
questions thus:  ‘Speak to us, we beg you, that we may know in what condition we are about to be.’764  
When they question their brother, the brethren are asking about themselves—what he can expect is what 
they can expect, if, indeed, they may expect anything at all.   
These questions echo those which the condemned brethren ask themselves daily.  The same 
habits which define monastic life also overshadow the moment of death.  Earlier in the rung, Climacus 
said of those in the Prison: 
All of them sat always seeing death with their eyes [Πάντες δὲ ἐκάθηντο ἀεὶ ἐν 
ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες τὸν θάνατον+ and saying, ‚What then will be the result?  
                                                          
761 §5, 764B 
762 §11, 852D:  ‘πένθους δεσμωτήριον, δακρύων φίλη, θανάτου μνήμης ἐργάτης, κολάσεως ζωγράφος, κρίσεως 
φιλοπράγμων.’ 
763 S.v. LSJ 
764 §5, 773A 
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What the sentences?  What our end?  Is there restoration?  Is there forgiveness for those 
in shadows, for the humble, for the convicts?...Will the judge be conciliated in the end?  
At least partially?  Even half the deserved punishments?  For they are truly great, and in 
need of many tears and labours.765 
 
Their daily activity was contemplation of death, the content of which is judgment.  In this presentation, 
contemplation of death elides into a contemplation of judgment and its outcome.  Climacus has already 
said of these that, ‘Among them, if it became necessary to utter a sound, their constant and unceasing 
conversation was the memorial of death and thought of eternal judgment.’766  Of course, in this regard, 
the convicts are no different from the holy, upon whom Climacus also enjoins memory of judgment.  
Their memory is simply sharpened by their keen awareness of their failings and generally lowly 
condition.767  Concern with, or memory of, judgment defines the activity of the penitent as well as of 
monks more generally. 
 Memory of judgment operates always in the present moment by means of the sensible world.  
One discerns signs in daily life of an eternally important reality which, whether one has yet experienced it 
or not, is always at hand.  Climacus says in Rung Seven, on Mourning: 
Let your reclining on your bed be for you a type of your interment in the grave, and 
enjoyment of the table be a memorial of the agonizing table of those worms.  Neither, 
receiving a cup of water, be forgetful of the thirst of that flame.  And in every way do 
violence to nature.768 
 
Climacus understands that temptations lurk in the mundane activities of daily life.  Eating a meal is an 
opportunity for gluttony; sleep for lethargy; dreams a time for lust to creep in.  These temptations do not 
come from the activities themselves, but from demons using those activities as an opportunity for attack.  
Climacus can therefore see a spiritual reality through the veil of daily life—the apocalyptic struggle of 
monks with demons, angelic spectators, God’s final judgment, and glimpses of eternity beyond.  One can 
thus counter demonic assault by discerning a sign of judgment in seemingly innocuous activities.  As 
such, memory of judgment functions paraenetically by reminding the monk of the punishments which 
                                                          
765 §5, 769B-C 
766 §4, 685B 
767 Acute but not inappropriate, if we take seriously Climacus’ admonitions at §1, 632B and §27, 1108D-1109A.  The 
penitents, by their flamboyant lifestyle, cultivate this sense. 
768 §7, 805A-B; so also §4, 685C:  a baker who has preserved tears (τὸ δάκρυον) explains that ‘Οὐδέποτε<ἀνθρώποις 
με δουλεύειν ἐννενόηκα, ἀλλὰ τῷ Θεῷ· καὶ τ῅ς ἡσυχίας πάσης ἀνάξιον ἑαυτὸν καταδικάσας, αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ 
πυρὸς θέας ὑπόμνησιν τ῅ς μελλούσης φλογὸς διὰ παντὸς κέκτημαι.’ 
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await sinners—the negative imagery inculcates fear, a very important response for Climacus and one to 
which I will return below. 
 More than paraenesis, though, judgment metaphysically underpins present reality.  Climacus 
relates the story of a robber who became a monk.  The abbot received only after making him undergo a 
public confession, with all the trappings of a convict being dragged to the gibbet—even having other 
monks beat him ‘lightly.’  When the robber makes his confession, Climacus reports, ‘one of the brothers 
standing around told me that he saw a fearful figure holding a writing tablet and pen, and, he said, each 
sin the prostrate man mentioned, that fearful one crossed it out with the pen.’769  Thus, while the scene in 
the Church was an artificial judgment, it provided an opportunity for very real spiritual judgment.  The 
judgment has already begun because, as the story suggests, deeds are already recorded.  Confession, 
however, and repentance cross them out and so while one’s sin puts one constantly under judgment, 
repentance constantly gives the hope of acquittal.  In fact, when questioned about the matter, the abbot 
told Climacus, ‘I did it for two reasons.  First so that, having brought him to confession, I might free him 
from eventual shame through present shame [διὰ τ῅ς παρούσης αἰσχύνης τ῅ς μελλούσης ἀπαλλάξω].  
And this is what happened.  For, brother John, he did not rise from the floor until he received forgiveness 
for everything.’770  The abbot then adduces the above vision of the fearful angel as proof.  The second 
reason, he says, is to exhort others to confession.771  Memory of judgment certainly functions 
paraenetically for the robber-cum-monk, who amends his life because of it.  But it is not merely an artifice 
or a hortatory device—there really is an angel marking down deeds and preparing the coming judgment.  
And because judgment is real, it is all the more a motivator to the monk. 
In his various exhortations to monks to act ‘like convicts’ Climacus heightens the sense of 
judgment as something already begun.  While he uses the vocabulary of the convict in reference to the 
penitents in Prison, Climacus also applies it to apparently holier and more successful ascetics. When 
discussing stillness, Climacus says,  
One fettered in prison dreads fear of the one who punishes [φόβον κολάζοντος δέδοικε].  
But one in a wilderness cell has borne fear of the Lord.  The former does not fear the 
court as the latter fears the judgment of the judge [τὸ τοῦ κριτοῦ κρτιήριον δέδοικεν].  
There is need for you to have much fear in stillness, my marvellous friend.  For nothing is 
able to drive out acedia like fear.  While a condemned man constantly looks intently for 
                                                          
769 §4, 684C 
770 §6, 684C 
771 Ibid. 
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when the judge comes around to the prison, the true worker looks for when he who 
hastens will be freed [πότε ὁ κατεπείγων ἐλεύσεται].  A weight of depression [φορτίον 
λύπης] is bound to the former, but to the latter a font of tears.772 
 
The prisoner fears an inevitable punishment and so becomes depressed.  The one who cultivates stillness 
fears the Lord, as a judge who is coming, but with the hope of ‘being freed’ and of attaining salvation.  
The contrast between these echoes Macarius’ injunction that monks must weep now in order not to weep 
later—for the monk tears are an expression of fear mingled with hope; for the damned tears only express 
despair.  Nevertheless, the analogy serves Climacus well, and he uses it to explain how a monk must act 
at confession,773 and how he can maintain mourning.774  Seeing himself as a convict focuses the monk’s 
activity.  Distractions seem less important in relation to the sentence under which he feels himself to 
labour.  But, again, despite its artificiality, the self-presentation of the convict relies on the reality of 
judgment already begun. 
 
 Interlude:  Three Sketches of the Memory of Death 
‘Prepare your works for death’ (Proverbs 24.27).775  If memory of judgment disengaged from 
death describes a spiritual reality already present, memory of death as mortality forestalls the terror of 
that reality to some extent by recalling its inherent futurity.  Deployed in this way the memory of one’s 
eventual death continues to urge the ascetic on, but also gives a crucial forward-looking perspective to 
the ascetic life which keeps the monk from the paralysis to which fear of judgment on its own might lead.  
Because judgment awaits death and is uncertain until then, the present moment is never a ‘final’ moment.  
Nevertheless, because of the uncertainty of mortality, every moment should be treated as though it were 
one’s last.  Memory of death serves to allay despair and inculcate humility, and, when coupled with the 
above-discussed memory of judgment, serves to spur the monk to constant action.  The sketches which 
follow highlight the gravity and efficacy of the memory of death.776 
                                                          
772 §27, 1088B-C 
773 §4, 708D-709A:  ‘Γίνου καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῷ λογισμῶ ὡς κατάδικος ἐπὶ τῆ ἐξομολογήσει· εἰς γ῅ν νενευκὼς, καὶ εἰ 
δυνατὸν, τοὺς τοῦ κριτοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ πόδας, ὡς τοῦ Φριστοῦ, δάκρυσι βρέχων (cf. Lk 7.37-50, Mk 14.1-9, Jn 12.1-8).’ 
774 Summary after §26, 1085C-D:  ‘Ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν ἀπόφασιν εἰληφὼς, καὶ πρὸς τὴν καταδίκην πορευόμενος, οὐ 
λαλεῖ περὶ θεάτρων· οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ πενθῶν, γαστέρα θεραπεύσει ποτέ.’  Cf. §7, 813D. 
775 §27, 1116A-B:  Ἐτοίμαζε εἰς τὴν ἔξοδον τὰ ἔργα σου.  In context ‘εἰς τὴν ἔξοδον’ means only ‘outside’ or ‘in the 
outdoors.’  Climacus, however, relying on the wider possible semantic range associated with ἔξοδος, takes it to refer 
to ‘death.’ 
776 §6, 796C-797A:  these sketches make up a large portion of Climacus’ chapter on ‘Memory of Death.’ 
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 One monk had a habit of going into ecstasy as the memory of death and would be found in a 
state close to death, like an anaesthetized patient on the operating table.  
Another related that he found himself unable to escape the memory of death which, ‘firmly 
established in his heart,’ stood before him and hindered him from slackening his regimen, ‘as though it 
were a judge.’ 
Another ‘lived in every carelessness, giving no care whatsoever to his own soul’, although he was 
himself a monk.  Climacus presents here another death scene in which we can see the classic topoi of the 
Desert subtly altered to bring out different details.  It is again of a penitent, though one in no Prison save 
his own cell.  He is a flesh-and-blood character, named Hesychius ‘the Horebite.’  Once he fell very sick, 
and ‘for about an hour was absent from the body [τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἐπὶ ὥραν μίαν ἀκριβῶς ἐξεδήμησε+.’  
Upon his ‘return’, he begged others to leave him, walled up his cell, and lived there silently, in rather 
extreme bodily ascesis, for twelve years.777  When he was ‘about to die’778 his fellow monks broke down 
the door.  The change in his appearance and demeanour shocks his brethren, who undoubtedly 
remembered a better-fed, better-rested man than they found.  Climacus describes a changed man ‘always 
seated, meditating thus on the things which he saw in the ecstasy [ἃ ἐώρακεν ἐν τῆ ἐκστάσει ἐξηστηκὼς 
σύννους οὔτως+, never changing his habit, but always out of his mind, and silently weeping hot tears.’ 
He is at the point of death and so they ask him questions.  And, again, he reveals nothing of what he saw 
or would see.  His only words strongly recall Sisoes 19:  ‘Forgive me.  No one who has known the 
memory of death will ever be able to sin (cf. Sira 7.36).’779  With that he dies.  His burial is neither in the 
field nor the river, but ‘reverently in the cemetery near the castrum.’ 
The memory of death clearly holds for Climacus an incredible power.  It prevents those who have 
‘founded it firmly in their hearts’ from slackening their pace of ascetic progress.  It sends others into 
swoons so that they live quite literally as dead.  And those who were negligent it makes heedful, turning 
unrepentant sinners into saints.  When the brethren went to look for Hesychius’ remains (presumably to 
bury them) they found nothing.  Climacus treats their absence as a sure sign of Hesychius’ acceptance by 
God, ‘the Lord demonstrating by this his much cared-for and praiseworthy repentance, for all those 
                                                          
777 His actions recall the Gazan practice of ‘extreme enclosure’, discussed in chapter three above. 
778 §6, 797A:  ‘Ὅτε δὲ ἤμελλεν τελευτᾷν.’  This echoes Luke 7.2:  ‘Ἑκατοντάρχου δέ τινος δοῦλος κακῶς ἔχων 
ἤμελλεν τελεῦταν, ὃς ἦν αὐτῷ ἔντιμος.’ 
779 Hesychius here echoes Sisoes 19, discussed in chapter two above. 
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wishing to correct their ways, even after much carelessness.’780  Where one might have expected visions of 
a soul ascending to Heaven, we find instead evidence of bodily assumption—an tomb empty like 
Christ’s. 
 For Hesychius, the memory of death functioned paraenetically, as a tool first for dissuading 
himself from sin and second for focusing on repentance, expressed through tears.  In this regard it was 
the same for the unnamed Egyptian monk who was prevented from laziness by the memory of death.  
Hesychius does not say how, or particularly what he saw, but one may surmise from what Climacus says 
elsewhere that by undergoing a temporary death (and not just imagining or picturing it781) he 
experienced firsthand the judgment which Climacus elsewhere describes in more or less detail.  But, 
together with the judgment, Hesychius experienced the devastating effect of death itself.  He encountered 
his own mortality and the transience of worldly distractions and so when he returned to his body, he shut 
himself away from all those temptations.  The demons could no longer hide behind the veil of the 
perceptible world.  Pleasures could no longer appear innocuous, and he could see the eternal meaning of 
ephemeral activities.  Perhaps this sounds like an exaggeration, but Hesychius’ behavior warrants the 
description.  Closing himself off from the sights and sounds of the sensible world, he could see only his 
own ecstasy—which is to say, he live always with his own mortality, knowing the transience of the world 
in the blinding light of eternity and judgment.  The memory of death as mortality reminds the monk that 
judgment has not yet overtaken him, and so create space within which he can work and progress, if only 
through repeated repentance. 
 
Scene Two:  The Elder’s Soliloquy 
Climacus closes the Seventh Rung with a haunting description of the death of ‘a certain hermit, 
Stephen’, who lived near Elijah’s abode on the far side of Gebel Musa.  This was a man who ‘came to the 
eremitic and solitary life having spent many years also in the monastic wrestling school, being adorned 
with fasts and especially with tears, among other good advantages.’782  Becoming famous, he departs and 
                                                          
780 §6, 797A-B 
781 Cf., however, §7, 808A-B:  ‘Κατάνυξις κυρία ἐστὶν, ἀμετεώριστος ὀδύνη ψυχ῅ς μηδεμίαν ἑαυτῆ παρηγορίαν 
παρέχουσα, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀνάλυσιν καθ’ ὥραν φανταζομένη, καὶ τὴν τοῦ παρακαλοῦντος Θεοῦ τοὺς 
ταπεινοὺς μοναχοὺς παράκλησιν ὡς ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν προσδεχομένη.’ 
 
782 §7, 812A-B 
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undertakes a life ‘with scope for more beneficial, more restricted, and painful repentance.’783  Days before 
his death he returns and becomes sick.  The day before his death: 
He went into ecstasy, and opening his eyes he looked to the right and to the left of the 
bed.  And as though being accused by some, he spoke so that all standing about could 
hear, sometimes ‚Yes, truly, *this is the+ truth, but I have fasted for so many years.‛  Or, 
‘No, not at all, truly you lie, I have not done this.‛  Or again, ‚Yes, this is true, yes, but I 
have wept, I have served.‛  And again, ‚No, you falsely accuse me.‛  But sometimes he 
said to one:  ‚Yes, truly, yes.  And to this I do not know how to respond.  In God is 
mercy.‛784 
 
Climacus is shaken by this whole episode.  He says, ‘And this was truly a marvel, terrifying and fearful, 
this hidden and unrelenting accounting.  And the most fearful thing, was that they also accused him of 
things which he had not done.’785  Even the great and holy come to a fearful end, regardless of their 
ascetic regimen, their virtues, their deeds, their reputation however well deserved.  The angelic or, 
perhaps demonic, judgment at death lays bare that reputation, and through the combination of true and 
false accusations demands a perfect self-awareness on the part of the ascetic.  What is impressive is less 
the falsity of the accusations, but the old man’s ability to sift through deeds which were and were not his 
own.786   
 
The Uncertain Judgment 
Climacus is most frightened not by false accusations—which one expects, after all, from 
demons—but that one like Stephen could possibly have been accused of something for which he had no 
response.  He says this about ‘one of his faults *εἵς τινα τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πταισμάτων+.’787 Πταίσματα is an 
important word for Climacus.  The penitents dwell on their πταίσματα, worrying on account of those 
whether they will see God’s ‘good things’ after death.  This is also how Climacus deploys the word in 
conjunction with the memory of death:  ‘As a concept precedes a word, so the memory of death and 
faults [πταίσματα+ precedes mourning.’788  Faults imply that one will come under judgment and make its 
                                                          
783 §7, 512B 
784 §7, 812C 
785 §7, 812C-D 
786 Cf. §4, 701C-D, where Climacus mentions a little book (μκρὸν πτύχιον) that brethren at Alexandria keep attached 
to their belts, in which they write down their thoughts throughout the day to take to confession.  This seems to mirror 
the χάρτην γεγραμμένον καὶ κάλαμον which an angel uses to record deeds at 684C.  Deeds are recorded constantly 
on both sides. 
787 §7, 812D 
788 §6, 793B 
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uncertainty something frightening.  In the story of Stephen, it is important to see that his πταίσματα lie 
in the past, while death is still in the future.  This means that one is accused at death about things which 
can lie only in his past, and the time of accusation and judgment is necessarily a retrospective one.  This is 
certainly most true at death, but any accusation, insofar as it is true, must be about something in the past.  
Thus, the constant self-examination of the monks bespeaks a constantly retrospective attitude, constantly 
calling up the past in light of a future judgment.  Between past and present then lies the iconic present 
moment, prefiguring judgment based on past deeds. 
Drawing out this sense of uncertainty on account of past faults, we see that Climacus finds most 
terrifying not the accusations or even the ‘more fearful’ false accusations, but rather Stephen’s silence 
before one of them.  Climacus cries out thus:  
Good Lord!  The hesychast and anchorite said about one of his sins that ‚to this I do not 
know how to respond‛.  This man was a monk for about forty years, and had tears!  Woe 
is me, woe is me, where then was the saying of Ezekiel, that Stephen might say to them 
‚In that which I find you, in that shall I judge you, says the Lord.‛789  Truly he was able to 
say nothing of the kind.  On what account—glory to Him who alone knows; some told 
me—as though they were in the presence of the Lord—that he fed [or, raised] a leopard 
by hand in the desert.790 
 
Stephen fits the mould of a desert elder.  He has been a monk most of his life.  He has lived first in 
obedience in monasteries and then in the desert in stricter ascesis with God alone as his master.  He is self-
aware, and above all has ‘tears.’  For Climacus tears and mourning are very important and remarkably 
effective for repentance—in a sense, they symbolize the whole of repentance as a ‘second baptism’—a 
point which I will discuss at length below.  Stephen had even come to that freedom and authority before 
the world which the Desert Fathers saw expressed through an Adamic relationship with animals—
feeding or rearing a leopard in the desert is a sign of great purity and holiness.791  And this man was not 
only accused but found his defence eventually reduced to silence.  Whereas in the Prison the penitents 
were portrayed like elders, here the elder is portrayed like one of the penitents.  He dies in uncertain 
straits.  Climacus says simply ‘Being thus questioned he was separated from the body.  What the 
                                                          
789 Reference unclear:  perhaps Ezekiel 7.5 or 24.14. 
790 §7, 812D 
791 See, e.g., Paul of Thebes 1; HM 4.3, 9.5-7, 12.8, 21.15-16; HL 18.28; PS 58, 107, 125, 181, etc.; on which Harmless, 
Desert Christians, 292-93 
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judgment, what the decision, what his sentence or the end of the accounting was not made clear.’792  
Stephen dies in the same uncertainty as a penitent, the same uncertainty with which monastics live their 
whole lives.   
 While this uncertainty could give hope to penitents, when applied to elders and solitaries it 
tempers hope with fear.  The ascetic’s activity is repentance before the prospect of judgment, and as 
Climacus has made clear again and again, that judgment is not handed down this side of death.  Stephen 
lived with it in mind, remembering judgment, remembering death, and at the end he could recall himself, 
his failures and achievements together.  But even this is not enough.  There are still accusations which 
ascesis cannot answer.  What hope, Climacus seems to ask, is there for the rest of us?  None, he says, ‘of 
those who mourn expect inheritance at death—for it is hidden and uncertain.’  Yet Stephen in his silence 
did not despair.  He knew what Climacus would remind readers of elsewhere:  ‘Nothing is greater than 
or even equal to God’s mercy.  The one who despairs kills himself.’793  Stephen says simply:  ‘I do not 
know what to say.  In God is mercy.’  Stephen has no response because he is not ‘able’, he cannot redeem 
himself.  But he needs no response because God can save him, and, in Christ, God has done so. 
 
Conclusion:  Past, Present, Future 
Discerning eternal reality in daily activities, one begins to see the present life not simply as less 
valuable than the next, but, rather, full of τύποι and εἰκόνες for eternity.  The monk who understands the 
present world as an image of the next learns to pierce the veil of sensible reality and mundane activity, 
and find its proper, eschatological, meaning.  The whole of one’s life becomes an image of eternity and so 
one undertakes every activity as though one were already being evaluated and consigned to an eternal 
fate based on that evaluation.  The nature of the world is such as to divide good from bad, saint from 
sinner.  That is, there is no existence which is not judged according to ethical criteria and, especially 
obedience to God.  God’s judgment, however, operates on deeds already done, and so the monk prepares 
by looking backward.  He recalls his sins and so learns to avoid them.  The meditation on judgment, 
made possible by the iconic present moment, requires a constantly retrospective gaze.  As in Desert 
literature, God’s judgment is, in a sense, ongoing, because every action is added to the case (although, as 
above, confession and repentance remove actions as well).  But the prospect of mortality serves, in 
                                                          
792 §7, 812D:  καὶ οὕτω λογοθετούμενος, τοῦ σώματος ἐχωρίσθη, τί τὸ κρῖμα, ἥ τὸ πέρας, ἥ ἀπόφασις αὐτοῦ, ἥ τὸ 
τέλος τοῦ λογοθείσου κατάδηλον μὴ ποιησάμενος. 
793 §5, 780B 
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Climacus, not only to highlight the urgency of renunciation, but to remind the monk that he has not yet 
been judged.  So long as death looms, the monk still has time.  This side of mortality has never before been 
so highlighted as in Climacus’ thought.  The monk lives constantly in the balance.  Thus, memory of 
judgment shows the ascetic’s situation not as it already is, but as it is always becoming—shaped by the past, 
but not yet solidified by death and so always open to repentance and progress. 
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The Opposition of Ages 
Climacus’ characterization of the memory of death rests on the implicit ‘opposition of ages’ 
which was developed in Desert literature and the Gaza Fathers coupled with a strong recognition of their 
continuity.  Climacus’ descriptions of death nuance this line of thought.  For him, the duality of mortality 
and judgment reveals the present world in its twofold eschatological significance.  On the one hand, as 
discussed above, memory of judgment shines eternity’s light through the ephemeral world and, in its 
opacity one can see eternal significance in even the smallest action—baking bread can remind the monk 
of hell, and so aid him in his quotidian discipline, which appears no longer mundane but of vast, eternal 
importance.  At the same time the fact of death as an end to ephemeral existence appropriately values 
present ‘goods’ such as family, friends, dignity and wealth.  In light of both mortality and judgment the 
present world’s iconic value is revealed as merely that—it is an image of the things to come and never a 
substitute. 
On the other hand, memory of death as mortality implies what I have termed ‘futurity.’  One 
only enters eternity through physical death, at which point one is judged for deeds already done and seen 
only then in their full significance.  Because this is always future to the monk death effectively delays 
eternity.  The monk looks forward to a time when the iconic world gives way completely to the eternal 
one, but ‘so long as it is called today’ the monk has not yet reached the end of his ascetic life.   
Climacus has little to say of the delights of eternity.  His concern is certainly more in the present 
and so, although he can imaginatively describe death, judgment, and subterranean terrors, he is 
consistently reticent about eschatological beatitude.  He hints in the final rungs at delights in store for 
God’s servants.  For example, when Climacus treats ἀπαθεία, it is in eschatological terms and, indeed, 
Climacus evinces strong ambivalence as to whether it can be attained in the present life.794  Taking up 
traditional teaching on the subject he pushes it into an eschatological—post-mortem—framework.  
Within that framework, he describes ἀπαθεία in expansive, yet strongly biblical, terms: 
Consider apatheia as a palace of the heavenly king in the heavens and the ‘many rooms’ 
(Jn 14.2) as dwellings within this city:  the fortified Jerusalem,795 the forgiveness of 
failures [τὴν τῶν πταισμάτων ἄφεσιν].  Let us run, brethren, so as to gain entrance into 
                                                          
794 See, e.g., §26, 1029D:  Οὐ πάντες μὲν ἀπεθεῖς γενέσθαι δυνατόν· πάντες δὲ σωθ῅ναι καὶ Θεῷ διαλλεγ῅ναι οὐκ 
ἀδύνατον; or Gluttony’s speech at §14, 869D-872A:  ἐχθραίνει μοι εἰς ἅπαν ἔννοια θανάτου, τὸ δὲ ἐμὲ καταργοῦν 
τελείως ἐν άνθρώποις οὐδέν.  Cf. §25, 993B et infra (on the paradox of being ἀπαθὴς and συμπαθὴς); §26, 1028A; 
§14, 865A-B; etc. 
795 Cf. §3, 665B:  where Climacus calls Jerusalem the land of apatheia, making an etymological argument, on which 
Luibheid and Russell, The Ladder of Divine Ascent ET, 86 n. 11. 
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the palace’s bridal chamber.796  But if from some anticipation of a burden, or if we run 
short of time, what misfortune!  Let us run to some dwelling near the bridal chamber.  
And if we slacken, or become yielding, at least let us be found in every way within the 
wall.797 
 
Climacus conflates and develops three classic eschatological images:  the heavenly Jerusalem (Heb 12.22, 
Rev 21.2), the bridal chamber, and what Jesus describes as ‘my father’s house.’  The eschatological hope 
of the monk is the νυμφῶν, the ‘bridal chamber’ within the rooms of the city by which image Climacus 
implies union with Christ as the climax of eschatological hope.  Thus Climacus uses topological language 
to describe a mode of existence defined by union with Christ and freedom from the passions which 
express fallen existence.798  The future hope requires strenuous present activity if the monk is to attain it.  
Climacus speaks of ‘faltering’ or ‘slackening’—Paul’s image of the race to be run in his mind (cf. 1 Cor 
9.24, 2 Tim 4.17, Heb 12.1).  Climacus envisions a clear connection between present and future ages 
wherein one’s behaviour in the present and, perhaps more to the point, one’s use of the present time (1 
Cor 7.31), determines one’s eschatological dwelling.  As Barsanuphius put it:  ‘Here the labour, there the 
reward.’799  Yet Climacus not only exhorts his readers to run, but also depicts the ‘holy criminals’ as 
exhorting each other the same way.800   
Likewise, the fortified Jerusalem is also the ‘forgiveness of faults’—the ‘πταίσματα’ which we 
have discussed above in relation to the Penitents.  The personal failings which necessitate repentance and 
make judgment a fearful prospect are not to be found in the ‘land of ἀπαθεία’—not because it is 
attainable only for the perfect but, rather, because God is merciful.  Such is the point of Climacus’ tale of 
the elder, Stephen:  no matter one’s personal achievements, one has still failed, and, though these failings 
will be reckoned, God is merciful and on that fact the monk can rely.801 
One lives presently so as to become like Christ, preparing for the bridal chamber and yet already 
striving to taste something of it—in types of judgment, and more especially in prayer802 and desire.803  
Preparation for a mode of being possible only after death inculcates a present mode of living which has 
                                                          
796 Cf. Mat 9.15, Mark 2.19, Luke 5.34 
797 §29, 1149D-1152A 
798 Cf. Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 166-67 
799 QR, 604 
800 §5, 769D; cf. §1, 637B; Climacus quotes Heb 12.1, but substitutes δράμωμεν for τρέχωμεν. 
801 So also §28, 1137B 
802 §28, 1129A:  Πρεσευχή ἐστι κατὰ μὲν τὴν αὐτ῅ς ποιότητα συνοισία καὶ ἕνωσις ἀνθρώπου καὶ Θεοῦ. 
803 §27, 1097D-1100A:  Εἶδον ἡσυχαστὰς, καὶ τὴν φεγομένην αὐτῶν πρὸς Θεὸν ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ τ῅ς ἡσυχίας 
ἀπληρώτως πληρώσαντας· καὶ πῦρ πυρὶ καὶ ἔρωτι ἔρωτα καὶ πόθῳ πόθον γεννήσαντας. 
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always a future focus.  The perfection of the monk is one thing, and attainable by some in this life but, 
Climacus claims, the ultimate goal waits for death and resurrection, and so the monk is able to maintain 
future focus even when tasting it presently.  Indeed, whatever taste one has of that future state only 
heighten the sense that he has not yet achieved his desire.  That future existence for which one prepares 
now is one of more perfect imitation of Christ.   
In this passage, Climacus deploys several Scriptures which describe an imitation of Christ made 
possible by Christ, for which one prepares now and which one receives later.  Climacus implies as much 
by following his description of Jerusalem with a quotation from Psalm 17.30 (LXX):  ‘By my God I will 
climb a wall.’  The thrust of this passage is that, with God’s help, the monk is enabled to enter the 
heavenly community.  Yet Climacus goes on to exhort his brethren to ‘break down the middle wall of 
separation’, an activity which Paul had ascribed to Christ at Eph 2.14.  The ascetic becomes, with God’s 
help, like Christ.804  Or, rather, Christ lives in him—Climacus begins his eschatological vignette by 
quoting Galatians 2.20.805  That is, the dispassionate ascetic imitates Christ but only because Christ enables 
him to do so.  Imitation is as much surrender to Christ as it is response to him. 
 
Memory and Concept 
If we recall Hesychius’ life and admonition, discussed above, we see that in light of death, the 
world loses its solidity.  The ages, present and future, resolve themselves in the light of that moment and 
all its content.  Hesychius’ story shows how Climacus connects mortality and judgment so that the 
‘memory of death’ can inspire virtue and draw the monk into his all-encompassing ἀποταγή.  Climacus 
begins the rung on Memory of Death by telling us that ‘as a concept precedes speech, the memory of 
death and of faults precedes wailing and weeping.’806  Ἔννοια denotes a ‘concept’ as much as anything 
else,807  and so a the content of death provides the ‘conceptual framework’ for mourning—which in turn 
expresses the crucial practice of repentance.  In the Ladder as in the whole tradition that came before, 
death’s content is composed of first, mortality and second, judgment.  Climacus makes their connection 
very clear in his phrase ‘μνήμη τοῦ θανάτου καὶ πταισμάτων.’  ‘Death and faults,’ considered as 
                                                          
804 §29, 1152A  
805 §29, 1149D 
806 §6, 793B:  ‘Παντὸς λόγου προηγεῖται ἔννοια.  Μνήμη δὲ θανάτου καὶ πταισμάτων πρεηγεῖται κλαυθμοῦ καὶ 
πένθους.’ 
807 The phrase ‘ἔννοια *τοῦ+ θανάτου’ is used by, e.g., Ps.-Justin, Quaestiones et responsas ad orthodoxos, (Morel 447D2-
448A7); Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 3.6.77.1f; Basil of Caesarea, Epistulae, 26, 46.5. 
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mortality and coming judgment are also that about which one must mourn.808  The monk weeps because 
death will take him, prepared or not, and so his time for repentance is limited; and he weeps because, 
aware of his own failings he foresees future misfortunes when judgment is handed down.  The monks 
mourns because of and about death and judgment. 
The relationship of ‘concept’ and ‘memory’ is an important one in the activity of mourning.  
While one may ‘possess’ a concept, one can not only ‘possess’ a memory, but can actively ‘remember’.  
Climacus treats memory in all its aspects—as faculty, as object809 and as verb.810  One develops a habit of 
‘remembering’ death in which one calls up the ‘memory’ or ‘concept’ of death.  It is, perhaps, a way of 
training the memory to avoid Evagrius’ ‘ἐμπαθ῅ νοήματα’ and Mark the Monk’s ‘πρόληψις.’  The 
memory is dangerous, certainly, but memory of death will purify from ‘passionate’ or ‘polluted’ 
memories, because it helps the monk view the world with entirely different eyes.  With this goes 
Climacus’ idea of the ‘αἴσθησις τοῦ θανάτου,’ a kind increasingly intuitive perception of one’s mortality 
and the judgment hidden behind the world.811   
As did the whole tradition before him, Climacus see two possible outcomes of judgment:  
salvation or damnation.  This duality, coupled with judgment’s ‘futurity’ through physical death keeps 
the monk from despair and pride.  Climacus carefully warns his readers not to arrogate to themselves a 
false confidence.  He says flatly 
Do not be confident until you receive your sentence,812 contemplating the one who, after 
sitting down to table at the marriage feast, was bound hand and foot and cast out into the 
outer darkness (Mat 22.11-14).  Do not be stiff-necked (cf. Exod 33.3-5, Acts 7.51, etc.), you 
who are an earthly [mortal] being, for many, though holy and immaterial, were cast from 
Heaven (Apoc 12.9).’813 
 
                                                          
808 So Hausherr, Penthos, 26-40 
809 E.g., §12, 856B 
810 §6, 797B-C:  Ὁ πάντων νεκρωθεὶς, οὗτος θανάτου ἐμνημόνευσεν· ὁ δὲ ἔτι σχετικὸς, οὐ σχολάσει ἑαυτῷ 
ἀντεπίβουλος ὤν; see also §4, 685B and §5, 769B. 
811 E.g., §6, 793C:  ‘ἐν αἰσθήσει καρδίας’; 796B:  ‘Ἀναλγησία καρδίας...τοῦ θανάτου αἴσθησιν’; 796C:  ‘μετὰ τὴν ἐν 
αἰσθήσει καρδίας τ῅ς τοῦ θανάτου μνήμης παγίωσιν.’  This reflects Macarian sentiments which influenced 
Diadochus, though differs from Macarian language.  On which see Stewart, Columba, Working the Earth of the Heart:  
The Messalian Controversy in History, Texts and Language to AD 431 (Oxford:  OUP, 1991), 116-38; and on its influence 
on Diadochus, see Plested, Marcus, The Macarian Legacy:  The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Easter Christian Tradition, 
OTM (Oxford:  OUP, 2004), 134-40. 
812 Cf. Elias 1 and Theophilus 4; HL 6.4, and Ps-Macarius, Collectio H, 26 (l. 352) 
813 §23, 968C; cf. §26, 1032C-D 
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Thinking of the penitent monks, we must remember what Climacus says of those who take up the crucial 
virtue of mourning (§7):  ‘None of those mourning would expect inheritance at death.  For it is hidden, 
not definite [Σὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον οὐ βέβαιον+.’814  The appearance of ἄδηλον here parallels its appearance in 
the penitent’s death scene—his ‘hope’ is unsurprisingly equitable with ‘inheritance’,815 but both are 
‘hidden’ or ‘uncertain.’  The monk must be vigilant until his last day, labouring under the threat of a 
judgment which he may find as surprising as, I am sure, the underdressed wedding crasher did.  He only 
overcomes this uncertainty when he receives his sentence.  That occurs only at or after death,816 and so the 
monk has the present time for preparation and repentance possibly only within the context of 
uncertainty.  He can live with fear and hope, rather than despairing expectation of condemnation or 
prideful confidence in vindication.     
Climacus’ anecdotes consistently make exactly this point:  the outcome of judgment, for penitents 
in the Prison or for the holy elder Stephen, is not certain.  Its uncertainty—and its fearfulness—rests on 
the πταίσματα which lie in the monk’s past and which will be accounted only after death.  Yet, as I have 
also shown, Climacus is quick to say that the same uncertainty should keep a monk from despair—there 
is hope as well as fear; not only hope of reward but hope founded in God’s merciful character.  As we 
have seen from Desert and Gazan literature, the monk must meditate on both:  hope keeps him from 
paralysis, fear keeps him from growing slack; and the two together link the renunciation of withdrawal to 
the cultivation of virtue.817  We may conclude, then, that the μνήμη θανάτου is the habitual revisiting of a 
concept of death developed in light of its physical and eschatological significance, a habit which helps 
release the monk from attachment and service to material and transitory goods, and, therefore, from the 
passionate thoughts and memories to which he is susceptible. 
 
Conclusion:  The Framework of Asceticism 
The present moment is always illuminated with the light of eternity, allowing the sensible and 
mundane world to image spiritual realities.  To behold this is to contemplate judgment, since the spiritual 
realm is a moral one.  Nevertheless, judgment remains uncertain prior to death.  To remember death, 
therefore, is to behold judgment at a distance and to understand that progress, repentance, and salvation 
                                                          
814 §5, 780A 
815 The favoured vocabulary of the NT is κληρονομία:  Eph 1.14, 1.18, 5.5; Col 1.12, 3.24; Heb 9.15, 11.8; 1 Pet 1.4.  But 
one also finds πληροφορία:  Col 2.2, 1 Thess 1.5, Heb 6.11, 10.22. 
816 §7, 808D, 816D, §26, 1021B; §27, 1116A-B  
817 See Chryssavgis, John Climacus, 110-111, 159-161 
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are always possible.  Nevertheless, death is also the moment when sensible and spiritual merge and the 
image finally becomes its archetype.  As such, death is also the limit and scope of ascetic progress, and so 
memory of death as mortality, held together with contemplation of judgment, spurs the monk on to 
immediate action in light of the world which is he so fast approaching.  Simultaneously, while he looks 
forward to what is already becoming present, the monk must look back, constantly remembering his 
beginnings, his sins, and his baptismal and monastic vows.  The dynamism of the ascetic life as progress 
is only possible when every part of this framework is present.  Unless the present moment tastes of 
eternity the monk has no hope, no fear, nothing to love.  Yet without delay, judgment would present only 
a cause for despair.  Without memory of his past, the monk has no sense of his own progress and, 
perhaps more importantly, his own lowliness.  The monk lives in a state of tension, looking to the future 
with fear and hope predicated on the inexorable uncertainty of God’s judgment, the futurity of death, and 
the retrospective awareness of his own faults. 
 Climacus inherited from VA, from Desert literature, especially from Gaza, a powerful tool in the 
memory of mortality and judgment.  He put that inheritance to work and crafted from it a symbolic 
framework within which he could conceive of the ascetic life more generally.  Not only has he deployed 
the μνήμη τοῦ θανάτου to motivate and clarify ascetic renunciation; not only has he connected it to a 
variety of virtues as did Barsanuphius and John; he has actually made death the means by which monks 
engage with time.  The memory of death provides an existential, temporal, iconic framework within 
which the monk labors functions primarily to make his labor possible—progress is a process bounded 
ethically and temporally by the virtues and, primarily, humility and hope, the brighter twins of despair 
and pride.  Within this framework, then, Climacus works out his vision of ascetic spirituality as a living 
death longing for resurrection.   
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IV. THE ASCETIC LIFE AS DEATH AND RESURRECTION 
 Procopius of Caesarea, writing about the castrum commissioned by Justinian, said that ‘In this 
mountain of Sinai dwelled monks, for whom life is a sort of careful ‚practice of death.‛’818  His words 
echo silently through the whole of the Ladder, as Climacus shapes the ascetic life and its eschatological 
purpose and hope by his imaginative descriptions of death and resurrection.  At the end of the Fifteenth 
Rung, on Ἀγνεία, Climacus describes a pure ascetic as one ‘who, attaining this while in the flesh, has 
died and risen; and from this time has already grasped the prelude of the incorruption [or, immortality] 
to come.’819 Merely to taste the future age, one must have died and risen.  And so the present life becomes 
an opportunity for precisely that.   
Climacus says of ‘those who think about thing above,’ that ‘being separated,820 they ascend in 
portions, while those who think on things below, return thither again, for there is no middle place for 
those who are separated [sc. who die+.’821  That is, those who see the age to come typified in the present 
world and set their minds to its contemplation already live there if only in soul, while their body will 
follow at the proper time.  Those who live only for and in the present world, not discerning its iconic 
nature, experience it only.  For them there is no ascent, because there is nothing between earth and 
heaven.  At another point, Climacus describes the dispassionate monk as one tasting resurrection before 
the resurrection.  Some, he says, ‘declare apatheia to be resurrection of the soul before the body.’822  This 
passage clarifies that ‘resurrection’ life is a mode, a way of life defined by virtues like apatheia, allowing the 
ascetic to focus wholly on the things above rather than those below.  The iconic world becomes 
increasingly transparent for the ascetic who focuses on heaven, so that at the heights of πρακτική he lives 
already in a resurrectional mode untroubled by the vicissitudes of the present life. 
                                                          
818 Procopius of Caesarea, De Aedificiis, 5.8.4; the ‘practice of death’ (μελέτη θανάτου) refers implicitly to Plato 
(Phaedo, 81Α) and suggests the by then common idea of φιλοσοφία as a uniquely Christian ascetical enterprise.  
Climacus is far less fond of that particular wording. 
819 §15, 904C 
820 Soul from body—the definition of death discussed in the introduction. 
821 §26, 1036B-C:  ‘οἱ μὲν τὰ ἄνω φρονήσαντες, χωριζόμενοι ἄνω μερικῶς ἀνέρχονται· οἱ δὲ τὰ κάτω, κάτω πάλιν 
πορεύονται· τῶν γὰρ χωριζομένων οὐδὲν λοιπὸν μέσον ἴσταται.’ 
822 §29, 1148B-C:  Σινὲς δὲ πάλιν ἀπάθειαν εἶναι ὁρίζονται ἀνάστασιν ψυχ῅ς πρὸ τοῦ σώματος.  The ‘some’ most 
likely refers to Diadochus, Capita, 82:  ‘Εἰ δέ τις δυνηθείη ζῶν ἔτι διὰ τῶν πόνων ἀποθανεῖν, ὅλος λοιπὸν 
γίνεται οἶκος τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος· πρὶν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀνέστη, ὥσπερ ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος 
καὶ ὅσοι τελείως ἠγωνίσαντο καὶ ἀγωνίζονται κατὰ τ῅ς ἁμαρτίας.’  This claim echoes Climacus’ words 
concerning those who have conquered lust in §15, 892D-893A. 
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To qualify the above, it is important to remember that while Climacus allows the possibility of 
living a resurrectional life ‘in the flesh’, he understands it as an imperfect or, at least incomplete one.  
Already ambivalent about ἀπαθεία as a possibility this side of death, Climacus actually attributes the 
idea of ἀπαθεία as pre-resurrectional resurrection to ‘some people’, while others call it a knowledge 
‘inferior only to that of angels’.  This is one of those moments where Climacus accepts without 
adjudication various traditional elements.  However, he then explains that he has it on good authority (‘I 
heard this from one who has tasted it’) that ἀπαθεία really is:  ‘the perfect uncompleted perfection of the 
perfect.’823  This last opinion does not necessarily exclude the first two, but, as Climacus’ lists do 
generally, each item exposes a different facet of ἀπαθεία.  If it is a taste of resurrectional life, or 
knowledge of God as far as possible for embodied creatures, it is also and above all a process without 
completion.  Climacus preserves, even among the ‘perfect,’ a sense of forward (and upward) progress in 
God.  The tension between ‘τελειότης’, which carries a connotation of completion, and ‘τὸ ἀτέλεστον’ 
plays out in Climacus’ understanding of the ascetic as a ‘blessed living corpse.’  This section will focus on 
this trope as a way of constituting the ascetic’s identity through death, conditioned by the iconic and 
temporal framework of death within which the monk labours. 
 
Obedience and Living Death 
Despite his clear claim that death and resurrection are necessary and even possible while still 
living, Climacus speaks more cautiously than many of his forebears about a monastic ‘living death.’  
Climacus does say that ‘Memory of death is daily death; memory of departure is hourly groaning 
[Μνήμη θανάτου ἐστὶ καθημερινὸς θάνατος, μνήμη δὲ ἐξόδου κάθωρος στεναγμός].’824  He presses 
on, however, to distinguish between fear and terror at death, and so does not stop to elaborate an idea of 
‘daily death.’   
Climacus is, like Paul, the Desert Fathers, and the Great Old Men before him, aware of the 
ambiguities of thanatological language.  He recognizes that ‘death’ spoken of in an unqualified way can 
have as many negative connotations as positive.  For example, ‘willing death’ can be understood as 
‘suicide’, something of which Climacus clearly disapproves.  Climacus demonstrates the ambiguity of 
                                                          
823 §29, 1148C:  ‘...αὔτη οὖν ἡ τελεία τῶν τελείων ἀτέλεστος τελειότης...’ 
824 §6, 793B 
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death by his equivocal use of the term ‘living corpse.’  In Rung Two, on Ἀπροσπάθεια, Climacus speaks 
of these corpses negatively: 
We who desirously and zealously desire to run, let us examine with understanding how 
the Lord has condemned all those living in the world as ‘living corpses’ *πῶς ὁ Κύριος 
πάντας τοὺς ἐν κόσμῳ διατρίβοντας, καὶ ζῶντας νεκροὺς κατεδίκασεν], saying to one: 
‚Leave the‛ worldly ‚dead‛, ‚to bury the dead‛ (Luke 9.60) with the body.825 
 
In this passage, strongly reticent of Barsanuphius’ treatment of Luke 9.60, the ‘living dead’ are those who 
still live according to the desires and ways of the world.  It is hard not to see in this remark a 
condemnation of non-monastic ways of life, but for present purposes it is enough to note that the vivified 
corpse signifies in this instance an untenable state of being.   
 Two rungs later, when discussing obedience, Climacus uses the same vocabulary to describe a 
diametrically opposite state.  He says of those living in obedience that ‘the blessed living corpse is 
distressed when he sees himself doing his own will, since he fears the burden of his own judgment 
[ἀλγυνόμενος ὁ ζῶν [Rader has ζιῶν] νεκρὸς οὗτος ὁ μακαρίτης, ὅταν ἑαυτὸν ὄψεται τὸ οἰκεῖον 
ποιοῦντα θέλημα, δεδοικότα βασταγὴν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ κρίματος+.’826  Climacus now speaks of the ‘living 
corpse’ as blessed.  In this case, rather than describing a life incapable of detaching itself from worldly 
desires, living death describes a life which has become so detached as to have given up its own ability to 
choose and desire.  The vocabulary and imagery of death is not, it seems, an inherently beneficial one—
death can be good or bad, and so the image requires contextualization. 
Climacus takes the up the idea of the ascetic life as a lived death always and only within 
obedience.  He describes obedience as a total state—not an act or even a habit of acting, but a state of 
being which resembles death.  It is worth quoting Climacus’ exuberant description of obedience as death: 
Obedience is in every way a denial of one’s own life, revealed actively through the body.  
Or perhaps obedience is the opposite:  mortification of members in a living intellect (cf. 
Col 3.5).  Obedience is unexamined motion, a voluntary death, an uncluttered life, 
carelessness of danger, an unconcerned defence before God, fearlessness of death, 
peaceful voyage, a dozing stroll...Obedience is the will’s *lit., willing’s+ tomb, and 
humility’s raising.827 
 
                                                          
825 §2, 657B; so also Summary after §26, 1089A:  Climacus compares one in despair to a dead man. 
826 §4, 680Β 
827 §4, 680A:  Cf. John the Sabaite’s story of an obedient disciple (§4, 720A-721A), whom Climacus calls τὸν ἀληθῶς 
ἐν κοιμήσαι ζῶντα (720C).  The language recalls also Abba Rufus’ encomium of obedience (Rufus 2). 
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In Climacus’ description, one hears echoes of John Kolobos watering his stick, Bessarion commanding a 
novice to cast his son into the river, Aphrodisius spending thirty years under Saba’s watchful eye, and 
those other tales of unbending, often absurd, obedience for which the Desert was famous.  Obedience 
makes a dead man out of the monk and in doing so, transfers the responsibility for his continued 
existence to his director or spiritual father, by which Climacus usually mean the abbot of the 
monastery.828  Climacus says:  ‘A dead man does not rebut or differentiate among goods or apparent 
evils.  For the one piously putting his soul to death will answer for everything.’829  When the monk dies 
his ‘voluntary death’ it is no longer he but his master who lives, and so no longer he but his master will 
answer for actions which can no longer be properly called his own.  Crucially, though, Climacus says that 
the master puts the disciples’ soul to death—it is not like suicide.  I note this because Climacus twice uses 
suicide as a metaphor, and both times it refers to despair.830  The ascetic does not kill himself—that would 
be pride and despair (really the same thing), an act of his own will or an attempt to take Heaven by his 
own means.  Rather, the ascetic, like the martyr, submits willingly to another who ‘kills’ him.   
 Climacus asserts all the usual demands of the monk who would be obedient.  As always, the 
monk denies his family and country, the constellation of relationships which once defined him.   In his 
Third Rung, on Ξενιτεία, Climacus describes the situation with characteristic gusto:  ‘Exile is separation 
from all things, through doing the inseparable thought of God.  Exile is a lover and work of insatiate 
morning.  An exile is one fleeing relationship with those he knows and those he does not.’831  He finds 
new relations in his fellow ascetics (brothers), his director (father), and the angels who, unlike worldly 
relations ‘are able to help you in the time of your death if they are your friends.’832  Climacus adds to 
these highly traditional ‘spiritual’ relations the fruits of the monk’s ascetic struggle.  He calls the monk’s 
moans his children, the memory of death his bride, compunction his mother, and his body his slave.  The 
monk gains an entirely new family tree.  His entire identity is constituted by the ascetic struggle and its 
context within a community composed of like-minded men and supportive spiritual beings.  Like Antony 
                                                          
828 For example, the one giving orders in §4 is always the abbot. 
829 §4, 680A:  οὐκ ἀντερεῖ, ἥ διακρίνει νεκρὸς ἐν ἀγαθοῖς, ἥ τὸ δοκεῖν πονηροῖς.  Ὁ γὰρ θανατώσας αὐτοῦ 
εὐσεβῶς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπολογήσεται.  The context clearly reveals the subject of θανατώσας as the 
father and not the son.  Pace Irénée Hausherr, Spiritual Direction in the Early Christian East, 226. 
830 §5, 780B:  Οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ οἰκτιρμῶν ἴσον, ἥ μεῖζον ὑπάρχει· διὸ ὁ ἀπογνιώσκων, ἑαυτὸν ἔσφαξε.  
Climacus also compares despair to suicide in the Summary after §26, 1089D. 
831 §3, 664C:  Ξειντεία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ πάντων χρωισμὸς, διὰ τὸ τὸν λογισμὸν ποι῅σαι Θεοῦ ἀχώριστον.  Ξενιτεία 
ἐστὶν ἀνεμπλήστου πένθους ἐραστὴς, καὶ ἐργάτης.  Ξἐνος ἐστὶν ὁ πάσης ἰδίων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων σχέσεως φυγάς. 
832 §3, 665C-668A.  This is perhaps because they are also God’s friends (§1, 632B). 
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like the novices advised by Macarius, or the monks under Barsanuphius’ care, the monk in flight uses the 
memory of death to overcome the impinging memories of family and friends, who would maliciously 
draw him back into the world.   
Climacus’ monk, as in earlier Desert traditions, obeys God through his human master.  At the 
monastery in Alexandria the abbot, wishing to show off the prudence of an old monk, Laurentius, second 
priest in the monastery and a monk of forty-eight years standing, called him over to table and let him 
wait for over an hour.  Finally, when lunch was over the abbot summarily dismissed poor Laurentius and 
sent him to Isidore to recite Psalm 39.1 (LXX):  ‘I waited patiently for the Lord and he answered me.’833  
Climacus later asks Laurentius what he thought about during that hour of waiting, and is shattered by 
Laurentius’ reply:   
Considering the shepherd as the image of Christ, I did not consider that I received the 
command from him, but from God.  Thus, Father John, [I considered myself] not as 
before a table of men, but as before the altar of God, and I stood praying to God.  Neither 
did I entertain any evil thought toward the shepherd, on account of my faith and love for 
him.834 
   
The human master images Christ, the divine master, whom the monk attempts to obey precisely through 
his unquestioning obedience—a sort of death to his desires and beliefs, culminating in a willing 
renunciation of his ability even to choose.835  This passage also contextualizes obedience as taking place 
within the iconic epistemology discussed above.  Thus not only does the abbot image Christ, but the 
luncheon table images the divine altar.  Importantly, then, the one who kills the monk is, in a sense, 
Christ; and the one who lives when the monk is dead, is also Christ.  Climacus commands monks in the 
Twenty-Sixth Rung, on Διάκρισις to ‘use our conscience, directed by God, as purpose and rule in 
everything, so that, knowing ‚whence comes‛ the breath of the winds (Jn 3.8), we may set sails 
accordingly.’836  In this passage the master is clearly God, working through the monk’s own faculties, but 
even in this instance discernment is still a repudiation of one’s own will insofar as it does not perfectly 
follow God’s.  In the prior Rung, on Humility, Climacus says that ‘the humble man always despises his 
own will as an error, and, making his petitions to the Lord in unswerving faith, learns what he should 
do...such a worker does and thinks and speaks everything in accordance with God, and never trusts 
                                                          
833 The story is at §4, 692A-B 
834 §4, 692B 
835 §4, 692B, 725D-728A; §15, 888C; §15, 1000B-C; etc. 
836 §26, 1013B, his quotation from John 3.8 suggests that ‘wind’ refers in this instance to the activity of the Holy Spirit. 
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himself.’837  Obedience is to God, but often obtained through a human intermediary, a Moses as Climacus 
says in the First Rung, who can mediate between God and men.838  In Climacus’ formulation, obedience 
describes the entirety of the ascetic life.  There is no point at which the monk can choose not to obey.  
Indeed, he longer chooses at all.  Obedience, then, even unto death,839 becomes the scope and limit of the 
ascetic life.  Like the Gaza Fathers before him, Climacus makes pointed reference to death as the limit of 
obedience. 
  Obedience, because it describes a mode and scope of existence, also presents the sort of freedom 
toward the world which Antony found and the Desert Fathers longed—but which seemed so often out of 
reach.  The desires, beliefs, relationships, and judgments which were formerly the monk’s own property 
have been lost to the will of a master, with submission to insults and lowliness until the monk no longer 
even notices these conditions.  He longer has any familial or societal ties to the world, and he no longer 
has a will with which to sin.  He is unbound by the world, and so he is free toward it.  When Climacus 
asked some obedient old men why they lived that way, some responded that ‘they gained perfect 
freedom from sense, and insensibility amid insults and rebukes.’840  They no longer take notice of how 
they are treated or whether they suffer good or ill.  One can hear Antony telling his disciples that monks 
do not seek revenge or concern themselves with honour.  Climacus has shown the path to freedom:  
finding the harshest, roughest master one can, and submitting constantly to abuse and insult.841  In this 
regard he adduces the memory of death as an aid.  He says, ‘Memory of death brings forth, for those in 
community, troubles and meditations or, rather, a pleasure in dishonour.’842  It is not entirely clear how 
recollection of death accomplishes this, except perhaps that meditation on death as judgment spurs the 
monk to struggles and virtues now; while recollection of mortality, which denigrates temporal goods, 
keeps him from struggling against dishonour. 
Obedience is therefore not ultimately concerned with the replacement of a sinful will with a 
healthy one, as one might think—that the monk’s will is perhaps sick with sin and, once healed by 
obedience, can be deployed in a healthy fashion.  Rather, even as an old man the monk remains like ‘an 
                                                          
837 §25, 1000B-C:  for Climacus, as for Evagrius before him, the director’s authority does not depend on his brilliance 
or even his good character.  Cf. §26, 1057B and Evagrius, Eulogium, 15 (PG 79:1113A-B). 
838 §1, 633D-636A 
839 §4, 716A; §24, 984C-D. 
840 §4, 688B 
841 This, he says, was Saba’s advice to three would-be monks:  §4, 724A-B 
842 §6, 793C 
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obedient child’, a sight which Climacus calls ‘fearful yet befitting angels.’843  Climacus even describes the 
overseer of the penitent monks as ‘obeying’ them in their dying wishes.844  Indeed, obedience demands 
the hatred of one’s own will, not because it is necessarily ‘sick’—although Climacus, like the more 
ambivalent Desert Fathers, asserts that the monk is beset by temptations until his last breath845—but 
because his will is not God’s will.  The elder’s orders image the commands of God, and so the monk’s 
receptivity to his earthly master is, in fact, receptivity to his Heavenly Master.  The things which a master 
commands his disciple may be stupid, even dangerous, but by learning to be attentive to them, the monk 
learns to put aside fear and mistrust.  But then, as Climacus notes, if a monk is obedient, God will direct 
him—God who has spoken through sinners and fools and even donkeys.  The monk learns to hear in his 
master’s words the voice of God, and so he does not receive his master’s faculty of will, but learns instead 
to have a constant open and attentive receptivity to God’s will. 
 
Joy-Bearing Tears 
But, of course, perfect obedience is not to be expected from many, maybe not from anyone at all.  
For all those who fail to obey—even in little ways or unexpectedly—repentance is in order.  To 
understand repentance as an expression of ‘living death’, I will look briefly at Climacus’ emphasis on 
πένθος, ‘mourning.’  Climacus’ Sixth Run, on Μνήμη τοῦ Θανάτου links the Rungs of Μετάνοια (which 
assumes a memory of death and judgment) and Φαροιὸν Πένθος, which, as we have seen, is preceded by 
memory of ‘death and faults.’  The Sixth Rung does not, then, detail a virtue learned for its own sake.  It 
concerns, rather, a virtue—an activity, really, of remembering—learned only in order to develop others:  
notably, repentance and mourning.  Mourning, though, is central to Climacus’ understanding of the 
ascetic life.  He writes, in a tone similar to Barsanuphius’, that 
We will not be accused, no, indeed, we will not be accused at the soul’s departure if we 
have not worked wonders, or if we have not theologized, or if we have not become 
contemplatives.  But we will give account to God in every possible way if we have not 
mourned unceasingly.846 
 
                                                          
843 §4, 688B 
844 §5, 772C 
845 See, e.g., §13, 860A and Summary after §26, 1088B; here the ‘limit’ of death is invoked as the extent to which 
struggle is necessary.  We can hear in this invocation AP and other Desert literature, as discussed above. 
846 §7, 816D; recalling Barsanuphius’ advice:  ‘Weep, rather, and mourn’ (QR 604). 
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Mourning is one of those activities which the monk never abandons as he ascends toward higher 
virtues.847  Mourning ‘purified from every stain’ is present with ‘much-cared-for repentance’ like flour 
and yeast in the unleavened bread of humility, baked with a ‘fire of the Lord.’848  In the same breath 
Climacus compares mourning to the water through which dough is then kneaded, which, he daringly 
claims, unites the soul with God.849  The memory of death (as also of judgment) is central in the activity of 
those repenting and the begetter of mourning and tears.  Of course the above quotation also demonstrats 
that tears are, like the memory of death, begetters of other virtues as well.  Climacus, like those before 
him values fear, but, more than fear, he values hope and love.  Joining all these, he says, ‘Tears about 
one’s departure bring forth fear.  When fear has brought forth fearlessness, joy shines forth; but the 
flower of holy love rises when infinite joy ceases.’850  These apparently opposite reactions to the memory 
of death operate together in Climacus’ understanding.  Thus, tears and mourning do not depart, but they 
do transform, and so are ‘joy-bearing’ and, more than that, ‘love-bearing.’   
                                                          
847 On mourning in Climacus see especially Hunt, Hannah, Joy-Bearing Grief:  Tears Of Contrition In The Writings Of The 
Early Syrian And Byzantine Fathers (Leiden:  Brill, 2004), 51-96. 
848 N.b. When Climacus says ‘fire’, he generally means ‘desire’, and this in a positive sense.  One of his most beautiful 
slogans is ‘bringing fire to fire’ to denote the increase of godly zeal.  See particularly his lovely encomium of the 
devout monk at §1, 644A:  ‘Σίς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πιστὸς, καὶ φρόνιμος μοναχὸς, ὃς τὴν θέρμην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφύλαξεν 
ἄσβεστον· καὶ μέχρι τ῅ς αὐτοῦ ἐξόδου καθ’ ἡμέραν [προστιθεὶς] πῦρ πυρὶ, καὶ θέρμην θέρμῃ, καὶ σπουδὴν 
σπουδῆ, καὶ πόθον πόθῳ οὐκ ἐπαύσατο;’  Climacus repeats this almost verbatim, when praising those who have 
attained ἡσυχία (§27, 1100A):  ‘Εἶδον ἡσυχαστὰς, καὶ τὴν φλεγομένην αὐτῶν πρὸς Θεὸν ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ τ῅ς 
ἡσυχίας ἀπληρώτως πληρώσαντας· καὶ πῦρ πυρὶ, καὶ ἔρωτι ἔρωτα, καὶ πόθῳ πόθον γεννήσαντας.’  He says 
much the same at §27, 1105B. 
 
At one other point does Climacus use the phrase πύρ πύρι, and there rather differently.  In that instance, godly desire 
drives out worldly—but both are called πῦρ.  Climacus begins the Fifteenth Rung, on Purity, thus:  ‘Ἁγνεία ἐστὶν 
φύσεως ὑπὲρ φύσιν ὑπερφυὴς ἄρνησις· καὶ ἀσωμάτων σώματος θνητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ παράδοξος ὄντως ἅμιλλα· 
ἁγνός ἐστιν ὁ ἔρωτι ἔρωτα διακρουσάμενος, καὶ πῦρ πυρὶ ἀΰλῳ ἀποσβέσας.’ 
 
Climacus has a high regard for ἔρως, even if he believes it often put to poor use.  It is a matter of analogy, though:  
divine ἔρως is good, drawing people to God just as God came to them in Christ; worldly ἔρως epitomizes an 
obsession with all that is false and transient—not only will it inevitably fail, it will destroy the soul with despair.  On 
this topic, see Chryssavgis, John, Chryssavgis, John, 'The Notion of "Divine Eros" in the Ladder of St John Climacus', 
SVOTQ 29:3 (1985): 191-200. 
849 §25, 989D:  ‘Μετάνοια, μεμεριμνημένη μέντοι, καὶ πένθος αφηγνισμένον πάσης κηλῖδος, καὶ ἡ πανόσιος 
εἰσαγομένων ταπείνωσις, τοσαύτην ἀπ΄ ἀλήλων τὴν διαφορὰν, καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν κέκτηνται, ὅσην ἔχει παρὰ 
τὸν ἄρτον ἡ ζύμη καὶ ὁ ἄλευρος.  ΢υντρίβεται μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ λεπτύνεται διὰ μετάνοιας ἐναργοῦς· ἑνοῦται δέ 
πως, καὶ ἵν΄ οὕτως εἴπω συμφύρεται Θεῷ δι’ ὕδατος πένθους ἀψευδοῦς· ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐξάψασα πῦρ Κυρίου 
ἀρτοποιεῖται καὶ στερεοῦται ἡ μακαρία ταπείνωσις ἡ ἄζυμος καὶ ἄτυφος.’ N.b. This points also to Climacus’ belief 
in the universality of repentance, ‘μετάνοια μεμεριμνημένη’ is also the title of §5:  ‘Περὶ μετάνοιας 
μεμεριμνημένης καὶ ἐναργοῦς’ 
850 §7, 813B-C:  ‘Δάκρυα ἐξόδου ἀπέτεκον φόβον· φόβου δὲ τεκόντος ἀφοβίαν, ἐπιφαίνει *for Rader’s ἐπιφαίει] 
χαρὰ, χαρᾶς δὲ ἀκατελήκτου ληξάσης τ῅ς ὁσίας ἀγάπης ἀνέτειλε τὸ ἄνθος.’ 
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The Hope of Repentance 
All of this is so amazing because tears symbolize for Climacus the whole movement of 
repentance.  Repentance is, according to Climacus the ‘daughter of hope and the denial of despair.’851  We 
have seen in the Holy Criminals an image of repentance which Climacus wishes to apply to all monastics.  
As Brouria Bitton-Ashkelony puts it, ‘In *late antique+ monastic culture, where self-criticism and 
purification of the personal consciousness marked its very existence, μετάνοια was a necessity.  Indeed, it 
was seen as the path leading to the gate that offered access to individual salvation, paved with optimism 
and permanently open.’852  Repentance does not, for Climacus, simply mean ‘getting up’ after falls, 
though it does mean that; 853 nor does it denote only an act of ‘penance’, though it incorporates those as 
well.  Rather, repentance is the state of mind in which a monk, through increasing awareness of God’s 
judgment and his own failures, learns to rely at all times on God’s mercy and to hope only in God’s love.  
By doing so he denies that the ascent to God is one which he makes under his own strength.  But he also 
denies that it is impossible for him.  He has hope—in God; and he fears—only God.  Repentance, like 
obedience, expresses the state of tension of fear and hope, the terror of judgment and the promise of 
mercy, within which monks live as though dead. 
They are certainly the proper activity in face of death and judgment, but only insofar as one has 
something to mourn.  Confidence about judgment would not breed tears.  Tears come from recollection of 
one’s sins and awareness of one’s lack of progress (although, paradoxically, this awareness increases with 
one’s progress).  Yet tears are also effective.  They do not simply bespeak failings, they wash them away—
tears are purifying.  Climacus boldly describes the various aspect of repentance, from impulse to effect, in 
terms of tears and mourning.  Climacus goes so far as to compare these godly tears to baptism.  He says,  
The font of tears after baptism stands greater than baptism, even if this saying is rather 
daring.  For the former [baptism] is a purification from previous evils in us (cf. Rom 3.25); 
but this [font of tears is purification] from later-arising evils.  While we received baptism 
as infants, we have all defiled it.  But through tears we cleanse it [our baptism].  For if 
this were not given philanthropically from God to people, those being saved would be 
truly few and hard to find.854 
                                                          
851 §5, 764A:   ‘Μετάνοιά ἐστι θυγάτηρ ἐλπίδος, καὶ ἄρνησις ἀνελπιστίας.’ 
852 Bitton-Ashkelony, Brouria, ‘Penitence in Late Antique Monastic Literature’, in Jan Assmann and Guy G. Stroumsa 
(eds), Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions, Studies in the History of Religions 83 (Leiden:  Brill, 1999), 
181 
853 §4, 696D 
854 §7, 804A-B 
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In this Climacus follows the Gaza Fathers in their specification and elaboration of a desert tradition 
especially associated with Poemen.855  The idea of tears as a ‘second baptism’ can be traced to AP.  
Barbara Müller sees enough indirect evidence in AP to allow us ‘spekulieren, dass die Wüstenväter ihre 
Tränen glichsam als Taufbad versanden haben könnten.‘856  We see here Climacus’ belief that no one 
remains perfectly pure until death.  Everyone requires repentance.  But repentance can be found in tears, 
in the process of mourning for oneself which requires a realization of one’s sins, of the judgment which 
befalls sinners, and a desire to return to the purity conferred in baptism.  Tears are the means and sign of 
repentance, brought on by former misdeeds and keeping the monk from future ones—a new purification 
like baptism.  Climacus says a little later that compunction (κατάνυξις) thinks hourly of death and finds 
therein the comfort that God alone can give to humble and contrite monks.857  Mourning then operates 
between past and future, transforming the present into a constant baptismal washing, a continuous 
repentance.  What is amazing, though, is that tears then become constitutive of virtues like humility, and 
preparatory for joy and even the love for which all monks strive.  Failure is presupposed and in no way an 
obstacle to ascent—provided, of course, that one rises from it through obedience and continues along in 
tears. 
 The impetus for mourning always lies in the past.  The monk does not mourn for future sins 
(which he hopes to avoid) or for his own future damnation (since it is always a matter of uncertainty).  
Despair alone would weep for these things.  The monk mourns instead for his own past sins.  Thus, 
mourning introduces a retrospective aspect to monastic development.  It reaches its apotheosis in the 
judgment at or after death, when all deeds are seen retrospectively, but the monk must have developed 
this perspective along the way.  In the story of the elder Stephen, we saw that he could, when accused, 
recall what he had done and not done, and what penance and atonement he had made for his sins.  Yet, 
while this could imply some self-assurance on his part, Stephen still came to a point where he could not 
respond.  As well as he knew himself, as many labours as he had undertaken, he still could not answer 
every accusation and so he fell back, as every penitent sinner must, on God’s mercy.  Ultimately, this is 
the value of tears:  they aid and express a penitential lifestyle.  Penitence requires self-awareness, an 
                                                          
855 See QR 148, 257, 461, discussed in Chapter Three above; as well as discussion of Poemen on tears in chapter two 
856 ‘ ‘Die Tränen der Vüstenväter,’ 310.  The image was already used by Clement of Alexandria (Quis dives salvetur 
42.14) and with some regularity in Christian martyr-literature. 
857 §7, 808A 
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expectation of judgment, a realization of the urgency of change, and, above all, the consistent denial of 
despair in the hope of God’s mercy.   
 
Conclusion 
The Ladder presents the present life as one of lived death, undertaken through obedience—to 
God, through a human master.  Yet it also depicts the resurrection life as one of obedience—directly to 
God.  If it is a lived death now, it will not cease to be one in the coming age.  But this lived death is also 
life more real than most humans ever experience.  The essence of human life, it seems, is found only in 
death, because only then does one become properly receptive to the will of God and only within a 
constant self-renunciation is one re-constituted entirely through relationship to God.  Yet all fail.  None 
can be proud if they are really aware of their failings, because they cannot expect vindication in God’s 
judgment.  That is, none are perfectly obedient, and so all have need need of repentance.  Repentance, 
expressed in tears, becomes constitutive of the ‘living death’ which monks undertake.   
For Climacus, asceticism is best characterized in the curious paradox of the ‘blessed living 
corpse.’  It is a state of tension between hope and fear, made possible through consistent engagement 
with death and the iconic epistemology which that engagement makes possible.  To conclude this section, 
I want to point how how far Climacus carries the metaphor of death.  He applies to the monastery itself—
he understands the whole of the monk’s environment in terms of death.  He quotes with approval the 
Alexandrian abbot who calls the Great Coenobium ‘an earthly heaven’858    That is, in the monastery one 
tastes one’s hope through the anticipatory ‘death’ of obedience.  Indeed, Climacus there continues, 
‘Therefore, as angels serving the Lord, so ought we to order our heart.’859  The monks live, as 
Barsanuphius once wrote, ‘on earth as though in heaven.’860  Yet, Climacus elsewhere calls the monastery 
‘tomb before the tomb...For no one leaves the tomb until the general resurrection.’861  The monastery may 
be an ‘earthly heaven,’ but that makes it as much an ‘image’ of things to come as anything else in life.  
Climacus’ iconic epistemology reveals the monastery as a foretaste of eternity whose dwellers are dead 
and waiting for their hope.  However, this death is a good one, and not to be confused with the death of 
                                                          
858 §4, 713B:  ‘Κοινόβιόν ἐστιν ἐπίγειος οὐρανός.’ 
859 §4, 713B-C:  ‘διὸ ὡς Κυρίῳ λειτουργοῦντες ἄγγελοι, οὕτω πείσωμεν διακεῖσθαι τὴν καρδίαν ἡμῶν..’ 
860 See Note 612 above. 
861 §4, PG 88:716B:  ‘Μν῅μά σοι πρὸ μνήματος ὁ τόπος ἔστω. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπὸ μνήματος ἐξέρχεται ἄχρι τ῅ς κοιν῅ς 
ἀναστάσεως...’ 
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pride or despair.  Thus Climacus continues, ‘But if some depart, know that they have died.’862  Only those 
who commit the willful act of departure—of disobedience that does not result in repentance—actually 
‘die.’  Those in the monastery are ‘dead’, yet, but their death gives way to ‘the general resurrection’ in 
which their ‘dead’ existence is revealed as most truly alive. 
  
                                                          
862 ‘...εἰ δὲ καί τινες ἐξ῅λθον, ὅρα ὅτι ἀπέθανον· ὅπερ μὴ παθεῖν ἡμᾶς, τὸν Κύριον δυσωπήσωμεν. 
 
235 
 
IV. IMITATING CHRIST THROUGH DEATH 
His epistemic framework of engagement with time and eternity through death, as well as his 
conceptualization of the ascetic life as ‘death’ through obedience in the tension of hope and fear, both 
serve to cultivate a particular identity.  As I argued in the Introduction, identity is Climacus’ driving 
concern and its cultivation requires organizing principles.  Death provides that principle, but only in 
relation to Climacus’ over-arching understanding of Christian identiy.  That is, Climacus uses death as 
the means of creating Christians whose lives reflect Christ by means of asceticism.  Climacus begins the 
Ladder by calling the Christian ‘the imitator of Christ, as far as humanly possible, in words, deeds and 
thought, rightly and blamelessly believing in the Holy Trinity.’863  Imitation of Christ is, as it were, the 
wood out of which the rungs of the Ladder are fashioned.864  The phrase, ‘κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν άνθρώπων,’ 
crucially qualifies Climacus’ notion of imitation.  He ends an ‘alphabet’ of virtues designed for those 
‘being perfected in spirit and body’ with ‘Ψ – imitator of the Master with the Master’s aid.’865  Imitation of 
Christ is not simply another human act.  It is the development of an identity possible only because of and 
through Christ himself.  Indeed, for Climacus the recollection of Christ’s self-giving in death creates an 
impossible debt which the monk cannot repay, no matter how much he suffers.866   
Yet Climacus concludes the Ladder by saying ‘Run, I beg you, with that one who said ‚Let us 
hurry on until we all reach the unity of the faith, and the knowledge of God, unto perfect manhood, unto 
the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ (Eph 4.13),‛ who, being baptized when thirty years old 
in visible age, fulfilled the thirtieth rung in the noetic ladder.’867  The monk who achieves love comes to 
the God who ‘is love’ (quoting 1 Jn 4.16) through imitation of Christ.  This imitation, though, is possibly 
only as an awed response to the overwhelming gift given in Christ.  Imitation operates in the curious 
tension of divine and human in the person of Christ—thirty years old ‘visibly’ yet remaining the 
‘invisible God.’  Christ’s death and resurrection are both model and inimitable ground of the ascetic life.  
                                                          
863 §1, 633B:  ‘Φριστιανός ἐστιν μίμημα Φηριστοῦ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων, λόγοις, καὶ ἔργοις, καὶ ἔννοίᾳ εἰς 
τὴν ἀγίαν Σράδα ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀμέμπτως πιστεύων.’ 
864 See, e.g., §29, 1149D 
865 §26, 1017C; Climacus sets out three alphabets, one for beginners, one for those on the way, and one for the perfect.  
The letters correspond to concepts only as a cipher to an encrypted message.  Bitton-Ashkelony and Kofsky argue 
that ‘The use of cryptic language here is clearly pedagogical, making it easier to memorize the monastic ideals 
represented...But it is not simply a program for ascetic progress from the beginning to perfection; rather it is a set of 
symbols designating a new state of self-consciousness, which can be defined as mystical and spiritual reality’ (The 
Monastic School, 112). 
866 §23, 968D; also§3, 668B and §25, 996C, on driving out pride by remembering the same fact. 
867 Concluding Summary, 1161A 
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Climacus uses this tension between imitation and awe at Christ’s death to form the monk’s proper 
attitude toward his own life and death.  By doing so, Climacus effectively resolves the tensions to which 
language of death gave rise in Desert literature--as will become clear, his application of ‘death’ to the 
monk betrays no indefensible or, at least, problematic, optimism. 
  
Failure 
First, imitation of Christ allows for failure.  To remain sinless, Climacus says, is to never see 
death.  If a monk could be perfect he would not have to suffer death.  Climacus gets the idea by working 
through Romans 7.24, where Paul asks ‘Who will deliver me from this body of death?’  Climacus 
interprets this ‘body’ to mean ‘the flesh’:  ‘mine and not mine, friend and enemy, the flesh.’  He then says 
that ‘If death, as was said above, is the flesh, whoever wholly overcomes the flesh will not die.’  Well and 
good, but Climacus then asks the despairing question:  ‘Who then is that man, who will live and not see 
death [cf. Enoch at Gen 5.25 LXX and Heb 11.5] from the defilement of his flesh?  I beg that he be 
sought.’868  Climacus sets up a hope for life—to completely conquer the flesh.  And then demolishes it by 
asking rhetorically whether any such victor can be found. 
His then moves to restore hope through an imitation of Christ.  Climacus asks, ‘Who is greater—
the one dying and rising, or the one never dying at all?  On the one hand, blessing the latter, he is wrong, 
for Christ, dying, rose.  On the other hand, [blessing] the former, he is constrained to believe nothing to 
be a rejection for those dying, or, rather, lapsing.’869  Part of imitating Christ, paradoxically, is lapsing—
failing, sinning.  Of course, for Christ death did not represent a lapse, which is why Climacus has to say 
‘or, rather, lapsing.’  The experience of death and resurrection provides an appropriate symbolic 
framework for Climacus to expound the hope that survives failure.  If death were the end, then there 
would be no hope; but one can, like Christ, rise again.  Resurrection does not, however, imply leniency in 
God—a point which Climacus is careful to make immediately after.  Claims of leniency, he says, originate 
with ‘the man-hating enemy of fornication’, about which Climacus is speaking in the present context.  
The imitation of Christ, while providing a framework of Christian progress which can incorporate failure, 
does not dismiss failure as unimportant or in any way acceptable. 
 
                                                          
868 §15, 885D-888A 
869 §15, 888A 
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Tension 
Second, Climacus uses Christ’s example to explain how the monk should properly fear but not 
despair about death.  Climacus says that ‘While fear of death *Ps 54.5 LXX] is a property of nature 
proceeding from disobedience, terror at death is a sure sign of unrepented errors.’  The ‘disobedience’ 
here likely refers to the human condition following Adam’s disobedience, rather than a specific act.  We 
saw in chapter one that Athanasius, for example, saw φόβος θανάτου as a result of humanity’s servitude 
to sin.  The Desert and Gaza Fathers, however, tended to see a degree of fear as healthy, provided that it 
referred to the limited time available for repentance and the fact of God’s judgment.  Climacus, however, 
moves in a different direction, drawing the line between fear and terror at death in terms of Christ’s 
attitude.  He says, ‘Christ is afraid of death, but not terrified, that he might wisely show the properties of 
the two natures.’  Christ certainly did not have un-repented sins, but Climacus, a good Chalcedonian and, 
perhaps a Dyothelite, affirms that Christ in his humanity took on even the properties of human nature 
which come from Adamic disobedience.  Christ provides the example for the ascetic’s attitude toward 
death.  He can, Climacus suggests, approach death like Christ did, so long as he lives in repentance and 
obedience.  Recall Climacus’ belief about confession as wiping away past sins, and his emphasis on 
repentance—the monk, even though he fails, can have hope in Christ and so not despair in his own 
approach to death. 
Along these lines Climacus uses Christology to explain how memory of death functions among 
the higher virtues.  He says in the Thirtieth and final Rung, ‘Some say that prayer is better than memory 
of one’s departure; but I hymn two natures in one person.’870  As in Christ humanity and divinity held 
firmly together, so in the monk the memory of death is present even as he ascends to the activity of 
prayer.  It is intriguing to hold this statement of Christ’s two natures together with the one from Rung 
Six.  They are, I might note, the only such references Climacus makes.  The monk in prayer is united with 
God.  Nevertheless, remaining human, he is still susceptible to temptation, just as Christ was (Heb 4.14).  
This duality hearkens back to the iconicity of the world in the monk’s memory of judgment—sensible and 
spiritual held together.  The monk lives between two worlds or, rather, within two worlds.  He lives as a 
sort of double creature, human and divine, an imitator however imperfect of the perfect God-man Christ.   
 
 
                                                          
870 §28, 1137A 
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Unity 
In this sense, the imitation of Christ provides the unity of the ascetic life which maintains the 
ascetic’s unique identity as he progresses in God—the more he is united with God, the more he is truly 
human, and the result is a simple creature, a unity rather than a duality.  This person whom Climacus 
calls childlike (νήπιος), simple (ἅπλος), and single (ἕν)871 is a Christian.  Or, rather, every true 
Christian—imitating Christ with every aspect of his existence—is ‘simple.’  This creature lives in 
contradistinction to the evil person, who, Climacus says, lives a double life.  He says, ‘Just as the wicked 
man is twofold—one thing publicly, another privately (cf. Luk 12.3), so the simple man is not twofold, but 
a single thing.’872  The simple are always the same, never having to hide their character.  But the wicked 
are deceitful, cunning, hiding behind a mask of apparent virtue.  If one could see behind the mask, 
though, one would find creatures like the Devil.  They appear human, but are become demons.873  The 
curious thing about the demons is that, while angels obey God, the Devil can do only his own will.874  
Every being (apart from God) is ‘bound’ in some way.  Obedience, however, frees the monk from 
bondage to his own will so that he can obey God instead. But the simple man, since he is not a demon, is 
instead an angel—like the obedient old men Climacus saw in Alexandria, a sight ‘fearful yet befitting 
angels.’  Yet, to become such, the monk must make his way through repentance.  He will inevitably fail in 
obedience either to his spiritual father or to the commands of God.  And so he must have recourse to the 
uncertainty which memory of death and judgment provide, as well as the activity of repentance 
expressed best through tears. 
 
Conclusion:  A Ladder of Repentance 
The view of time which is defined by memory of death and judgment describes the ‘triad’ of the 
Ladder.  Its contorted ‘shape’ denies a reader’s desire for a too literal interpretation of the image, or an 
over-extended mapping of the metaphor onto the spiritual life.  The Ladder is not a ladder.  But it is an 
image of progress, specifically progress as movement toward and within—Christian identity as an 
eminently human imitation of Christ.  The ascent is often halting, beset by obstacles and falls little and 
                                                          
871 See, e.g., §24, 984C; §26, 1057A; §28, 1129D, etc. 
872 §4, 688B-C:  Ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ πονηρὸς δύο ἐστὶν, ἄλλο τὀ φαινόμενον, καὶ ἄλο τὸ κρυπτόμενον· οὕτως ὁ ἁπλοῦς, 
οὐ διπλοῦς, ἀλλ΄ ἕν τί ἐστιν. Cf. §22, 949C:  Κενόδοχός ἐστιν εἰδωλολάτρης πιστὸς, Θεὸν μὲν τῷ δοκεῖν 
σεβόμενος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ, καὶ οὐ Θεῷ, ἀρέσκειν βουλόμενος.  Cf. QR 846, which lauds ἄπλοτης against διψύχια. 
873 See, e.g., §8, 832A; Völker highlights the importance of simiplicity at Scala Paradisi, 255. 
874 §4, 717D-720A:  Σῶν οὐκ ἐνδεχομένων ἐστὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ θελήματι τὸν διάβολον ἀντιστ῅ναι. 
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great.  In this halting climb we find the ‘dyad,’ without which the ascetic would be something inhuman, 
and certainly un-Christian.  The upward path is tortuous and as long as he is on the path, the monk 
resides on a frontier without conclusions, dwelling simulltaneously in the uncertainties of hope and fear, 
rather than the false certainties of pride or despair.   
The monk, like all others, is called to perfection and to the perfect imitation of Christ.  Yet the 
monk, like all, has sinned and very likely will sin again.  He is not perfect.  He must repent.  While it 
would be wonderful never to fall and, therefore, never to die, such is not the lot of humanity which limps 
beneath the burden of Adam’s sin, labouring to pay an unpayable debt.875  One who falls need not stay 
down, and the sleeper can be awakened.  But Christ makes this possible.  Christ is the ascetic’s model—
though Christ did not sin, he did suffer what the consequence of sin:  death and even a healthy fear of 
death.  So, just as Christ laboured in the fallen human condition, so fallen humans can labour to be like 
Christ.  It would no exaggeration to say that, for Climacus, death bounds and defines progress in 
becoming like Christ, even as the ‘death and resurrection’ repentance expresses the existential condition 
of humanity in light of God’s mercy.  Death is, therefore, the ontological precondition for progress, its 
memory the impetus to progress, and its practice the principle of progress.  Thus, the memory of death 
frames the possibility of Christian identity; the metaphor of death shapes that identity as a way of life; 
and both refer ultimately to Christ, whose life the monk receives in death. 
   
 
                                                          
875 Cf. §4, 724C-D; following Mark the Monk, Operibus, 20. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Die now, die now, in this Love die; when you have died in  
this Love, you will all receive new life.  
Die now, die now, and do not fear this death, for you will  
come forth from this earth and seize the heavens.  
Die now, die now, and break away from this carnal soul, for  
this carnal soul is as a chain and you are as prisoners.  
Take an axe to dig through the prison; when you have  
broken the prison you will all be kings and princes.  
Die now, die now before the beauteous King; when you  
have died before the King, you will all be kings and renowned.  
Die now, die now, and come forth from this cloud; when  
you come forth from this cloud, you will all be radiant full moons.  
Be silent, be silent; silence is the sign of death; it is because  
of life that you are fleeing from the silent one.  
      
--- Jalāl ad-Dīn Rumi, Ode 636, trans. A.J. Arberry 
 
  
241 
 
JOHN CLIMACUS’ ACHIEVEMENT 
The Parts and the Whole 
Climacus took up the various threads of ‘death’ in ascetic literature and wove of them a brilliant 
tapestry, stitching together an image of Christ out of the quotidian grind, the frequent failures, and the 
introspective struggle, of ascetic life.  For him, as for those before him, death is event, limit, metaphor, 
and tool.  Yet nowhere was it so holistically deployed as the organizing logic and symbolic meaning of 
the ascetic life.  For Climacus, the ascetic life means progress, in repentance, obedience, and the 
cultivation of a Christ-like identity.  Progress is made possible by the iconic temporality within which the 
monk finds himself, and which he engages through contemplation of mortality and judgment.  Thinking 
of what the future certainly holds—judgment and eternal destiny—the monk every moment sees the 
world in light of its eternal significance.  Memory of mortality, however, keeps him looking forward to an 
as yet unsettled future, urging him on in obedient renunciation.  Yet he looks back to his failures in 
obedience and love, and so he mourns in retrospect, repenting so as once more to move forward.  Each 
bite he takes, every drop he drinks, every task he performs, no matter how mundane, each of these 
remind him of the judgment to come at death, and the eternal destiny to which it will consign him.  In 
this he finds his spur to further renunciation as well as, in mourning and repentance, the content of his 
labours.  Thus, progress is movement forward and upward within the bounds of death toward love 
conditioned always hope and fear.  This three-fold engagement with time thus performs the balancing of 
fear and hope whose necessity the Desert Fathers clearly saw. 
Within this framework, Climacus deploys the metaphor of death as the definitive image of the 
ascetic life.  Characterizing obedience as the excision of will, and this as death,  Climacus describes a life 
bounded, as the Gazans and Basil had suggested, by an obedient ‘death.’  The monk obeys God through a 
human intermediary.  He surrenders himself to another and so opens himself to receive God’s will.  He 
progresses in this regard, becoming more and more a dead man—one who has denied his very self, the 
faculties by which he can perceive and choose.  The ‘voluntary’ and the ‘intellectual’ alike are killed in 
Climacus’ scheme.  The will is cut off, discernment handed over, desires denied—nothing is left, whether 
in mind or heart.  All the ways in which the Desert Fathers and, more especially, Barsanuphius and John, 
conceived of ‘death’ to oneself and one’s neighbour, come together in Climacus’ vision of obedience 
operative by means of the memory of death. 
In this way, Climacus’ Christological and Trinitarian reflections on death are particularly 
brilliant.  While the Gaza Fathers had referred ascetic ‘death’ to Christ’s crucifixion and, thereby, clarified 
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the ambiguity to which language of death is prone, Climacus goes much further.  He utilizes language of 
Christ’s natures as well as crucifixion to open up monastic identity.  The monk becomes like Christ.  But 
his imitation of Christ plays out precisely through his failures.  Repentance lets the monk turn his ‘death’ 
into a prelude to resurrection.  Likewise, Climacus’ Trinitarian language reminds readers that progress is 
always within a Christian identity and that the monk seeks, ultimately, to become a Christian by living as 
though dead.  Only thus can he hope for resurrection. 
Even then, though, Climacus would remind the reader that resurrection continues the mode of 
existence already defined as dead.  We could say, in an appropriately paradoxical fashion, that for 
Climacus, resurrection is itself lived death.  Perhaps, though, we simply have it backwards and Climacus 
wishes to correct our error—what we call death is, in fact, life.  Not in a physical sense, as Heraclitus or 
the Orphics might have put it—physical death really is death.  Rather, for Climaucs, ‘death’ refers to a 
mode of existence which is really a way of life:  the ‘death’ to oneself is ‘life’ in God. 
 
The Gift of Tradition 
I have catalogued the work and contributions of Athanasius’ Life of Antony, of Desert literature, 
and of the Gaza Fathers, in sufficient detail in the first three chapters of this study.  Their work is 
important and ought to be appreciated as so many unique voices proclaiming the life of ascetic 
spirituality.  Through their engagement with each other, tradition began to take shape—a trajectory of 
thought emerged, in which death held an increasingly important place for the Christian ascetic.   
Climacus, however, achieves something in his conception of ascetic life as ‘living death’ which 
previous tradition did not anticipate.  He effectively reconciles the optimism which language of death in 
VA and Desert literature implied with the earthy realism of Gaza, and through his emphasis on obedience 
and repentance, builds into the practice of death an allowance for the faults which bring a monk under 
judgment in the first place.  Climacus is fully aware that renunciation and withdrawal are difficult and 
that one falls unexpectedly, but his conception of the monk’s engagement with death and judgment 
actually allows the monk to dwell in uncertainty.  More than this, though, Climacus draws all together in 
terms of a Christ-like identity characterized by death.  The language of ‘living death’ finds in the Ladder 
its fullest expression as a principle of ascetic life which not only expresses the hopes and ideals of ascetic 
identity, but allows for an even incorporates the ways in which life fails to live up to expectations.  
Climacus does not attempt to smooth out the rough edges of asceticism.  He probably did not have in 
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mind any kind of conscious ‘synthesis.’  Rather, his was a genius which saw in what he inherited all that 
he needed to express what he found through experience.   
What did Climacus achieve?  What was his contribution to spirituality, his legacy for Byzantine 
theologians, scholars, monks, and laypersons?  It was, this study has demonstrated, no less than a 
profound and radically original vision of Christian identity which is new precisely by being traditional.  
Various authors would utilize his work for various ends—drawing here and there, picking out references 
which particularly suited their own ends.  And yet Climacus’ monumental achievement stands apart 
from the more limited usage to which later generations would put it, just as the traditional materials so 
important to Climacus remain alongside it.  Climacus offers not simply a theory of asceticism, but a 
vision of the Christian life whose practiced reading in monasteries and churches has, throughout twelve 
centuries that separate his lifetime from our own, inspired and directed generations of Christians. 
Of course, Climacus would say, first, that he was following tradition.  As this study has shown, 
his self-assessment would be absolutely accurate:  he takes up all that was left to him by centuries of 
tradition, and puts it together.  However, therein lies his creativity.  When the threads are woven 
together, a new picture emerges.  Climacus would also say that he simply described what is possible in 
response to and in imitation of Christ as the person in whom divine and human natures unite.  The Son’s 
place in the Trinity, his Incarnation, and his eschatological judgment, create a tensed space—a tomb and 
forecourt of heaven—within which the ascetic’s identity takes shape.  Christ’s death and resurrection 
create an unpayable debt, but it is not payment that interests Climacus.  It is acceptance.  For Climacus, to 
imitate Christ is to surrender oneself to him.  It is to accept that he alone shows a properly human life, 
and it is to attempt, with his help, to live his life rather than one’s own.  Climacus teaches his reader that 
to die is, ultimately, to allow Christ to live within oneself. 
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